Those are independent claims, not a premise and a conclusion. I am simply explaining that "X was A, therefore A is X" is a non sequitur, offering an example to make it clearer.

I'll try to break it down even further for you:

(1) X was A, therefore A is X
(2) X was a zygote, therefore a zygote is X
(3) A human was a zygote, therefore a zygote is a human
(4) A placenta was a zygote, therefore a zygote is a placenta

In none of these does the conclusion follow from the premise. You have been asserting (3). It's an invalid argument, just as (1), (2), and (4) are invalid.

If you want to argue that a zygote is a human then you need something more than just "a human was a zygote" as a solitary premise.

These are two different arguments:

1. A placenta was a zygote, therefore a zygote isn't a human
2. That a human was a zygote does not entail that a zygote is a human

You accused me of arguing for (1), when in fact I am arguing for (2).

Your reasoning is "Parts of X were A, therefor A isn't X." — NOS4A2

Except that wasn't my reasoning. Read carefully what I wrote.

Placentas and hearts were zygotes? I don't follow. The fact zygotes develop human organs seems to me to suggest that they are human, not something else. — NOS4A2

Your reasoning is "X was A, therefore A is X". I am explaining that this reasoning is flawed.

That a placenta was a zygote does not entail that a zygote is a placenta.
That glass was sand does not entail that sand is glass.
That a human was a zygote does not entail that a zygote is a human.

All human being were zygotes. That is irrefutable. — NOS4A2

All placentas and hearts and lungs were zygotes. That does not entail that zygotes are placentas, hearts, and lungs. And so that all humans were zygotes does not entail that zygotes are humans.

I’m sure you can figure that out. But if you go watch one, or look in the mirror, you’ll notice they’re not placentas and hearts. — NOS4A2

Nor are they zygotes.

And what does it mean to be that kind of animal?

What on earth does that mean? And how is that creating opportunity for Black men? And if anything it sounds racist against Black men. Why is protecting cryptocurrency investments protecting Black men more unless you're saying they're more likely to fall for scams or whatnot? — Baden

It's just another soundbite. The slightly more in-depth account is:

More than 20% of Black Americans own or have owned cryptocurrency assets. Vice President Harris appreciates the ways in which new technologies can broaden access to banking and financial services. She will make sure owners of and investors in digital assets benefit from a regulatory framework so that Black men and others who participate in this market are protected.

So it's more like "I'll make cryptocurrency safer, black men use cryptocurrency, therefore I'll be helping black men."

forgivable loans so long as you have a certain skin-color — NOS4A2

Although if you read beyond the soundbite, it's "... to Black entrepreneurs and others who have historically faced barriers..."

Kamala introduces racist policies, forgivable loans so long as you have a certain skin-color. Media silent. — NOS4A2

Sexist too. What about black women?

I'm finding this hard to follow - is your claim that the argument is invalid? It isn't. — Banno

I think it's more addressing that these mean different things:

1. ¬(P→A)
2. P→¬A

And so these mean different things:
3. (¬G→¬(P→A)∧¬P)→G
4. (¬G→(P→¬A)∧¬P)→G

(3) is valid but (4) isn't.

Translating (1) and (2) into ordinary language introduces a problem, because we would translate (1) as "it is not the case that if I pray then it will be answered" and (2) as "if I pray then it will not be answered" which seem to mean the same thing, but (1) and (2) don't mean the same thing.

Trump sways and bops to music for 39 minutes in bizarre town hall episode

The town hall, moderated by South Dakota Gov. Kristi L. Noem (R), began with questions from preselected attendees for the former president. Donald Trump offered meandering answers on how he would address housing affordability and help small businesses. But it took a sudden turn after two attendees required medical attention.

And so Trump, after jokingly asking the crowd whether “anybody else would like to faint,” took a different approach.

“Let’s not do any more questions. Let’s just listen to music. Let’s make it into a music. Who the hell wants to hear questions, right?” he said.

For 39 minutes, Trump swayed, bopped — sometimes stopping to speak — as he turned the event into almost a living-room listening session of his favorite songs from his self-curated rally playlist.

He played nine tracks. He danced. He shook hands with people onstage. He pointed to the crowd. Noem stood beside him, nodding with her hands clasped. Trump stayed in place onstage, slowly moving back and forth. He was done answering questions for the night.

Weird.

and is a member of the human species. — Bob Ross

What does it mean to be a member of the human species? Is the placenta a human being? It has human DNA, is a living organism, and develops from the blastocyst. Is the heart a human being?

If a blastocyst separates into twins, is that one human being becoming two? Was it already two human beings before the split? Are twins a single human being with two bodies?

Why would it even matter if it was a human being?

You seem to be talking about Hempel's dilemma? If the physical is defined just as whatever is explained by our current scientific theories then physicalism is false because our current scientific theories do not explain everything. If the physical is defined just as whatever is explained by some future scientific theory that does explain everything then physicalism is circular.

But then the same can be said of methodological naturalism. What does it mean to be natural or supernatural?

Think about how that focus on what the future holds bears on the disposition of a fetus. The human potential includes Einstein and Mozart. :grimace: — frank

And Hitler.

I don't think future potential is all that relevant. What matter is what the organism is now and what the parents want. Forcing a mother to carry to term and birth a child because the 1 day old zygote in her womb is a living organism with human DNA just ain't right.

I'm mostly addressing NOS4A2's reasoning. He argues that because a zygote/embryo/foetus is a living organism with a human genetic makeup then it is human and it is wrong to kill it, even if it is not conscious. The same reasoning would then entail that it is wrong to kill a baby born with anencephaly (assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is viable).

I think that the conclusion is false, therefore the reasoning is false. The capacity to be conscious is morally relevant.

Viability is about the connection between the vascular system and the alveoli in the lungs. It's called the AC membrane (alveolar capillary). It starts approaching functionality around 22 weeks. — frank

It requires more than that. Those born with anencephaly, if still alive when born, don't last very long. As far as I can tell from reading that, they don't have issues with their vascular system or lungs; they're just missing a significant part of their brain, and because of that the wider body cannot function properly.

But let's assume that a human could be born and be viable even with anencephaly. Well, it's okay to kill it. It has no cognition, no consciousness, no capacity for pain or sense of the world. It's just a beating heart and pumping lungs wrapped in a skeleton, muscles, and skin.

If consciousness and viability happened to occur at the same time, that was coincdental. — Hanover

Also I'm not sure if it's coincidental. I suspect that a sufficient degree of consciousness is required for a human life to be viable, and as the brain is the most complex organ it stands to reason that everything else is likely to have already developed enough.

Well I'm not talking about the law? I'm only saying that something being a living organism with human DNA is insufficient grounds to conclude that it would be wrong to kill it. I think that consciousness is a morally relevant faculty, and so to determine whether or not it is acceptable to kill a foetus we must determine whether or not it has developed such a faculty to a sufficient degree. The literature seems to suggest that this is determined by the presence of thalamocortical connections, which occurs towards the end of the second trimester, and so I tentatively place the limit there.

I was getting my information from the emergence of consciousness: Science and ethics:

Consciousness cannot emerge before 24 gestational weeks when the thalamocortical connections from the sense organs are established. Thus the limit of legal abortion at 22-24 weeks in many countries makes sense.

The fetus is minimally conscious before that. I think you're looking for a higher level of consciousness. — frank

I'm just reading what the neuroscientists have written, e.g. here:

Functional MRI and electrophysiology studies suggest consciousness depends on large-scale thalamocortical and corticocortical interactions.

So no thalamocortical interactions, no consciousness.

The fetus has a brain-like structure at 3 weeks. I'll put you down for supporting abortion up to 2 weeks after conception. — frank

No, because it needs to be a sufficiently complex brain functioning in the appropriate manner, hence why the brain dead and those with anencephaly aren’t conscious.

As mentioned in an earlier comment to you, the evidence suggests that thalamocortical connectivity is required, which occurs ~24 weeks after conception, and so I support abortion up to around that point.

There’s around five pounds of single-celled organisms in the human body that few care enough about to even feed properly. — praxis

The human body contains 37.2 trillion cells. I guess that means that I am in fact 37.2 trillion conscious individuals.

So your view isn't scientific. You just hold to that folk wisdom. — frank

The scientific evidence supports the claim that consciousness requires a brain-like structure; it does not support the claim that grass is conscious.

I am no more going to use CBC as a reason to condemn abortion than I am going to use it as a reason to condemn mowing the lawn.

How would you show that this view is wrong? — frank

I wouldn’t. I’d dismiss it as nonsense, much like the theory that consciousness is some immaterial magic that arbitrarily attaches itself to random clumps of matter.

There's science that says that? — frank

Yes. Consciousness requires a sufficiently complex and functioning brain (and plausibly some other brain-like structure). A zygote is just a small collection of cells. It lacks the necessary physical stuff that allows for an organism to be conscious.

I don't think there's really a scientific dividing line when it comes to consciousness, owing in part to our lack of understanding of what it is and what's required for it. — frank

We know that adults are conscious and zygotes aren’t. We know that (in humans) a functioning brain is required. We have reason to believe that certain areas of the brain are more relevant than others.

We don’t need certainty or a single, unambiguous neurological process to make (accurate) moral judgements.

I think the reason it would feel wrong to kill a fetus over 24 weeks is that it could possibly survive outside the womb. — frank

Why is it wrong to kill something that could survive outside the womb?

So there's nothing behavioral that signals cognition to you. It's a matter of wiring? — frank

Yes, which is why it would be wrong to kill someone who’s asleep or unconscious or with locked in syndrome but not wrong to take someone who’s brain dead off life support.

Do they have enough cognitive capability to show up as human? — frank

I'd say it's with the development of thalamocortical connectivity, which occurs ~24 weeks after conception.

The biological difference between you as a zygote and you as an adult was that you were in a different stage of your development. — NOS4A2

And I have developed morally relevant faculties that a zygote lacks. The actual possession of intelligence is an important biological difference.

I believe members of the species homo sapiens have moral relevance. — NOS4A2

Being a member of the species homo sapiens just means having a particular genetic makeup. What about having that genetic makeup is morally relevant? Because I say that the possession of a particular set of chromosomes is insufficient, and having actually developed the appropriate cognitive capabilities is required (regardless of chromosomes, allowing me to extend the same or similar moral consideration to non-humans).

You never once deviated from being this particular human, you still occupy the same location in space and time, no matter what nouns you use to identify the state of your development. — NOS4A2

A zygote also develops into a placenta. Why not say that a zygote is a placenta at the moment of conception?

And a zygote can develop into twins. If each twin is a distinct individual then at least one of them is not identical to the zygote (and it would be special pleading to claim that it was one of them but not the other).

Biology and identity just doesn't work the way you claim it does.

At what stage in that development is killing her acceptable? Do all the complex cognitive functions need to be developed at the same time, or does one or the other function take precedence? — NOS4A2

As I mentioned in an earlier post, there is no single point, much like with the Sorites paradox. It's acceptable when it's a zygote or blastocyst or embryo, not acceptable when it's due to be delivered in a day, and in between there's a large grey and ambiguous area as it develops more and more into a human like us.

It’s all too arbitrary for my tastes — NOS4A2

There is much more to an organism than its genetic makeup. There are very real, significant, and obvious biological differences between myself and a zygote. Your decision to only consider an organism's genetic makeup is not less arbitrary than my decision to also consider these other important aspects of an organism's being. But I do think that your claim that only an organism's genetic makeup has moral relevance is an absurd one.

I personally need a solid unit of value — NOS4A2

Well, biology and morality doesn't work that way, even if you "need" it to.

There is nothing else with our genetic makeup. There is only one extant species of human beings. — NOS4A2

That doesn’t explain or justify your assertion that it is wrong to kill anything with our genetic makeup.

My own take is that our genetic makeup is neither the measure of whether or not it is wrong to kill something (e.g. it can be wrong to kill an intelligent alien even though it would have a different genetic makeup) nor sufficient to entail that it is wrong to kill something (e.g. it can be acceptable to kill an embryo even though it has the same genetic makeup).

i.e. the claim “it is wrong to kill me because I’m a human” is as fallacious as the claim “it is wrong to kill Mork because he is an Orkan” and as fallacious as the claim “it is acceptable to kill a fly because it is not human.”

Whether or not it is wrong to kill something is not determined by its genetic makeup (whether that be human, Orkan, fly, or other), but whether or not the individual organism has developed sufficiently complex cognitive functions - functions that a fly, an embryo, and an early stage foetus have not developed, but that Mork and I have.

None of the things I mentioned are genetically similar to human beings in any way. — NOS4A2

That’s what I meant by “having human DNA”.

So why does anything with our genetic makeup deserve to live?

Which non-human organisms with human DNA are you talking about? — NOS4A2

All of them. You claimed, with examples, that some things can have human DNA but not be human. So I want to know what it is that makes something with human DNA human, and why having this thing entails that it “deserves” to live.

Here’s an interesting paper:

Could a zygote be a human being?

This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing with cases of fission and fusion and both seem to be available to the conceptionist. One is the Replacement View according to which objects cease to exist when they fission or fuse. The other is the Multiple Occupancy View - both twins may be present already in the zygote and both persist in a chimera. So, is the conceptionist position tenable after all? I argue that it is not. A zygote gives rise not only to a human being but also to a placenta - it cannot already be both a human being and a placenta. Neither approach to fission and fusion can help the conceptionist with this problem. But worse is in store. Both fission and fusion can occur before and after the development of the inner cell mass of the blastocyst - the entity which becomes the embryo proper. The idea that we become human beings with the arrival of the inner cell mass leads to bizarre results however we choose to accommodate fission and fusion.

Many things have human DNA, like sperm or a pool of saliva. Human beings have more than DNA. — NOS4A2

So what distinguishes a human organism with human DNA and a non-human organism with human DNA, and why is this distinction the measure of whether or not it is wrong to kill it?

I use the term "human being" in the sense that it is a member of species homo sapiens, whether it is developed or not. A fetus is not of some other species. If a human lifecycle begins at conception, then we are speaking of human life and no other. This is an existentialist and "animalist" view rather than an essentialist view. — NOS4A2

And to be a member of the species homo sapiens is to have the appropriate ("human") DNA? So when you say that it is wrong to kill a foetus because it is human you are simply saying that it is wrong to kill a foetus because it has human DNA.

I fail to see how you get from "the foetus has human DNA" to "therefore it is wrong to kill a foetus".

You’d need as a premise “it is wrong to kill anything with human DNA” but I see no reason to accept such a premise.

The differences are, as far as I can tell, you place moral value on what human beings can do, while I place moral value on what a human being is. Is that fair? — NOS4A2

Yes. As related to my reply to Hanover above, what a human is depends on how we use the word "human", and how we use the word "human" is a contingent fact about the English language, open to change. If we use the word "human" to refer to anything with human DNA then embryos are human. If we use the word "human" only to refer to sufficiently developed organisms with human DNA then embryos are not human. It is a mistake to commit to some kind of essentialist view of being human such that we can be wrong in (not) using the word "human" to refer to embryos.

And whether or not it is morally acceptable to kill an embryo does not depend on whether or not it is conventional in the English language for the word "human" to refer also to embryos.

We need to look to more concrete facts. These concrete facts are biological, neurological, and psychological. Simply having human DNA is not sufficient biological grounds to entail that the thing "deserves" to live. Whereas being able to think and feel and so on is sufficient biological, neurological, and psychological grounds.

So it's not that entity X with attributes a, d, l, and q ought not be killed. It's that if entity X has the attributes that satisify what a person is then entity X should not be killed.

I do follow what you're saying, and maybe we're not saying anything terribly different, but you seem to be saying that "Person" is shorthand for saying "entity X with attributes a, d, l, and q," so we needn't elevate the term "Person" to mean something more or different. My view though is that entity Y with attributes a, d, l, and c and not q might also be a "Person," so it serves an important function to place entities X and Y into the "Person" catagorization because in our moral universe, People have special rights. — Hanover

Whether or not something "satisfies what a person is" depends on what the word "person" means which depends on how we use it. How we use the word "person" is a contingent fact about the customs of the English language and unrelated to whether or not it is morally acceptable to kill the things that we happen to describe as a person.

Unless you want to say "morally wrong to kill" is part of the definition of "person", in which case to say that we ought (not) kill something because it is (not) a person is to beg the question.

She doesn’t deserve to be killed. — NOS4A2

That someone doesn't deserve to die isn't that they deserve to live. Embryos and foetuses don't deserve anything.

Here it is: it is wrong to kill an innocent human being. A fetus is an innocent human being. Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus. Which premise would you disagree with? — NOS4A2

You equivocate.

The premise "it is wrong to kill an innocent human being" is being interpreted as "it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being", but then if I were to deny this premise you would misinterpret my counter-premise as "it is never wrong to kill an innocent human being".

It is sometimes wrong to kill an innocent human being and sometimes not wrong. It is wrong if the innocent human being is an adult, a child, a baby, or a sufficiently developed foetus. It is not wrong if the innocent human being is an embryo or sufficiently underdeveloped foetus.