To shut up and calculate, then, recognises that there are limits to our pathways for understanding. — Banno
I said that any statement of, or knowledge about, the object's existence or non-existence can only be made by an observer.
— Wayfarer
Were this the limit of your claim, no one would be objecting. This is entirely compatible with hard realism. — Banno
(a) How do you know (i.e. corroborate) that you or any other agent is "conscious" if "consciousness" is completely, inaccessibly subjective? — 180 Proof
Biden was not removed by lawful means. — fishfry
the object neither exists nor doesn't exist in the absence of the observer. Nothing can be said about it.
— Wayfarer
So the cup ceases to exist when you put it in the dish washer? We can't say that it is being cleaned? — Banno
And as lived experience in the moneyed world, our children aren't having children. — apokrisis
Schrödinger proposed this thought-experiment only to show that the 'Copenhagen interpretation' of quantum mechanics is, at best, paradoxical (i.e. does not make sense). — 180 Proof
It could be opposed to its alternative. Not exponential growth but just an expectation of maintaining the world as it has always existed. — apokrisis
In many cases it comes down to the point I just made, that physics is based on the presumption that physicists have available a shared topic — Banno
I've read a few. — Banno
Edit: this is not trivial; physics is based on the presumption that physicists have available a shred topic that they can prod and poke and about which they can talk - the world. — Banno
So the cup ceases to exist when you put it in the dish washer? We can't say that it is being cleaned? — Banno
Why are eyes and hands OK, but not the sun or the earth? — Banno
Spooky action at a distance, wherein one observer’s measurement of a particle right here collapses the wave function of a particle way over there, turns out not to be so spooky — the measurement here simply provides information that the observer can use to bet on the state of the distant particle, should she come into contact with it. But how, we might ask, does her measurement here affect the outcome of a measurement a second observer will make over there? In fact, it doesn’t. Since the wavefunction doesn’t belong to the system itself, each observer has her own. My wavefunction doesn’t have to align with yours. ...
QBism...treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge. It resolves all of the quantum paradoxes, but at the not insignificant cost of anything we might call “reality.”
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding
— Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107
...are incompatible with your contending that you are no ontic idealist. You are sayign that the world is, and isn't, the creation of mind. — Banno
“The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself.
Sure. But so what? It's as if you were to say there is no vista without there being someone to see it, and that therefore the mountains depend on the tourist for their existence. — Banno
If you reject ontic idealism, then consciousness does not "create reality". — Banno
Sure, consciousness is not a passive recipient of the stuff in the world; nor is it it's creator. — Banno
In the story I wrote for you, as we walked across the landscape we developed a way of talking about the movement of butterfly that became progressively less dependent on the place we were standing. — Banno
Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'
Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was ...that the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of [human] sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.
This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.
Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. — Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107
According to evolutionary biology, Homo Sapiens is the result of billions years of evolution. For all these thousands of millions of years, our sensory and intellectual abilities have been honed and shaped by the exigencies of survival, through billions of lifetimes in various life-forms - fish, lizard, mammal, primate - in such a way as to give rise to the mind that we have today.
Recently, other scientific disciplines such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a steady continuum, is actually composed of a hierarchical matrix of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic nervous system which controls one’s respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that peculiarly human ability of ‘discursive reason’ (and beyond, according to the mystics.)
Consciousness plays a central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ - and also the apparent coherence and reality of the 'external world'. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness, the bulk of which are completely unknown to us.
When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is a considerable amount of work involved in ‘creating’ an object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the light-waves reflected or emanated from it, your mind organises the image with regards to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc).
And you will do all of this without you even noticing that you are doing it; it is largely below the threshold of conscious perception.
In other words, your consciousness is not the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them (Locke's tabula rasa). Rather, consciousness is an active agent which constructs reality partially on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of an enormous number of unconscious processes, memories, intentions, and so on, not to mention the activities of reason, which allows us to categorise, classify and analyse the elements of experience. — Wayfarer
If your point is that "model" be used with care, I agree. — Banno
To the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical realists, Yogācāra may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism, with the proviso that the purpose of its arguments was not to engender an improved ontological theory or commitment, but rather an insistence that we pay the fullest attention to the epistemological and psychological conditions compelling us to construct and attach to ontological theories. — Dan Lusthaus
his Buddhist-based metaphors & analogies… — Gnomon
Yogācāra doctrine is summarized in the term vijñapti-mātra, "nothing-but-cognition" (often rendered "consciousness-only" or "mind-only") which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating a type of metaphysical idealism, i.e., the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created by mind. However, the Yogācārin writings themselves argue something very different. Consciousness (vijñāna) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end.
Yogācāra tends to be misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as epistemological warnings about karmic problems. The Yogācāra focus on cognition and consciousness grew out of its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation. — What Is and Isn’t Yogācāra, Dan Lusthaus
a model is presumably a model of something. — Banno
There is no point saying that I don't understand some idea if you cannot explain it yourself. — Janus
Didn't we at least reach some agreement that being good at physics does not make one good at philosophy? — Banno
This sort of stuff can't not remind me of Deepak Chopra. — Lionino
My criticism of the view that everything is mind is that we really have no idea what that could mean — Janus
The only reality is mind and observations, but observations are not of things. To see the Universe as it really is, we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things.
I don't see how you could transcend the "I-making and mine-making proclivities" as long as you cling to the idea that the mind (that is the self) creates the world — Janus
I continue to add "details" to my own thesis, as do you, but I doubt that any amount of itemization will convince someone who is not already inclined toward your point of view. If the general notion is abhorrent to their worldview, more particulars will not sway them. Concur? — Gnomon
The conscious self is a construction that arises in the dialectical process that is a world-making.
— apokrisis
:100:
— Wayfarer
You see, I don't think that this comment says anything. At least, not clearly. — Banno
It's the sort of text against which Russell and Moore rebelled — Banno
Kelly’s credentials begin with his dazzling biography as a combat-tested Navy pilot and NASA astronaut who commanded shuttle missions aboard both the Discovery and Endeavour and traveled more than 20 million miles in space.
He has also turned out to be a supremely skillful politician in a tough state where the Biden-Harris ticket has been running behind. Kelly won a close race in 2020 to fill the unexpired term of John McCain (R) and then turned around to win it again two years later — this time, with a more comfortable five-point margin against a hard-right Republican election conspiracy theorist endorsed by Donald Trump.
Border Politics: “When I first got to Washington, it didn’t take me long to realize that there are a lot of Democrats who don’t understand our southern border and a lot of Republicans who just want to talk about it, don’t necessarily want to do anything about it, just want to use it politically,” he told me shortly after his 2022 victory. “So my approach has been — to the extent that we could and can — to make progress on securing it, but also doing it in a way that’s in accordance with our ethics and our values, not to demonize people.” — WaPo
. Of course, the fact that some scientific theories have been observed to yield accurate predictions countless times is a point in their favour. The same cannot be said for metaphysical speculations, because they make no predictions that can be rigorously tested. — Janus
The problem I see is that without positing either some mind-independent reality or collective or universal mind it is impossible to explain how it is that we all see and hear the same things in the environment. — Janus
Wayfarer claims he doesn't agree with Kastrup's "mind at large", which I would say is itself an incoherent idea, but he apparently cannot offer any coherent alternative. — Janus
Philosophy itself ultimately consists in faith, not in knowledge or understanding in a scientific, mathematical or logical kind of sense. — Janus
I should remind you of Joanna Macy who drew the parallels between systems theory and dependent co-arising. — apokrisis
...whatever we consider to be real has a subjective as well as objective grounding
— Wayfarer
Do you see how this crosses from the epistemic to the ontic, in the way I tried to encapsulate using cake? — Banno
The conscious self is a construction that arises in the dialectical process that is a world-making. — apokrisis
We become not just selves but superbeings. — apokrisis
I can't tell the difference between Wayfarer and ChatGTP anymore — apokrisis
But this is another way of talking about that holism vs atomism division which a logic of vagueness hoped to resolve. — apokrisis
I am not enamoured with a simple division into ontic and epistemic versions of idealism. — Banno
I wonder if that sometimes engenders an uncomfortable loyalty to ontological idealist metaphysics of a Berkeleyan stripe. — bert1
what is the "super-natural" other than the longing for something different? — schopenhauer1
