So my question is: what makes Tom's justification method to be superior to Sam's justification method? Or in other words, why Tom is more justified to believe "it is called outside" then Sam? — Curious Layman
There has been a fair amount of work in recent years on what has been called a pre-reflective form of minimal self-awareness. Dan Zahavi has made this his central focus, but there is growing concensus that all experience presupposes some primitive sense of self. Infants have been shown to differentiate self from others. — Joshs
1 aware of and responding to one's surroundings: although I was in pain, I was conscious.
2 having knowledge of something: we are conscious of the extent of the problem.
• [in combination] concerned with or worried about a particular matter: they were growing increasingly security-conscious.
3 (of an action or feeling) deliberate and intentional: a conscious effort to walk properly.
• (of the mind or a thought) directly perceptible to and under the control of the person concerned: when you go to sleep it is only the conscious mind which shuts down.
It’s an ambiguous term, says Chalmers. This is before he sprinkled in a little experience, feelings, and quality to make it worse. But it becomes more and more apparent that the “consciousness” he speaks of is the organism itself. So when he says “It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience”, he is descending into tautology. — NOS4A2
Not to be glib, but in a word or so, consciousness is a mystery. You know kinda like God, cosmology, mathematics, music, and whole host of other things found in living structures. — 3017amen
Strict materialists often make the argument that we are essentially machines, that there is very little authentic base for awareness or mind or consciousness (some of this is based on study of brain functions). But thinking of machines, say cars, do they ever wonder if they are basically machines? If we are, we are quite a peculiar kind of machines with tendency to self-doubt and capability for ferocious arguments whether we actually are "just" machines. This would seem somewhat strange behaviour for a car or a hairdryer etc. — hwyl
Self-awareness becomes redundant it is specifies an innate distinction between self and other, an innate awareness of selfhood in this sense. An ameba will hold awareness of this distinction, but we do not say it is self-aware. Lesser vertebrates can become unconscious—e.g., due to sedatives—but when conscious we likewise don’t consider them self-aware in the senses defined in the OP. Defining consciousness by self-awareness, as self-awareness was specified in the OP, constrains “consciousness” strictly to critters that can not only conceptualize information but, additionally, can conceptualize information about (and thereby hold abstract knowledge of) their personal innate awareness of their own selfhood via which other is discerned — javra
So, in equating consciousness to self-awareness, one would be forced to state that human infants hold no consciousness. This being something I’m personally very adverse to doing. If, however, consciousness is equated to awareness, then human infants and lesser animals can all be conscious (again, in contrast to being unconscious). But, in so defining, then unicellular organisms can then be deemed conscious as well, since they hold awareness of things, including of that which is other relative to themselves—and, hence, of themselves relative to that which is other. — javra
So that's what I propose. We use experience in this broad sense to refer to conscious goings-on. Everything else that is not part of experience at this moment (minus other people who one assumes have experience too) would be non-experiential.
I find it useful. Consciousness tends to have a lot of baggage attached. Experience is a bit less ambiguous. — Manuel
I have found "experience" a useful term - we have the experience of being in the world. We are not directly in the world, we experience it and thus are at least somewhat removed from it. There is a space there, a distance. This self-understanding of being in the middle of the act of experiencing the world seems like awareness to me. — hwyl
We all know what consciousness “is” because we all experience it (supposedly), but the problem with experience, is that experience is subjective and may not be conveyed to others, outside of the use of abstract language. — Present awareness
I do get a bit triggered when people don't respect the OP. Otherwise every thread becomes the same free for all for people's opinions on whatever they want to sound off about. A bit of discipline and focus would be really nice. Then each thread would have a proper subject. Banno knows better and is capable of staying on topic, but chooses not to. — bert1
As in, if I say consciousness is to be defined as what-it's-like to be something and someone replies "that's no good, you can't be a rock. Also, can you tell me what it's like to be a bat?" Then we simply get stuck in discussing the definition as opposed to the phenomena. — Manuel
I see why you may want to clarify these terms. I'm not sure how useful it's going to be. The simpler the definition the better. Consciousness can be said to be awareness. Self consciousness means awareness of one's being aware. And so on. But defining a term says little about the phenomenon. — Manuel
Best, not only. It's the one that is clearest; the one with which no one will disagree... — Banno
This understanding of consciousness may be the best we have, but I am only saying that I don't think it is helpful to try to exclude all other usages of the term, because some people may be using it differently. — Jack Cummins
It's not about a single definition but about seeing examples of it in practice. The people involved.
The whole human experience. — Amity
I'm afraid that I am having a problem with you wishing to narrow down the idea of consciousness to that of a first aid test. — Jack Cummins
Neither of them seem to know who the current Prime Minister is. It's not looking good. — bert1
Not so much meaningless as wrong. — Banno
Thinkers within philosophy and other disciplines may use the term consciousness in differing ways, and surely, thinking about it should not be reduced to one way of seeing it. — Jack Cummins
‘Oh, too bad. How’s the rock? And the tree?’ — Wayfarer
But (contentious as what I’ve so far written might be) back to the central point: My take so far is that all interpretations of “consciousness” will encompass awareness. This although certain notions of consciousness will specify only certain forms of awareness and therefore label other forms of awareness as not constituting consciousness proper. — javra
I was not criticising it, but simply read it when waking up in the middle of the night, so my response may have seemed a bit grungy. — Jack Cummins
The reason why I think your question is so good is that we use the word so often on this site, and I know that I have written threads including the word consciousness. While people are inclined to seek definitions, I am not sure that there are many discussions here about the specific meaning of the term consciousness. — Jack Cummins
I have a different position. My own understanding of consciousness incorporates a possible collective unconscious as a source of consciousness, or of levels of consciousness as dimensions. But, I will stop here, because I am going into what is consciousness and I believe that you are looking more specifically at what we mean by the term consciousness, although it is linked because people probably use the word differently. — Jack Cummins
n short, the OP isn't really about the word "consciousness", nor is it about consciousness, it's actually about language in general and Latin & English in particular. — TheMadFool
Are you familiar with the original paper, which is here — Wayfarer
How is degree of consciousness quantified?
— Pantagruel
I agree with Wayfarer, it's binary not "a matter of degree" like a dimmer. Why think this? I understand things this way:
• pre-awareness = attention (orientation)
• awareness = perception (experience)
• adaptivity = intelligence (optimizing heuristic error-correction)
• self-awareness = [Phenomenal-Self Modeling ~Metzinger]
• awareness of self-awareness = consciousness
Except for the last (sys. 2), every other cognitive modality (sys. 1 (aka "enabling blindspot for sys. 2")) is autonomic and continually manifests a non-zero degree of functioning (thus, quantifiable?); "consciousness", on the hand, is intermittent (i.e. flickering, alter-nating), or interrupted by variable moods, monotony, persistent high stressors, sleep / coma, drug & alcohol intoxication, psychotropics, brain trauma (e.g. PTSD) or psychosis, and so, therefore, is either online (1) or offline (0) frequently – even with variable frequency strongly correlated to different 'conscious-states' – each (baseline) waking-sleep cycle. — 180 Proof
Perhaps it might be useful to talk in terms of what you do or don't agree with or understand about this paper, as that is the one that defined the problem. — Wayfarer
Consciousness is a feature of an entity capable of manipulating its environment. And what determines the form and function of that entity? The successive and cumulative manipulations of its environment. An apparent circularity. — Pantagruel
Something is either conscius or it's not. Birds, bees, humans are conscious - unless they're not - but one is not 'more conscious' than the other. But I'm sure that birds are more intelligent than bees, and humans more than birds. — Wayfarer
Very general words - consciousness, love, meaning - are much harder to define, because they're polysemic, that is, they have different meanings in different contexts. — Wayfarer
The other, related issue is the domain of discourse in which the words are being used. For example, if you study both psychology and philosophy at an undergrad level (which I did) you will find the conception of mind in 'philosophy of mind' (philosophy) and in 'theories of the unconscious' (psychology) may be very different. They will refer to different sources and explore the subjects from different perspectives. They have different background assumptions and different aims in mind. — Wayfarer
The last point, is that I think much of the talk about 'consciousness' has seeped into Western discourse from Eastern sources... And that means at least some of the discussion about consciousness is freighted with (often implicit) references to Asiatic (Hindu/Buddhist) cultural memes. — Wayfarer
I think that your definitions are fairly good, but I just wonder how the unconscious and subconscious fit into the picture, — Jack Cummins
I am not really sure that I would clearly wish to come up with an overriding definition of consciousness, because it seems like trying to put it into a category. It seems larger than that, — Jack Cummins
I think some call this phenomenal consciousness or 'what is it like to be consciousness' per Nagel/Chalmers. — Tom Storm
The best answer is to be found in a First Aid course. — Banno
I think it's pretty clear from this thread and others that 3017 has posted to that 3017 simply is not interested in any sort of reasonable exchange. What do you say? — tim wood
Unfortunately, that's incorrect — 3017amen
Think of it this way, as Einstein eluded, if we were all Dr. Spock's or 'Spock-like', we wouldn't contemplate those kinds of things...there would be no need. — 3017amen
I understand. I think the concepts of ethics and morality, in contemplation of the soul, are still valid but you are correct; I am postulating that seeing the soul as a distinct entity seperate to the body and mind should be discarded. — Brock Harding
What I am suggesting is that there needs to be a "third camp". — thewonder
I postulate that most, if not all, current philosophy regarding the soul or spirit can be transposed to the ‘mind’. — Brock Harding
