Conscious being = True AI = P-Zombie — TheMadFool

One possible conclusion from this equation is that p-zombies, as defined, cannot exist.

We humans are not designed to let go of our desires that's like pretending to be full when you're hungry... — Gitonga

Indeed, desire is very the essence of man (Spinoza) and trying to get rid of it is illusion. But there is value in realizing that desire is never ending, that you will never be fully satisfied. It helps manage the frustration.

The question then is this: [are there] some things that matter interacts with [but] are not matter?

Light? Radio? EM radiation in general?
— TheMadFool

Matter is coagulated energy. Could we then say that everything is energy? — Harry Hindu

Considering how hard it is to understand what such things as "matter" or "energy" are, maybe we should just call it "stuff"...

Life cannot be both worth living and acceptable in ending. — JacobPhilosophy

It can worth living at a certain age or time, and worth ending at another, either because one is past one's prime and doesn't enjoy it anymore, or because the circumstances have changed.

In mathematics, spaces are a certain form of sets, in which the elements can interact through operations. I believe the mind can be understood as a similar kind of space in which thoughts interact.

As I said, the mind is nothing substantial, but a vector, a trend, a project. Of course, without it there would be no project. But it is nothing substantially speaking, I insist. — David Mo

The mind is a mental space, and a space is something.

I'm screaming out some tunes at the recording studio to no obvious purpose :) — Kenosha Kid

You don't need a purpose to sing a song, but I find it helps going through life... :-)

My point was just that scientists are not "dismissing" reason by understanding it as emergent behaviour any more than non-materialist philosophers who describe it as immaterial. In fact, I'd say scientists would be taking it far more seriously. The immaterial world is a vague dumping ground for things not yet understood, which is ]back to what I said before: if someone had a meaningful non-materialist explanation for consciousness, that would be something to consider. But it seems to me the root if the conflict is not incompatible descriptions of consciousness but rather a matter of taste: "Out of bounds, science!" — Kenosha Kid

Okay, I agree with you. I am also a materialist in a way, but a compatibilist.

we're a fleeting fizz at a tiny dot in a mundane part of a giant cosmos. It's an artefact of our biology that our word revolves around us. But it is great being a fizz, so make the most it — Kenosha Kid

Thanks for the advice. Personally I wouldn't trade my present condition with that of, say, a galaxy. I'm just finishing making some appricot jam, not the best I've ever done, but better than hydrogen and helium still...

. As Richard Feynman said, understanding something on another level only increases its beauty. — Kenosha Kid

And that is exactly what I am saying: one cannot logically use reason to dismiss reason, but one can use it to explain how useful and beautiful it is.

The stars are hotter than I am, so what? — Kenosha Kid

All this talk about human lives being meaningless because of the vastness and indiference of the universe is just wrong footed in my opinion. I don't see how the meaning of our lives depends in any way on whether this universe is large or small, its stars hot or cold or whatever.

Astronomers study the universe for very human reasons: it's an interesting job if you can get it.

But surely if it's irrational and illogical, it's not science either
— Olivier5

I don't think that makes sense. — Kenosha Kid

What I am trying to say is: a scientific theory cannot contradict itself and still be worthy of the name "scientific".

If it is not testable, it is not scientific. — Kenosha Kid

But surely if it's irrational and illogical, it's not science either.

A scientist may well accept that a human life is a pretty meaningless accident in the scheme of things, and that all human life is a blip in an ambivalent universe. — Kenosha Kid

That's one point of view. I go with Omar Khayyam instead: the stars and planets are less wise than you are.

What seems impressive to me is how any scientist would think that human rationality can be dismissed as mere noise or an "epiphenomenon", without dismissing the whole of science, a product of human rationality, as mere noise or an "epiphenomenon" as well. Logic, anyone?

Any scientific theory attempting to solve the brain-mind problem needs to be able to account for the possibility of its own emergence in a human mind or several, as a theory that correctly solves the brain-mind problem. Otherwise the theory contradicts its own existence.

In other words, a correct scientific (human) theory about the human mind must assume that the human mind is capable of producing correct scientific theories...

It's called compatibilism. In this view, minds exist for a reason: because they can solve complex problems involving far more considerations than your basic fight-or-flee response. Consciousness allows to place under consideration not just present stimuli and past memories but also deductions of consequences, and hence planning about the future. It's very useful.

We have minds because we need them, including for science.

there are no meaningful non-scientific questions. — Kenosha Kid

Surely that must be false. Moral questions, for instance, are not scientific but still meaningfull.

↪Mww Thanks for engaging.

I was very impressed by your: You can use reason to justify reason of course. What you cannot do logically is use reason to debase or disprove reason. — Pop

Sebastian Rodl, — Wayfarer

Err. I wrote this, not Mwww, but thanks for the appreciation all the same. :-)

Aren't the low-neckline, exposing cleavage, and the miniskirt, exposing the thighs, just that - striptease? — TheMadFool

Of course it’s a tease. So what?

We would recognise respecting her as a person and performer entails being aware of the sexual relation she is comfortable with. We would choose not to stare in ways she found uncomfortable because her well-being is important to us, and we recognise the interaction as an event of mutual agency. — TheWillowOfDarkness

A stripper whom nobody stares at will soon feel uncomfortable.

Indeed, it's a fair transaction. But the point is that being an object of desire is sometimes a boost to one's agency, rather always necessarily undermining it.

multiple realizability for reduction — SophistiCat

Meaning?

The assumption is that a woman [working in a strip joint] wants to be treated as an object, or that she is fully aware that she may be treated as an object - neither of which may be an accurate assessment of a woman’s agency or self-awareness. You can only ascertain this by asking her questions and listening to her answers. — Possibility

I actually did that once, in New York. With men rather than women. I had a conversation with a group of chipendales after I was invited to their show by a female friend. I was hid at the back, for normally no man is allowed in the audience. The boys would come onstage playing a cowboy, a firemen, these sorts of outfits, and they would end up in thong, slightly short of full frontal. The girls were hysterical, screaming and inserting banknotes in various parts of the chipendales' bodies, fighting off one another to reach out to the chipendales...

I felt uncomfortable at first and started to laugh manically. Then I had a few shots and felt better. I started to wonder about the motivations of the performers, and casually asked one after his show. Found out it's quite simple: 1) it pays some 300-400 a night, which for a 20 something is pretty good money. 2) you get to be adulated by hords of girls, and that's good ego boosting. 3) you can have sex every night if you want to. Their seductive power is totally validated every night.

So yes, he was seeking objectification for self-validation. I guess chipendales never get gloomy about "nobody likes me" -- they know they are amongst the most desirable men in the city. And I must admit they had flawless bodies.

Not every body can do it either. E.g. the bar tender in that joint wanted very badly to go onstage but was yet to convince the boss to give him a chance, so he was doing much body building and taking dance lessons, and he would watch the shows every night with stary eyes... :-)

The point is that objectification can help build up a sense of agency. The two are not mutually exclusive. In final analysis, many people would rather be desired, than not be desired.

Just trying to be friendly. :grin:

The ship of Theseus is a good example of why the structural level is important. And by definition you cannot explain a structure by breaking it into pieces. You have to pay attention to how the shape of the structure as a whole arranges, channels and combines the interactions between the pieces into a succesful, functioning outcome, eg a floating boat or a living body.

Exactly. In system thinking, any part of the structure is replaceable by a similar part, because what matters most is the structure. As long as Theseus's ship remains structurally identical to itself, Theseus can replace all the parts and he still has a boat.

You must know the paradox called the ship of Theseus. What's your solution for it?

Interestingly, our body is a literal example of the ship of Theseus. Pretty much all the parts in our body, ie the molecules comprising it, are constantly being replaced and recycled. That's how the body keeps itself alive: through constant maintenance and replacement of broken parts.

It is analysis — Pantagruel

I would say it values synthesis and analysis equally, while reductionism uses only analysis.

The parts are typically replaceable, and the structure (or system) will still work.

For instance, let's take a large mechanical clock, with wheels of say 1 to 3 inches wide, made of some metal eg steel. The clock works. One day for some reason, a wheel breaks. The owner orders the piece but has to wait a long time for it so he decides to 3D print a replica, identical to the broken wheel but made of some hard plastic. He fits it in and the clock works again, at least for a few days (plastic being more wearable than steel).

I posit that what happened there can easily be explained within a non-reductionist system approach: it's the structure, the shape of the pieces and the way they are put together, that makes the clock work. So all you need to replace a part is a replica of the same shape, the actual material you use is secondary (though it matters of course, eg for durability reasons) as long as it is solid at ambiant temperature.

However, in a reductionist approach, one would have to redo the whole quantic level of the explanation, as the fundamental physics involved in explaining metal and plastic solidity are different.

Ergo sometimes system thinking beats reductionism.

I think "The whole is MORE than the SUM of its parts" deserves better than a misquote and summary dismissal as a bumper sticker. It explains a lot, including why human beings generally don't fancy being cut in pieces. They kinda know that they would lose something in the process...

Reductionism is not peculiar to materialism, and neither does materialism entail reductionism. Idealism is reductionist with respect to the physical. On the other hand, there are non-reductionists among materialists/physicalists. — SophistiCat

You use the term differently than I do. To me, it's the idea that you can explain anything by looking at its parts, and that this will provide sufficient explanation and prediction. I disagree on ground of system theory, that says that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

May I ask for your definition of reductionism, or a good approximation thereof?

Determinism is like all metaphysics; it's unprovable, counter-intuitive and pretty useless. It's also fundamentally depressing for an agent to think of him or herself as deprived of agency. Spinoza managed to present determinism a positive, happy metaphysics, but I'm not buying it.

Do you have any citations to support this assertion? Even if you did, are you saying that thinking is dependent upon hormones? We can write a program that emulates how our emotions impact our thinking. — Harry Hindu

Let me take another one. A visit to the Wikipedia entry on "Brain" would answer the first question. Yes, the brain is a very elaborate system of hormonal information management. Such systems are universal in life, they go way beyond emotions. For instance your body temperature is regulated by a thermostat-like hormonal information management system referred to as "homeothermy", and emotions can factor in your temperature but homeothermy is not in essence an "emotional system". The same applies to pretty much everything that happens in your body: it's about using chemicals as support for information exchange and management.

The brain is just a bunch of specialized cells, doing better and faster what any cell can do i.e. manage information through chemistry, and bringing it to the next level: symbolic thought, emotions, artistic creativity, etc.

Hey Harry, you ask a lot of questions. Can you prioritize a bit? To take a simple one:

Would dreaming qualify as thinking? — Harry Hindu

The meaning of words is only a matter of convenience and convention. You can define thinking as inclusive or exclusive of dreaming, depending on what you want to say. I am just pointing at the common English use of the term, which in my humble opinion does not cover all dreaming but one can think in a dream of course.

As much as possible, it is useful to stick to regular language when doing philosophy. Popper said something like that in his introduction to the Open Society And Its Enemies: don't use more complicated language than you need to.

That's just my answer to one question.

I don’t see how accounting for it can not amount to explaining it away. — Wayfarer

Let's take an example. Chemistry can explain how DNA is a relatively stable, potentially very long molecule, where variations in the use of some elements (the nucleobases) can be introduced without affecting the molecule structure. This gives you a very long molecule which can be used to encode information, through the use of the different nucleobases as "letters". Biochemistry can further try to explain how DNA is encoded, decoded, expressed, supressed, copied, mutated, etc. through chemical equations, enzymes and the likes.

Does this chemical explanation of the genetic code "explain away" its capacity to support life? No it doesn't. It doesn't say: "DNA is an epiphenomenon, don't you worry about it, it means nothing of use." On the contrary, the chemical argument only supports the conceptual construct of a genetic code, which does all sorts of marvelous stuff. The explanation opens up a new realm, builds up a platform on which many other stuff can develop.

Now, I certainly hope we will one day find a rational, fact-based explanation for how neurones generate thoughts, that describes how biochemistry can open up an entirely new realm (the symbolic realm) and how it makes entirely new things possible thanks to this realm, including the explanation itself.

Just like DNA makes things possible, including the life of the very guys who study DNA.

I'm saying that reason can't be accounted for in neuroscientific terms. It belongs to a completely different ontological level - the symbolic level, you might say. — Wayfarer

I disagree: you can (in theory) explain reason in neuroscientific terms as long as you don't explain it away, as long as your explanation accounts for the agency and utility of that symbolic level that it explains. In short: compatibilism is the only logically coherent form of materialism.

You can use reason to justify reason of course. What you cannot do logically is use reason to debase or disprove reason.

Wayfare is correct that one cannot use reason to disprove the efficacy of reason. The contradiction involved is obvious: IF reason is BS, THEN you can’t use to prove that reason is BS.

This issue has been summarized as follows: any solution proposed to the mind-body problem has to account for the possibility of its own emergence as a true solution. Another way to say it is: scientific theories of the mind must account for the human mind’s capacity to understand the world through science.

Brains operate on electricity, as do computers. — Harry Hindu

The brain is not an electric machine, for the most part it is an hormonal machine with a bit of electricity to speed it the signals.

my point was that you are always thinking — Harry Hindu

In common language: there’s always some mental activity happening.

A computer could be programmed to be aware of itself, just as you are. And to say that you are aware of yourself, what exactly do you mean? — Harry Hindu

In theory it can be done, but current ones can’t so by my definition they are not “thinking”. What I mean by aware is: I can hear myself thinking. I have some knowledge of what I think while I think it.

If you use reason to prove that reason is not working, or useless or an epiphenomenon, then there is a contradiction, the same contradiction than “This sentence is false”.

If you’re claiming that the mind is explicable in terms of neurological data, then you have to show how the brain causes or gives rise to the activities of thinking, such as reasoning, etc — Wayfarer

There is no inherent contradiction in trying to understand reason with reason. The difficulty is in explaining reason together with its efficacy, its capacity to understand the world, its agency.

If one uses reason to state: "reason is useless", then there is a contradiction. But if one uses reason's efficacy to understand reason's efficacy, then there's no contradiction.

"sleeping on a problem" — Bitter Crank

Sure, some mental activity is unconscious, but I am not sure one would call that "thinking" in plain English. Also, the question is asked in the context of the cogito, which speaks of self-conscious thought.