This doesn’t really help us to define consciousness, except to recognise the context of what we’re doing when we define it. What we can say about consciousness will always be an aspect of consciousness, limited by our own capacity to experience, and to reconstruct that experience from language. — Possibility
I do think that people should generally object to the usage of "waffle", — thewonder
I assume that Banno is from the U.K., though, where that sort of thing is, for whatever reason, considered acceptable, — thewonder
We are the rotting corpse of God, heading to annihilation.
I'm sure I'm missing some details, but I think the main point is given. I don't know why, but the idea of "God" killing himself is haunting, in a certain way... — Manuel
You were insinuating that I was a waffle, which is clearly an insult. I don't really care, though. — thewonder
That is intriguing. I have heard people say this occasionally about fiction writers (never philosophy) but I always assumed it was hyperbole. I've enjoyed writers and books but nothing I've read has ever made a difference to my overall happiness (as far as I can tell). — Tom Storm
But, of course, you have Lao Tzu to inspire you. — Jack Cummins
John Searle says that, like many other terms, consciousness is best defined ostensively, that is, by pointing to examples. — Daemon
Agreed, but for the purposes of a philosophical discussion, or any specific discussion, it is more important that we agree on a definition than that the definition is precisely correct. — T Clark
How far do you think this thread has progressed in the right direction? — Apollodorus
Are you suggesting that we agree on a set of definitions and then agree on one of them whenever we choose to discuss anything that involves "consciousness"? — Apollodorus
Of course, this can be endlessly debated. — Manuel
In that case, you would need to redefine the term with every new discussion. — Apollodorus
The term still implies "awareness" and above all "self-awareness". What has changed? — Apollodorus
Well, that much I've noticed already to be honest. I was talking about everyday language in general. When we say things like "I become conscious", "I become aware", "I am self-conscious", etc. it is normally understood what is meant even if there is no precise definition for it in our mind. — Apollodorus
Interesting that you ‘recognise’ experience as a movie playing in your head. You do realise that this is a construction and not a recognition as such. So is talking to yourself about what is going on - it’s a probabilistic construction using the logic and qualities of language as an approximation. — Possibility
No, there isn't a single correct definition, so it's a waste of time looking for that. I think you have to state your own working definition, in the specific context. — Daemon
His take is that "emotion" is primary, and is located in the brain stem, a more "primitive" part of the brain. We've been looking in the wrong place. — Daemon
And it must be consistent with how the word has been used for centuries. — Apollodorus
in order to know whether you have come up with a correct definition, you must already know what the term means. — Daemon
I still think that monism and property dualism are essentially the most often pursued views. I don't know many people who believe in substance dualism, aside from theologists. — Manuel
I understand what you mean but it is an inherent limit of language. We all use the same terms but due to “personality” and “individual identity and experience” the terms will always vary in what we each associate them with and understand. — Benj96
I think if we try to define every term unanimously we end the fluid nature of language. — Benj96
Similarly I cannot refer to the term “consciousness” with anything but the content of consciousness. It’s self- referential and therefore can never be objective. — Benj96
To put it in rather non-philosophical language: that there seems to be someone here who is experiencing the world and at the same time thinking and pondering about that act of experiencing - along with a strong presumption that this is true of other people too, that there are someones there. It appears that the world is populated by conscious or aware minds who inhabit human bodies and who have space, distance to question and doubt all things, including their own reality. — hwyl
Terms like “consciousness” aren’t normally a problem because the meaning is understood from the context. — Apollodorus
The content of your own experience, too, is constructed from inference, as is the ‘you’ who experiences. What we can be certain of is the faculty of consciousness - awareness with. Anything else is inference. — Possibility
I sometimes feel that I should be reading Kant and Schopenhauer, and I have read portions of their writings. When I do read the philosophers I try to do so as if I was meeting them as individuals, as great minds to learn from. — Jack Cummins
How important is our reading as the foundation for philosophical explorations? — Jack Cummins
Doesn’t this destroy the subjectivity of consciousness, the very essence of awareness? — Joshs
The only difficulty which I have with your definitions are that they are a bit too precise and rigid. — Jack Cummins
I think that you may have made it too neat and tidy, with no blurry or hazy borders at all. We probably would not be able to agree fully on a definition at all on the forum. This is because trying to do so cannot be separated entirely from the questions about the nature of consciousness, which is one of the most central recurrent problems, or themes, within philosophy. — Jack Cummins
How does one define behavior — Joshs
But some materialists seem to argue that because our minds - or the illusion of our minds - rise from solely from matter and are pre-determined by it, there really is no "question or mystery of consciouness" or, even, "real" consciousness or mind at all. How this follows, I don't exactly understand. — hwyl
But consciousness is recognised by empirical evidence or observations, and more recently defined as a perceived/known capacity or potential - in self and in others. We commonly refer in these instances to an awareness of certain aspects in experience or what is evident, rather than to the faculty itself. — Possibility
I’m just thinking out loud here, and it may not make a lot of sense - but if we try to bring this back to T Clark’s discussion of the ‘experience’ aspect of consciousness, then perhaps the important point becomes how we understand this shift from awareness with to awareness of. — Possibility
It sometimes seem to me that trying to parse the idea of consciousness is like trying to understand what Spinoza meant by God. — Tom Storm
Well, I think they actually are; but given that it is your thread and you are so adamant, i'll let it go for now. — Banno
I've considerable sympathy for the method you wish to use, it being not dissimilar to that of J. L. Austin. — Banno
So the term carried with it a mutuality.
Consciousness is not private. — Banno
Well, yes, an infant would not hold abstracted ideas regarding their innate awareness of self via which other is discerned. And if that is how one chooses to understand what "consciousness" refers to then infants hold no consciousness. — javra
There has been a fair amount of work in recent years on what has been called a pre-reflective form of minimal self-awareness. Dan Zahavi has made this his central focus, but there is growing concensus that all experience presupposes some primitive sense of self. Infants have been shown to differentiate self from others. — Joshs
ns of "mine", as in what we linguistically address as my thirst, my pleasure or pain, my affinity to familiar voices, and so forth--this even if its associating these personal states of self to stimuli takes time. And, in so doing, I offer that an infant holds an ingrained awareness of self, hence a degree of self-awareness without which it (the infant) would literally perish. — javra
The following are all available free here:
https://ku-dk.academia.edu/DanZahavi
Zhavi: We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood. March 2021 Journal of
Social Ontology
Zahavi: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.2005
Zahavi: ‘Is the Self a Social Construct’, Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 6, 551–573,
Zahavi Consciousness and (minimal) selfhood: Getting clearer on for-me-ness and mineness
U. Kriegel (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.
Oxford University Press, 2019 — Joshs
Take an animal, maybe a bat, maybe a lizard. They likely have experience, they are aware of things in the world: prey, food, shelter and the like. I am skeptical that such creatures would have "self awareness" as opposed to awareness.
What is added by self-awareness that is absent in experience? The apparent fact that one is aware that it is oneself that is having the experience, not another person nor another creature. — Manuel
Are you familiar with the original paper, which is here http://consc.net/papers/facing.html — Wayfarer
The following are all available free here: — Joshs
The fallacy fallacy: The mistake of thinking/inferring that the conclusion of an argument is false because it contains a fallacy. — TheMadFool
