Given that we both acknowledge the occurrence of the word "quality" in the English language (you've made use of it), and if in your view conscious experiences do not consist of quality, where does quality take place?
Or is it your view that quality does not take place anywhere, that it has no occurrence, thereby making the term fully meaningless to you? — javra
Good for you. Can you tell sugar from salt by tasting it? If yes, you have qualia too.I'm by no means denying my senses. I grant them as necessary elemental constituents of all conscious experience. — creativesoul
I see the subjective experience as the font of all knowledge.
— Olivier5
:up: It was put very well by somebody on another thread, but I can not remember who. It went something like; every experience creates a note, in sequence the notes create a tune - this is what we dance to! I love it :smile: — Pop
It's your denial that I find sad. You guys are denying your own senses and your own life. It's nothing to me of course, but it makes TPF a bit depressing.I'm especially surprised that Oliver takes them seriously, given his express discontent with philosophical patter. — Banno
It's on a par with the little man who wasn't there. — Banno
I guess part of my resistance is that I assume the whole point of any encyclopedia compiling we do is to develop of repertoire of responses and options to consider as a response. That's pretty crudely put, but the point is I'm not sure you need the encyclopedia as a separate thing at all, when you could just have the responses. — Srap Tasmaner
The argument given, that there has to be a smell that we smell, is not convincing. — Srap Tasmaner
we can’t communicate what it’s like — Marchesk

But to get there, you claim we store particular qualia as memories. Really? Like, the whole thing, the exact smell of the rancid bacon? I'm skeptical. — Srap Tasmaner
So you would agree that explaining function doesnt explain qualia. That's a pretty common view. — frank
I'll leave figuring out how memory works to neuroscientists. — Srap Tasmaner
Would you be able to recognise the coffee you like in a blind test?How would you go about proving that if I like how this coffee tastes, there is an entity, how this coffee tastes to me, that I like? — Srap Tasmaner
It is a logical claim. As such, it could be disproved by using propositional logic. I am saying something like:you can't have flavour preferences if flavours don't exist.
— Olivier5
What kind of claim is that? Is there anything that could convince you that it's false? — Srap Tasmaner
Category error - confusing someone's flavour preferences with flavours. — fdrake
I think the point is that none of these require talking in terms of qualia in order to be effectively and exhaustively explained. — creativesoul
I think most would agree p-zombies are logically possible. — frank
why should someone commit themselves to an independent "phenomenal" type associated with the experiences, when the elements of the phenomenal type ("what is it likes") vary with changes in the type they are supposed to be independent of? — fdrake
What is an "extra" layer of epistemic value, may I ask???? Something you haven't yet read about in a book? Something non-canonical? And how can you possibly check if some "layers of epistemic value" are "there" or "not there"??? What are the criteria for the existence of layers of epistemic value?It's like matter and forces are given extra layers of epistemic value that are not there. — schopenhauer1
So just at the first step: can you accept that I might be a p-zombie? — frank
In the face of that doubt, how would you defend your belief that there was qualia associared with my tasting? — frank
There is something it's like which is being changed. — Marchesk
Note that the scientists who objectively and verifiably invert poor Chase’s taste buds in IP #8, the pill that changes Dennett’s experience of cauliflower in IP #11, and the inverted spectacles of IP #12 affirm the objective existence of qualia, since they imply that taste and visual qualia can be objectively manipulated by science. Likewise, IP #10 proves that tastes are genetically mediated and a product of our biology, which also lends them objectivity.Intution pumps 8-12 look like we don't have direct access to previous qualia — Marchesk
Emergence has a view from one thing to another. I'll call it a an epistemic leap. In fact, I don't even know if there was a view to start from that leaps, so perhaps nothing is leaping anywhere. — schopenhauer1
I just summarized each and every of his 15 "pumps", and then examined it... I am aware it is hard to do, it took me the evening. But now I can prove than none of these pumps amount to a serious conceptual critique, that the idea that scientists could invert one's qualia attracts attention to the fact that qualia are objective, scientifically studied phenomena, for instance.I've no idea how you arrived at that summary. I'm not equipped to disentangle it. — creativesoul
Correct. It is private in the sense that you cannot be sure that others see exactly what you see. But it is universal in the sense that we all report seeing something different from the objective image.So the board appears to bulge, but does not really; and this is a private thing, despite our shared talk about it.
And this is the sort of thing you would call qualia.
Not disagreeing here - just checking if this is what you want to assert. — Banno
