Can I be obligated to do something that I am incapable of doing?

And they all just baselessly assert "promises are more than just intentions". There's no justification for this assertion, or an explanation of what else there is.

You say "it is also false because he has not bound himself". But what does "bound himself" even mean? It's just more vacuous phrases.

The thread is filled obvious refutations of all of these bizarre ideas. — Leontiskos

No it isn't. There is just the bare assertion that if I sincerely use the phrase "I promise to find your cat" then I am obligated to find your cat, without any explanation of what "I am obligated" means. And when I ask what "I am obligated" means I am not given an explanation but am instead given different examples of things that I am said to be obligated to do.

And it's all nonsense.

There's just me using a certain verb, intending to find your cat, possibly looking for your cat, possibly finding your cat, and possibly being told off if I don't. This simple, straightforward, parsimonious description of what actually happens (or doesn't happen) provides an exhaustive account of the reality of the situation, without the need for nebulous, abstract entities.

This is all just meaningless word games, like when I asked you to explain the difference between "he is more likely to fulfil his obligations" and "he is more likely to complete the contract".

So I stand by what I have previously said. A sentence like "you ought not do this" is just a command (or, as someone else mentioned, advice) that is fictitiously phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition. Any attempts so far to show otherwise have amounted to nothing more than the bare assertion that "obligations exist".

I can only take the unwillingness of anyone to actually make sense of obligations as evidence that Anscombe was right.

You're missing the word "wrong" at the very end of your sentence. — Leontiskos

Criminals have punished witnesses who testified against them in court. Was it wrong of the witnesses to testify against the criminal in court? What does "wrong" even mean?

As I've said, taking away something you value is not punishment. If it was then the thief who stole your car has necessarily punished you. — Leontiskos

It's a punishment because it was done in response to something I did. If the thief stole my car because I insulted him then it could be construed as punishment.

And by "punished" you presumably do not mean what every dictionary in the world says, because then we would be right back to the equivocation on "penalty." — Leontiskos

I mean that I will be put in prison or executed. It's right there in the text of the law.

Let's take 18 U.S. Code § 1111 - Murder as an example.

It starts by explaining what counts as murder:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.

Any other murder is murder in the second degree.

It then describes how anyone found guilty of murder is to be punished:

Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,

Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life;

Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

Nothing in here implies or entails or requires anything else, e.g. "obligations", whatever they are.

It is just the case that if you murder then you will be executed or imprisoned. There is no need to imagine phantom abstract entities.

Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange [dogmatic] position. — Leontiskos

I don't deny future accountability. I have repeatedly said that if I don't do as I'm told, whether it be by some authority figure or by the terms of a contract, then I will be penalised.

You are the one claiming that there is some additional thing involved – the "obligation" – which you refuse to make sense of.

A contract establishes an obligation, and therefore someone who is more likely to fulfill his obligations is more likely to fulfill his contracts. — Leontiskos

A contract tells the party what he is to do, and therefore someone who does what the contract tells him to do is more likely to fulfil his contracts.

So, again, how is my phrasing different from yours?

Like Count Timothy von Icarus, you're not explaining what obligations are. You're just insisting that they exist. That's no explanation at all. As it stands, what they are hasn't been explained, what purpose they serve hasn't been explained, and what evidence there is for them hasn't been explained.

They just seem to be meaningless and superfluous.

Again, you're not telling me what obligations are. You're just insisting that they exist. That's no explanation at all.

So I'll try to make this very simple. Please explain to me the difference between these two propositions:

1. According to the law I have an obligation to pay income tax
2. The legislature has passed a bill that says that I am to pay income tax

I can't tell what you mean by obligations being "incoherent." I presume that when your mechanic finishes working on your car and hands you receipt stating that you are obligated to pay him some amount you don't stand in front of him dumbfounded, unsure of what is being said to you, nor that your annual tax bill provokes complete puzzlement. — Count Timothy von Icarus

He fixes my car in exchange for money. It's a trade we agree to. So what additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

And obligations are clearly not the same thing as all imperative statements. "Watch out, those stairs are icy," is an imperative statement with no obligation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is "do this" as a command and there is "do this" as advice. Something like "brush your teeth" can be one or the other depending on whether it's your mother telling you or your dentist. What additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

The terms of a loan, by contrast, will speak about obligations.

They can speak of whatever they want; it doesn't then follow that there are such things.

Loans are simple; the bank gives me money and I pay them back with interest, else I will be prosecuted. So what additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

So I assume you mean something like: "there is no reason why people should honor obligations outside of individual preferences," or something to that effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean exactly what I have said very clearly. Here are two sentences:

1. You have an obligation to do this
2. Do this

I cannot understand (1) except as (2) treated as if it were a truth-apt proposition.

If (1) means something else, or something more, then please tell me. Nobody is ever explaining this. Whenever I ask someone to explain what an obligation is I am only ever told "obligations exist" or "you have an obligation to do this". Why is that? I suspect it's because Anscombe is correct; it's a word with force but no substance.

Yes, but the naturalistic frame begs some sort of explanation for obligations, not claiming they "don't exist," which is clearly not the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why is it clearly not the case? Because we use the sentence "you ought not kill"? I think it's far simpler to just interpret this as the phrase "don't kill". You haven't actually explained what makes the former any different, you just reassert the claim that we ought (not) do things.

It wouldn't make sense to say "Babe Ruth was good as baseball," has no truth value. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't said that. I haven't mentioned anything about success at hitting a ball at all. I've only questioned the coherence of obligations.

Nor would it make sense to say "in chess the bishop can change what color square it is on," simply because it is physically possible for a player to violate the rules of chess and switch their bishop onto a new color with an illegal move. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't said anything to suggest otherwise. The rules tell you not to move the bishop to another colour. If you do then your opponent tells you to move it back, and then either you do or he declares victory.

As for the "if... then" phrasing, this is just confusing things. In natural language if/then stands in for all sorts of entailment and implication, e.g. material, casual, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How is "if you are playing chess then don't move the bishop onto another colour" more problematic than "if you are playing chess then you ought not move the bishop onto another colour"?

Hence why I cannot make sense of obligations (if something other than a command fictitiously phrased as a truth-apt proposition). I understand being told to do something, I understand either doing as I'm told or not, and I understand being punished if I don't do as I'm told. But that's it. I don't understand what else there can possibly be, or why something else is necessary, or what evidence there is of something else.

I mentioned Anscombe before, and so I'll quote more from her:

This word 'ought', having become a word of mere mesmeric force, could not, in the character of having that force, be inferred from anything whatever. It may be objected that it could be inferred from other "moral ought" sentences: but that cannot be true. The appearance that this is so is produced by the fact that we say "All men are φ" and "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is φ." But here "φ" is a dummy predicate. We mean that if you substitute a real predicate for "φ" the implication is valid. A real predicate is required; not just a word containing no intelligible thought: a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept.

Can you find any newspapers magazines or documentaries comparing Biden to Hitler for example? — NOS4A2

Kilmeade says Biden went ‘full Hitler’

Tulsi Gabbard says Biden, Democrats share same ‘core principles’ as Hitler

But also, when you have Trump's social media account post[ing] video referencing ‘unified Reich’ if re-elected, it's hardly surprising that people will respond accordingly.

Likewise, one can be a nominalist without denying that triangles exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because nominalists don't claim that triangles are abstract objects. There are concrete objects with three sides, or there are instructions that one can follow to draw a triangle.

What would it mean to be a nominalist and to claim that obligations exist? Perhaps it amounts to nothing more than the claim that some relevant authority has told me to do something, and that if I don't do it then I will be penalised.

So an official Trump campaign video posted by the official Trump YouTube account isn't a valid example of propaganda against Joe Biden and the Democrats? :brow:

This all seems to reduce to the claim that some authority has told me to do something. I understand and accept that. What I cannot make sense of is the conclusion "therefore I ought do as I'm told". What does this conclusion add that hasn't already been covered by the fact that some authority has told me to do something?

You seem to think that there is the command and then also the obligation. I don't know what this second thing is, or how/why it follows from the command.

I posted one, you posted one. What's the problem? Are we going to spend the rest of our lives posting every instance of one side attacking the other?

I literally posted something Trump said when I first responded to your remarks:

“He’s been weaponizing government against his political opponents like a Third World political tyrant,” Trump said to a crowd in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. “Biden and his radical left allies like to pose as standing up as allies of democracy,” Trump continued, arguing: “Joe Biden is not the defender of American democracy, Joe Biden is the destroyer of American democracy.”

I didn't just mention moral nihilism.

I also mentioned nominalism: obligations, if they exist, are abstract objects. Abstract objects do not exist. Therefore, obligations do not exist.

But my main position is that there is no meaningful distinction between these two sentences:

1. Soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers
2. If you are a soldier then report all instances of sexual assault to your superior officers

(1) is just (2) but fictitiously treated as a truth-apt proposition. If you think that (1) means something more then please explain what that is because I promise you that I don't see it.

I think even you will admit that the propaganda in one outpaces the propaganda in the other. — NOS4A2

Yes, and I can assure you that it’s the opposite side to the one you think.

I'm finding it hard to believe that you cannot parse the meaning of sentences like: "soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why? Moral nihilism, fictionalism, and nominalism are legitimate philosophical positions.

Sure. What the complaint here, that the claim that "lifeguard's primary purpose is to prevent drownings," has no truth value? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the concept of obligations isn't clear, and that it isn't clear that the sincere use of the phrase "I promise" entails the undertaking of an obligation.

No, it means your role entails a duty to perform that action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What does "if someone is drowning then you have a duty to jump into the water and save their life" mean?

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition?

It's not clear to me what "if someone is drowning then you are obligated to jump into the water and save their life" even means.

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition? Because that's all it seems to be to me.

The attempt is the logical conclusion of anti-Trumpism. If you repeat long enough that another human being is an existential threat it won’t be long before someone takes action. It was only a matter of time until the persecution reached murderous levels. — NOS4A2

Both sides are guilty of that, e.g.:

“He’s been weaponizing government against his political opponents like a Third World political tyrant,” Trump said to a crowd in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. “Biden and his radical left allies like to pose as standing up as allies of democracy,” Trump continued, arguing: “Joe Biden is not the defender of American democracy, Joe Biden is the destroyer of American democracy.”

I’m not really sure how your comments are related to mine? I am simply asking what “obligation” means, and how the sincere use of the verb “promise” entails an obligation.

As I understand it obligations are an incoherent concept and superfluous to the use of the phrase “I promise”.

Even though one of their fellow panicked brethren committed the act, one way or another this will be Trump’s fault. — NOS4A2

Surely the only person whose fault it is is the shooter?

And who do you even mean by “they”?

As a comparison, consider these two propositions:

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie

What does the addition of "I promise you that" add? Not much. It's more of an emphasis; an expression of certainty. — Michael

As a further example, consider something like "I'll try to do this, but I can't promise that I will". This isn't me saying that I intend to but am not obligated to; it is me saying that I am not certain that I will.

The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen.

Here.

I guess you're asking what "obligation" is supposed to be adding to the act of uttering a promise. — frank

Yes. I want to know what an obligation is, and why it is necessary.

To me, it's simple; we use the verb "promise" in conversation and sincerely intend to do what we say we promise to do.

No need to make things more complicated by bringing in some further conditions, especially conditions that entail/require the existence of some abstract object.

As a comparison, consider these two propositions:

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie

What does the addition of "I promise you that" add? Not much. It's more of an emphasis; an expression of certainty.

The Secret Service did a terrible job. Apparently them and the police were told about a man with a gun on the roof several minutes before shots were fired, and when they surrounded Trump they barely covered him at all, leaving his head in the open, and just stood on the spot.

Crooks is a registered Republican — Wayfarer

Hopefully that will temper the response of those who might otherwise take it as a call to arms.

If there's an active shooter – and especially if you've been shot – then you get away and get help. All this macho man bullshit is childish.

The reason I never really think Michael is being sincere is because he is never willing to do any of the leg work. How many times have we told him that to intend something is not yet to promise it, only to be met with mute silence? — Leontiskos

I'm still waiting on a reply to this.

There is something of Moore's paradox here. — Banno

I was going to bring up the same point, which is why these matters are best discussed in the third person:

S promised to marry H but S is not obligated to marry H.

Whether or not this sentence is contradictory depends on what it means to be obligated to do something, but as previously mentioned it is barely a coherent concept. It seems to me that obligations are nothing more than commands fictitiously treated as truth-apt propositions.

Your reference to contracts does not explain them further. It simply asserts that a contract lists our obligations; it doesn't explain what obligations are. At best I understand a contract as a list of commands that if not followed entail a penalty. The introduction of further (abstract) entities certainly seems superfluous. See also my recent comment to Leontiskos, where we are discussing this very issue.

But still, do you at least accept that your claim that a promise is the undertaking of an obligation is not one of Searle's conditions, and nor does it follow from Searle's conditions? His conditions (7) and (8) only describe what S intends to happen, and intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

I think it’s clearer to phrase it like this:

Scenario 1
A sometimes lies (and is lying)
B always lies
C always tells the truth

Scenario 2
A sometimes lies (and is telling the truth)
B always tells the truth
C always lies

Scenario 3
A always tells the truth
B always tells the truth
C always lies

Or one of a and B sometimes, and the other one always tells the truth — flannel jesus

What I was getting at is that if "sometimes tells the truth" doesn't mean "only sometimes tells the truth" then the original claim "one person sometimes tells the truth and one person always tells the truth" is consistent with the claim "two people always tell the truth".

So our initial setup is that two people always tell the truth and one person always lies.