It does seem, though, that cause is most easily seen, understood, appreciated as an observer's account, serving the needs of the observer, rather than something itself. — tim wood
And I wonder if that distinction has been made, or even seen, because accounts themselves are just convenient fictions. — tim wood
Not quite, imo. Cause is simply a presupposition of a theory. That means at best it is never true - except as a cogwheel in the theory - but only efficacious. Apparently for parts of modern physics it's no longer adequate even as that. Perfectly good for billiards players though, still. — tim wood
The point is, I suppose, that if you wish to account for your world with stories, you can. But they'll break down at the borders of your world. And just see to what lengths some - many - will go to extend their story beyond its border, where it does not belong. — tim wood
It's difficult. — Manuel
Why is that? Historically, elaborate metaphysical systems have often been used as a justification for an existing hierarchical political system. — _db
I thought I had offered a serious response — Wayfarer
Yes! You don't know how good it feels to finally speak with someone who is willing to take the conversation to its conclusion. — Philosophim
The question does arise as to why bother posting on a philosophy forum if you think it's a waste of time. — Wayfarer
There are few things in life that are exactly what we want them to be. So philosophers, unlike Scientists, tend to adapt the Self to the Situation (Ethics), instead of changing the world to better suit the human body (Physics). — Gnomon
It would be nice if we could all agree on a "set of rules" for discussing metaphysical questions. — Gnomon
That said, we are still faced with agreeing on a definition of whatever it is we are disagreeing about. Which is even more difficult, if we can't even agree on what divisive topics fall under the umbrella of Metaphysics. — Gnomon
No no no. That won't do. Metaphysics is the stuff of the transcendent. Metaphysics is that which lies beyond the physics. Metaphysics is what Kant tried to ask how is it possible. Metaphysics is whatever Hegel said. And worldmaking, and interpreting physics, and seeing spirits and is gobbledygook and also profound. — Manuel
After reading some of your comments here and elsewhere, I think Salmon's metaphysics about causal forks and statistical causation is perfectly fit for you. — Verdi
Most of it is rigorous daydreaming; a pseudo-scientific posturing about things that cannot be known, usually with a surreptitious (right-wing) political aim (i.e. propaganda). — _db
There could have been many first causes. In theory, there could be first causes happening in the universe now that we're unaware of. But much like multiverse theory, its something we really can't test easily, if at all. — Philosophim
meta-metaphysics — Janus
Whereas in a lot of modern thinking, the idea of there even being 'an eternal order' is passé. Positivism says straight out that metaphysics is empty words, and a lot of people agree. I think you feel the pull of something beyond - hence your attraction to the Tao Te Ching - but find it very frustrating and difficult to pin down or articulate what it is, as you say in your post. — Wayfarer
What do you think is shiba the next rockstar? — TheQuestion
But what is the goal here? To arrive at a definitive meaning of "metaphysics"? How will we know when we arrive there? Seems to me on par with trying to find the world's longest sentence -- as soon as you get there, you can also add a word. — Xtrix
Quite. Unfortunately, it's less precise while also being more effort. So as a model, it's objectively worse, and there is no situation in which it would be preferrable to use it. But I take your point. The standard is the one that modern physics applies to itself, primarily, and applying it outside of that domain can be a bit absurd. — onomatomanic
Which if you feel that way, is fine. But why? — Philosophim
Models approximate reality. Newton's model doesn't approximate it as well as Einstein's, so it's worse in that sense. But it's also considerably lower-effort, which is a point in its favour. Choosing a model to apply is like choosing a tool to use: The optimal choice depends on the job at hand. — onomatomanic
Interestingly enough, Newton wasn't wrong. It was simply not precise enough for large bodies. You can take the theory of relativity and reduce it down to Newton's equation for regular sized bodies. It is evidence that certain equations are useful for particular scales, but breakdown in others. — Philosophim
Fair enough, I am presupposing some knowledge here. — Philosophim
Ask the person who you're debating with what they mean by metaphysics. Get them to define their particular terms. Phrases are digests of complex simple ideas. The act of doing philosophy should be to breaking down those phrases into complex simple terms with the person who you are discussing with. You're not debating the phrase, you're debating the underlying logical components. Those transcend any labels or ideologies. — Philosophim
In short precision is a very significant aspect of scientific theories. An example: Newton's gravity theory was imprecise when it came to predicting the planet Mercury's behavior. Enter Albert Einstein's theory of relativity and it solved the problem - Mercury's orbit could now be predicted precisely. — TheMadFool
Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim
That's actually valid. Academics do it all the time. — Artemis
It seems the problem with the term is here to stay. — Manuel
It just seems to me that we could come up with all manner of rules and principles that are perhaps internally intelligible, but don't apply to the reality we actually deal with. Like solipsism. It makes a strange kind of sense, but it doesn't compute with the data available to us. — Artemis
That's the problem. We have many definitions, sometimes incompatible with each other, so we have to choose one. Or leave the topic ambiguous. — Manuel
there's no technical notion of metaphysics. — Xtrix
Would you agree that what I'll call a naive worldview - that of a child or a caveman, say, developed on the basis of unaided senses and common sense - will be more static than what I'll call a modern worldview - developed on the basis of modern equipment and insight? This appears obvious to me, as things that seem simple at the scale of the unaided senses invariably turn out to be complicated at other scales. — onomatomanic
there is a knowable external, objective reality; truth represents a correspondence between external reality and some representation of it
— T Clark
I reject both of these, because I think the "subject/object" distinction, though very old, is not very useful. So I guess that rules me out of discussion. — Xtrix
You can't do much with this though. I have noticed you like to make divisions. A break-up can be made into physical stuff and metaphysical stuff. But together they form a whole bigger than their parts. — Verdi
Are you suggesting that the change I'm talking about is less a binary contrast between un-scientific and scientific approaches, and more an ongoing process that takes place within science just as much? If so, the point is well taken. — onomatomanic
To account for this, our models tend to become less and less static over time. — onomatomanic
I like philosophizing about knowledge, but I don't need to know anything about it. — Verdi
It's no battle we are fighting. — Verdi
Here I disagree. — Verdi
Here you misunderstood what I read. I read you have to make divisions. But what's divided should be kept also. It's the mutual interaction between the divisions, science and philosophy, that gives the quality absent from each apart. The fire that can only be produced by a lighter with gas only (science) and a lighter with a firestone only (philosophy). — Verdi
I suppose the most straightforward example of the former is the Newtonian take on motion - that, without dissipative effects like friction, a body, once in motion, will stay in motion - replacing the Classical take - that the natural state of a body is to be at rest. — onomatomanic
True. In ancient Greece they were torn apart and we're left with the mess. So, they are separable, and in that sense no unseparable whole. What I mean though is that the whole is a wholistic whole, to which qualities can be assigned not present in one of both. If I have two lighters of which one contains gas only but no brimstone, and the other vice-versa, I can't light my cigarette with either of them. But combined, I can light it up. — Verdi
It's the hand played on this forum. It's even called the philosophy forum. Why shouldn't there be a place for me? You don't say this directly, but I sense this from your wording, and that's all I can cling to. — Verdi
I don't deny philosophy or attack it, not at all. It's a pity though that no attempt is made to regain the connection with the stuff it talks about. Regaining the assembled whole doesn't destroy philosophy nor science. It merely brings to bear unimagined new qualities. — Verdi
It can be a usefull one. But for making the distinction what is metaphysics or physics, one needs to know both first, because the division can't be made if there is nothing to divide. — Verdi
In order to trust knowledge, you don't need epistemology. You need to know that that knowledge works out fine for you. Knowing about the knowledge involved, or the methodology one must use for approaching a problem will only paralyze you. You may claim that epistemology or methodology are exactly what philosophy is about, and that that's the stuff discussed here, but philosophy is not invented to restrict knowledge and its gathering. Philosophy is meant to set free from restrictions. Or at least to further scientific knowledge. — Verdi
