I’d like to critique your argument, specifically your use of the analogy of a tidy room to demonstrate the idea that God is responsible for the order present in the universe. I'm inclined to like this analogy, but I think it could be refined a bit.

To illustrate this analogy, you say, “Imagine yourself entering a room and finding it clean, well arranged and tidy. You're then asked to infer something from this information. What will be your thoughts? I wouldn't be wrong in saying the first thing to cross your mind would be someone has been in this room, cleaned and put it in order.” You’re correct: that was my first thought (since rooms don’t, unfortunately, clean themselves). However, I then was struck by this point: the very existence of a room and its contents implies intervention. In keeping with your analogy, somebody built the room, and the furniture, and then arranged the contents of the room. The existence of the room demonstrates some creator: without it, there would be no room and no contents to be tidied, and I wonder if that might be another avenue for this analogy, because it could be extended via metaphor to the complex universe. The fact that the room is well arranged is not the only thing that suggests intervention. I do, however, understand that your metaphor of the organized room is analogous to the perfectly arranged, life-conducive universe, which suggests the intervention of a creator (God). You state, “The argument from design for the existence of god is simply another instance of the above argument. There's order in the universe. Conscious agencies are known to create order. So, the all so evident order in our universe implies the existence of a conscious agency - God. Why is this version of the same argument difficult for atheists to swallow?” This would be stronger if you elaborated on the existence of order in the universe, maybe adding some specific examples of ways that the universe has been perfectly designed. Further, you say that the “evident order in our universe implies the existence of a conscious agency - God.” This makes me wonder about the roles of chaos or random events. Do you consider those to be present? If so, are they also the creation of God, or do they pose a problem to the idea of order implying God’s existence?

I’d like to provide a critique of your assertion that miracles are not evidence of the divine, and the counterexample that you use to illustrate that.

You say that religious people “simply infer God/supernatural from so-called miracles. From a scientific standpoint that's jumping to conclusions.” I think this is false. In the Catholic Church, for example, before an individual can be sanctified, they must have performed two miracles, which are investigated for eligibility. Say the miracle is a medical one, and a person recovered from a terminal illness. The person must have had no chance of survival, as documented by medical evidence, and must have recovered only after they started praying to a specific person, thus implying the presence of “God/supernatural.” On the other hand, if you’re referring to miracles recorded in the Bible, I think you have a better point, because those are less documented and researched (although equally outside natural laws.) If those are the miracles you’re referencing, it would be helpful to say that. You continue, “From a simple logical perspective the reasoning of believers depend on the following premise: ALL miraculous events are evidence for the divine.” That premise is too broad. Saying that all miracles are evidence for the divine makes it sound as though the miracles of the Buddha could be evidence of a Christian God, or vice versa. And what if believers of a religion find some miracles plausible, but reject others, such as Orthodox Jews who believe in some miracles from God but not in the resurrection of Jesus?

To show the above premise false, you say, “My own counterexample would be a modern 1st world citizen with a simple modern device, such as a camera, visiting a pre-contact people and by that I mean people who are stuck in the hunter-gatherer stage of human evolution (I believe there are tribes in Brazil who qualify). They would simply be struck with wonder by the camera which, in other words, means the camera would be a miracle. Yet, this person is not a God.” I take issue with your definition of a miracle as something that strikes people “with wonder.” Miracles are outside natural and scientific laws, and a camera is not. If you are arguing that the camera is a miracle because these people had no way to explain it, then I see your point. However, if somebody showed you a time traveling machine, would you consider it a miracle? No, you’d probably want to know how it operated. Similarly, in your example, the people could be informed of the way the camera works, because there is a natural and scientific explanation for it. You’d have a harder time explaining miracles in Christianity, for example: the healing of paralytics, resurrection from the dead, and so on. Those things are outside natural and scientific laws, but your counterexample is not, so I think it should be refined in order to better illustrate your point; or if you consider those miracles to be false, then an argument formulated directly toward that conclusion would be helpful.

Interesting points about the role of Islam in this.

I would like to provide a critique of your claims that a theist has no evidence outside of their own belief, that nobody knows if God really exists, and that theists should not attempt to convince atheists of the existence of God.

You state, “When a Christian or a person of another theistic religion says that their God exists, the truth is that they are saying this because they believe that God(s) exists.” That’s true: a person wouldn’t be a theist if they didn’t believe in God’s existence. However, you then claim that belief is the only factor present, saying, “Regardless of how sure they claim to be or what "evidence" they give, the fact is that is simply what they believe, because no one knows if any God(s) exist, which is the exact reason why no evidence has been provided for the existence of any God(s).” The last part of this assertion should be reversed; a lack of knowledge of God doesn’t necessarily entail that there is no evidence, but I assume you’re saying that there can be no knowledge of God because there is no evidence of Him. You seem to be implying that a theist’s beliefs lack foundation. I believe that this claim fails to note that a theist might consider themselves to have evidence of God’s existence, and a better route might be to question the validity of that evidence, rather than denying its existence altogether. You seem to do that in the first half of the above claim, but then switch to asserting that there is no evidence, and I think that picking one or the other would better serve your purpose. An atheist would likely agree with your claim, but if you were to tell a theist, "You have no evidence of God other than your belief," I doubt that they would accept it. I also think the "no evidence" claim is vulnerable to counterargument, and perhaps you should have defended it in your original post.

You state, “...I am simply pointing out that no one knows if God(s) exists.” Clarity would be helpful here. Do you mean that nobody knows if God exists because there is no evidence of it, or regardless of evidence? This doesn’t necessarily refute theistic beliefs: if no one knows if God exists, does anybody know that He doesn’t exist?

You conclude, “If Christians actually knew that their God exists, then they could easily provide irrefutable evidence and there would not constantly be disputes by atheists asking for said evidence. I'm not arguing for atheists or theists, I'm simply saying that theists don't actually know if God does or does not exist, and therefore they should not claim to know this or try to give atheists reasons why God(s) does exists as opposed to simply accepting that they don't know if God exists.” My issue with this is that you’re claiming that there is no way to know if God “does or does not exist.” Under that logic, atheists should provide “irrefutable evidence” that God doesn’t exist. This entire section of your argument could be reversed by switching the words “theist” and “atheist.” You claim that you’re not arguing for atheists or theists, but they could both employ this idea that the other side cannot truly have correct knowledge of God’s existence, and this argument doesn’t specifically challenge theists.

I'd like to critique your argument, specifically the premise that reality is always better than the imagination, and that therefore God must exist in reality, and also the premise that God is the greatest thing we can think of.

You claim, "Things that exist in reality are always better than the things that exist in our imagination." I can see a point here that truth and reality ought to be valued, but that's not what you're directly expressing; instead, you claim that things in reality are "better" than things in the imagination. Clarification is needed: what do you mean by "better?" If you mean that reality is more concrete and authentic, then that seems fair. However, "better" can also refer to something that is more pleasant and enjoyable. In that case, reality is not necessarily better than the imagination. Things in reality can be horrific, unfair, and painful, whereas things in the imagination (daydreams, for example) can be as pleasant as one wants them to be.

Building on this, you then say, "If God existed only in our imaginations, he wouldn't be the greatest thing that we can think of, because God in reality would be better." I'm unsure as to your specific meaning here. Are you stating that it would be impossible to imagine a God who would be as great as the real God, and that we are unable to conceive of the greatness of His nature? You seem to be implying that our ability and capacity to think about God proves his existence, which is an intriguing claim, but isn't strongly presented in this argument. This claim also rests heavily on the premise that “God is the greatest thing we can think of,” which I will address next.

You put forth the premise, which is really the backbone of the above claims, "God is the greatest thing we can think of." This statement is too vague to offer any support to the rest of your argument. How are you defining greatness? To a theist, that statement might be true, but an atheist would wholeheartedly reject it, and thus dismiss the remainder of your argument.

Overall, I believe that this argument would benefit from refining the above premises to be more specific, and also giving a better definition to ideas such as the reality/imagination comparison.

I think that this argument has good potential, but there are a few points that I would like to critique, specifically regarding P1 and P2.

P1 states that there is a link between the existence of God and the existence of objective moral values. This is an acceptable claim, but I think it would be strengthened if you demonstrated exactly what that connection is. In your response to the user "Noble Dust," you said that you're arguing that "if God does not exist, then morality is just an evolutionary spin-off." Are you implying that God created morality and objective moral values? If so, it might serve the goal of your argument to actually state that.

P2, which states, "Objective moral values and duties exist," could benefit from a separate argument to support it. From my view, I can think of supporting examples for this: humans from infancy onward regard harming another as "bad," kindness is regarded as morally good, most people would consider events like the Holocaust to be objectively morally wrong, and so on. Still, I think others might question this assertion: can't widespread views of morality change with time? Is there always an objectively morally right or wrong course of action, or objective moral values that transcend differences in situations? I'm not denying the existence of objective morality, but I think that your presentation of this argument would be stronger if insulated against those types of questions.

Further, I'm not sure that P1 or P2 support your stated intention with this argument: to show that morality is a product of evolution if God doesn't exist. You've asserted that, but your argument doesn't support or fully address it; instead, it focuses on linking the existence of morality to the existence of God. That claim could be a good basis for you to use to develop this argument and expand on it in order to reach your point about evolution. For example, if our morality is a product of evolution, what are the odds that it would be both evolutionarily productive and objectively morally right? If our morality is objectively right, doesn't it make sense that it is the product of an all-knowing Creator? These points are related to the stated purpose of your argument, but I don't see that the argument you chose to present supported your intended conclusion as clearly as it could have.

I’d like to critique two objections that you pose to Jackson’s argument: the first regarding Jackson’s assertions about Mary’s knowledge, and second, your claim that Jackson’s argument contains a begging the question fallacy.

P1 of the version of this argument that you posted states, “Mary knew everything physical about the color red but has never seen the color red.” This refers to the fact that Mary’s knowledge of the color red encompasses everything except the actual experience of seeing it. However, you claim that this “implies Jackson is of the view that physicalism entails that knowing what brain-state corresponds to actually seeing red should evoke the brain-state of actually seeing red,” and that because of this, the argument “fails to achieve its intended objective of refuting physicalism.” I don’t see how this implication follows from P1. Even if Mary knew the exact brain-state that occurs when a person sees red (perhaps through brain imaging, descriptions, or information about the operation of the senses), she would not have any reason to experience the brain-state of actually seeing red, and she would still be gaining knowledge after seeing the color for herself. I acknowledge your assertion, based on this premise, that the knowledge of red and the experience of seeing red are both brain-states, but I think it fails to note one of Jackson’s points: Mary still gained new knowledge through the experience of seeing red, in a way that could not be taught to her. Further, even after acquiring the new brain-state of seeing red, she experiences yet another: if she goes back into the black-and-white bunker, she has the memory of seeing red, and is in the new state of having knowledge of experiencing red. Based on these points, I have a difficult time accepting your claim that the argument fails to refute physicalism.

You further claim that Jackson’s argument contains a begging the question fallacy, which you label as Premise 1a: “Complete physical knowledge can't account for actually seeing red.” This fallacy is present in the version of the argument that you posted, but I’m curious as to where it came from: is it your interpretation of the argument, or another’s? The versions of the argument that I’ve seen don’t suggest this fallacy. I’ll focus on the first half of the argument, because that’s the part that you’re taking issue with. Most versions that I’ve seen go something like:

P1: In the bunker, Mary knows every physical fact about the color red.
P2: Mary learns something about the color red after her release.
P3: Therefore, Mary didn’t have complete knowledge of the color red in the bunker.

This first part of the argument does show that there was some knowledge that Mary lacked, but I don't see a fallacy there, when it's organized and worded this way. It just illustrates Mary’s example, before the remainder of the argument states that physicalism is false. Therefore, I think that the idea of the fallacy that you mention doesn’t harm Jackson’s argument.

This argument raises some intriguing points, and I’d like to critique them.

You assert that God “never has nor never will strive because striving is a sign of an imperfect nature for a Christian. So how then can God be considered virtuous?” This implies that if God did strive, he would be imperfect in nature; if he did not strive, as you claim, he would be perfect. I’m not sure how this leads to your conclusion that God cannot be considered virtuous. You cite Nietzsche’s belief that the values in Plato’s work can be found in Christianity (he took issue with otherworldly experiences and philosophical idealism in both Christianity and Platonism.) I can understand using this to back your claim that “Christianity is a kind of idol worship,” but how does this connect to the idea that God is less powerful and virtuous because we do not observe him striving? Do you mean that God must strive to achieve perfection or perform creation? The argument that God’s power is measured by the effort he exerts or temptation he overcomes could lead to a counter claim that God is so powerful that he simply doesn’t have to strive for anything.

You use examples to point out the “Satanic nature of Christianity.” I thought this was a stronger part of your argument: the eradication of populations and the story of Abraham and Isaac are both represented in the Bible, and represent actions that are morally troublesome. However, religious stories frequently present upsetting concepts. The Greek gods condoned and participated in wars (the Trojan war), the Greek god Zeus engaged in adultery and rape (the story of Leda), and the goddess Hera sent snakes to kill a baby (the story of Hercules). We can shift gears to another religion, say, Hinduism, with the same effects. The god Shiva is described as beheading his own son, who he believes is a rival for his wife’s affections. Would you say that these other religions are also Satanic?

You assert that somebody could take the Bible’s teachings literally, leading them to start wars and commit murders. This seems valid: religious fanaticism can drive people to commit immoral acts. If that is the case (and it is), it seems possible that somebody could commit horrible deeds in the name of Christianity. You present the dilemma of Jesus ordering someone to start a war. This argument is missing a link that would prove it to be an example of Satanic beliefs. If Jesus told you to start a war, and you obeyed, wouldn’t that still be an example (albeit it an unfortunate one) of Christianity, rather than Satanism?

In order to critique this argument, I'll begin by restating it. Essentially, your assertion is that:

1. If God created the physical world along with time, then he experienced a change (from existing alone to existing with time).
2. If God experienced a change, it calls into question his ability to be timeless and changeless.
3. God created the physical world and time.
4. Therefore, we must question his ability to be timeless and changeless.

If we're using this argument with regard to most monotheistic, God-worshipping religions, such as Christianity, God is usually regarded as an eternal deity; God exists within eternity and isn't generally regarded as experiencing, say, aging. One thing that came to my mind when reading this argument was the creation story from the Bible, in which God seemingly experiences time in a linear fashion; first one day, then the next, and so on.

However, if God exists within eternity, it is possible that he could then create "time," as we know it, while continuing to exist within the separate, unchanging eternity. Traditionally, the belief is held that eternity has always existed, and God has always existed within it. Therefore, God could have created "time" without being altered by its creation. I recognize that these are broad statements, but I wanted to introduce this idea before I explain it below.

I believe that one issue with your argument is P1's implication that God would be changed by the mere introduction of time. If, as you're stating in this argument, God created time, it does not necessarily follow that he would be changed by it, or that he would "exist with time" at all. I'll elaborate on this point by addressing P2, which further proposes that God could be changed by time.

An issue with P2, which is an extension of my comments regarding P1, is that God is traditionally not regarded as existing within time. He is viewed as being timeless in that he is outside time altogether, completely separate from it. If this is the case, it seems reasonable to infer that he could create time without being affected by it. I saw this concept referred to in other replies to your post: people used phrases such as “a different dimension,” and “a different plane,” when describing the idea of God’s separation from time. In this view, God could avoid the "change" that you reference because he does not have experiences in an order that our idea of time could explain, and we wouldn't be able to determine a point at which his experience shifted and he changed. This concept of God as existing outside of time can be a difficult one to understand, and I freely admit that there is a bias present, because it hinges on beliefs that many religions hold about the eternal nature of God’s existence. Nonetheless, it has the potential to pose a problem to this argument.

I'd like to make a critique of this argument. One issue is the association of a God with omnipotence. This argument has the implicit premise that a God must be omnipotent, and indeed, it was stated before the argument was laid out, and in P1 and P2. The argument then associates the idea of omnipotence with that of an inability to be killed, as demonstrated in P5. This opens it up to counterarguments from a multitude of polytheistic religions.

In ancient Greece, for example, multiple Gods were worshipped. Now, in this instance, if each God was stated to be omnipotent, your argument could be suitable: after all, these Gods were noted to have physical bodies, and to engage in physical pursuits (eating, running, and even getting headaches are all noted to be experienced by the Gods in Greek mythology.) Beings with physical bodies, generally speaking, are able to die or have their existence ended in some way. Therefore, if these gods had physical bodies, you could infer that dying would be a possibility for them, which would pose a problem to their omnipotence. However, that claim would be problematic, because the Greek Gods were never considered to be omnipotent, as demonstrated throughout Greek mythology: none of them were all-powerful, since there were Gods for different subjects and areas, and they were able to outwit each other.

For argument's sake, and to illustrate this, let's say that I tell you that I have a religion with ten gods, and none of them are omnipotent. Your argument is laid out in such a way that this would be impossible if the gods were omnipotent (as they would cancel out each other's omnipotence in a difficult paradox), but this example slips through a loophole: none of these ten hypothetical gods are omnipotent. I'll put this example in a standard argument form.

1. If a God does not necessarily have to be omnipotent, it poses an issue to this argument, which would not disprove the existence of multiple Gods.
2. Greek, Norse, Incan, and Mayan religions throughout history, to name a few examples, all involve Gods with limited powers, who do not have to be omnipotent.
3. Therefore, this argument is called into question, and the issue of omnipotence does not necessarily disprove the existence of multiple Gods. (1, 2 MP)

Further, if I change courses and say that I worship a religion with three Gods, and specify that they do not have corporeal forms in any way: no physical bodies, no atomic makeup, nothing, your argument does not contain language that could prove me wrong. P4 gives the impression that death is something that could be applicable within the context of a God's existence, at least enough to create a problem with a God's omnipotence. We don't know, and when formatting an argument, shouldn't assume that a God is capable of dying, particularly in the absence of concrete evidence of a God with a physical form. If a God doesn't exist in a physical body, and isn't "alive" by our definition of the word, it seems implausible to say that "death," again by our definition of the word, would be possible for them. The definition of omnipotence, or being all-powerful, does not necessarily need to concern or specify with regard to death at all.