A rose is a flower. It was a flower before it was called a rose, it will remain the same flower even if I decide to call it a Flamingo. The flower does not care what I call it. It simply is — Book273

Well in that case, I fail to see how your argument is one for atheism. If the Christian God took a second before he revealed himself to people (which isn't the case according to Jewish and Christian scripture but just for the sake of argument), this isn't an argument for atheism. It's just an argument for God having strange timing to reveal himself to people.

Dear ballarak,

In your recent post, you made the following claim:
So we have this all powerful being, which would mean that it would be able to do everything, all at once. It wouldn't be bound by time constraints. This would indicate that the way we experience time is illusory, it was all created at t=0, but somehow we experience it in slices…. I understand that there appears to be a logical gap: just being it could do everything at once, doesn't mean that it would. This is answered by the all-knowing aspect of the being, is there a difference in experiencing time at t=0 and t=1000 if you have foreknowledge of all the events in between? To recap, I think if we posit that there exists a being with these attributes, it would indicate that in some form we are all manifestations of the same thing, and it would indicate that the universe is deterministic, and our experience of time is an illusion. To use a Christian concept, the gift of free will isn't literal, in that we get to choose our choices, but rather, the gift of free will is the subjective sense of freedom, it's the cutting off of foreknowledge. It's what makes life meaningful.
I think your argument has this form:

1) If God can do everything and know everything, then all time was created at t=0.
2) If all time was created at t=0, then the world is deterministic.
3) If the world is deterministic, then we do not have free will in the literal sense.
4) Therefore, If God can do everything and know everything, then we do not have free will in the literal sense (from 1, 2, 3 via hypothetical syllogism)
5) God can do everything and know everything.
6 Therefore, we do not have free will in the literal sense (from 4, 5 via modus ponens)

I have the following objections to this argument. Premise one is questionable. It is not clearly obvious that God’s ability to do everything and know everything means that all time was created at t=0. If time is simply the state of being before, during, or after, then time is everlasting and was not created by God at one point. If this is the case, then God might have created the universe at t=0 without creating time then. Furthermore, arguing that God’s omniscience means all time was created at t=0 does not necessarily work either. If one adopts a view that the future is not real and only the past and the present are, then the future was not created at t=0. For these reasons, the conditional in premise one is problematic, and the argument is unsound.

Sincerely, Joel

Dear Zuhair,

In your recent post, you made the following claim:
Monotheism pictures a sole wise good God who created a world in which evil is so prevalent, that he can of course stop at any time, yet permit it to exist physically, for some agnostic purpose. Isn't it MORE ethical to think that the source of good is not the same as the source of evil, that there are natural processes that can even be rational (but natural) that planned all Good things, and that opposes a vigorous natural but separate chaotic stuff that is the source of evil, that the first good natural processes are taming over time, thus resulting in "evolution" . The problem of evil disappears with the second realistic position, while it is so prominent with the first one that it can only be evaded by running away form it and seeking refuge in optimistic agnosticism. While the second option seems to couple ethical kind of realism (i.e. realism that does NOT feature the paradoxicality of a good who did the bad) with apriori optimism. It appears to me that Monotheism confuses ethical issues, so you see a God ordering evil things like tsunamis, congenital anomalies, earthquakes,etc.., ordering his profits to kill people including innocent children and even animals and plants, and even planning an everlasting torture in hell for MOST of people as an outcome of his wise plan of free will? There are lots of paradoxes in monotheism, that I don't see in dichotomous optimistic realism.
I think your argument has this form:

1) Monotheism leads to ethical paradoxes that are not present in dichotomous optimistic realism.
2) If monotheism leads to ethical paradoxes that are not present in dichotomous optimistic realism, then we should favor dichotomous optimistic realism to monotheism.
3) Therefore, we should favor dichotomous optimistic realism to monotheism (from 1, 2 via modus ponens).

I have the following objections to this argument. Premise one is faulty. Dichotomous optimistic realism as laid out here is vague and unclear. Because of this, it cannot necessarily be posited that the ethical paradoxes seemingly present in monotheism are not present in dichotomous optimistic realism. This argument trades a clearly defined concept in theism for blind hope in optimistic agnosticism. Because of this, premise one is questionable. Furthermore, premise two is also faulty. It is not clear that monotheism leads to ethical paradoxes that are not present in dichotomous optimistic realism. Monotheism offers many solutions to ethical paradoxes like the problem of evil, while dichotomous optimistic realism is vague and does not necessarily have answers for all the ethical problems seemingly present in monotheism. Many people would favor a clearly defined concept with potential flaws over one that claims to get past these flaws without clear evidence that it does. For this reason, premise two is also questionable, and the argument is unsound.

Sincerely, Joel

Dear Maureen,

In your recent post, you made the following claim:
In other words, before Christianity came about, there may as well have been no Christian God. I will not argue that there could have been a Christian God even before Christianity came about, but unless humans were aware of His presence before the onset of Christianity (which is impossible to determine, but again very unlikely), then no one among us can argue that He existed before then. The conclusion that we would have to draw, therefore, is that this God is only a result of the development of the Christian religion, or in other words only exists in conjunction with the Christian religion. The same argument could be made for the God(s) of any other religion, in that they only exist in conjunction with their respective religions. Like I said any of these Gods could exist and could have existed without respect to their given religion, but it is impossible to make that argument unless humans were aware of the presence of any of the Gods before their religion came about, which in itself cannot be proven.
I think your argument has this form:

1) We cannot argue that there was a Christian God before Christianity started.
2) If we cannot argue that there was a Christian God before Christianity started, then the Christian God is only the result of the development of the Christian religion.
3) Therefore, the Christian God is only the result of the development of the Christian religion (from 1, 2 via modus ponens).

I have the following objections to this argument. Premise one is problematic. Just because we are not aware of something before some time does not mean that we cannot argue that it existed before that time. We were not aware of evolution before Darwin, but that does not mean evolution did not exist or was not occurring before Darwin posited it. Since this is the case, it is unreasonable to say that we cannot argue there was a Christian God before Christianity started. Thus, premise one is faulty, and the argument is unsound.

Sincerely, Joel

Pain is bad, even if it has a function to tell you that something is wrong. It can be both. — schopenhauer1

It can be both. But a world with pain might be better than a world without pain, however, it the pain is necessary for some other good thing. For instance, if it is necessary to have pain to have a functioning nervous system that includes pleasure, then the good of having pleasure (even if it means one will experience pain) is better than the supposed good of no pain whatsoever.

To me, its foundational that pain, suffering, negative states are bad and causing conditions which inevitably will lead to them, is wrong if it can be avoided. To purposely create conditions for these negative conditions, when other alternatives can have been created etc.. — schopenhauer1

So pain is bad because pain is bad (foundationally). Makes sense, though I did offer an explanation of pain where is pain is not foundationally bad (when it is serving its natural function). Based on this, it seems that saying pain is bad foundationally faces problems from the natural-function argument.

This world we live in now has pain that may "serve its natural function", but the point is there could have been a universe that does not have pain, and in fact has no need for pain to serve "its natural function". — schopenhauer1

Why is a universe without the capacity for pain fundamentally better than one with the capacity for pain?

My question was regarding the counterfactual possibility that God could have created a universe where its nature was not to have the capacity for pain. — schopenhauer1

And yet my question still stands of why he would need to create a universe without the capacity for pain. What is wrong with pain when it serves its natural function? You could very well be right that it would be better to live in a world without pain, but you haven't shown me why.

That seems immoral to create a universe with the capacity for pain, whether to see them overcome it or any other reason. — schopenhauer1

They are not overcoming pain, rather it is serving its natural function in their bodies. If I smell something disgusting, that is unpleasant, but it's serving a natural function in our body. If pain is serving a natural function, why is it immoral to create a universe with the capacity for pain?

Because that pain serves a good purpose and isn't inherently bad.

Whence noses then? — schopenhauer1

This doesn't apply here but good try.

I never said that. Pay attention. I said the conditions for pain.. which you are replacing with capacity. Same thing. — schopenhauer1

I still think my analysis applies, but let's say it doesn't. That still doesn't show that the conditions for pain are bad. I think that the natural use of pain (as a way of keeping an organism balanced and healthy) makes pain not an inherently bad thing.

That's the same thing :lol:. — schopenhauer1

Actually it's not. There is a difference between causing pain and giving one the capacity for pain. God (according to theism) gave us noses but that doesn't mean he directly causes us to smell things.

But God didn't create the conditions of pain. He merely gave us the capacity to feel pain. That's besides the point though. You and I have been talking past each other. I don't think the presence of pain is a bad thing, and you do. I think that the good of having a fully-formed nervous system (pain, pleasure, and all feelings included) is better than having no fully-formed nervous system and no pain.

But God didn't create the conditions of pain. He merely gave us the capacity to feel pain. That's besides the point though. You and I have been talking past each other. I don't think the presence of pain is a bad thing, and you do. I think that the good of having a fully-formed nervous system (pain, pleasure, and all feelings included) is better than having no fully-formed nervous system and no pain.

I don't think that pain on its own is a negative experience in a way that affects the good-making qualities of God. Having a fully functioning nervous system that gives us the capacity for both pleasure and pain seems like a good thing to me, even if that means we (or animals) can feel pain.

I am not entirely sure why he would need to create a world without pain. In a perfect world, organisms are designed to do certain things (eat certain foods, live in certain climates). Pain could just be a natural way for those organisms to "walk the line" (to maintain balance in other words). I don't see that as a thing that conflicts with any of God's omni-characteristics

Dear TheMadFool,

In your recent post you made the following claim:
Such a view jibes with the standard notion of god as an omniscient being. The scientific theory of evolution states that the fundamental principle all life obeys is trial and error i.e. genetic mutations are randomly initiated and those that confer a survival advantage are selected for in what is but a dance of chance. Trial and error is a bona fide problem solving technique as attested here but it's a method that according to the article is "Nevertheless, this method is often used by people who have little knowledge in the problem area" i.e. it doesn't display understanding as much as other more advanced problem solving techniques do. So, if god exists and he's the one behind all creation in general, evolution in particular, and if his preferred method is trial and error, it must be that good is not a genius who understands the ins and outs of creation and life but is actually a simpleton as herein defined.
I think your argument has this form:

1) If God created the world, then God used trial and error to create all living beings.
2) If God used trial and error, then he used a simple solution that is often used by people who do not know a lot about what they are doing.
3) If he used a simple solution that is often used by people who do not know a lot about what they are doing, then God does not know a lot about creation.
4) If God does not know a lot about creation, then God is a simpleton without the quality of omniscience.
5) Therefore, if God created the world, then God is a simpleton without the quality of omniscience (from 1, 2, 3, 4 via a hypothetical syllogism)


If this argument works, it presents a challenge to the omniscience of God, which could cause problems for commonly held theistic beliefs. I have a few objections to this argument: First, most theistic accounts of creation do not depict God as having used trial and error to create the world. Living organisms do evolve according to natural selection, but they were designed to do that. God himself did not utilize trial and error to create livings organisms even if he did program those organisms to do so. This makes premise one questionable. Second, premise three is objectionable too. Even if God used trial and error to create living beings, and even if trial and error is often used by people with little knowledge about something, it does not then follow that God does not know a lot about creation. This would be like saying that if I use spell-check, and there are people that use spell-check that do not know a lot about grammar or writing, then I do not know a lot about grammar or writing. Just because God uses the same method as simpletons would not make him therefore a simpleton. Because premise 1 and 3 are objectionable, the argument does not succeed.

Sincerely,
Joel

Dear Matthew724,

In your recent post, you made the following claim:
If you were to ask somebody, before Darwin, whether certain facts like animals suffering for millions of years would lower the probability of theism even further than general suffering, they should have said yes…. It’s not just that the fact that animals suffering for millions of years (and most species going extinct) is incredibly unexpected given the hypothesis of theism, there’s also the fact that this piece of data wasn’t always something that was obvious and ‘trivial’. Since the data of animal suffering was something that was not always part of our background knowledge, and since it wasn’t something that was just expected to show up, and since the data is extremely surprising on theism, then that clearly counts as more confirmation that theism isn’t true… when taking in facts about suffering. One could chalk up all the animal suffering/extinction to God’s mysterious ways. But we all know the simpler explanation: nature doesn’t care whether we suffer or not.
I think your argument has this form:

1) If the hypothesis of theism is likely, then animals would not be suffering.
2) Animals are suffering (in this world).
3) Therefore, the hypothesis of theism is unlikely (from 1, 2 via modus tollens).

If this argument works, it clearly lowers to probability of theism. Though this argument does not disprove theistic belief, it makes theism less rational to accept by showing it is unlikely. I have the following objections to this argument: premise one is objectionable. It would not necessarily make theism unlikely if animals were suffering. The suffering and dying of animals could serve a good purpose in nature, as animals die and contribute to the circle of life. Furthermore, a world without the suffering of animals would likely include the immortality of animals, if we view death as suffering. If this were the case, the world would become crowded with animals, which would itself cause problems like the overuse of resources and the elimination of livable space. Along with this, even if animals did not suffer in nature, the free will of humans would mean that people would still be able to torture and mistreat animals. If the suffering of animals is likely to happen because of human free will, and free will is a moral good that God seemingly would want to maintain, then there is a good reason that the suffering of animals happens in a world created by God. Therefore, the hypothesis of theism is no less likely even if animals are suffering. For this reason, premise one is faulty, and the argument is unsound.

Sincerely,
Joel

Dear Gregory,

In your recent post, you made the following claim:
So the first premise in this discussion is that animals are innocent. They are not capable of doing true evil, they did not ask to exist, and they are good because they naturally follow their natures. Now, it seems obvious that animals feel pain. If animals do not feel true pain then it would not be wrong to torture them. Therefore, either 1) The world, which reflects God nature, proves that God is not all good. If it's not in God's nature to create a world and allow humans to sin all the while protecting the innocent from pain, then God's nature is imperfect or evil 2) God doesn't exist.
I think your argument has this form:

1) If God creates a world where animals experience pain, then either God is not good, or God doesn’t exist.
2) God created a world where animals experience pain.
3) Therefore, either God is not good, or God doesn’t exist (from 1, 2 via modus ponens).

If this argument works, it is exceptionally problematic for theistic belief, as it either shows that God does not exist or is not good. I have the following objection to this argument: The conditional expressed in premise one is problematic. Just because animals experience pain does not mean that God is not good, or God does not exist. It is entirely possible that animals could experience pain and even death in the world God created and God could still be good. This could be a natural part of life for animals. It would be wrong if God tortured animals, but the presence of pain in animals on its own is not enough to affect the goodness of God. Pain itself is not a bad thing. It is a natural indicator of something going wrong within or to an organism. In this way, pain itself is not necessarily a bad thing and so is compatible with the existence of a good God. In other words, if God created a world where animals experience pain, he could exist, and he could be good. Because of this compatibility, premise one is faulty, and the argument is unsound.

Sincerely,
Joel

Thank you for pointing that out. It was bugging me.

Dear BBQueue,

In your post, you made the following claim:
I have an almost indisputable explanation regarding God and how He (or rather the idea of Him) came to be. The first people to define or describe the presence of a God are believed to be those who were looking for an explanation for unexplained things that happen such as natural disasters or deaths before there was knowledge of disease or bacteria, or even good things such as rain after a long drought. So they ultimately decided that these things were being caused by a celestial being that they decided existed and was causing anything that could not be explained…. However, this does not by any means change the reality of the situation, which is that the being or thing they are turning to is just that, and has no physical presence beyond that which they decide that He does.
I think your argument has this form:

1. If people believe in God, then their religious beliefs were created to explain unexplained phenomena and provide comfort for themselves.
2. If their religious beliefs were created to explain unexplained phenomena and provide comfort for themselves, then they would believe in God even if they knew he was not real.
3. If they would believe in God even if they knew he was not real, then their belief in God is irrational.
4. Therefore, if people believe in God, then their belief in God is irrational.

If this argument is successful, its conclusion presents major problems for belief in God, as it seems that no one could rationally believe in God. I have a few objections to this argument. First, premise 2 has clear problems, namely that the origin of religious belief does not determine how strong the current epistemic standing of that belief is. In other words, even if people’s religious beliefs were created for the purposes mentioned in the second premise, they could still be held based on evidence. Even if this person or the founders of their faith before them used reasons of comfort and simple explanations as justification for their belief, this does not mean that that they did not also have reasonable evidence for their beliefs. Because of this, it is quite possible that a believer in God, whose religious beliefs fit the criteria of the antecedent in premise 2, would not believe in God even if they knew he was not real, thus showing that premise 2 is false. This is because their beliefs are justified by reason and so can be debunked using reasonable arguments. For this reason, premise 2 is faulty and the argument is unsound.

Sincerely,

Joel

Fair enough, thanks for the heads up.

That's one way to solve the problem.

I see. Here's a scenario for you to consider. It's plausible that an alien life form exists that's as different from humans as humans are from plants. By your logic these alien life forms should treat humans in the same way as humans treat plants. — TheMadFool

This scenario doesn't really affect the points I have been making. If the alien life you are hypothesizing about is sentient (capable of complex emotions and thoughts and feeling pain), then it is as valuable as human life according to my argument. If the alien life is not sentient, then it is not as valuable as human life. Your "as different from humans as humans are from plants" statement is poorly defined. What do you mean by different? It seems that the degrees of difference you are talking about don't matter if we are judging value by the standard I have put forth. I have established parameters for value and equal worth, while you have not.

You need to learn what pillars are. — TheMadFool

I'm willing to learn. What do you mean by pillars?

You're saying "all life forms are equal but some life forms are more equal than others" — TheMadFool

No, I'm saying human beings (specifically) are equal to each other and of more value than other life forms (specifically plants. I make no argument about the comparative worth of humans and animals here). There is no some living organisms are more equal than others. There is simply some living organisms are equal to each other and ABOVE other living organisms.

The principle of equality is a crucial part of ethics, but to my knowledge it is commonly understood as equality between people and not between every living thing.

Really? What's your logic? — TheMadFool

1. Human beings are have complex emotions and thoughts and feel pain.

2. If a living organism has complex emotions and thoughts and feels pain,then it is more valuable than those living organisms which don't have complex emotions and thoughts and feel pain.

3. Therefore, Humans are more valuable than those living organisms which don't have complex emotions and thoughts and feel pain (i.e. plants).

If, as you say, equality isn't the main pillar of morality then, it should be possible for morality to exist without equality. — TheMadFool

This doesn't follow at all. Even if equality isn't the main pillar of morality that doesn't mean it should be possible for morality to exist without equality. I'm not sure what that means. Also, I could imagine a case where equality is immoral. If you would like I can share a case like this.

Your words remind me of George Orwell's book, 1984 where the pigs who're in the process of establishing an oppressive totalitarian regime declare "all animals are equal but some are more equal than others". FYI, the story didn't end well. — TheMadFool

Just fyi, the book you are referring to is "Animal Farm" not "1984." Regardless, I'm not sure how me saying that human beings have more worth than plants (I don't think I ever explicitly said this, but it's what I was implicitly saying) makes me equivalent to Orwellian pig dictators. I am definitely not saying some people are more equal than other people. I'm not saying human beings are equal to each other and not equal to each other (which would be contradictory). I am saying human beings have more worth than other types of living organisms (i.e. plants).

You're trying to eat the cake and have it too. You can't envision morality sans equality and that's why you say things like "human beings are definitely equal" and then you contradict yourself by saying "are they equal to plants?" suggesting, quite clearly, that you believe they're not. Please rethink your position. — TheMadFool

This comment indicates that your begging the question. I am not contradicting myself by saying human beings are definitely equal (to each other) and then asking if they are equal to plants (which they are not). The only way this is contradictory is if one assumes that human beings and plants are already equal (in which case it would be contradictory to say that humans are equal to each other and not equal to plants). I do not assume this. As to your request for me to rethink my position, I'm pretty comfortable saying that human beings are more valuable than non-sentient living organisms, but I am willing to have my mind changed.

I definitely agree that equal is a main pillar of morality, but there it doesn't seem like it is the main pillar of morality.

Also, I refer back to my argument in reference to

Your claim that humans are different from other beings is immoral. — TheMadFool

.

Human beings are definitely equal to each other, but are they equal to plants? Your argument does not clearly define which living organisms are equal to each other. If you do think that plants and human beings are equal, I would suggest that this goes against most moral intuitions we have. We do not think it is as immoral to stomp on and kill grass as it is to murder a human being. If you do think this, it would seem that the burden of proof is with you to show that equality as you understand it extends between species of living organisms. Your system of morality is much more defensible, in my view, if the equality you speak of extends between sentient creatures as opposed to between any living organisms.

Dear TheMadFool,

In your post, you made the following claim:
Firstly, it is to be taken as true that an omnibenevolent god will not play favorites with his creation: maggots, bacteria, fish, beggars, the rich, birds, etc. are all equal in god's eyes. The widely held belief that equality is one of the pillars of the moral edifice should make that easily relatable…. God permits natural evil not because he's not good but because he is good as evinced by his impartial attitude in what is after all nothing but a family feud. We share 99% of our DNA with chimps; work from that to the inevitable conclusion that we're all family and god, being a good parent will not intercede regarding the "arrangement" of humans required to play host to distant worm cousins and occasionaly dying in a disaster to feed yet another relative, bacteria.
I think your argument has this form:

1) If God is good, then he is impartial in his treatment of his creation.
2) If he is impartial in his treatment of his creation, then any bad things that happen to living organisms are permitted by God on an impartial basis.
3. If any bad things that happen to living organisms are permitted by God on an impartial basis, then any bad things that happen to living organisms are not evil.
3) God is good.
4) Therefore, any bad things that happen to living organisms are not evil.

If this argument works, it would be significant, as the problem of natural evil presents a significant and persistent challenge to theism. I have the following objection to your argument: Premise three is faulty, because it assumes that each living organism in nature is of equal worth. To say that a human being dying is not bad if it provides food to bacteria seems extreme, as humans have a far higher emotional and cognitive capacity than bacteria (if bacteria have any cognitive and emotional abilities at all). If a human suffers and dies in a natural disaster, then it seems like the evil of that disaster cannot be mitigated by saying that bacteria, which do not think or feel, are able to feed off the dead human. Your mention of the genetic similarities between humans and chimps also presents a problem. If your claim that all living organisms are equal is based on sharing DNA, then the parameters of this equality are problematic. Bananas and human beings share 50% of their DNA, but few people, if anyone, would say that bananas and human beings are equal. Because your claim about the equality of living things is not well defined and could lead one to saying that human beings and plants are of equal value, your third premise is faulty, and your argument fails.

Sincerely,

Joel