I can contain in my head different types of beliefs that I do not hold as "being the case". They "might" be the case. — Philosophim

So is that the difference between the beliefs in your statement about knowledge (that I quoted earlier)? So the first belief (“belief in something”) is only a belief that something might be? And the second belief (“belief that ‘the something’ is co-existent with reality”) is a belief that something actually is?

First of all I think that belief in x already indicates that you believe x is true (or 'the case' or 'co-existent with reality'), so the truthiness does not need to be further emphasised. On the other hand, if you only believe that x might be, then you should be explicit about that. So your statement should be rephrased like this:

[Knowledge] is both the belief that something might be, and a further belief that “the something” is.

But my second point is that while the statement now makes a bit more sense, I still think it’s nonsensical. I don’t think it’s possible, at the same time, to believe that x might be and that x is.

So you can believe that it might be sunny and that it might be rainy. Then when you look out the window and see that it is actually rainy, the ‘might’ vanishes, and you only believe that it is rainy. You don’t believe that it is sunny or that it might be sunny or that it might be rainy.

Feel free to point out if I've made an error in the argument if we use the encyclopedia definition. — Philosophim

So, if we go with the encyclopedia definition, we can go back to the first sentence that I quoted from your paper:

[Knowledge] is both the belief in something, and a further belief that “the something” is co-existent with reality

If we rephrase the encyclopedia definition with the words used here, we get: belief in something is the attitude we have, whenever we regard that “the something” is co-existent with reality. Then what does the “further belief that ‘the something’ is co-existent with reality” add here?

I guess it should have been obvious.

I've been thinking that a voting system could be handy namely for upvoting a post rather than downvoting. There have been times when I've been writing a reply to something and then someone posts before me with a better reply than I ever could have. Worthy of an upvote! Maybe I'm an optimist for thinking that such downvote bullying wouldn't be a thing on a forum like this.

Wouldn't it be handier if you didn't have to post that thumb but instead you could just downvote the post? Or are you just demonstrating to frank, how bad it feels to get downvoted, and normally you wouldn't post plain thumbs?

I must disappoint you by saying that I did not read the later parts. I did try, but quickly came to the realization that I really should try to understand part 1 first. Surely understanding of the first part should be a requirement for understanding the later parts? Or at least it shouldn’t be the other way around?

However, after reading some of the recent discussions in this thread, I realized that my understanding fails already at the very first paragraph. Initially I thought that you defined belief in a similar way as I (and I assume most others) would, but in a response to Coben you say this:

A belief is simply a wish or desire that something is a particular way.

Equating belief with a wish or desire seems quite extraordinary. According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term ‘belief’ to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

To me that’s quite a common sense definition. Would you agree with that (and I’m just not understanding the way you define the same thing) or is your conception of belief really something very different?

What are you hoping to achieve with objective morality?

killing is condemned in the majority of cultures — Aleph Numbers

And therefore in most countries there are laws preventing it. What else do you want?

If one subscribes to this theory of human evolution, then it would appear that altruistic acts are rooted in the selfish motive of strengthening the group. — flaco

Would you agree that being selfish requires that one is also conscious of their selfish motives? I don’t think most people are thinking about group strength when they are behaving altruistically.

I think it depends on the balance of thinking about yourself and others. So if the halo-shining or whatever selfish motive weighs (considerably) more than some selfless motive, then most people would probably consider the person selfish.

Isn’t it enough if someone just feels good about sacrificing themselves? So they are not getting any rewards after the sacrifice (because they don’t exist anymore) but rather before and during the sacrifice.

Do we or do we not have control of our desires. — Caldwell

In the context of everyday life, I like to think that we do control our desires: sometimes I can prevent myself from eating the chocolate bar, and sometimes I get overrun by my desires.

But then, when I dig deeper and try to see what it is that motivates me to prevent me from eating the chocolate bar, it’s hard to see anything else but just another desire. Perhaps this time there was more rational thought involved in the action, perhaps it was a more long-term desire, e.g. to stay healthy, but it’s hard to see any fundamental differences.

“To ignore evil is to be an accomplice to it” — Legato

I believe that is just a colorful way of saying “ignoring evil is bad”. And I don’t think it’s very fruitful to categorically make such a judgement. Judgement should depend on the level of evil and the chances someone has to affect it.

Ignoring a person robbing your neighbor's house → bad.

Ignoring a dictator in a far away country → not bad.

I can buy a lottery ticket believing that I will win, but with the knowledge that I probably will not. — Philosophim

So at the same time you believe that “you will win” and that “you probably will not win”? I don't think that is possible.

[Knowledge] is both the belief in something, and a further belief that “the something” is co-existent with reality

Can you really believe in something without believing that “the something” is co-existent with reality?

I claim the sky is red while I clearly experience it as blue. The contrary existence of the blue sky negates my belief that it is red.

Can you really believe something is red and at the same time experience it as blue? Or does that “negative belief” mean that you don’t actually believe, you just “claim”?

Without memories, how could I remember my claim to what a memory is and think to deny its reality?

I don’t think that experience of remembering something requires that you actually have memories. I would grant that we both have memories, but I believe that at this point we step outside of absolute knowledge.

Can we choose not to be a virus? In other words: can we choose not to fulfil that definition of a virus?

How do you define a virus? I don’t have a clear definition in mind, but I don’t think viruses are conscious so they wouldn’t be thinking about what they should do.

I think it comes down to the definition of free will. If we define free will as something absolute, I don’t think we have it. But for everyday life we might want to use some more practical definition. I like to think that if we cannot comprehend the underlying causes for someone's behaviour, then it is acceptable to judge the person. We can say he was responsible for his actions. We can even say he did it out of his own free will.

That video didn't really provide any arguments to not think that overpopulation is a problem. It was basically just saying that the population in developed countries is a bigger problem than the population growth in developing countries. Yes, it would be helpful if we reduced our consumption levels but it would also be helpful if we reduced our population. I think we need both.