As the T-schema doesn't give the intension of "snow is white", then it doesn't allow translation between "snow is white" and "schnee ist weiss". — RussellA

You're putting the cart before the horse. Tarski is saying that if "snow is white" is the translation of "schnee ist weiss" then "schnee ist weiss" is true iff snow is white.

I really don't understand what you're asking.

In simple terms his argument is just that "Schnee ist weiß" is true if and only if snow is white, where "snow is white" is a translation in the meta-language (which in this case is English) of the object-language (which in this case is German) sentence "Schnee ist weiß".

You seem to want to know how it is that the English sentence "snow is white" is a translation of the German sentence "Schnee ist weiß". That's irrelevant to Tarski's point. He just argues that assuming that it is the translation the T-schema follows.

Whether or not any given meta-language sentence is a translation of any given object-language sentence is a separate matter entirely.

If I understand what you're after, because the meaning of denoting (designating) is central to Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth. — RussellA

In the sense that words have to mean something for his theory to have any relevance, sure. But Tarski doesn't need to give a comprehensive account of meaning to make his point.

How exactly does "snow" denote snow ?

In the ordinary sense, "snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow. — RussellA

What does this have to do with Tarski?

This means that unless we are absolutely certain, we ought not call something "knowledge", because it could turn out not to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? I don't need to be certain that something is true to assert that it is true. I will have Weetabix for breakfast tomorrow. I'm not certain that I will, but I'm still going to say that I will.

We don't require certainty to assert things. If that were true then we ought stay silent on everything except anything that is necessarily true. It would make for a very quiet, impractical world.

Do you not agree that as epistemologists, if there is a possibility that the thing which appears to be knowledge is not actually knowledge, then we ought not call it "knowledge"? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I'm happy with fallibilist knowledge. It's consistent with ordinary use. The list of things we claim to know is greater than the list of things we claim to be certain about, and so clearly what we mean by "know" isn't what we mean by "certain".

So my argument is that if it has to be actually raining out for us to correctly call what Alice has "knowledge", (as Andrew asserts), then we ought not label what Alice has as "knowledge" unless we are certain that it is raining out. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this doesn't follow.

You start by saying that it has to actually be raining for Alice to know that it is raining. You then conclude by saying that we have to be certain that it is raining for Alice to know that it is raining. So as I said in my previous post, you are asserting that if we are not certain that it is raining then it is not actually raining. What evidence or reasoning is there for this? Most of us accept that sometimes we are not certain but it is actually raining.

Now to say that the rock exists is not to say something about the rock. Existence is not a predicate in the way being granite is. — Banno

Maybe not in classical logic, but perhaps classical logic doesn't really fit with ordinary language, hence the development of free logic which makes for claims like "God does not exist" possible, and which some of us accept as true.

Or if you want to continue with classical logic then consider what I said here:

That fairies exist is that ∃xFx, where Fx means "x is a fairy". If ¬∃xFx then fairies do not exist. Some x is my nose but no x is a fairy, therefore my nose exists but fairies don't.

All this to return to the answer to your question: It is true that the rock existed yesterday. — Banno

From my understanding @hypericin isn't asking if the rock existed yesterday. He's asking which theory of time is correct: growing block, presentism, or eternalism.

Mind independence is simply what "real" means. What is your problem with this definition? — hypericin

So my mind isn't real? My thoughts and feelings aren't real?

Also a toy gun isn't a real gun, but (for the sake of argument) toy guns are mind-independent.

"Real" doesn't just mean "mind-independent". Which is why I have often said that antirealism isn't unrealism. It's unfortunate that realism is called realism. It leads to the kind of equivocation that you appear to be making here.

I have it on good authority that Biden reclassified everything at Mar-a-Lago just by thinking about it.

Michael’s reasoning attempts to make us believe that a President must follow “established procedures” as outlined by another president’s executive order — NOS4A2

That's what the court said.

and that the lower courts get to decide what the leader of the entire American military can and cannot declassify — NOS4A2

I didn't say that.

Remember when Trump tweeted "I have fully authorized the total Declassification of any & all documents pertaining to the single greatest political CRIME in American History, the Russia Hoax. Likewise, the Hillary Clinton Email Scandal. No redactions!"

Did that declassify all those documents?

And let's imagine that Trump were to tell some relevant subordinate on record that some document is to be declassified and published but then privately thinks to himself that he's changed his mind and it isn't to be declassified. Would it be illegal for his subordinate to start the bureaucratic process to declassify and publish the document? According to NOS4A2's reasoning, yes. Which is absurd.

This is an assumption. You can invite people to share your assumptions, but you can't really bang them over the head with them. Assumptions have no weight. — frank

It's also true.

If it were false then it's negation would be true, irrespective of our certainty and judgements and justifications. Which would be a contradiction.

Then your hypothetical does squat, as Srap says, toward justifying your claim. We still cannot ever correctly judge that what Alice has is "knowledge", in the real world, because any such judgements could always turn out to be incorrect. Your example only applies to a hypothetical world, in which it actually is raining. What good is it, if it doesn't apply to the real world? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your argument seems to be that if we cannot be certain that it is raining then it is not actually raining and that if we cannot be certain that it isn't raining then it is not actually not raining. This doesn't follow and is even a contradiction.

Sometimes, in the real world, it is actually raining, and sometimes, in the real world, it actually isn't raining, irrespective of our certainty and judgements and justifications.

Nothing from that quote supports your claim, whereas the quote saying "declassification, even by the President, must follow established procedures" supports mine.

That someone has the authority to do something isn’t that they can do that something telepathically. Again, an employer cannot fire their employee just by thinking about it.

“Established procedure” is that the president is the ultimate authority on classified materials and can declassify at will. — NOS4A2

As the ruling says, he must still follow a procedure. An employer has the right to fire someone at will, but simply thinking "John is fired" isn't actually firing someone. He'd need to actually tell John, remove him from the payrolls, etc.

A footnote to that quote from the court ruling says "As explained above, Executive order 13,526 established the detailed process through which secret information can be appropriately declassified."

The president can do whatever he wants with classified documents. — NOS4A2

He can set the classification status of a document. He cannot decide that it's his personal property and take it home with him when he's no longer President, or refuse to return it when the new administration requests it.

To repeat the recent appeals court ruling, "In any event, at least for these purposes, the declassification argument is a red herring because declassifying an official document would not change its content or render it personal. So even if we assumed that Plaintiff did declassify some or all of the documents, that would not explain why he has a personal interest in them."

And besides, his lawyers are refusing to assert that the documents have been declassified, so this is even more irrelevant.

"Do not try and read the classified documents—that's impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth."
"What truth?"
"There are no classified documents."

Trump claims he can declassify top secret documents just ‘by thinking about it’

There doesn’t have to be (a process), as I understand it. If you’re the president of the United States, you can declasify just by saying ‘it’s declassified’, even by thinking about it. Because you’re sending it to Mar-a-Lago or to wherever you’re sending it.

Hmm, so where else did Donnie send classified documents? We already know of a classified folder at the Trump Tower. Maybe there are more documents there. And maybe also Bedminster. Who wants to bet on more search warrants?

And on the issue of declassification, there was a court ruling in 2020:

Declassification cannot occur unless designated officials follow specified procedures.

...

Because declassification, even by the President, must follow established procedures, that argument fails.

To make a different analogy, if a pointer is measured to be pointing North along the North-South axis, then what direction is it pointing along the West-East axis? — Andrew M

Isn't this like asking for the z coordinate of a point plotted on a plane?

You seem to be asserting that a thing which a person might name as a triangle, has an independent property, which you call "being a triangle", which is separate from being named a triangle. How could you justify such a claim? — Metaphysician Undercover

The independent property is having three edges and vertices.

A "property" is a concept — Metaphysician Undercover

Properties are something that objects have. Objects don't just exist as some property-less simple. They have a nature, including a mass, an extended position (i.e. a shape), and often a certain kind of movement.

That we decide which words refer to which properties isn't that the object only has these properties if we refer to it using these words. This is the fundamental mistake you keep making. If something has three edges and vertices then it is a triangle even if we do not call it a triangle.

Do you just not understand/disagree with how reference works, or the use-mention distinction?

This is how "truth" is most commonly used. When someone is asked to tell the truth, the person is asked to state what they honestly believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I ask someone to tell me the truth of where my kidnapped wife has been hidden I'm not interested in where the person believes my wife has been hidden; I'm interested in where she's actually been hidden. The request to "tell the truth" is premised on the notion that things actually are as this person believes them to be. I have no interest in an honest belief if it's erroneous.

What is "a number"? Are you taking a position of Platonic realism here? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. A number is a value. It is the "propositional content" of one or more mathematical symbols. For example, $0.25$, $1\over4$, and $2\over8$ are different mathematical symbols that refer to the same mathematical value/number.

How do you honestly believe that there are objects called "triangles" which have never been called by that name?

Being called a triangle and being a triangle are two different things. Something can be a triangle even if it isn't called a triangle. The word "triangle" has a meaning, and objects can satisfy that meaning even if we do not talk about them. Something that satisfies the meaning of the word "triangle" is a triangle even if we do not call it a triangle.

Decapitation is going to kill me even if I call it a non-fatal injury. Saying something doesn't make it so, and not saying something doesn't make it not so.

The issue is, that the thing must be judged to be of that kind. because a "kind" is something artificial, created by human minds, a category. A natural object isn't just automatically of this kind or that kind, because it must fulfill a set list of criteria in order to be of any specific kind. And, whether or not something fulfills a list of criteria is a judgment.

This is where we disagree. Objects exist and have properties even if we are not aware of them. We define the word "triangle" such that an object is a triangle if it has such-and-such a property. If some object exists and has such-and-such a property then it is a triangle, even if we are not aware of this object and/or it having this property.

I think the relevant metaphysical dispute is regarding the claim that objects exist and have properties even if we are not aware of them. Your argument depends on this claim being false. Are you, then, assuming something like idealism?

This does not tell us whether "there are 66 coins" is the product of a judgement, or whether it's something independent from judgement. Nor does it tell us if there is 66, or 67 coins. It really tells us nothing. It is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a useless statement. It's a sound argument.

1. There are only 66 coins iff "there are only 66 coins" is true
2. There are only 67 coins iff "there are only 67 coins" is true
3. There cannot be both only 66 and only 67 coins
4. Therefore, "there are only 66 coins" and "there are only 67 coins" cannot both be true

Do you disagree with one of the three premises, or do you disagree that the conclusion follows?

This part in the court's ruling is very important:

In any event, at least for these purposes, the declassification argument is a red herring because declassifying an official document would not change its content or render it personal. So even if we assumed that Plaintiff did declassify some or all of the documents, that would not explain why he has a personal interest in them.

Trump's (and his supporters') "defence" that he declassified them is irrelevant. None of the statutes cited in the warrant concerned the classification status of the documents. Declassifying a document doesn't make it Trump's property. And declassifying a document doesn't make its contents no longer a matter of national security. Normally when a document is declassified it is done so because it is no longer an issue for its contents to be made public, but if we were to accept Trump's "standing order" to declassify documents when moved to Mar-a-Lago so that he could continue to work with them then presumably they are still a matter of national security and their public release would harm the United States, showing once again Trump's utter incompetency and the danger he posed as President.

Also I like this little swipe at the district court:

Here, the district court concluded that Plaintiff did not show that the United States acted in callous disregard of his constitutional rights. Doc. No. 64 at 9. No party contests the district court’s finding in this regard. The absence of this “indispensab[le]” factor in the Richey analysis is reason enough to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in exercising equitable jurisdiction here.

Donald Trump, 3 of his children sued for business fraud by New York AG

New York Attorney General Letitia James filed a lawsuit Wednesday accusing former president Donald Trump, three of his grown children and executives at his company of flagrantly manipulating property valuations to deceive lenders, insurance brokers and tax authorities into giving them better rates on bank loans and insurance policies and to reduce their tax liability.

The 222-page civil complaint asks the New York Supreme Court to bar Trump, as well as Donald Trump Jr., Ivanka Trump and Eric Trump, from serving as executives at any company in New York, and to bar the Trump Organization from acquiring any commercial real estate or receiving loans from any New York-registered financial institution for five years.

It seeks to recover more than $250 million in what James’s office says are ill-gotten gains received through the alleged deceptive practices. While the lawsuit itself is not a criminal prosecution, James (D) said she has referred possible violations of federal law to the Justice Department and the IRS.

You seem to be saying that the numeral "66" is already related to the coins, prior to being counted — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sense that the numeral refers to a number and that number is the number of coins prior to being counted.

For there to be "66 coins in the jar", it is necessary that "66" is the symbol which has been associated with the quantity of coins in the jar. You seem to think that the symbol "66" is somehow magically associated with the coins in the jar, without anyone making that association. How do you believe that this comes about, that the symbol "66" is related to the coins in the jar, without someone making that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not magic. We agree to use the word "triangle" to refer to the shape of some object that we have seen. Now every object with that shape -- even objects we haven't seen -- are triangles, even though we haven't explicitly used the word "triangle" to refer to each of those objects individually. They are triangles by virtue of having the same shape as an object that we have referred to as having a shape named "triangle".

The same is true for the numeral "66". We've already agreed that the numeral "66" refers to a specific number, and so any jar containing that number of coins, even jars of coins we've never counted, have 66 coins.

You make the mistake of saying that because we need to explicitly assign a particular word or numeral to a particular kind that we need to explicitly assign that particular word or numeral to every individual of that kind. This is false. We need to do the former to establish meaning, but we don't need to do the latter.

Truth alone cannot resolve contradictions, because two people will both insist on knowing "the truth", even though they contradict each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

They can insist anything they like. They'd just be wrong. At least one of them doesn't know the truth. It's really quite simple.

The T-schema is useful here. There are 66 coins iff "there are 66 coins" is true, there are 67 coins iff "there are 67 coins" is true, there cannot be both 66 and 67 coins, therefore "there are 66 coins" and "there are 67 coins" cannot both be true.

This is consistent with how we actually understand the meaning of the word "true". I don't know why you're trying to make it mean "honest belief". What evidence or reasoning is there for that?

Going back to your own question, "Can something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow?", the answer remains "yes". — Banno

The question was "can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow?".

Some X ("it exists") is true of the rock today. He's asking if that X is true of the rock of yesterday and true of the rock of tomorrow. He's not just asking if we can say some Y about the rock of yesterday and some Z about the rock of tomorrow.

In your sense, fairies on mars exist as much as my nose. — hypericin

Yep. Both may be the. subject of a predicate. — Banno

That fairies exist is that ∃xFx, where Fx means "x is a fairy". If ¬∃xFx then fairies do not exist. Some x is my nose but no x is a fairy, therefore my nose exists but fairies don't.

Of all the philosophical ubiquities, the most tedious is "does such-and-such really exist?"

Yes, it does, since you are talking about it. — Banno

This isn’t consistent with how we ordinarily use or understand the word “exists”. The claim “God does not exist” isn’t self-refuting, and so that God exists isn't just that God is talked about.

To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin

On the one hand this is just an issue of grammar. Things in the past existed, things in the present exist, and things in the future will exist.

On the other hand if "yesterday's rock", "today's rock", and "tomorrow's rock" refer to the same object, and if that object exists, then yesterday's rock exists and tomorrow's rock exists.

Perhaps a more relevant question would be "does the rock exist with the properties it had in the past and/or will have in the future", although I think the remark above regarding the grammar should answer that.

There is no number assigned to the supposed quantity within the jar, until the coins are counted — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by a number being assigned?

If you're saying that nobody has said that there are 66 coins in the jar then my responses are that a) someone can say that there are 66 coins in the jar without counting, b) there cannot be both 66 and 67 coins in the jar, and so two different assignments cannot both be true, and c) there can be 66 coins in the jar even if nobody says so.

The reasoning for (c) is that it is a parsimonious explanation for why we count the number of coins that we do. Your reasoning appears to be that there are 66 coins in the jar because we have counted 66 coins, whereas my reasoning is that we have counted 66 coins because there are 66 coins in the jar. The problem with your reasoning is that it doesn't explain why it is that we counted 66 coins (and not, say, 666), and also that it can lead to the contradiction which I reject in (b).

There is no number already assigned to the coins prior to being counted, just like there is no location already assigned to the electron prior to being determined. — Metaphysician Undercover

But as I said, the findings of science are that the position of an electron isn't like the number of coins in the jar. The former is in a superposition, the latter is not. If you want to use science to support your position then you cannot pick and choose which bits you like.

Now do you honestly believe that a particular number has already been singled out, and related to the quantity of coins in the jar, prior to them being counted? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not even sure what you're asking. If you're asking if somebody has determined the number of coins before somebody has determined the number of coins, then of course not. If you're asking if there is some number of coins before somebody has determined the number of coins, then yes.

Your argument seems to commit a fallacy of equivocation.

But until someone does, there is no such thing as the number of coins in the jar. — Metaphysician Undercover

So are you saying that the number of coins in the jar is in some sort of superposition of all possible numbers until someone counts them?

Forget the word "true" for the moment: what kind of (meta)physics are you suggesting describes the nature of the world?

You are just begging the question Michael. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am asserting what our best understanding of the world entails. You brought up quantum mechanics earlier to support your argument, so you appear to accept the findings of scientific enquiry, and the findings of scientific enquiry are that the number of coins in the jar isn't in a superposition of all possible numbers until counted.

I would say that you are begging the question, saying that "there is no such thing as the number of coins in the jar [until counted]" without any evidence or reasoning.

There is some number n where n >= 0 such that “there are n coins in the jar” is true even if nobody has counted them.

Your account of truth depends on a (meta)physics that isn’t the case. The number of coins in the jar isn’t in a superposition of all possibilities until someone has made a judgement.

And how do you account for two people making contradictory judgements, much like you and I here? Is it just the case that we disagree or is it also the case that one of us is right and one of us is wrong?

The fact that this is a mistake is fully exposed in quantum mechanics. The particle's location really is not determined before the process of determination, and it is obviously mistaken to think that it is. Therefore it is only the process of determination (the act of measurement) which can determine "the correct answer". — Metaphysician Undercover

We're not talking about quantum states though. It's not the case that the number of coins in the jar is in a superposition of all possible numbers until they're counted.

Your account of truth appears inconsistent with the (meta)physics of the world.

An "answer" is something stated as a reply to a question. If no one has counted the coins, and it was not determined at the time of placing the coins in the jar, and the jar has been watched, then no one knows how many there are, and no one has stated the "correct answer" — Metaphysician Undercover

I can say "there are 66 coins in the jar" and that claim can be true even if I haven't counted the coins in the jar and even if nobody knows how many coins are in the jar.

It's not the case that my claim retroactively becomes either true or false after someone has counted them. And it's not the case that if two people count the coins in the jar and come to a different conclusion that both of them are right.

That's how we determine the truth of a proposition, through judgement. How could the truth of a proposition be determined, except by a judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

A proposition being true and a proposition being determined to be true are two different things. There is a correct answer to "how many coins are in the jar?" before we actually count them.

Actually, what you've just stated, that one must be right and the other wrong, is just a judgement itself, made by you, as Mww has already pointed out. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not just a judgement. See above.

A proposition requires an interpretation and a comparison with what is the case, to be determined as either true or not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said to another poster a few days ago, all this says is that we determine the meaning of a proposition. It doesn't follow from this that we determine the truth of a proposition.

Our language use determines the meaning of the proposition "water is H₂O". John believes that this proposition is true and Jane believes that this proposition is false. The laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction entail that one of them is right and one of them is wrong, irrespective of what they or I or anyone else judges to be the case.

Your use of "true" here is deceptive, because you do not disclose the person who is making the judgement that p is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no judgement. It just either is or isn't true.

A man who lives alone, perhaps the last living man in the universe, can die even if he believes that he is immortal.

If two men disagree on whether or not something is the case, the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle entail that one of them is right and one of them is wrong.

The sensibility of these scenarios proves the distinction between truth and judgement.

Is it true that even the president can't declassified documents that contain information about our nuclear arsenal? — TiredThinker

It doesn't even matter. It can be illegal to possess documents even if they're not classified. Tax records are not classified, but that doesn't mean a President can just take someone's tax records.

None of the three laws mentioned in the warrant to search Mar-a-Lago concerned the classification status of the documents. They were:

18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information

18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally

18 U.S. Code § 1519 - Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy

To answer your specific question, anything related to nuclear weaponry is considered restricted data, which falls outside the scope of ordinary classification (established by Executive Order 13526), and as such information about nuclear weaponry can be both classified and restricted data. Regarding restricted data the President's "declassification" powers are limited to that of adjudication when the Department of Defence and the Atomic Energy Commission disagree. He cannot unilaterally "declassify" restricted data at-will.

In addition to both the aforementioned Espionage Act and Atomic Energy Act, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act prevents the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of spies, irrespective of "classification" status.

Although, perhaps tellingly, Trump's lawyers haven't actually claimed in court that the documents were declassified. They've only said that the FBI hasn't proven that they haven't been declassified.

I have three queued up that aren't buying it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, the SEP article does say that "Hazlett’s diagnosis is deeply controversial".

Maybe it's something of an idiom. "It's raining cats and dogs" can be true, but not literally true. So, "I know p" can be true even if it's not literally true.

So, what does the paper say about factive verbs? — Metaphysician Undercover

That a verb like "know" isn't factive.

One of my aims here has been to convince you to abandon the idea that the 'factive verbs' form a sui generis semantic or syntactic category. Perhaps there is some sui generis semantic or syntactic category of expressions that deserves the name 'factive verbs' or 'factive expressions', but the list that philosophers usually offer does not comprise such a category. I have made a case for denying that an utterance of "S knows p' is true only if p is true, i.e. that "knows" is factive.

@Srap Tasmaner @Andrew M @Metaphysician Undercover

Just to play devil's advocate: The Myth of Factive Verbs.

The SEP article on knowledge summarises Hazlett's view as:

Hazlett takes this to motivate divorcing semantic considerations about the verb “to know” from knowledge, the state of traditional epistemic interest. Even though “knows” is, according to Hazlett, not a factive verb, even Hazlett accepts that knowledge itself is a state that can only obtain if its content is true.

This is almost exactly what @Metaphysician Undercover is saying:

Yes, that is how "knowledge", as the subject of epistemology, is normally defined. But we were not talking about "knowledge", the epistemological subject, we were talking about normal use of "know" as an attitude. And the fact is that people often claim to know things, which turn out to be not the case. So the definitions which epistemologists prescribe as to what "knowledge" ought to mean, do not accurately reflect how "know" is truly used. — Metaphysician Undercover

Lindsey Graham Introduces Nationwide Abortion Ban Weeks After Saying It’s Up to States

“I think we should have a law at the federal level that would say that after 15 weeks, no abortion on demand,” the South Carolina senator said at a news conference to discuss the bill, which would indeed ban abortion nationwide after 15 weeks gestation, a far cry from the “late-term abortion” ban Graham is publicly marketing.

Graham wants to overrule the right of states to set their own abortion laws despite having said on several occasions that abortion should be dictated by states, not the federal government. “I think states should decide the issue of marriage and states should decide the issue of abortion,” the South Carolina senator told CNN last month.

Graham also tweeted in May that if “the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade, which I believe was one of the largest power grabs in the history of the Court, it means that every state will decide if abortion is legal and on what terms.”