( 1 ) A total determination of the referent "the kettle" by the underlying collective standards of interpretation.
( 2 ) A partial determination of the referent of "the kettle" by those same standards.
( 3 ) No dependence of the referent of "the kettle" by those same standards.

By the looks of it, no one here is arguing that ( 3 ) is true and no one here is arguing that ( 1 ) is true. (@Michael, correct me if I'm wrong). — fdrake

From the argument here:

a. The meaning of the sentence at T₁ is the meaning of the sentence at T₂
b. The truth value of the sentence at T₁ is the not the truth value of the sentence at T₂
c. Therefore, the truth value of the sentence is determined by something other than (even if in addition to) the meaning of the sentence
d. The only other thing that differs at T₂ is a material object
e. Therefore, the truth value of the sentence is determined by (even if only in part) that material object

I think the argument is valid and that the conclusion refutes (3) and is consistent with (1) and (2). It might not be clear which material object(s) determine (even if only in part) the truth of the sentence, but it is still the case that it is some material object(s) which determine (even if only in part) the truth of the sentence.

You didn't look at the slingshot argument, did you? — Tate

But if I were to take a shot at it, I would say that the “Great Fact” that true sentences refer to is the world.

Just as “the kettle is black” and “the kettle is metal” refer to the same kettle, “the kettle is black” and “snow is white” refer to the same world. In a sense the sentences are “the world is such that the kettle is black” and “the world is such that snow is white”.

But even though in one sense “the kettle is black” and “the kettle is metal” refer to the same thing (the kettle), there’s another sense in which they don’t refer to the same thing: one refers to the kettle being black and the other to it being metal.

I think the slingshot arguments address the first sense of reference, whereas correspondence-like theories address the second.

But I admit that I can’t quite grasp the logic of the slingshot arguments. This is just my intuitive understanding.

It's the reason we say the extension of any sentence is it's truth value — Tate

And how does this account for the truth value of a sentence changing? Truth values don’t change apropos of nothing. The truth value of some sentences change because a particular physical event happens. So why is it that physical event that changes the sentence’s truth value and not a different one? Because the sentence refers to that physical event and not a different one.

I think either the slingshot arguments are mistaken or they’re not addressing the same kind of extension that I’m addressing. See here and here.

2. — Isaac

Then why did the truth value change if the meaning didn’t? It seems to me to be a contradiction to argue both that a) the truth of a sentence is determined entirely by its meaning and that b) the truth of the sentence changed but its meaning didn’t.

The truth value changed because I painted the kettle red. The material object changed. Therefore the truth of that sentence depends on that material object.

No, I agreed to that. — Isaac

Then it is exactly as I said:

1. The meaning of the sentence didn't change at T₂ but its truth value did.

2. If the truth value of a sentence can change without the meaning of that sentence changing then the truth value of that sentence depends on more than just its meaning.

3. In this specific case the truth value changed because a material object changed, and so the truth of that sentence depends on that material object.

Which of these three claims do you disagree with?

No. I don't see how you're getting that. — Isaac

Because you're rejecting my claim that the sentence "the kettle is black" means the same thing at T₁ and at T₂. If it's not me painting the kettle red that changes the meaning then what does change the meaning?

Are you saying that me painting the kettle red changes the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black"? That's an absurd claim.

Which doesn't refute my point.

We agree to fix the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is red" such that it is unambiguously false at T₁. I paint the kettle red at T₂. The sentence "the kettle is red" is unambiguously true at T₂. The meaning of the sentence "the kettle is red" didn't change at T₂ but its truth value did. Therefore, its truth value depends on more than just its meaning. It also depends on the kettle and its properties.

Doesn't that just beg the question a little — Isaac

You agreed above that we can decide what words mean. So, for the sake of this example, we decide that the screw in the drawer is not part of the kettle, and to use a spectrophotometer to measure the kettle's colour, agreeing which range of results indicates the kettle being black or not-black.

Otherwise I don't understand the point that you are trying to make. That the sentence "the kettle is black" is neither true nor false? Or both true and false? Or true for some and false for others?

If the truth value of a sentence can change without the meaning of that sentence changing then the truth value of that sentence depends on more than just its meaning. — Michael

I wonder if this is inconsistent with the redundancy theory.

Is it. — Isaac

Yes. For the sake of argument we have fixed the referent of the phrase "the kettle" (and "black", and "red") such that the truth value of "the kettle is black" is unambiguously true at T₁ and false at T₂.

The meaning of the sentence didn't change at T₂ but its truth value did. Therefore, the truth value of the sentence depends on more than just its meaning. It also depends on the material object referred to by the phrase "the kettle".

Yes. But since it could be literally any matter at all, to claim that the truth of any sentence involving kettles depends on this fact would render all statements about kettles always true, since there's always some matter. — Isaac

The sentence "the kettle is black" is true at T₁. I paint the kettle red at T₂. The sentence "the kettle is black" is false at T₂.

The meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" did not change at T₂. So why did the truth value of the sentence "the kettle is black" change at T₂? Because the material object changed.

If the truth value of a sentence can change without the meaning of that sentence changing then the truth value of that sentence depends on more than just its meaning.

And I honestly don't know how you make the inference you do in the above quote.

We determine that by language use. — Isaac

But it's still the case that whichever matter we decide 'counts' as being the kettle must exist for the sentence "the kettle exists" to be true.

The "sure" was actually a response to the rest of your comment. Sorry for not being clear.

Does this particular matter the kettle depends on include the screw in the drawer or not? — Isaac

That's for us to decide.

I really don't understand the point you are trying to make. That words and phrases can be ambiguous isn't that the truth of a sentence like "the kettle is black" doesn't depend on the existence of a material object (or the occurrence of a sensory experience).

You said "yes" when I asked if the material particular matter was any particular matter. — Isaac

Did I? Where? If I did then it was a mistake.

I agree with that. My recent comments are a response to @Tate saying that "truth is a matter of comparing a statement to another statement". A sentence like "the kettle is black" isn't made true by another sentence but by the existence of a particular material object (if materialism is true), or by the occurrence of a particular sensory experience (if idealism is true), etc.

What particular particles? Do they include the screw in the drawer or not? — Isaac

Possibly, it's ambiguous. But if there are no particles, just the sentence "the kettle is black", then is it true?

What sensory experience? The one I say is that of a kettle, or the one you say is that of a kettle? — Isaac

Either. But if there were neither, just the sentence "the kettle is black", then is it true?

Do you? Or do you get damp when you stand out in drizzle? If you're wearing a coat are you still getting wet? Does the sentence "I didn't really get wet, just a bit damp" make no sense to you? — Isaac

Yes, yes, a little, and no.

But if there is no water falling from the sky, just the sentence "it is raining", then is it true?

Your arguments for the ambiguity of language do not refute my point. It still requires that there is something in addition to the sentences "it is raining" and "the kettle is black" for these sentences to be true. Truth depends on more than just language.

You say that the truth of "the kettle is black " depends on both that the kettle is black and that some hidden value is in such and such a state — Isaac

I've not said anything about some hidden value. The truth of "the kettle is black" depends on both the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" and on the kettle being black, the latter being a non-linguistic, material feature of the world (assuming materialism for the sake of argument). Assuming reductionism and naïve realism (again for the sake of argument), the kettle being black is the existence of particular particles at particular locations in space. This has nothing to do with language (even if language is required to talk about it).

Or if materialism is unwarranted, then perhaps phenomenalism is the case, and the kettle being black is the occurrence of a particular sensory experience, which again has nothing to do with language (even if language is required to talk about it).

The world isn't just a conversation we have with each other. There is more to the world than language, and the existence and behaviour of these non-linguistic parts of the world are often the things that make a sentence true. I get wet when I stand out in the rain, not because of the sentence "it is raining", but because of the water falling from the sky.

You want to name non-linguistic things, as if that very act were not linguistic. — Banno

The act of naming is linguistic, but the thing named is not linguistic. A kettle is not a word. A kettle being black is not a sentence.

SO what, if anything, is our disagreement? — Banno

You tell me. You were the one who decided to mention me when you said "it's as if @Michael would have us say, that the kettle is boiling is not a fact" even though I wouldn't have us say that, and then later "you want there to be another thing, that shall not be named" even though I don't want that.

I think I made my point quite clear here.

I don't know why you want that. I'm not your shrink. — Banno

Huh?

I don't want that. So I'm asking you why you (wrongly) think that I do.

The point at hand is the kettle boiling. That's a fact. But you want there to be another thing, that shall not be named, that is nevertheless the fact of the kettle boiling. — Banno

Why would you think I want that?

To make my point clearer, assume physicalism and mathematical anti-realism. Everything that exists is a physical object. Therefore, the set of all that exists is the set of every physical object. That its power set has a greater cardinality doesn't entail that there are physical objects that are not in the set of every physical object, because no member of the power set is a physical object.

Language is embedded in breakfast and waking and...

You might not narrate your life, but you might. — Banno

I also might paint my life, but it doesn't follow from this that painting is "embedded" in breakfast and waking. You really need to be more explicit with what you're saying because it seems vacuous as-is.

The "existence" of mathematical objects in mathematical anti-realism is different to the "existence" of mathematical objects in mathematical realism. — Michael

Correct, hence why platonism and nominalism about mathematics here is far-reaching and beyond the closer phenomenon at hand, being just that universal set itself. — Kuro

This is why I think you need to clarify your argument. Is the set of all that exists the set of all that realist-exists or the set of all that antirealist-exists? Because if it's the former, and if mathematical anti-realism is true, then your set of all that realist-exists isn't a universal set, as the universal set contains members that don't realist-exist.

It's as if Michael would have us say, that the kettle is boiling is not a fact — Banno

I didn't say that.

One must drop the pretence of being able to get outside of language while still using language. — Banno

I get "outside of language" most of the day. When I wake up and eat breakfast I don't narrate my life.

Sure, as I said, the truth of a sentence depends on both the meaning of the sentence and on non-linguistic features of the world. If the meaning is ambiguous then the truth-value is ambiguous. But, except in certain cases, it is still the case that a sentence’s truth value also depends on something which isn’t that, or another, sentence. We need something in addition to language for the sentence “it is raining” to be true.

One sign of mystery is a collection of arguments known as the slingshot. It's the reason we say the extension of any sentence is it's truth value. All truths designate the same Great Fact. — Tate

And why do statements have the truth value they do? Why is it “the kettle is black” which is true and not “the kettle is red”? Some non-linguistic feature of the world has to be a certain way. The object referred to by the phrase “the kettle” has to have the colour property referred to by the word “black”.

It seems the truth of "the kettle is black" is entirely dependent on the meaning of 'kettle' and 'black' — Isaac

Not entirely dependent. “The kettle is black” is not true by definition. The truth of “the kettle is black” is determined by both the meaning of “the kettle is black” and by whether or not some non-linguistic feature of the world satisfies that definition.

You can change the truth of “the kettle is black” either by changing the meaning of the sentence or by painting the kettle a different colour.

Yes

It's just that we have a mystery box in the flowchart specifically regarding that last sentence. — Tate

What’s the mystery about it? That last sentence often refers to some non-linguistic thing in the world. They’re the things we see and feel and eat.

It looks like you've stepped out beyond the speaker and the world to affirm that this is what truth is. — Tate

Beyond the speaker but not beyond the world.

Do we all basically agree that we never get "outside" of language. Truth is a matter of comparing a statement to another statement? — Tate

Most of the time I live my life without saying anything. There's more to the world than just language. Those other things in the world are often what make a statement true.

What I’m arguing against is the deflationary view that there is never any material component to facts; — Luke

As far as I understand it, the deflationary view is that truth isn't a property, or if it is then it isn't a substantial property. The sentence "'snow is white' is true" is nothing more (or not much more) than the sentence "snow is white".

It doesn't say anything about whether or not snow being white is a material fact.

Not sure of the relevance to the topic, either. — Banno

The subjective quality of visual (and other) experiences is private, but not "incoherent, unintelligible".

So have you spoken to any blind folk about this? — Banno

Yes. On the old forum there was a blind poster named Maya. I think a few people tried to explain sight and colour to her but she said that she couldn't make any sense of it at all.

Can you describe sight and colour to a man born blind?

What do you think of the link, if any, to Davidson's rejection of conceptual schema? Davidson's strategy seems to me to be showing that conceptual schema, if they exist, must be private; but that leads to their being incoherent, unintelligible. Hence, he rejects the notion. — Banno

Well, if you believe that Wittgenstein's point about a private language is well-founded, then it would follow that Davidson is correct to reject the notion of a private conceptual schema. It would be incoherent and unintelligible. — Sam26

Can you describe sight and colour to a man born blind?

U.S. reveals more classified records may be missing in Trump probe

Former U.S. President Donald Trump's team may not have returned all the classified records removed from the White House at the end of his presidency even after an FBI search of his home, U.S. prosecutors warned on Thursday, calling it a potential national security risk that needs investigation.

...

The Justice Department on Thursday suggested there could be more classified records that were removed from the Trump White House that investigators have not yet located. This revelation comes about a week after the Justice Department released a detailed list of property seized from Trump's home which showed the FBI located 48 empty folders labeled as classified and another 42 which indicated they should be returned to a staff secretary or military aide.

Legal experts were perplexed as to why the folders were empty, and it was not clear whether records were missing.

...

"The injunction against using classified records in the criminal investigation could impede efforts to identify the existence of any additional classified records that are not being properly stored - which itself presents the potential for ongoing risk to national security," they added.

No equivocation at all between "is a member of some set" and "exists", it's not a matter of conflating the concepts rather simply a matter of logical entailment. It's incoherent (and inconsistent) for anything to be a member of a set but also simultaneously not exist. — Kuro

The "existence" of mathematical objects in mathematical anti-realism is different to the "existence" of mathematical objects in mathematical realism. I took the "set of all that exists" as referring to existence in the realist sense. If this is correct, and if mathematical anti-realism is true, then no member of the power set exists in the realist sense (every member of the power set is a set and sets don't exist in the realist sense), and so that the power set has a greater cardinality is not a proof that there isn't a set of all that exists.

So could you clarify what you mean by "exists" when you consider the set of all that exists, and whether or not you're arguing for mathematical realism.