If I say he has the right to eat meat because he can only survive on it, I'm appealing to the "Intrinsic Rights" school of morality which is incompatible with utilitarianism.
I don't see how that follows. I'm asking why you think preferences are irrational if they aren't "reasoned." Are all non-reasoned things irrational? Is my tv set irrational? My taste for Indian food? These are non-rational...not irrational. Also, rationality and reasons can split apart, as my examples illustrated. Furthermore, rationality is a complex; it is an achievement of sorts. There are no default rational items. In order to arrive at "rational" beliefs, we will need justifiers. Justifiers themselves need not be justified. Insofar as our preferences can act as justifiers (I can think of several accessibility internalists who think this) they would be part of the process of rational belief formation. Because they themselves are non-rational elements of one's justifying base does not make them irrational.Preferences would be irrational as they aren't reasoned positions.
probably not.Would Plato have approved of the current US administration?
Consciousness does not drive the mind, it follows along with a notebook and writes things down.
I think this is a plausible analogy. There are many senses to the word reason. An exhaustive taxonomic breakdown may be too much to ask for, but I think what you point out is relevant to the question. Sometimes we ask for the reason why someone did something, and all we are looking for is what motivated them. Other times we are looking for a justification. When I think of normative reasons, it's the justificatory role that is primary. So in my example of a person (call him Joe) mistakenly believing a murderer was in his house, one could respond that Joe was responding to "reasons", and what we mean by that is Joe was responding to what Derek Parfit called apparent reasons. Still, this would be an example in which rationality is not tied to actual normative, justifying reasons.In the coherence sense, one is rational if one acts according to reasons that, regardless of their reality, cohere with the rest of a person's beliefs and desires.
This has always bothered me, but I can't quite seem to figure out why I find this so bothersome. Do our intuitions demand rationality to be a thick concept that has a non-arbitrary connection with the world? Because my intuitions about that annoyingly oscillate back and forth. I guess I fear that if we make criteria for rationality external to mental processes then the criteria itself becomes arbitrary. How do we come to know which external criteria actually count as genuine requirements of rationality? To avoid that problem, I adopt a more limiting, less thick, conception of rationality, relegating it to consistency amongst beliefs, conative states, etc.The rules are set up, and the agent follows them correctly, but they don't really mean anything.
If morality is aligned with rationality, so that what is rational is also what is moral, then the question "why be moral" is eclipsed by the question "why be rational?"
this is actually quite beautiful. Is this from somewhere or did you make this up? Either way, I like it.we go the way we are drawn
One that doesn't have to do with reasons. A rather intuitive one is the view that rationality is a property of persons; it supervenes on the mental. If two individuals in different universes are mentally equivalent, then they both have the same degree of rationality. Under the assumption we can be mistaken about reasons, if I mistakenly think a murderer is in my house, truly genuinely believe it, and I do not wish to die, then it is rational for me to try to escape whether or not I actually have a reason to escape. I can lack a reason to act and be rationally permitted to act. It is also rather natural for us to say that I would be irrational if I did not intend to escape given my beliefs and desires, because rationality, according to this conception, is more a matter of consistency between our beliefs, intended goals, etc., and not actual reasons.What other definition of rationality is there apart from having reasons?
No. I'm asking for a reason to be rational. I'm wondering if people think of rationality as normative. It would be circular if one adopted a reason-loaded conception of rationality, which I'm leaving open-ended.Are you asking for a rational justification for being rational? Isn't that circular?
I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting position, both logically adequate.The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.
This language is rather confusing, because reasons are those things we cite when we try supporting a position. If axioms support arguments, then axioms could act as reasons. From here, your overall concern is rendered moot, because we could maintain a position by citing said axiomatic reasons. When you say:Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.
But I'd examine this claim if I were you. If I smell smoke upon waking, and believe, genuinely, my house is on fire, and I desire to live, is it not rational of me to save myself? Now suppose there is no fire. There is no reason for me to flee. Am I rendered irrational because I have no reason to flee? You could say my own beliefs and desires give me reason to act, but then you'd be admitting our preferences/ mental states can act as reasons, which is contrary to your point.Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational
I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting positions, both logically adequate.The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.
This language is rather confusing, because we cite reasons within arguments, not axioms. Axioms are the foundation of certain mathematical or logical universes. They don't show up in premises when we argue. It is possible you are using "axiom" more casually to mean, a starting point in an argument, e.g. the first premise of an argument. If that's what you mean, then axioms could act as reasons because we cite reasons in argumentation. Axioms would just be those starting reasons we cite. But this way of interpreting things would render your question moot, as our choice of positions would be determined by reasons/axioms.Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.