The fundamental units of nature are events which take place in the medium of spacetime. Events have both physical and experiential aspects, attributes or poles. — prothero

I like neutral monism because it is consistent with Aristotle's notion of substance (hylomorphism), which I find useful to retain for other reasons. For example, human substance is a unity of organic mass-energy and mind, arranged according to the Laws of Nature and Intentionality, respectively; consisting of objects and events (constituting systems) which may be abstracted as "physical" and/or "mental".

What I've been saying is that matter and mind aren't illusions, rather they are types of information. — Harry Hindu

I agree. And fundamentally, they are types of empirical data.

Cheers!

I am sorry, I do not understand this, as it seems to me that symmetry is as much a datum as asymmetry. A priori, we could have either. — Dfpolis

So a datum (asymmetry or symmetry) is epistemically and ontically foundational?

Data being asymmetries, are you referring to anything other than symmetry?

Nonetheless, I was not entirely satisfied with my reply, as it did not close the loop bake to a mental foundation in the case of non-semantic "messages" such as DNA sequences. I left them with the reduction of ontological rather than logical possibility. That left open the possibility of understanding information without reference to a knowing subject. — Dfpolis

Of course it is not possible that information can be understood (except in a metaphorical sense) without reference to a knowing subject.

In the case of non-semantic messages (e.g., DNA), understanding is irrelevant. The vocabulary (energy-mass set) used in a non-semantic message is common to (not understood by) both message source (e.g., DNA) and message destination (e.g., RNAP).

Vocabulary being: an energy-mass and/or symbol set common to and/or understood by message source (informer) and message destination (informee).

So, I consider the related general definitions of information, message, communication, code, and data to constitute a foundational concept which applies to both material (physical) and intentional (mental) domains.

Where we disagree is how logical possibility relates to this. You have brought in semantics, pointing out that not all codes communicate meaning to minds. However, that is not what I meant in saying that the the possibility in Shannon's definition is logical. I am considering the message materially, as Shannon did -- not formally (as meaning something) as you are. — Dfpolis

Or rather, as I suspect you were (i.e., considering the message formally), as follows:

The problem is that information cannot be a primary concept. Since it is the reduction of logical possibility, it presupposes the existence of logical possibilities to be reduced. Logical possibilities are possibilities in the realm of knowledge, and knowledge presupposes a knowing subject. So, we need knowing subjects (minds) to ground the concept of information -- as well as that of intentionality. — Dfpolis

However, thanks for your clarification. From that, it appears we agree on the nature of Shannon information, and on the role of genetic code (DNA) in gene expression. Where we disagree concerns whether or not your original comment was "considering the message materially, as Shannon did".

The problem is that information cannot be a primary concept. Since it is the reduction of logical possibility, it presupposes the existence of logical possibilities to be reduced. — Dfpolis

What "information" presupposes depends on how it is defined. Shannon defined information as communicated code (which can apply to physical, biological, and semantic processing), not as "the reduction of logical possibility" (which can only apply to semantic processing).

Defining information as communicated code presupposes a dataset (vocabulary) and constraint(s) (syntax), not mind.

Code being: transformed, translated, or converted data (asymmetries) which are elements of a vocabulary (energy/mass and/or symbol set) arranged according to a syntax (principles of structural constraint).

Aristotle's process of information can be equated with Shannon's process of communication, and both can describe physical, biological, and semantic processing.

When you consider what a 'code' really is, there aren't that many instances of them. I mean, science has been scanning the Universe for signs of extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) for decades, and found no evidence of anything like a code. (If they had, it would be big news.) You can say that the spectral footprints of atoms and stars are 'a code' but they are only so to a scientist who can interpret them; in themselves they don't convey information; nothing like a string of transmitted information has been found. I think the only examples of codes that science knows of, are human languages and symbolic systems (including maths and computer languages), and DNA, which transmits biological information. — Wayfarer

We agree that DNA is a code, but it doesn't transmit biological (or any other kind of) information during gene expression.

According to Hoffmeyer & Emmeche, it is inactive, and:
1) Determinate to the extent that it preserves identity through time.
2) Indeterminate with respect to material detail.

So, DNA isn't a code by your definition (either "a string of transmitted information", or something "which transmits biological information"). Do you still think DNA is a code? If so, what do you think a code really is?

There’s a topic in comparative religion and philosophy about the distinction between ‘henosis’ as the kind of mystical union sought by Plotinus (and ‘orientals’ generally) and the ‘theosis’ of the Christian tradition proper, in which the soul (individual identity?) of the aspirant still remains distinct. — Wayfarer

So, it would seem that @javra's perfect objectivity (impartiality) is, ironically, a form of cultural (collectivist versus individualist) bias.

My main point here being that, were this state to in fact be a metaphysically determinate aspect of existence, and were beings to be capable of someday actualizing this state of being in non-hyperbolical ways, then here all sense of subjectivity, of self, would vanish … and one would become perfectly impartial awareness (what I believe Neo-Platonist address by “the One”). — javra

Is this to say that all things which have awareness also have self awareness (said self awareness vanishing when perfectly impartial awareness is attained)?

A definition of awareness would be useful, because I cannot determine whether or not "being" is used equivocally (as "subject" obviously is).

I am currently trying to piece together an idea for a board game. It is an abstract representation of cultural development and interactions within and between different species. — I like sushi

Do different species interact on a cultural level?

If culture is the collective mindset and consequent products of a social group (including social order and artefacts), then:
1) Only species which form social groups have cultures.
2) Cultural development determines social group development.

As a starting point, human culture is primarily determined by the exigencies of natural environment (physical geography, climate, and availability of natural resources).

Then human social groups progress through more complex levels of organisation (from egalitarian to hierarchical) in order to enhance quality of life.

Finally, at civilisation stage, progress is seen in terms of rise(success) and dominance (expansion).

The goal of the game is to attain the greatest level of dominance, and to delay the inevitable stagnation, decline, and fall (failure) for as long as possible.

Maybe allow for remote multi-player participation across a wide area network, and call it SimCivilisation.

If Science is empirical investigation which provides a reliable explanation, and Philosophy is logical investigation which provides a coherent concept, then Science and Philosophy can be complementary areas of study and/or practice.

Relevant empirical facts should be presupposed in Philosophical problem-solving. And, the coherence which logical investigation imposes upon Scientific description should serve to clarify current knowledge and guide further empirical investigation.

I want to make an argument that concepts can also function as apparatus, and that philosophy - largely in the business of concept mongering - is thus also in the business of constructing what are essentially intellectual apparatuses. — StreetlightX

Engineering design is an intellectual apparatus which captures a project brief and existing data, and produces a building, or infrastructure.

Whereas, concept is an intellectual apparatus which captures objects having similar attributes and logical relations to other ideas, categories, and concepts, and produces a mental model, or theory.

The nature of consciousness varies across animals, both in terms of sensitivity and awareness (perception and/or cognisance), in that:
1) Lower animals have cognisance in the form of instinct (natural or innate impulse, inclination, or tendency, not acquired through learning, nor contingent upon volition).
2) Higher animals have cognisance in the form of tacit knowledge and implicit memory.
3) Human beings have cognisance in the form of tacit and declarative knowledge, and implicit and explicit memory.

Tacit data is processed in the human mind passively (in an automatic, or intuitive, manner), while declarative code is processed in the human mind actively (in a controlled, or cogitative, manner). For other correlations, see Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow (1st ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 9780374275631.

So, human language (code consisting of a set of words having paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, hence; semantic content) implies cogitation, as opposed to just instinct or intuition.

My aim for this discussion was the genesis of consciousness: And clearly one of the problems with discussing consciousness is in defining what exactly it is. We all have our own slightly different shade of grey here. I am going to state my definition: it is the understanding and acceptance of the concept 'I think, therefore I am'. — Tim3003

Self is not an actuality which is located:
1) Within a body, or body part (e.g., a head, or brain).
2) Within a mind, producing behaviour.

Self is:
1) Individuality, reflexively considered (i.e., a subject and object having the same referent). So, in English, it is a noun, or personal pronoun suffix.
2) Reflexive. So, in English, it is an adjective, or combining form.

Myself is me thinking about me.

"When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception...If anyone upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him...He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me." (Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, I.iv.6.)

So, it would be inappropriate to define consciousness or experience in terms of a self, instead of in terms of a whole individual organism (body and mind).

"The subject of experience is not an owner of experience or a 'self', but a human being." (Bennett & Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 12.4,333)

My current working definitions:
1) Human Consciousness: a conscious (sensitive and actively aware) mind-body condition.
2) Sensation: the organic ability to respond to stimuli through sense function.
3) Sense: the reception and transduction of exogenous and/or endogenous stimuli, resulting in the propagation of action potentials in excitable cells.
4) Aware: perceptive and/or cognisant.
5) Experience: transitive consciousness.

By these definitions, Ildefonso and Helen Keller (having sensory limitations, yet having sensations) could be conscious (e.g., awake) or semi-conscious (e.g., asleep, or daydreaming) without recourse to a linguistic "I" or "self".

I prefer to define intention as: reference to an object (physical or mental actuality) by mental representation in order to describe it and/or cause its essential development (synonyms: purpose, goal), because I find it to be consistent with commonly held notions of:
1) Intentionality: the capacity to form mental representations of objects, and
2) Propositional Attitude: attitude which describes the relation between a proposition and existence.

As such, these terms belong to the domain of mind.

So:
1) I think referring to the Laws of Nature as a type of intentionality is a category error apart from an association with a Supreme Being having mind, and
2) Recognising determinate cause in both physical and mental aspects of the universe, I would prefer to define Final Cause as: constraint(s). This would comprehend the Laws of Nature with regard to physical aspects, and intentions with regard to mental aspects.

Mathematics and language are types of mental code (transformed, translated, or converted mental data) consisting of a mental vocabulary (symbol set) arranged according to a mental syntax (logical structure).

Mental codes require mental representations, and facilitate mental processing.

Numeracy (the ability to understand number arrangements, and perform numerical operations) and literacy (the ability to understand word arrangements, and perform verbal operations) are human faculties, hence; human universals.

Both faculties develop in parallel with mental maturation, personal experience, and social influences. Mathematical and verbal abilities develop subjectively, while mathematics and language develop intersubjectively.

Our ends are objectively knowable as are those things that can advance our ends. "Ought," then, refers to objectively effective behavior with respect to the attainment of human ends. — Dfpolis

I agree, but would suggest that Manfred Max-Neef's Fundamental Human Needs has superseded Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.

Max-Neef, Manfred A. with Elizalde, Antonio; Hopenhayn, Martin. (1989). Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflections. New York: Apex.

Maslow, A.H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370–96.

What is it that makes even the religious and conservatives more liberal and tolerant than at any previous point in history? — Ryan B

Your contractualism may serve as an "ethical" basis for a liberal agenda, but as a foundation for human morality, it doesn't (and cannot) exist.

My objections concerning universal morality and rule-based systems, as well as many of my questions, have not been addressed. So, rather than read replies which contain more of the same ideological nonsense found on your blog, I am opting out of this discussion.

No, modern-day morality incorporates 7,000 years of cross-cultural thought and experience but has refined the concepts through a dialectical process. — Ryan B

Where is this "modern-day morality", that I may examine its contents and ascertain which parts of extant moral codes and value systems have been retained, and which parts have been rejected?

And if it doesn't exist, what should we use as a system of morality until the "modern-day" version is formulated (presumably through a dialectical process) and is universally accepted? And how long will that take?

What was the dialectical process whereby extant moral code and value system concepts were refined? Who formulated and approved this process? When and where was it conducted, and by whom?

An independent rational actor occupying the original position is forced to conclude that all human life is equal because they face the possibility of occupying any future social position. — Ryan B

A psychopath is unlikely to accept your neural typical notion of rationality.
If:
1) Moral progress depends on "maintaining an open society to freely discuss and debate moral issues." And,
2) Psychopaths occupy positions of power.
Then:
It is unlikely that moral issues will be resolved to the satisfaction of neural typicals.

Morality is difficult to ground in anything objective. Our sense is that morality is not arbitrary or relative, but most proposed systems of morality (Utilitarianism, Deontology) are subject to criticism that precludes the system from universal application. — Ryan B

Anthropologist Donald E. Brown has determined that morality is a human universal (Human Universals, 1991), cf. Human Universals, Human Nature, Human Culture

So, I think human morality is an intersubjective (species-specific) consensus gentium based on human nature (genetic predisposition) which has many subjective (personal) and intersubjective (cultural) manifestations. Specifically, that it is implemented in the human mind through theory of mind, empathy, ethical knowledge, conscience, introspection, and self-judgement, as follows:
1) Once theory of mind has been attained at 2-7 years of age (Piaget), ethical knowledge begins to be acquired by human beings through the operation of empathy (which has affective and cognitive aspects).
2) A person's morality construct develops in parallel with mental maturation, personal experience, and social influences (cf., Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development).
3) Moral action-behaviour is informed by the operation of conscience, and self-judgement is activated by introspection.

Hence, the similarities between the value systems and moral codes of the World's major book religions and systems of moral philosophy. Generally, these are based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs; and so, are accepted by all neural typical people, and applicable to all people without exception, for the regulation (guidance and judgement) of human behaviour.

Are you proposing that humanity should throw away 7000 years of cross-cultural experience and formulate a new morality based on rational public discourse simply to divest ourselves of any connection to religion? If so, how is this artificial consensus attained?

Also, if moral progress depends on:
1) "Increasing our scientific knowledge regarding how the world works and how we can reduce human suffering and promote human flourishing." Wouldn't that effectively make scientists the priests of a new religion?
2) "Promoting our biological predispositions for cooperation, empathy, and reciprocation." Does this entail genetic engineering and/or transhumanism?
3) "Using rationality as the foundation to match what we know about the world and ourselves with the acts most beneficial and consistent with those facts."
4) "Maintaining an open society to freely discuss and debate moral issues."

Regarding points 3) and 4), do you realise that fully rational psychopaths gravitate toward positions of power?

Rule-based systems are destined to fail because there is always a conflict between consequences and duties, utilitarianism and deontology. General principles will always conflict with particulars, and vice versa. — Ryan B

Given:
1) Right action is the faultless execution of rational action.
2) Rational action is based on the greater/greatest ethical value of available choices.

The faultless execution of rational action may be achieved through one or more approach.

1) General Approaches
a) Master Rule Approach: the derivation of particular rules from a master rule (e.g., the Golden Rule).
b) Method Approach: the derivation of particular rules from a methodological principle (e.g., testing whether or not an option satisfies a fundamental human need).

2) Particular Approach
a) Virtue Approach: reference to particular rules contained in a standard (e.g., moral code, value system, etc.).

The amount of time available for decision-making depends on the exigencies of a situation. Required response time varies along a continuum between immediate and eventual.
1) Immediate decision-making requires automatic processing.
2) Eventual decision-making permits controlled processing.

So, the exigencies of a social situation determine the type of mental processing required (i.e., automatic and/or controlled), and therefore which approach is most suitable. For example:
1) The application of a Master Rule Approach is suitable for automatic processing.
2) The application of a Method Approach is suitable for a combination of automatic and controlled processing.
3) The application of a Virtue Approach is suitable for controlled processing.

Public policy should be formulated using a virtue approach, because:
1) The ethical quantity of action affecting a social group is relatively great, warranting careful consideration of particular circumstances.
2) The problem-solving, decision-making, and planning resources of a social group are task appropriate.

The ethical value of an action can be calculated using variables of ethical quality (moral, amoral, or immoral) and quantity (multitude and/or magnitude). Also, ethical utility (an after-the-fact measurement of ethical efficiency) can be calculated using variables of intent, means, and consequences.

While mulling this over, I've wondered what different ethical systems would have to say about this. Clearly there are situations where failing to inform the appropriate parties could be viewed as immoral, such as failing to report a terrorist plot, the hiding place of a murderer, etc. The potential harm of not informing far outweighs the potential harm of informing in situations like those. However, it is not so clear when it comes to lower-stakes situations. — ProbablyTrue

So, the question becomes: in what situations is it (im)moral to share or withhold information?

Given that similarities obtain between the value systems and moral codes of the World's major book religions and systems of moral philosophy, on an inter-personal level:
1) Sharing information regarding another's marital infidelity would generally be considered meddlesome and/or cruel (immoral).
2) Withholding information for profit or advantage would generally be considered fraudulent (immoral).

On an intra-group level:
1) Withholding information regarding criminal activity would generally be considered illegal and/or collusive (immoral).
2) Sharing others' personal information without their permission would generally be considered exploitative (immoral).

On an inter-group level:
1) Sharing national secrets with another nation would generally be considered treasonous (immoral).
2) Withholding information in violation of an international regime would generally be considered treacherous (immoral).

Clearly, whether or not sharing information is moral or immoral depends on the social situation under consideration.

1 John 4:8 says God is love. But there’s also hell, and I think God being loving and creating hell are at odds with each other. — Empedocles

The Koine Greek word rendered "love" here is agape (self-sacrifice), not philos (affection) or eros (romantic/sexual desire).

Using a concordance and/or lexicon, it is instructive to note the subject, object, and context for each occurence of these terms.

In short, the occupants of hell (Koine Greek, geenna) are not the objects of God's affection.

Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens). — Galuchat

I have no idea what data one could bring to bear to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. So, in my view it is an unscientific speculation. — Dfpolis

From Anthropology:

Homo habilis (-2,000,000 years):
Brain Capacity = 600-800 cc
Unable to encode speech.

Homo erectus (-1,500,000 years):
Brain Capacity = 800-1200 cc
Linguistic competence exhibited by tool design and fire use.

Archais Homo sapiens (-300,000 years):
Brain Capacity = 1400 cc
Ability to encode and decode speech.

Modern Homo sapiens (-40,000 years)
Brain Capacity = 1500 cc

I am in general agreement with this explanation, except for the following two points:

1)

The object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. So, there's no epistic gap here between us and the sensed object. Rather, our representation of the object is the object's existential penetration of us. — Dfpolis

If the word phrase "sensory representation" and word "representation" were replaced with "awareness" (perception and cognisance caused by sensation), I could agree with your formulation. Otherwise, I consider the use of the word "representation" in this context to be unnecessarily metaphorical.

2)

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. — Dfpolis

I agree with the first sentence, but disagree with the second. While my own thought is largely verbal, Einstein's thought experiments were, by his own admission, nonverbal.

Also, Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens).

If true, nonverbal thought and communication proceeded verbal thought and communication in evolutionary terms.

I think that the vagueness of the concept of personhood forces us, ethically, to err on the side of generosity : better remain open to the idea that something might be someone in principle, so as not to deny the existence of alternate form of subjectivities. — Akanthinos

I agree, and well said.
Is it possible to arrive at a general definition of "person" given the natural-legal distinction?

Also:
1) If I have a notion of my identity, and others have a notion of my identity, does my actual identity consist only of the relevant facts which can be established, or does it consist of the intersubjective identification of the agents involved in a social situation, or both?

2) If animals have social groups, do they have personal and social identities, and if so, should they be granted personhood in a human society?

I have always been of the opinion that personhood, as a concept, is almost entirely vacuous once it is removed from the legal domain. — Akanthinos

I agree.
And yet, in hierarchical social groups, a legal domain exists, and social role (a part of social identity) is often linked with legal status. For example:
1) Family and conjugal relations.
2) Inmates of penal and mental health institutions.
3) Wards of the State.
4) Officials.



You have a notion of your own identity (i.e., a Self Schema), and others have a notion of your identity (i.e., a Person Schema). Nishida, H. (1999). Cultural Schema Theory: In W.B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing About Intercultural Communication, (pp. 401–418). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

If a human being has dementia (entailing distortions, then loss, of autobiographical memory), their social identity changes, but their personal identity (heritable attributes) remains essentially unchanged.

The self and person schemata of the individual with dementia may be modified initially, but ultimately they are lost. And the person schema of their family members and acquaintances would be accommodated (modified) or assimilated (extended), resulting in a change of social identity for the afflicted individual. But self (combined personal and social) identity is not lost unless a human being is no longer recognised by one's self and others.

So, given that identity loss is a possibility, should personhood be defined in terms of social identity, or only in terms of human nature (i.e., genetic predisposition)?

So there are at least two aspects of identity, but is who we think we are, make us who we are? — Waya

Does a person's identity change when they suffer from a brain disease (e.g., dementia) or a mental illness (e.g., dissociative identity disorder)?

What causes a person to be a person? — Waya

The foundational question is: what is a person? It's an important question because personhood has social and legal implications.

All human beings have a self (personal and social) identity:
1) Personal identity is the set of heritable attributes which remain essentially unchanged throughout the course of a person's life.
2) Social identity is the set of social attributes which have their basis in social learning and change throughout the course of a person's life.

Social identity is a mental construct which is stored in episodic and semantic memory.
Addis DR, Tippett L J. (2008). The Contributions of Autobiographical Memory to the Content and Continuity of Identity.

If a person is a human being possessing a social identity, and all human beings have a biological mother and father, then all human beings are persons.

I agree with your thoughts on subjectivity.

With regard to Dennett's levels of psychological explanation, he assigns an ontological status only to his Physical Stance, not to his Functional Design or Intentional Stance.

So, I reject eliminative materialism as a radical form of reductionism which denies the existence of mental conditions and functions known from experience and through introspection.

He's never said we don't have minds or experiences, only that they're not what some people (including myself) think they are. — Marchesk

What does he say, and what do you think, minds and experiences are?

Currently, however, eliminative materialists, such as Dennett, have chosen to doubt mental experience. (Showing in my mind that you can will to suspend belief about anything.) — Dfpolis

In Dennett's case, no mental experience may be a fact.

So, if knowing is not a species of belief in this view, what is it? It is what Aristotle described in De Anima iii -- the actualization of intelligibility -- or, in more phenomenological terms, the awareness of present being. — Dfpolis

Or, in psychological terms, cognition (knowing condition).
Or cognisance (mental experience of knowing), part of being aware; the other part being perception (experience caused by sensation).

His awareness of this dynamic presence, of this intelligibility, was him knowing that he was in his chamber, and it was unaffected by his suspension of belief. — Dfpolis

I have not read Descartes. Was he suspending belief or modulating attention (concentrated direction of mind by means of information selection)?

I found John of St. Thomas and Henry Veatch very useful. — Dfpolis

Much has been considered and written in the field of semiotics since John Poinsot's Tractatus de Signis.

Why have you recommended this work over those of modern semioticians (e.g., Saussure, Peirce, vonUexkull, Morris, Sebeok, Lotman, Eco, Deely, etc.)?

Yes. I would define a mental representation as a cognitive symbol (a type of sign).

I like to project reality into different conceptual spaces -- to think about the same thing from different perspectives. I think doing so, and comparing the resulting "pictures," helps me understand an issue more fully. — Dfpolis

Absolutely.

I would say that phenomena (physical actualities) are perceived, not encoded in neural representations.
Perception being the experience caused by sensation (sense function). — Galuchat

A neural representation is a modification to our neural state that encodes information in the same way that an E-M signal carries a representation of transmitted information. — Dfpolis

It is the use of the word “representation” to describe phenomena such as neural conditions and signals that I object to, because none of its contextually-relevant connotations (e.g., picture, figure, image, idea) reasonably apply. Whereas, referring to phenomena such as paintings, sculptures, dance movements, and music as representations would be an appropriate use of the word. The difference being the latter are semantic (have meaning for a mind).

It is especially inappropriate to use the word “representation” with reference to neural conditions when Antonio Damasio (as well as Sherrington, Edelman, and Crick) thinks that perception involves constructing an image in the brain:

“When you and I look at an object outside ourselves, we form comparable images in our respective brains...But that does not mean that the image we see is the copy of whatever the object outside is like. Whatever it is like, in absolute terms, we do not know. The image we see is based on changes which occurred in our organisms...when the physical structure of the object interacts with the body...The object is real, the interactions are real, and the images are as real as anything can be. And yet, the structure and properties in the image we end up seeing are brain constructions prompted by the object... There is a set of correspondences between physical characteristics of the object and modes of reaction of the organism according to which according to which an internally generated image is constructed.”
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens. p.320. Heinemann, London.

“But this is confused. What one perceives by the use of one's perceptual organs is an object or array of objects, sounds, smells, and the properties and relations of items in one's environment. It is a mistake to suppose that what we perceive is always or even commonly, an image, or that to perceive an object is to have an image of the object perceived. One does not perceive images or representations of objects. To see a red apple is not to see an image of a red apple, and to hear a sonata is not to hear the image or representation of a sonata. Nor is it to have an image in one's mind, although one can conjure up images in one's mind and sometimes images cross one's mind independently of one's wish or will. But the mental images we thus conjure up are not visible, either to others or to ourselves – they are 'had', but not seen. And the tunes one rehearses in one's imagination are not heard, either by oneself or by others.”
Bennett, M.R., Hacker, P.M.S. (2003). Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. p.138. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

7) Received and decoded by the brain (Sensory Processing) — Galuchat

I have no idea what it means for the brain to "decode" the neural signal. It surely processes neural signals, but what difference can there be processing in which one form of neural signal is input and another form output, and "decoding" when the output is simple a neural signal? — Dfpolis

What I am attempting to describe in succinct terms is the reception of neural signals from sense organs at these locations in the brain where sensory processing takes place:
1) Primary Sensory Cortex
2) Somatic Sensory Association Area
3) Visual Association Area
4) Visual Cortex
5) Primary Motor Cortex
6) Somatic Motor Association Area
7) Prefrontal Cortex
8) Broca's Area (Speech Production)
9) Auditory Association Area
10) Auditory Cortex
11) Wernicke's Area (Speech Comprehension)

This processing activates schemata, which effectively “decodes” neural signals into meaningful data for the mind to act on. However, I accept that these terms may be faulty from a neurophysiological standpoint.

Thanks for the references to John of St. Thomas, Henry Veatch, and your video on Ideas and Brain States.

Thanks very much for your feedback.
I will need to wait until tomorrow to consider it in detail.

Fair enough.

(2) Somehow we distinguish the object modifying our senses from the modification of our senses by the object -- even though both are encoded in a single neural representation. — Dfpolis

I would say that phenomena (physical actualities) are perceived, not encoded in neural representations.
Perception being the experience caused by sensation (sense function).
Sense being the reception and transduction of exogenous and/or endogenous stimuli, resulting in environmental perception (exteroception) or corporeal perception (interoception).

Therefore, what "modifies" our senses are physical stimuli originating from the environment, or from our own body.

I think communication is a good analogy for the process which connects phenomena to awareness.

In Shannon's Mathematical (Quantitative) Theory of (Data) Communication, it is data which is encoded, transmitted, conveyed, received, and decoded. Information (defined as a measure of improbability) is the result.

This clearly provides an incomplete definition of information (for example, not addressing the semantics inherent in human communication), but I find the framework of communication it presents to be useful.

Following Floridi, I prefer to define information in more general terms of data, which, in addition to mathematical information, applies to semantic, physical, and biological information (among other types).

Noting that Floridi's description of data bears similarities to Merleau-Ponty's concept of form, I consider the two terms to be synonymous, referring to asymmetries.

So,
1) Information becomes: communicated data (form), and
2) A process of physical communication provides a connection between phenomena and awareness.

For example, in seeing an apple:
1) Apple colour and shape are encoded into reflected light.
2) Reflected light is transmitted from the apple surface,
3) Conveyed through a transmission medium (e.g., air) capable of propagating energy waves,
4) Received by an eye (Sensory Stimulation),
5) Encoded into a neural signal (Sensory Transduction),
6) Transmitted to the brain (Neurotransmission),
7) Received and decoded by the brain (Sensory Processing),
8) Received and decoded by the mind (Perception & Cognition).

Mental representation happens at step 8. I have no idea what a neural representation is.

In talking about the logical order, I'm discussing information. Information is the reduction of (logical) possibility and results from the actualization of intelligibility. Both physical and intentional states have an intelligibility that is prior to our knowledge of them. — Dfpolis

While information properly speaking belongs to the logical order, a state's intelligibility, as a source of information, may be called "information" by an analogy of attribution -- just as we say food is "heathy" not because it's alive and well, but because it contributes to health. — Dfpolis

So, I'm using "logical" to refer to the information (intelligibility) specifying a state, whether that state be physical or intentional. "Logical Propagators" in nature, then, transform the intelligibility of one state into that of another. — Dfpolis

For my cognitive psychology project, I have found it very useful to maintain a physical/mental distinction in conceptual analysis (as the above example demonstrates).

That is why I would prefer to describe intentionality/logical propagation in general terms which can apply to both physical and semantic information, not exclusively in terms of the latter.