One thing they will not find is that the push was a death blow. — NOS4A2

Strawman. I didn’t say it was. I said that I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff, which is true.

I’m not speaking of law here. — NOS4A2

Deflection. I assume because you recognise the absurdity of your position and are just unwilling to admit it.

Then it should be easy to demonstrate. — NOS4A2

Non sequitur. That something is possible and sometimes happens isn’t that it’s easy.

No, by autonomous I mean organisms can self-govern, self-produce, self-differentiate, and maintain themselves. They are capable of creating their own components and structures, continually renewing and reproducing themselves. They can spontaneously create and maintain their complex organization from simpler components. They can maintain their integrity and functionality through ongoing processes of internal regulation and repair, counteracting degradation and external degradation like disease. No need for non-physical entities at all. — NOS4A2

Red herring. Plants do not have agent-causal libertarian free will, and neither the existence of plants nor the possible existence of von Neumann probes disprove causal determinism.

It’s just one fallacy after another with you, along with absurd misinterpretations of “cause”, “determinism”, “agent-causal libertarian free will”, and “persuasion”.

I do. — NOS4A2

Well, they're not mutually exclusive. By analogy, both me typing on the keyboard and the computer are causally responsible for the words appearing on the screen as I type them. It isn't just coincidence or correlation.

I think you embrace the reductio ad absurdum. The push killed him, with nothing to say regarding the impact with the ground. For me and medical doctors the cause of death would be the injuries produced by the impact, something like spinal injuries and head trauma. For you, it’s the push. — NOS4A2

As above, this isn't mutually exclusive. It is both the case that head trauma is the cause of death and the case that I killed him by pushing him off the cliff.

Are you honestly going to argue that to be justly convicted and imprisoned for murder one must have either strangled someone or beaten them to death with one's bare hands, and that for everything else "I didn't do it" is true?

Unlike biological organisms, machines are not autonomous. They’re heteronomous. They cannot self-govern, self-produce, self-differentiate, nor maintain themselves. I think you intuitively know this. That’s why I think you wish to use analogies involving machines and other devices designed, programmed, and engineered to be causally determined by forces outside themselves, so as to confuse the reader. — NOS4A2

This is equivocation. If by "autonomous" you mean "has agent-causal libertarian free will" then in saying that biological organisms are autonomous you are begging the question. If by "autonomous" you don't mean "has agent-causal libertarian free will" then your reasoning is a non sequitur; you are missing a step that gets you from "is autonomous" to "has agent-causal libertarian free will".

As for "autonomous machines" that "self-govern, self-produce, self-differentiate, and maintain themselves", what of von Neumann probes? Would such things have agent-causal libertarian free will?

I honestly don't think you actually understand much about physics or determinism. As I referenced in an earlier comment – that you ignored – agent-causal libertarian free will requires a non-physical substance capable of acting as an uncaused cause. It certainly isn't proven true by the mere existence of plants.

There are plenty reasonable people who can differentiate between machines and biological organisms. But for some reason you can’t, or refuse to. — NOS4A2

I can differentiate them. I use machines in my analogies to show that your reasoning is invalid. If “X uses its own energy and does the work, therefore its behaviour is not causally influenced by stimuli” is a non sequitur when X is a machine then it’s a non sequitur when X is a biological organism.

Your retort that “biological organisms aren’t machines” is special pleading.

Right, there is no physical or magical property in the words that changed your mind. In other words, there is no detectable property or force in those symbols that you can point to that caused any physical changes in your body. Yet you implore me to believe they changed your mind. If not through the physical properties in symbols or biology, how can words change, alter, or do anything to your mind? What has changed and how have they been changed? — NOS4A2

I've been over this so many times. Speech causes the ears to release neurotransmitters to the brain causing certain neurons to behave in certain ways. Given eliminative materialism, certain neurons behaving in certain ways just is what it means for someone's mind to have been changed.

This is the same issue, for when you say that they "have different truth conditions," you are implying that they are both assertions. — Leontiskos

I don't think I am. I'm sure many philosophers of language will say that sentences have truth values even if not asserted.

There is more to causation, but you cannot quantify what that “more” is. That’s a problem to me. So I’ll stick with the quantifiable and measurable causation, whereby one object imparts a measurable physical property like energy or momentum onto another. — NOS4A2

That’s the impasse. I say that I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff, and so therefore there is more to causation than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. You say that there is nothing more to causation than the immediate transfer of kinetic energy, and so therefore I can't kill someone by pushing them off a cliff.

You embrace what I consider to be a reductio ad absurdum.

Whether voluntary or involuntary, the ear has the structure, spends the energy, and does all the work of hearing. It guides the sound wave, amplifies it, converts it, and so on. — NOS4A2

All of which is compatible with causal determinism.

Therefore the human is the cause of hearing, not the soundwave. — NOS4A2

These are not mutually exclusive.

By analogy, both me typing on the keyboard and the computer are causally responsible for the words appearing on the screen as I type.

Further, words cannot be shown to possess any provocative, persuasive, or inciting properties. We could stare at words for days, record them, and we will never see them perform the acts of persuading, provoking, or inciting. Therefor they are not provocative, persuasive, or inciting. — NOS4A2

This is another non sequitur. Being persuasive is not some isolated physical property that strings of symbols have, just as being toxic is not some isolated physical property that atoms with 33 protons have. You've constructed a strawman of what it means for an argument to be persuasive.

Someone is persuaded by an argument if they read it, consider it, and change their mind. This occurs even if causal determinism is false. There are countless examples of this happening, and we've even measured the neurological changes that occur when it does.

Then it is still as I said from the start. The phrases "the cat is on the mat" and "I assert that the cat is on the mat" mean different things and have different truth conditions, given that the latter can be true even if the former is false.

To just assume that we are talking about assertions seems to beg the question of the whole thread.

...

You basically want to stipulate that everything we are talking about is an assertion. You could stipulate that, but it is contrary to the spirit of the thread because it moots the central question of the thread. — Leontiskos

I'm not.

You told me that we were talking about assertions, and asked me about two such assertions:

But what if we actually spoke about assertions rather than circumlocutions that may or may not indicate assertion? What about:

"The cat is on the mat."
"I assert the cat is on the mat." — Leontiskos

You seem to be confused about what I have been arguing, so I'll spell it out more clearly:

There are three independent arguments:

Argument 1
There is more to causation than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. This is proven by the facts that smoking can cause cancer, droughts can cause famines, I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff, and I can turn on the lights by flicking a switch, pulling a chord, pushing a button, clapping my hands, or saying “Siri, turn on the lights”. With respect to speech and biological (whether animal or human) listeners, spoken words cause a listener's ears to transduce energy and emit neurotransmitters, in turn causing the activation of certain neurons.

Argument 2
If eliminative materialism is true then agent-causal libertarian free will is false, as agent-causal libertarian free will requires a non-physical mind capable of acting as an uncaused cause of (some) bodily behaviour. All physical phenomena (which is all phenomena), including the behaviour of machines, plants, animals, and humans, is causally explained by antecedent physical phenomena in an unbroken chain (some of which may involve stochastic rather than certain outcomes, e.g. if quantum indeterminancy is not explained by hidden variables). This then entails either that we do not have free will or that free will is compatible with causal determinism.

Argument 3
It is possible to be persuaded by another's words, and this does in fact sometimes happen. This is possible even if interactionist dualism is true and we have agent-causal libertarian free will.

---

Note specifically that Argument 1 only talks about bodily behaviour that almost all of us can accept is involuntary bodily behaviour (e.g. the chochlea's response to being stimulated by sound and the brain's response to receiving neurotransmitters).

So-called voluntary bodily behaviour is instead addressed by Argument 2.

I understood Tim to be arguing that it is convention that explains meaning. If that is so, it is hard to see how going against a convention, as in the case of malapropism, can be meaningful. — Banno

I don't think it's mutually exclusive. A malapropism, by definition, is a term used to mean something it doesn't normally mean. The "normal meaning" is explained by convention and the "abnormal meaning" is explained by intention.

It certainly seems appropriate to tell someone "that's not what the word means" and that they "misspoke".

As a comparison we could consider a table. We certainly could use it as a seat (and we may sometimes do if there are no chairs available) but its "correct" use is determined by convention; tables aren't seats.

But we are asking why, "I assert the cat is on the mat," cannot mean that one is asserting that the cat is on the mat. — Leontiskos

The grammar here is confusing.

I am claiming these things:

1. The assertions "the cat is on the mat" and "I assert that the cat is on the mat" mean different things and have different truth conditions, as shown by the fact that the latter can be true even if the former is false.

2. In asserting "the cat is on the mat" one is asserting that the cat is on the mat.

Do you object to either of these?

So with any such pair, we can assume that there is an implicit assertion or not, and we can identify the explicit assertion with that implicit assertion or not. — Leontiskos

John believes that the cat is on the mat. Jane does not believe that the cat is on the mat.

John asserts "the cat is on the mat".

Jane asserts "I disagree".

Jane is not disagreeing with the implicit assertion "I [John] assert that the cat is on the mat" because Jane agrees that John is asserting that the cat is on the mat. Jane is disagreeing with the explicit assertion "the cat is on the mat". As such, we should not identify the explicit assertion with the implicit assertion.

So when someone says, "The cat is on the mat," they are not asserting that the cat is on the mat? — Leontiskos

They are asserting that the cat is on the mat. And they're speaking English. But just as "the cat is on the mat" doesn't mean "I am speaking English", it also doesn't mean "I assert that the cat is on the mat".

You believe turning on the stove causes the water to boil. I believe the transfer of heat causes the water to boil. — NOS4A2

And you think that these are mutually exclusive?

The problem is there isn’t always a pot of water on the stove. Siri doesn’t always understand. The bulb needs to be changed. There is a body of water below the cliff. — NOS4A2

So? It's still the case that I can boil the water by turning on the stove, turn on the lights by flicking a switch or saying "Siri, turn on the lights", and kill someone by pushing them off a cliff.

It is superstition to believe words have causal powers above and beyond the immediate effects of their physical structure. — NOS4A2

No it isn't, because there is more to causation than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy.

It is superstition to believe in telekinesis. — NOS4A2

Being persuaded by another's argument doesn't require telekinesis. Turning on the lights by saying "Siri, turn on the lights" doesn't require telekinesis. This is an absurd strawman.

We know this because writing begets varying responses, as is apparent in your own writing. Same words, varying responses. The only thing that could account for that variability is the listener. — NOS4A2

Yes, and different computers can have different responses to the same input, but it's still the case that the input causes the output.

Your words do not transduce light into electrochemical energy. Your words do not send neurotransmitters. — NOS4A2

My words cause your eyes (or your ears if I'm speaking) to transduce energy and emit neurotransmitters. You are misrepresenting my claim.

I can write a sentence in a different language and the words will never cause you to understand them. You’d have to first go out of your way learn what the words mean, whether through association or immersion. Understanding needs to be there before your cause, not after. That is why it cannot be an effect unless you believe in backwards causation. — NOS4A2

You're conflating active and passive understanding (compare with knowing how to play tennnis and actually playing tennis).

Given that you already (passively) understand English, and assuming that you don't already understand Serbian, the words "it is raining" cause the neurons in your brain to behave in a way that the words "пада киша" don't. I describe this kind of neural activity as "understanding my words". This neural activity did not occur apropos of nothing and was not caused by some uncaused cause within the human body (e.g. a non-physical mind). So as per both the counterfactual theory of causation and causal determinism, the existence of these words caused this neural activity (described as "understanding my words") to occur.

Hence Davidson's account provides an explanation for how we are able to understand malapropisms, which by their very nature run contrary to the conventions of language. — Banno

I’m a little confused. If malapropisms “by their very nature run contrary to the conventions of language” then there are conventions of language. So the very existence of malapropisms is proof that there is a (conventionally) “correct” way of speaking (else nothing could be a malapropism).

You don’t believe the transfer of energy has any effect? So the transfer of momentum from one billiard ball to another doesn’t cause it to move? So the transfer of heat to water doesn’t cause it to boil? — NOS4A2

I didn't say that. I said that there is more to causation than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. All of your examples are examples of causation, but so too are all of mine.

Not all smokers get cancer. Not all droughts cause famines. People can fall off cliffs and live. — NOS4A2

I have never claimed otherwise. That A can cause B isn't that A always causes B (and so that some particular A didn't cause B isn't that A can't cause B).

Smoking can cause cancer, droughts can cause famines, I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff, and I can turn on the lights by flicking a switch, pulling a chord, pushing a button, clapping my hands, or saying “Siri, turn on the lights”. None of this is superstition or magical thinking. And neither is being persuaded by another's argument.

In every case it is me moving my eyes, focussing on the words, reading them, and so on down the line. — NOS4A2

And you think that this is mutually exclusive with the words causally affecting your body and brain?

The physical existence of the printed words physically cause light to reflect the way it does, physically causing your eyes to release the neurotransmitters they do, physically causing the neurons in your brain to behave the way they do ("understanding").

Tim apparently asserts that language is governed by conventions. The best rebuttal of that of which I am aware is Davidson's essay. I've used it before, it has been discussed at length. — Banno

Quoting from here:

Davidson denies that conventions shared by members of a linguistic community play any philosophically interesting role in an account of meaning. Shared conventions facilitate communication, but they are in principle dispensible. For so long as an audience discerns the intention behind a speaker’s utterance, for example, he intends that his utterance of “Schnee ist weiss” mean that snow is white, then his utterance means that snow is white, regardless of whether he and they share the practice that speakers use “Schnee ist weiss” to mean that snow is white.

Assuming that this is an accurate summary, it seems to me that Davidson believes both that words and phrases have conventional meanings and that words and phrases can be used to mean anything a speaker intends. So yours and Count Timothy's positions might not be incompatible.

But what if we actually spoke about assertions rather than circumlocutions that may or may not indicate assertion? What about:

a) "The cat is on the mat."
b) "I assert the cat is on the mat." — Leontiskos

They mean different things and have different truth conditions.

(a) is true if and only if the cat is on the mat
(b) is true if and only if I assert that the cat is on the mat

(b) can be true even if (a) is false.

I believe it means we come to agree with an argument by assessing it with our own reasoning and judgement. — NOS4A2

And you think that this is mutually exclusive with "his argument persuaded me"?

Great, a new theory of causation. — NOS4A2

It's not new. I first mentioned it a month ago.

What caused me to both respond or not respond to these comments was me in both cases. I read, ignored, dismissed as stupid, or took seriously each argument and at my own discretion. The influence of this activity was my own interest and desires. The force behind the reading, response, and each keystroke was my own. — NOS4A2

And you think that this is mutually exclusive with the comments causing you to respond?

The comments themselves had no causal power, for the simple reason that they do not possess the kind of energy to impel such actions. — NOS4A2

You keep repeating the same non sequitur ad nauseum. There is more to causation than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. Smoking can cause cancer, droughts can cause famines, I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff, and I can turn on the lights by flicking a switch, pulling a chord, pushing a button, clapping my hands, or saying “Siri, turn on the lights”.

Then you should be able to cause my brain state and any subsequent activity with your words, as if you were turning on a light. Let’s see it. — NOS4A2

You being able to read and understand them is proof that they causally affect your sense organs and brain, and you responding to them is a causal consequence of that, as per both the counterfactual theory of causation and causal determinism (given that eliminative materialism is true).

The notion that material strings have strict meanings without taking context and intention into account is not going to get us anywhere. — Leontiskos

I wasn't offered any context when bongo fury asked me what they mean. So I think it's both reasonable and correct to say that "the cat is on the mat" and "I think that the cat is on the mat" mean different things and have different truth conditions, with it being possible that one is true and the other false.

Yes, it’s obvious various brain regions light up when we read and come to agree with something — NOS4A2

What do you think it means to be persuaded if not the appropriate areas of the brain being active in response to hearing or reading some words?

I’ve outright ignored countless people, even you. Did they provoke me not to respond, then? — NOS4A2

The counterfactual theory of causation says that A causes B if B would not have happened had A not happened. So their comments would have caused you to not respond to them if you would have not not responded to them (i.e would have responded to them) had they not been posted, which isn’t possible.

So no, the comments that you didn’t respond to didn’t cause you to not respond to them, but the comments that you did respond to did cause you to respond to them.

But none of that means the words moved or animated the brain, which is impossible, and for the reasons I’ve already stated. The words don’t make the eyes move over them. The words don’t force you to understand them. The words don’t cause you to agree just as they don’t cause you to disagree. They physically cannot move the brain in that way. Symbols do not nor cannot gain causal powers when they become words. It’s impossible and absolutely nothing has shown that it is possible. — NOS4A2

Your reasoning is:

a) A causes B only if B is the immediate effect of A's kinetic energy
b) the brain's behaviour is not the immediate effect of the kinetic energy of speech or writing
c) therefore, the brain's behaviour is not caused by speech or writing

When you say “[words] physically cannot move the brain” you mean it in the sense of (b), which is irrelevant given that (a) is false. This is the mistake you keep repeating ad nauseum.

Smoking can cause cancer, droughts can cause famines, I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff, and I can turn on the lights by flicking a switch, pulling a chord, pushing a button, clapping my hands, or saying “Siri, turn on the lights”. These common sense examples are not metaphors or analogies or superstitions or magical thinkings, but are literal and prove that (a) is false. There is more to causation than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy.

The impasse is that you insist on saying that all of these examples are false because (a) is true. You commit to the absurd implications of (a), which is evidently unreasonable.

Do you think that those sentence strings mean those different things as they stand? Or do you only mean that they will end up meaning the different things if and when they are later on asserted? — bongo fury

They mean different things whether asserted or not.

Haha, 3 a step too far?

Are you back peddling on 1 also? Its being a claim and an assertion, even while lacking a prefix to that effect?

You seemed to provide confirmation on the point. But there may have been a misunderstanding. — bongo fury

I just don't understand what you're trying to say.

All I am saying is that "the cat is on the mat" and "I think that the cat is on the mat" mean different things, as shown by the fact that one can be true and the other false.

And 1. is no less a claim (or assertion) for lacking a personal endorsement (or other assertion sign).

And the string "the cat is on the mat" is no less a claim (etc.) even for being embedded in

3. It's false that the cat is on the mat. — bongo fury

I don't understand what you're trying to say here.

Given your claim to some empirical fact it should be easy to devise some empirical test of it or some demonstration that anyone can observe. — NOS4A2

The Neural Correlates of Persuasion: A Common Network across Cultures and Media

Yet I am not persuaded, and you have abjectly refused to persuade, incite, or provoke me into some behavior, as you have claimed to be able to do. No demonstration of your empirical fact is forthcoming. — NOS4A2

Each of my posts has provoked you to respond. See the counterfactual theory of causation, coupled with the fact that eliminative materialism is true and that causal determinism applies to all physical objects and processes (whether organic or not, and whether "using its own energies" or not).

In those instances, where have the causal powers of your words disappeared to? — NOS4A2

They haven't disappeared. They caused your eyes to release neurotransmitters to your brain, causing certain neurons to behave in certain ways. It just happens to be that this neural behaviour is not the neural behaviour referred to by the phrase "understanding the words and being persuaded" but instead by the phrase "understanding the words and being stubborn".

If words can persuade or otherwise move someone to some other behavior, then it should be easy to get me to agree. — NOS4A2

This is another non sequitur. That words can persuade isn't that there's some specific sequence of words that can unavoidably cause any listener or reader to be persuaded. The human brain is far too complex for that.

You might not be persuaded by my words but it is an undeniable fact that many people throughout human history have been persuaded by others' words. Your persistent refusal to accept this is just willful ignorance.

Yes.

I was using the turnstile as a shorthand for Frege's judgement stroke, so read "⊢⊢the cat is on the mat" as "I think that I think..." or "I think that I judge..." or whatever. Not as "...is derivable from..." — bongo fury

Okay, well these are clearly two different claims:

1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat

(2) can be true even if (1) is false.

It may be that whoever asserts (1) is implicitly asserting (2), but they are nonetheless different claims.

1. Words can't persuade
2. Words can persuade, but never do
3. Words can persuade, and sometimes do
4. Words can persuade, and always do

Throughout this discussion you have been arguing for (1) and I have been arguing for (3).

Me not having persuaded you is not evidence against (3), and so does not falsify (3). Your suggestion that it does is a non sequitur. It would be evidence against (4), and so would falsify (4), but I have never made that claim. Either way, it isn't evidence for (1).

The emprical evidence supports (3). The laymen and the psychologists and the neuroscientists who talk about persuasion are not engaging in superstition or magical thinking. It is nothing like ghosts or goblins or gods.

Speech causes the ear to release neurotransmitters to the brain, causing certain neurons to behave in certain ways — and assuming eliminative materialism, "understanding" and "being persuaded" and "deciding to do something" are all reducible to certain neurons behaving in certain ways.

The fact that the human body "uses its own energies" does not refute this, and is, again, a non sequitur. The Apple device "uses its own energies" but it is still caused to do so by my touch and my words. If anything in the human body avoids the physics of causal determinism then it's not because it "uses its own energies" (or because it's organic matter) but because interactionist dualism is correct.

And so we circle back to the (almost) start of this discussion two months ago:

So either speech can influence behaviour or eliminative materialism is false. Pick your poison. — Michael

Are you using the turnstile as used here, e.g. where "⊢ A" means "I know that A"?

It’s not a non-sequitur to note that the evidence against a claim contradicts a claim. — NOS4A2

It’s not evidence against the claim. That’s why it’s a non sequitur. That I haven’t done something just isn’t evidence that that thing is physically impossible.

The evidence for the claim is all of human history and psychology.

If there is no way to test or observe your theory and contradict it with evidence, it’s pseudoscience, I’m afraid — NOS4A2

I didn't say it wasn't falsifiable. Try reading my words.

That we persuade, convince, provoke, incite, coerce, teach, trick, etc. isn’t pseudoscience. It's an emprical fact about psychology.

But a question remains: if your words persuade, why aren’t they persuading? — NOS4A2

We went over this a while ago. That words can, and do, persuade, isn't that they always persuade. You're just continuing with non sequiturs. It's tiresome. Your position throughout this discussion has been found absurd and now you're just floundering. I should have stopped when you refused to admit that we can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff.

Then what would falsify your empirical fact that you persuade people with words? It’s a simple question. — NOS4A2

"What would falsify your empriical fact that we swear with words" is also a simple question. I don't really know how to answer either.

All I can do is point out that we do persuade and swear with words, and that your argument that because I haven't persuaded "anyone" then my claim is falsified is a non sequitur.

Then what would falsify your empirical fact if not the empirical fact that you’ve persuaded no one? — NOS4A2

"Michael hasn’t persuaded anyone therefore persuasion is physically impossible" is a non sequitur.

That aside, I've persuaded many people in my life, and many others have persuaded many people, too.

Persuasion (Wikipedia)

Persuasion (Britannica)

The Neural Correlates of Persuasion: A Common Network across Cultures and Media

Persuasion is real, turning on the lights is real, and killing someone by pushing them off a cliff is real. That your reasoning entails that they’re not suffices as a refutation of your position. There is more to causal influence than just the immediate transfer of kinetic energy, as these common sense examples from everyday life prove.

Yes, that was my claim. And you claimed that me not having convinced you falsifies my claim. This is a non sequitur.

I never said that, though. — NOS4A2

I claimed that people can, and do, persuade one another. You claimed that because I have not persuaded you then my claim is falsified.

This is a non sequitur because "Michael has not persuaded NOS4A2" being true does not entail that "people can, and do, persuade one another" is false.

I do know what a non-sequitur is but you have been unable to explain why the evidence against a claim (that I am not moved by your words) does not falsify your claim that it is a fact “people are moved by words”. — NOS4A2

"You haven't done X to me, therefore X is impossible" is a non sequitur. This is such basic reasoning.

Your rejections of reality are just not taken seriously — AmadeusD

He even denies that we can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff. His understanding of causation is just so fundamentally absurd.

Proof by assertion. — NOS4A2

Proof by a common sense example from everyday life. I can turn on the lights, whether that be by flicking a switch, pulling a chord, pushing a button, clapping my hands, or saying "Siri, turn on the lights".

An agent’s behavior is determined by the agent, which I’ve been saying all along. Agents are physical. — NOS4A2

This is compatibilism, not agent-causal libertarian free will. The latter requires interactionist dualism.

As you don't like Wikipedia, let's use SEP:

A number of incompatibilists have maintained that a free decision ... must be caused by the agent, and it must not be the case that ... the agent’s causing that event is causally determined by prior events.

...

An agent, it is said, is a persisting substance; causation by an agent is causation by such a substance. Since a substance is not the kind of thing that can itself be an effect ... on these accounts an agent is in a strict and literal sense ... an uncaused cause of [her free decisions].

The emphasized parts are false if agents are physical.

Yet this evidence completely contradicts your claim that “it is an empirical fact that we do persuade, convince, provoke, incite, coerce, teach, trick, etc. with our words”. Our mutual inability to persuade and convince each other is evidence against your claim that you can “influence their free decisions and behaviours by persuading, convincing, provoking, inciting, coercing, tricking, etc.”. — NOS4A2

No it doesn't. This is a non sequitur.

It wasn’t much of a refutation because you haven’t shown how you affected and moved anything beyond the diaphragm in the microphone. — NOS4A2

I turned on the lights.

But the body provides the energy required to both maintain the structure and function of all cells in the body, including in the ear and the subsequent parts involved in hearing. It also provides the energy required to transduce signals, to move impulses, and to respond to them. The body does all the work of hearing, thinking, moving etc. using exactly zero energy provided by the sound wave ... In other words, all the energy required to move the body comes from the body, not the soundwaves, not from other speakers, and so on. — NOS4A2

The same is true of the Apple device responding to me saying "Siri, turn on the lights", yet you referred to this as a domino effect. You seem to be contradicting yourself.

I just don’t understand how they’re inconsistent. — NOS4A2

See the Wikipedia article on libertarian free will:

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, and consequently the world is not closed under physics. Such interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality.

Explanations of libertarianism that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior.

...

In non-physical theories of free will, agents are assumed to have power to intervene in the physical world, a view known as agent causation.

If (a) physics is deterministic and if (b) nothing non-physical explains an agent's behaviour then (c) an agent's behaviour is deterministic.

Agent-causal libertarians deny (c) by denying (b), whereas eliminative materialists accept (b) – hence why your positions are inconsistent.

An eliminative materialist must either accept (c), and so be either a hard determinist or a compatibilist, or deny (a).

I don't know why you continue to misrepresent my claims. I'm not going to repeat myself in correcting you.

Sure you did — Harry Hindu

No I didn't.

All I am saying is that I can kill someone by pushing them off a cliff or by shooting them. This is irrefutable. And I can turn on the lights by saying "Siri, turn on the lights".

My literal argument was: “The obvious falsification of your theory is that you’ve persuaded and influenced precisely no one.” — NOS4A2

P1. You have persuaded and influenced precisely no one
C1. Therefore, your theory is falsified

This is a non sequitur.

At any rate, the words you’re using are a class of verbs which suggest that you’re literally causing the behaviors of others, in some way, which is evident by your false analogy that you’re causing the lights to turn on by talking to Siri. — NOS4A2

You are misunderstanding the purpose of that example. Your argument was:

P1. Symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, cannot affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.
C1. Therefore, incitement is physically impossible ("superstitious, magical-thinking").

The example of turning on the lights by saying "Siri, turn on the lights" is simply a refutation of P1. It's not meant to be anything more than that. Given that P1 is false you need to either offer a better justification for C1 or (which you now seem to have done) acknowledge that incitement is not physically impossible.

But your urge to use an analogy of a device that is programmed and engineered to obey your commands is a tell, to me, because human beings don’t operate like that. Someone might come to agree with you or believe as you do, but it isn’t because your soundwaves hit their eardrums setting off a domino effect in their skull. — NOS4A2

Again, you are misunderstanding me. I'll refer you back to this comment from a month ago:

You somehow seem to want something like libertarian free will whilst also denying anything like a non-physical mind. These positions are incompatible. So, once again, you need to pick your poison and abandon one of these two positions. — Michael

I am not claiming that causal determinism is true. I am only arguing that agent-causal libertarian free will is incompatible with eliminative materialism, and so that your positions are inconsistent. If you want to argue against the "domino effect" then you must argue for something like interactionist dualism, because the domino effect is an inevitable consequence of physicalism (even counting quantum indeterminacy), applying to artificial machines, natural (inanimate) phenomena, and biological organisms.

The brain, though vastly complex, is just a physical machine. If that machine can experience qualia, why not a future machine of equal or greater complexity? — Jacques

It may not be just a matter of complexity but also of composition. Organic molecules may be necessary for consciousness to emerge because other chemicals are incapable of behaving in the appropriate way.

So if anything like an artificial brain is possible, it might require being made of the same material as ours, and so traditional computers might never produce qualia no matter how many moving parts there are.

Turing showed that such a program would lead to a logical contradiction when applied to itself. Similarly, a human trying to model the human mind completely may run into a barrier of self-reference and computational insufficiency. — Jacques

I'm not entirely familiar with the halting problem, but your wording suggests a mistake in your reasoning. It may not be possible for some program A to determine whether or not itself will halt, but is it possible for it to determine whether or not some equivalent program B will halt? If so, even if I cannot model my own mind, I may be able to model your mind, and if it's reasonable to assume that our minds are broadly equivalent then that will suit our purposes of modelling "the human mind" in general.