Of course the thread is a Wittgenstein thread not a Kant thread -- 'Trying to clarify objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus'. I don't ask too much of this project, given that Wittgenstein himself grew disillusioned about trying to 'clarify objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus'.

I see this quote: 'Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space.'
— Kant- Critique of Pure Reason

The reply was this: 'Why? Because Kant says so?'

I note that 'we' includes you, and I take it that you know what time is as well as Kant does. It hardly seems controversial to assert, then, that basically, if a system is unchanging, it is timeless. Time is one of the few things we regard as regular and unchanging. That we have an incredibly complex topic is the largest part of Kant's point -- to see this much, is to become more Kantian in your view -- it's not some hypothesis that might or might not be true -- Kant's 'doctrine' that his fanboys imbibe without questioning it. It's a question. Or, call it a change of emphasis. While we are considering what is not, actually, controversial, what you believe yourself, consider that in the 17th century, physicist Isaac Newton saw time as an arrow fired from a bow, traveling in a direct, straight line and never deviating from its path. By applying this theory, he was able to assume that if the speed of light could vary, then time must be constant. This is something that it's easy to think is true. But we know of, so to speak, Einstein's theory that time fluctuates throughout the universe. I'm not trying to say anything controversial about it, so much as just to hint that it seems relevant. After all, the old definition of a second was based on the rotation of Earth. What -- the 'old' definition? Time remains a complex topic. Consider then, this not-so-constant universal constant and such. Start with what you yourself think -- Kant doesn't know anything you don't know about 'time'. How do you know what you know about it?

Mww: 'The problem since, isn’t the understanding of it, but whether or not it is the case.'

You go on to mention Quine, as if Quine maybe understood it. Did Quine even read Kant? No reason to feel misled, he never claimed to have read Kant. As to 'whether or not it is the case', yes, it is the case.

'That mathematics is synthetic is beside the point of whether a priori cognitions are possible, and if so, whether they are necessary.'

Okay, but there isn't anything controversial in mathematics being a science. What then, is the 'mathematical evidence'? It's a priori. Nothing controversial in that either. The synthetic part is the controversial part. Addition and geometry have apodictic certainty, they're necessary. You came to the thread to debunk them? Don't you *like* mathematics? 2+2 = .. what?

'If he’d made it just another few years, he might have been the one to notice tossing an object out the window of his railcar didn’t appear anywhere near the same to him as it did to his manservant watching him ride away.'

This doesn't get me to Kant having been wrong about anything that he did notice.

By the way, I see this later remark of yours:
'In Kantian epistemology, reality, in and of itself, without modifiers or qualifications, is a category, a “pure concept of the understanding”, and accordingly, has no object of its own by which it is empirically known. Instead, they have schemata, by which they are thought. As such, no category, and by association, reality, can be either a cause or an effect. And if every effect must have a cause, and reality is not an effect, it follows reality does not necessarily have a cause.'

True that 'reality' is a category, but I don't think that seems to be the issue. I think the thread is, maybe I rephrase a bit, that *appearances* have a cause. Kant discusses this notion. The logic is that 'appearance' is what things look like or seem to be rather than what they actually are. Thus, there is the question of 'what they actually are' -- it's implied in the mere concept of 'appearances'.

'Kant was very meticulous with his wording, to the point where to properly understand his work, you need to write your own dictionary as reference. Changing words around in Kant's works is not a good idea.'

Impossible to overstate this point. Maybe even more true of theoretical physics. Thus, finding the right way to synthesize these two areas is tricky. Is it even worth it? I am a fan of Kant, but even the infamous 'analytic/synthtetic' distinction, which Kant thought of as a fine way to begin, is poorly understood. Kant claimed that mathematics is synthetic, or 'synthetic a priori' judgment. This is a controversial point, and much of the controversy is about understanding what it even means. I think one would want to understand what it means before speculating about what Kant might have made of Einstein's non-Euclidean geometry, for example. This theoretical physics of Eistein is certainly a challenging and fascinating subject.