P3 seems easily deniable by the worm-theorist, who can claim that we experience all times in which we exist (it's just, as you note, temporally extended).

It's easy for someone to claim that you experiencing all of your times, but do you really find yourself having all of them? I can claim that you are in excruciating pain right now despite your protests to the contrary, but I imagine that that is not gonna be convincing if you simply do not find yourself as being in pain.

At best you have only the trivial premise that we only experience one time 'at a time,' which can of course be granted. — The Great Whatever

Like I told Pierre, when I say that I find myself as only having the experience of, say, me sitting in my room, I am not saying that I am having them "at a time". Nowhere does such a notion come into my description of what I am experiencing. I only say that I am only having this experience in a general sense.

Yes, and the worm theorist need not dispute that.

I disagree. The claim that I am having an experience of sitting in my room only is simply inconsistent with the claim that I am also having another experience that is not of me sitting in my room (as you later claim). You cannot have both facts be true so one of them has to be false.

The worm theorist says that those two events relate you, the very same individual (or space-time worm) to the two separate contents of those experiences.

If that was indeed the case, then I should not be introspecting myself as only having one of those experiences (again, not specified as being "at a time"). So much as I have an experience of one of those times, I should've found that that particular experience is had as part of a larger experience which also contains the experience of the other time along with any other times I may have (at least if my introspection on my direct experience is supposed to be certain). This is what it would mean to have both experiences together after all.

That's because the eternalist (or the perdurantist) aren't saying that there are different conscious subjects along your world-line. You are the whole worm, and your temporal time-slices are temporal parts of yours just as much as your hands and feets (or rather, their own worms) are spatial parts of yours. What the eternalist may argue is that your having experiences one at a time doesn't contradict your being a worm who is having those experiences anymore that your being touched by someone on specific parts of your body, say, contradicts that it is you, the same individual, who is being touched in each case.

I think you are misinterpreting what I mean in my P3 since you seem to be emphasizing the fact that I am only having an experience "at a given time". When I say that I am only experiencing a certain set of experiences, I am not saying that my experience is limited to a certain set of experiences "at a time", I am saying that I am only having those experiences in general. Nowhere when I introspect upon my experience does the notion of my experience being had "at a time" even come in. I, as the entity that should be a temporally extended conscious subject, only have an experience of sitting in my room in front of my computer simpliciter. This is just how it feels to me.

SImilarly, if I told you that I am only seeing red in my vision and you reply by saying that I am "really" saying that I am only seeing red at a particular part of my visual field, then I will tell you that I am not making any such claim at all and that I am only referring to my visual experiences of seeing only red in a general sense simpliciter.

Hello and thank you for welcoming me.

I think the worm-theorist would readily accept the way you are characterizing the content of your experience (i.e. what it is you are experiencing) but she would question your portrayal of who it is who is the subject of this experience. The worm-theorist would claim that each separate content of experience had over time is being had (which is a event rather than an ownership relation) not by "your" perduring worm as a whole, but rather by just the one contemporaneous temporal stage of your worm that is occurring at the time when this experience is being had. Hence, the fact that you are truly only experiencing one thing at a time just reflects the fact that those episodes (or events) of experiencing something or other characterize your own temporal stages separately. In yet other words, your saying that you only experience one thing at a given time only boils down to saying that only one single temporal stage of yourself (i.e. just one time-slice of your worm) is involved directly in this experiencing. (There may still be indirect involvement through the exercise of memory and anticipation).

It seems that this type of response collapses to the stage theory does it not? Cause if we are going to grant that there are multiple different conscious subjects who exist at every stage of our lives anyways, then why not just adopt the stage view? As far as I know, the worm theory claims that there is one only entity, one conscious subject which identifies with the whole spacetime worm. Although it is conceivable to argue that such a being could also exist on top of the multiple conscious subjects at every time it would seem unnecessary to do so.

Just because something is temporally extended needn't imply that every temporal slice of the extended thing is identical to every other temporal slice. Differences between one slice and another would represent change in this this kind of scheme, and we obviously change during the course of our lives. (That introduces the problem of how to define personal identity.)

I am not saying that every part is identical to every other part, or that it is a requirement for composite objects. Certainly such a view would be clearly false because that would mean that there can be no objects with heterogeneous parts.

I am merely saying that the whole, which is identical to the sum of every part (but not identical to each individual part) should itself have the sum of the experiences which every part has. That is, if a time slice has experience x at T1, and another one has an experience y at T2, then, as the being who is composed of both time slices, I should have an experience x at T1 and y at T2. In other words, I have them both together.

Assuming that we are conscious throughout our lives (which isn't likely to be true)...

Even if that weren't the case, we are certainly still conscious for a fair amount more than a single instant, so it doesn't seem to matter for the purposes of my argument.

... we should probably say that our consciousness at time T-1 is consciousness of T-1, while our consciousness at time T-2 is consciousness of T-2. So we can say that our time-slices are experiencing throughout, but only experiencing the time in which that particular slice resides (plus accumulated memories).

This probably has more to do with P2. than P3 IMO. From the looks of it since you don't seem to be disputing what I claim to be experiencing (or really not experiencing) as a conscious subject and are instead focused on what we should be experiencing.

In any case, I think your objection is missing some context. Sure a consciousness at a time has conscious experiences of that time, but what does this say for a temporally extended spacetime worm that is the sum of multiple consciousnesses at multiple times?

Maybe I'm not understanding the distinction between worm-theory and stage-theory properly. It's conceivable that my amendments to your premises and my interpreting personal identity in something other than a strong logical way has moved me towards being a stage theorist and I'm actually conceding your point without realizing it.

Sorry if my explanations aren't clear enough. The wiki on perdurantism distinguishes between both views, so perhaps you can check that out for a quick reference.