Going back to your own question, "Can something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow?", the answer remains "yes". — Banno

The question was "can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow?".

Some X ("it exists") is true of the rock today. He's asking if that X is true of the rock of yesterday and true of the rock of tomorrow. He's not just asking if we can say some Y about the rock of yesterday and some Z about the rock of tomorrow.

In your sense, fairies on mars exist as much as my nose. — hypericin

Yep. Both may be the. subject of a predicate. — Banno

That fairies exist is that ∃xFx, where Fx means "x is a fairy". If ¬∃xFx then fairies do not exist. Some x is my nose but no x is a fairy, therefore my nose exists but fairies don't.

Of all the philosophical ubiquities, the most tedious is "does such-and-such really exist?"

Yes, it does, since you are talking about it. — Banno

This isn’t consistent with how we ordinarily use or understand the word “exists”. The claim “God does not exist” isn’t self-refuting, and so that God exists isn't just that God is talked about.

To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin

On the one hand this is just an issue of grammar. Things in the past existed, things in the present exist, and things in the future will exist.

On the other hand if "yesterday's rock", "today's rock", and "tomorrow's rock" refer to the same object, and if that object exists, then yesterday's rock exists and tomorrow's rock exists.

Perhaps a more relevant question would be "does the rock exist with the properties it had in the past and/or will have in the future", although I think the remark above regarding the grammar should answer that.

There is no number assigned to the supposed quantity within the jar, until the coins are counted — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by a number being assigned?

If you're saying that nobody has said that there are 66 coins in the jar then my responses are that a) someone can say that there are 66 coins in the jar without counting, b) there cannot be both 66 and 67 coins in the jar, and so two different assignments cannot both be true, and c) there can be 66 coins in the jar even if nobody says so.

The reasoning for (c) is that it is a parsimonious explanation for why we count the number of coins that we do. Your reasoning appears to be that there are 66 coins in the jar because we have counted 66 coins, whereas my reasoning is that we have counted 66 coins because there are 66 coins in the jar. The problem with your reasoning is that it doesn't explain why it is that we counted 66 coins (and not, say, 666), and also that it can lead to the contradiction which I reject in (b).

There is no number already assigned to the coins prior to being counted, just like there is no location already assigned to the electron prior to being determined. — Metaphysician Undercover

But as I said, the findings of science are that the position of an electron isn't like the number of coins in the jar. The former is in a superposition, the latter is not. If you want to use science to support your position then you cannot pick and choose which bits you like.

Now do you honestly believe that a particular number has already been singled out, and related to the quantity of coins in the jar, prior to them being counted? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not even sure what you're asking. If you're asking if somebody has determined the number of coins before somebody has determined the number of coins, then of course not. If you're asking if there is some number of coins before somebody has determined the number of coins, then yes.

Your argument seems to commit a fallacy of equivocation.

But until someone does, there is no such thing as the number of coins in the jar. — Metaphysician Undercover

So are you saying that the number of coins in the jar is in some sort of superposition of all possible numbers until someone counts them?

Forget the word "true" for the moment: what kind of (meta)physics are you suggesting describes the nature of the world?

You are just begging the question Michael. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am asserting what our best understanding of the world entails. You brought up quantum mechanics earlier to support your argument, so you appear to accept the findings of scientific enquiry, and the findings of scientific enquiry are that the number of coins in the jar isn't in a superposition of all possible numbers until counted.

I would say that you are begging the question, saying that "there is no such thing as the number of coins in the jar [until counted]" without any evidence or reasoning.

There is some number n where n >= 0 such that “there are n coins in the jar” is true even if nobody has counted them.

Your account of truth depends on a (meta)physics that isn’t the case. The number of coins in the jar isn’t in a superposition of all possibilities until someone has made a judgement.

And how do you account for two people making contradictory judgements, much like you and I here? Is it just the case that we disagree or is it also the case that one of us is right and one of us is wrong?

The fact that this is a mistake is fully exposed in quantum mechanics. The particle's location really is not determined before the process of determination, and it is obviously mistaken to think that it is. Therefore it is only the process of determination (the act of measurement) which can determine "the correct answer". — Metaphysician Undercover

We're not talking about quantum states though. It's not the case that the number of coins in the jar is in a superposition of all possible numbers until they're counted.

Your account of truth appears inconsistent with the (meta)physics of the world.

An "answer" is something stated as a reply to a question. If no one has counted the coins, and it was not determined at the time of placing the coins in the jar, and the jar has been watched, then no one knows how many there are, and no one has stated the "correct answer" — Metaphysician Undercover

I can say "there are 66 coins in the jar" and that claim can be true even if I haven't counted the coins in the jar and even if nobody knows how many coins are in the jar.

It's not the case that my claim retroactively becomes either true or false after someone has counted them. And it's not the case that if two people count the coins in the jar and come to a different conclusion that both of them are right.

That's how we determine the truth of a proposition, through judgement. How could the truth of a proposition be determined, except by a judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

A proposition being true and a proposition being determined to be true are two different things. There is a correct answer to "how many coins are in the jar?" before we actually count them.

Actually, what you've just stated, that one must be right and the other wrong, is just a judgement itself, made by you, as Mww has already pointed out. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not just a judgement. See above.

A proposition requires an interpretation and a comparison with what is the case, to be determined as either true or not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said to another poster a few days ago, all this says is that we determine the meaning of a proposition. It doesn't follow from this that we determine the truth of a proposition.

Our language use determines the meaning of the proposition "water is H₂O". John believes that this proposition is true and Jane believes that this proposition is false. The laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction entail that one of them is right and one of them is wrong, irrespective of what they or I or anyone else judges to be the case.

Your use of "true" here is deceptive, because you do not disclose the person who is making the judgement that p is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no judgement. It just either is or isn't true.

A man who lives alone, perhaps the last living man in the universe, can die even if he believes that he is immortal.

If two men disagree on whether or not something is the case, the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle entail that one of them is right and one of them is wrong.

The sensibility of these scenarios proves the distinction between truth and judgement.

Is it true that even the president can't declassified documents that contain information about our nuclear arsenal? — TiredThinker

It doesn't even matter. It can be illegal to possess documents even if they're not classified. Tax records are not classified, but that doesn't mean a President can just take someone's tax records.

None of the three laws mentioned in the warrant to search Mar-a-Lago concerned the classification status of the documents. They were:

18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information

18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally

18 U.S. Code § 1519 - Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy

To answer your specific question, anything related to nuclear weaponry is considered restricted data, which falls outside the scope of ordinary classification (established by Executive Order 13526), and as such information about nuclear weaponry can be both classified and restricted data. Regarding restricted data the President's "declassification" powers are limited to that of adjudication when the Department of Defence and the Atomic Energy Commission disagree. He cannot unilaterally "declassify" restricted data at-will.

In addition to both the aforementioned Espionage Act and Atomic Energy Act, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act prevents the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of spies, irrespective of "classification" status.

Although, perhaps tellingly, Trump's lawyers haven't actually claimed in court that the documents were declassified. They've only said that the FBI hasn't proven that they haven't been declassified.

I have three queued up that aren't buying it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, the SEP article does say that "Hazlett’s diagnosis is deeply controversial".

Maybe it's something of an idiom. "It's raining cats and dogs" can be true, but not literally true. So, "I know p" can be true even if it's not literally true.

So, what does the paper say about factive verbs? — Metaphysician Undercover

That a verb like "know" isn't factive.

One of my aims here has been to convince you to abandon the idea that the 'factive verbs' form a sui generis semantic or syntactic category. Perhaps there is some sui generis semantic or syntactic category of expressions that deserves the name 'factive verbs' or 'factive expressions', but the list that philosophers usually offer does not comprise such a category. I have made a case for denying that an utterance of "S knows p' is true only if p is true, i.e. that "knows" is factive.

@Srap Tasmaner @Andrew M @Metaphysician Undercover

Just to play devil's advocate: The Myth of Factive Verbs.

The SEP article on knowledge summarises Hazlett's view as:

Hazlett takes this to motivate divorcing semantic considerations about the verb “to know” from knowledge, the state of traditional epistemic interest. Even though “knows” is, according to Hazlett, not a factive verb, even Hazlett accepts that knowledge itself is a state that can only obtain if its content is true.

This is almost exactly what @Metaphysician Undercover is saying:

Yes, that is how "knowledge", as the subject of epistemology, is normally defined. But we were not talking about "knowledge", the epistemological subject, we were talking about normal use of "know" as an attitude. And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. So the definitions which epistemologists prescribe as to what "knowledge" ought to mean, do not accurately reflect how "know" is truly used. — Metaphysician Undercover

Lindsey Graham Introduces Nationwide Abortion Ban Weeks After Saying It’s Up to States

“I think we should have a law at the federal level that would say that after 15 weeks, no abortion on demand,” the South Carolina senator said at a news conference to discuss the bill, which would indeed ban abortion nationwide after 15 weeks gestation, a far cry from the “late-term abortion” ban Graham is publicly marketing.

Graham wants to overrule the right of states to set their own abortion laws despite having said on several occasions that abortion should be dictated by states, not the federal government. “I think states should decide the issue of marriage and states should decide the issue of abortion,” the South Carolina senator told CNN last month.

Graham also tweeted in May that if “the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade, which I believe was one of the largest power grabs in the history of the Court, it means that every state will decide if abortion is legal and on what terms.”

Durham Inquiry Appears to Wind Down as Grand Jury Expires

Anyone remember this thing?

The special counsel appointed by the Trump administration to examine the Russia investigation seems to be wrapping up its work with no further charges in store.

When John H. Durham was assigned by the Justice Department in 2019 to examine the origins of the investigation into the 2016 Trump campaign’s ties to Russia, President Donald J. Trump and his supporters expressed a belief that the inquiry would prove that a “deep state” conspiracy including top Obama-era officials had worked to sabotage him.

Now Mr. Durham appears to be winding down his three-year inquiry without anything close to the results Mr. Trump was seeking. The grand jury that Mr. Durham has recently used to hear evidence has expired, and while he could convene another, there are currently no plans to do so, three people familiar with the matter said.

...

Mr. Durham and his team used a grand jury in Washington to indict Michael Sussmann, a prominent cybersecurity lawyer with ties to Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Mr. Sussmann was indicted last year on a charge of making a false statement to the F.B.I. at a meeting in which he shared a tip about potential connections between computers associated with Mr. Trump and a Kremlin-linked Russian bank.

Mr. Sussmann was acquitted of that charge at trial in May.

A grand jury based in the Eastern District of Virginia last year indicted a Russia analyst who had worked with Christopher Steele, a former British spy who was the author of a dossier of rumors and unproven assertions about Mr. Trump. The dossier played no role in the F.B.I.’s decision to begin examining the ties between Russia and the Trump campaign. It was used in an application to obtain a warrant to surveil a Trump campaign associate.

The analyst, Igor Danchenko, who is accused of lying to federal investigators, goes on trial next month in Alexandria, Va.

In the third case, Mr. Durham’s team negotiated a plea deal with an F.B.I. lawyer whom an inspector general had accused of doctoring an email used in preparation for a wiretap renewal application. The plea deal resulted in no prison time.

Judge unseals less redacted version of affidavit used for Mar-a-Lago search warrant

It was previously known that Trump's lawyers provided one envelope to investigators, which contained 38 unique documents with classification markings, according to court filings. But the newly lifted redactions in the search warrant affidavit indicate that some of those classified files contained markings for "HCS, SI and FISA," according to court filings made public on Tuesday.

These classification markings indicate that the documents were connected to extremely sensitive government programs. "HCS" refers to human sources, or spies, that often work with the CIA. "SI" refers to signals intercepts that are typically handled by the National Security Agency. And "FISA" refers to domestic surveillance and wiretaps related to counterintelligence.

What she is saying is that these positions are consistent:

1. 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true iff Warsaw was bombed in World War II

2. 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true iff the Bible asserts this

One just then has to accept that:

3. Warsaw was bombed in World War II iff the Bible asserts this

The T-schema is silent on the truth of (3), and so the T-schema isn’t always the right tool to refute a substantial theory of truth. Some bizarre theories can be consistent with the T-schema.

We are afraid that these numbers mean capitulation for us and most probably another way of life. Are we not justified in wanting to promote models like having a few kids, being more courageous, handling guns, and so on?

So, in this extreme model I don't think it very good to erase all models whereas at the same time we praise our way of life. If we stop having models, we better renounce our way of life and accept whatever our neighbors will decide for us.

I hope these puts some perspective in the need for role models. — Eros1982

You don’t need role models for this. Just promote the virtues of having children, fighting for your country, etc.

Here we have a dilemma now: take like your model the courage, intelligence and skills of General X167 or take like your model the good heart of Preacher Y259? — Eros1982

Why would you need a statue of someone to have them as your role model? This is just about not wanting to publicly glorify someone who committed an atrocity, which seems perfectly reasonable to me. If you want a public display of someone with courage and intelligence and skill then find someone else who exemplifies those qualities and who isn’t a mass-murderer.

Or just stop needing role models.

As in what kind of ‘model’ person should liberal people look to for inspiration? What kind of values are they to view as worthwhile? — I like sushi

I've already made my views on role models clear.

But on this point, that's the question I'm trying to get answered. @Eros1982 appears to have a problem with liberal role models. So I want to know what he thinks are the "right" values, and which liberal values he thinks are wrong.

Who are the guardians that should be admired when there is more and more attempts to literally rewrite history out of pure ignorance driven by nothing more than a political agenda to ‘appear’ to be doing ‘the right thing’. — I like sushi

What history is being rewritten?

What I don't see like a good thing are attacks on the history, the mores and the aesthetics of people (majorities), just because we have to stick to "correct/representative politics". — Eros1982

Again, I don't know what this means. Can you be specific? What is an actual example of a "more/aesthetics of the majority" that is being attacked by liberal social policies?

As it stands all I can read from this is that you want to be excused for being a bigot.

I have no idea what you're trying to say. Can you be less vague and give specific examples of things that we do, or don't do, that you think is problematic?

@Eros1982 Maybe you could stop dancing around the issue and be more precise with what you're saying. Are you saying that it's better for society if homosexuals are not allowed marry, and women are not allowed to vote, and black people are not considered citizens, and ...?

What specific liberal policy related to social equality do you disagree with?

Having a "demos" (a like-minded community) is very important also. But when you hear all the time about differences and identities that need to be respected, you stop believing that you are living in a demos. — Eros1982

So a like-minded community is one where certain groups of people should be disrespected? This really is quite telling of your (lack of) ethics.

This is what am I talking about. Does this kind of mentality lead to models? — Eros1982

Why wouldn't it?

Can cultures and societies last without models? — Eros1982

See here and here.

Like taken out from some George Soros' article where the impression readers get is that in democracy what matters the most is that every minority is represented enough, so as none to be excluded, none to be offended. — Eros1982

Well, equal rights is a pretty important aspect of democracy.

Still don't know what this has to do with Soros.

(viz. Sorosianism) — Eros1982

What?

That's why it must be a consequence of any substantive theory of truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Haack has an interesting comment on this point from that same book.

But exactly what kinds of definition will the material adequacy condition rule out? In answering this question I shall use a weakened version of the criterion: not that all instances of the (T) schema be deducible from any acceptable truth definition (Tarski's version), but that the truth of all instances of the (T) schema be consistent with any acceptable truth-definition. The reason for this modification is simply that the weakened adequacy condition is much more readily applicable to non-formal definitions of truth. Now it is to be hoped - and perhaps even expected - that it will allow the sorts of definition which have been seriously proposed, and disallow what one might call' bizarre' theories. But matters turn out rather oddly. Consider the following definition of truth, which seems to me definitely bizarre: a sentence is true iff it is asserted in the Bible. Now it might be supposed that this definition (I shall call it 'D_B' for short) does not entail all instances of the (T) schema, not, for instance:

'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true_B iff Warsaw was bombed in World War II.

Now it is indeed the case that someone who did not accept D_B might deny:

'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is asserted in the Bible iff Warsaw was bombed in World War II.

But further reflection makes it clear that a proponent of D_B could perfectly well maintain that his definition does entail all instances of (T); he may allow that 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true, but insist that it is asserted in the Bible (in an obscure passage in Revelation, perhaps), or if he agrees that 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is not asserted in the Bible, he will also, if he is wise, maintain the falsity of the right-hand side of the above instance of the schema. So, rather surprisingly, Tarski's material adequacy condition cannot be relied upon to be especially effective in ruling out bizarre truth-definitions.

If you take take means as has the same extension as, then yes. Otherwise, no, or depends. — Srap Tasmaner

A fitting quote from Haack's Philosophy of logics:

Tarski emphasises that the (T) schema is not a definition of truth – though in spite of his insistence he has been misunderstood on this point. It is a material adequacy condition: all instances of it must be entailed by any definition of truth which is to count as 'materially adequate'. The point of the (T) schema is that, if it is accepted, it fixes not the intension or meaning but the extension of the term 'true' [my emphasis].

Conversely, if a proposition p entails a contradiction, p is false. We can only know what is false; truth, on this view, is indeterminable. — Agent Smith

If we know that p is false then we know that not-p is true.

If you take take means as has the same extension as, then yes. Otherwise, no, or depends. — Srap Tasmaner

So "p" and "'p' is true" have the same extension but might have a different intension?

I suppose the same could be said of "'p' is true" and "'p' is foo", and so of "is true" and "is foo". Same extension, possibly different intension?

I think a definition of "is true" (and "is foo") should explain its intension.

They can't all be true at the same time, because the use of "sentence" in (2) conflicts with its use in (3), doesn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, good point. Not sure what I was thinking there. Obviously (3) is false.

And it's also obvious that any such predicate "is foo" is equivalent to "is true," that there is a unique identity function on truth-values, and thus a unique identity function on truth conditions. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure about this. Are these equivalent?

1. "p" is true iff p
2. "p" is a true sentence iff p
3. "p" is a sentence iff p

(1) might be equivalent to (2), but neither (1) nor (2) are equivalent to (3), and (3) follows from (2).

So does "is foo" mean "is true" or "is a true sentence" or "is a sentence" or something else?

I think, yes, that is the semantics of "is foo." It says, in plain English, that whatever the truth conditions of p are, those are the truth conditions of 'p' is foo, and vice versa. And it's also obvious that any such predicate "is foo" is equivalent to "is true," that there is a unique identity function on truth-values, and thus a unique identity function on truth conditions. — Srap Tasmaner

So you're saying that these are equivalent?

1. "p" is true iff p
2. "'p' is true" means "p"

Tarski's T-schema is Ramsey's redundancy theory?

(2) Semantics in terms of truth conditions, and the T-schema is the semantics of "is true". That's it; that's all it can be. — Srap Tasmaner

I lean toward (2), but I just don't know enough to say. — Srap Tasmaner

I find the part in bold problematic. Is "p" is foo iff p the semantics of "is foo"?

As I said at the start of this discussion, I think a distinction needs to be made between these two claims:

a. "p" is true iff p
b. "'p' is true" means "p"

I would say that (b) would count as an explanation of the semantics of "is true" but that (a) doesn't.

There’s a difference between aspiring to have certain qualities and aspiring to be like another person. It’s the latter that I find problematic.