Durham Inquiry Appears to Wind Down as Grand Jury Expires

Anyone remember this thing?

The special counsel appointed by the Trump administration to examine the Russia investigation seems to be wrapping up its work with no further charges in store.

When John H. Durham was assigned by the Justice Department in 2019 to examine the origins of the investigation into the 2016 Trump campaign’s ties to Russia, President Donald J. Trump and his supporters expressed a belief that the inquiry would prove that a “deep state” conspiracy including top Obama-era officials had worked to sabotage him.

Now Mr. Durham appears to be winding down his three-year inquiry without anything close to the results Mr. Trump was seeking. The grand jury that Mr. Durham has recently used to hear evidence has expired, and while he could convene another, there are currently no plans to do so, three people familiar with the matter said.

...

Mr. Durham and his team used a grand jury in Washington to indict Michael Sussmann, a prominent cybersecurity lawyer with ties to Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Mr. Sussmann was indicted last year on a charge of making a false statement to the F.B.I. at a meeting in which he shared a tip about potential connections between computers associated with Mr. Trump and a Kremlin-linked Russian bank.

Mr. Sussmann was acquitted of that charge at trial in May.

A grand jury based in the Eastern District of Virginia last year indicted a Russia analyst who had worked with Christopher Steele, a former British spy who was the author of a dossier of rumors and unproven assertions about Mr. Trump. The dossier played no role in the F.B.I.’s decision to begin examining the ties between Russia and the Trump campaign. It was used in an application to obtain a warrant to surveil a Trump campaign associate.

The analyst, Igor Danchenko, who is accused of lying to federal investigators, goes on trial next month in Alexandria, Va.

In the third case, Mr. Durham’s team negotiated a plea deal with an F.B.I. lawyer whom an inspector general had accused of doctoring an email used in preparation for a wiretap renewal application. The plea deal resulted in no prison time.

Judge unseals less redacted version of affidavit used for Mar-a-Lago search warrant

It was previously known that Trump's lawyers provided one envelope to investigators, which contained 38 unique documents with classification markings, according to court filings. But the newly lifted redactions in the search warrant affidavit indicate that some of those classified files contained markings for "HCS, SI and FISA," according to court filings made public on Tuesday.

These classification markings indicate that the documents were connected to extremely sensitive government programs. "HCS" refers to human sources, or spies, that often work with the CIA. "SI" refers to signals intercepts that are typically handled by the National Security Agency. And "FISA" refers to domestic surveillance and wiretaps related to counterintelligence.

What she is saying is that these positions are consistent:

1. 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true iff Warsaw was bombed in World War II

2. 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true iff the Bible asserts this

One just then has to accept that:

3. Warsaw was bombed in World War II iff the Bible asserts this

The T-schema is silent on the truth of (3), and so the T-schema isn’t always the right tool to refute a substantial theory of truth. Some bizarre theories can be consistent with the T-schema.

We are afraid that these numbers mean capitulation for us and most probably another way of life. Are we not justified in wanting to promote models like having a few kids, being more courageous, handling guns, and so on?

So, in this extreme model I don't think it very good to erase all models whereas at the same time we praise our way of life. If we stop having models, we better renounce our way of life and accept whatever our neighbors will decide for us.

I hope these puts some perspective in the need for role models. — Eros1982

You don’t need role models for this. Just promote the virtues of having children, fighting for your country, etc.

Here we have a dilemma now: take like your model the courage, intelligence and skills of General X167 or take like your model the good heart of Preacher Y259? — Eros1982

Why would you need a statue of someone to have them as your role model? This is just about not wanting to publicly glorify someone who committed an atrocity, which seems perfectly reasonable to me. If you want a public display of someone with courage and intelligence and skill then find someone else who exemplifies those qualities and who isn’t a mass-murderer.

Or just stop needing role models.

As in what kind of ‘model’ person should liberal people look to for inspiration? What kind of values are they to view as worthwhile? — I like sushi

I've already made my views on role models clear.

But on this point, that's the question I'm trying to get answered. @Eros1982 appears to have a problem with liberal role models. So I want to know what he thinks are the "right" values, and which liberal values he thinks are wrong.

Who are the guardians that should be admired when there is more and more attempts to literally rewrite history out of pure ignorance driven by nothing more than a political agenda to ‘appear’ to be doing ‘the right thing’. — I like sushi

What history is being rewritten?

What I don't see like a good thing are attacks on the history, the mores and the aesthetics of people (majorities), just because we have to stick to "correct/representative politics". — Eros1982

Again, I don't know what this means. Can you be specific? What is an actual example of a "more/aesthetics of the majority" that is being attacked by liberal social policies?

As it stands all I can read from this is that you want to be excused for being a bigot.

I have no idea what you're trying to say. Can you be less vague and give specific examples of things that we do, or don't do, that you think is problematic?

@Eros1982 Maybe you could stop dancing around the issue and be more precise with what you're saying. Are you saying that it's better for society if homosexuals are not allowed marry, and women are not allowed to vote, and black people are not considered citizens, and ...?

What specific liberal policy related to social equality do you disagree with?

Having a "demos" (a like-minded community) is very important also. But when you hear all the time about differences and identities that need to be respected, you stop believing that you are living in a demos. — Eros1982

So a like-minded community is one where certain groups of people should be disrespected? This really is quite telling of your (lack of) ethics.

This is what am I talking about. Does this kind of mentality lead to models? — Eros1982

Why wouldn't it?

Can cultures and societies last without models? — Eros1982

See here and here.

Like taken out from some George Soros' article where the impression readers get is that in democracy what matters the most is that every minority is represented enough, so as none to be excluded, none to be offended. — Eros1982

Well, equal rights is a pretty important aspect of democracy.

Still don't know what this has to do with Soros.

(viz. Sorosianism) — Eros1982

What?

That's why it must be a consequence of any substantive theory of truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Haack has an interesting comment on this point from that same book.

But exactly what kinds of definition will the material adequacy condition rule out? In answering this question I shall use a weakened version of the criterion: not that all instances of the (T) schema be deducible from any acceptable truth definition (Tarski's version), but that the truth of all instances of the (T) schema be consistent with any acceptable truth-definition. The reason for this modification is simply that the weakened adequacy condition is much more readily applicable to non-formal definitions of truth. Now it is to be hoped - and perhaps even expected - that it will allow the sorts of definition which have been seriously proposed, and disallow what one might call' bizarre' theories. But matters turn out rather oddly. Consider the following definition of truth, which seems to me definitely bizarre: a sentence is true iff it is asserted in the Bible. Now it might be supposed that this definition (I shall call it 'D_B' for short) does not entail all instances of the (T) schema, not, for instance:

'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true_B iff Warsaw was bombed in World War II.

Now it is indeed the case that someone who did not accept D_B might deny:

'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is asserted in the Bible iff Warsaw was bombed in World War II.

But further reflection makes it clear that a proponent of D_B could perfectly well maintain that his definition does entail all instances of (T); he may allow that 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is true, but insist that it is asserted in the Bible (in an obscure passage in Revelation, perhaps), or if he agrees that 'Warsaw was bombed in World War II' is not asserted in the Bible, he will also, if he is wise, maintain the falsity of the right-hand side of the above instance of the schema. So, rather surprisingly, Tarski's material adequacy condition cannot be relied upon to be especially effective in ruling out bizarre truth-definitions.

If you take take means as has the same extension as, then yes. Otherwise, no, or depends. — Srap Tasmaner

A fitting quote from Haack's Philosophy of logics:

Tarski emphasises that the (T) schema is not a definition of truth – though in spite of his insistence he has been misunderstood on this point. It is a material adequacy condition: all instances of it must be entailed by any definition of truth which is to count as 'materially adequate'. The point of the (T) schema is that, if it is accepted, it fixes not the intension or meaning but the extension of the term 'true' [my emphasis].

Conversely, if a proposition p entails a contradiction, p is false. We can only know what is false; truth, on this view, is indeterminable. — Agent Smith

If we know that p is false then we know that not-p is true.

If you take take means as has the same extension as, then yes. Otherwise, no, or depends. — Srap Tasmaner

So "p" and "'p' is true" have the same extension but might have a different intension?

I suppose the same could be said of "'p' is true" and "'p' is foo", and so of "is true" and "is foo". Same extension, possibly different intension?

I think a definition of "is true" (and "is foo") should explain its intension.

They can't all be true at the same time, because the use of "sentence" in (2) conflicts with its use in (3), doesn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, good point. Not sure what I was thinking there. Obviously (3) is false.

And it's also obvious that any such predicate "is foo" is equivalent to "is true," that there is a unique identity function on truth-values, and thus a unique identity function on truth conditions. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure about this. Are these equivalent?

1. "p" is true iff p
2. "p" is a true sentence iff p
3. "p" is a sentence iff p

(1) might be equivalent to (2), but neither (1) nor (2) are equivalent to (3), and (3) follows from (2).

So does "is foo" mean "is true" or "is a true sentence" or "is a sentence" or something else?

I think, yes, that is the semantics of "is foo." It says, in plain English, that whatever the truth conditions of p are, those are the truth conditions of 'p' is foo, and vice versa. And it's also obvious that any such predicate "is foo" is equivalent to "is true," that there is a unique identity function on truth-values, and thus a unique identity function on truth conditions. — Srap Tasmaner

So you're saying that these are equivalent?

1. "p" is true iff p
2. "'p' is true" means "p"

Tarski's T-schema is Ramsey's redundancy theory?

(2) Semantics in terms of truth conditions, and the T-schema is the semantics of "is true". That's it; that's all it can be. — Srap Tasmaner

I lean toward (2), but I just don't know enough to say. — Srap Tasmaner

I find the part in bold problematic. Is "p" is foo iff p the semantics of "is foo"?

As I said at the start of this discussion, I think a distinction needs to be made between these two claims:

a. "p" is true iff p
b. "'p' is true" means "p"

I would say that (b) would count as an explanation of the semantics of "is true" but that (a) doesn't.

There’s a difference between aspiring to have certain qualities and aspiring to be like another person. It’s the latter that I find problematic.

they make decidedly inadequate subjects of veneration. — Tom Storm

Veneration. Honestly such an appalling idea. Hero worship, God worship, all of it just seems terrible to me.

What if your best self is an exceptionally talented serial killer? — Tom Storm

By “best” I’m also including moral goodness.

I dislike the notion of role models. I've never had any. Aspiring to be like someone else seems to me to show a weakness of character and a lack of self esteem. Better to aspire to be your best self instead.

And, in order to evaluate "better fit" for any given theory of truth, you'd have to understand truth already. So the very act of being able to evaluate correspondence/coherence in particular circumstances means we must already have some understanding of truth that is neither correspondence or coherence — Moliere

The T-schema suffers from the same problem, as I mentioned before.

1. "p" is foo iff p

This is not a theory, or definition, of "foo".

If we want an actual definition of truth then we need some q such that “[is] true” means q, or “‘p’ is true” means q.

For me I'm getting caught up in the notion that it's us who decide what counts as "material object" — Moliere

Your wording is ambiguous and leaves it open to equivocation. We decide that the word "water" refers to this stuff, that the symbol "2" refers to this number, that the letters "H" and "O" in chemistry refer to these elements, but we don't decide that water is H₂O.

Ah, OK. I guess I'm just looking for something a little more universal from a theory of truth, and I see the T-sentence as setting out that universal relationship effectively for all sentences other than the liars -- including sentences like the kettle. — Moliere

The T-schema doesn’t say much and is compatible with more substantial theories of truth, e.g:

“7 + 5 = 12” is true iff 7 + 5 = 12, and

7 + 5 = 12 iff “7 + 5 = 12” follows from the axioms of maths, therefore

“7 + 5 = 12” is true iff “7 + 5 = 12” follows from the axioms of maths

But I should add that I don’t think it’s a given that I’m talking about the correspondence theory. I’m not saying that some sentences correspond to material objects; I’m only saying that some sentences depend on material objects to be true.

As a rough analogy to explain the difference, speech depends on a speaker, but it doesn’t correspond to a speaker.

I'd reject correspondence theory as a universal theory of truth -- since 7 + 5 is 12, and "7 + 5 = 12" is true. — Moliere

So do I. I think coherence is a better fit for formal systems like maths.

That just strikes me as clearly false. I understand the point you're making, but lately on this forum people making that point use the phrase "forms of life" more often than they use "language-games" to try to mitigate its implausibility. — Srap Tasmaner

It does seem to me that people have been taken so completely by Wittgenstein and those like him that they’re being bewitched by language in the opposite direction. Now apparently everything is language.

The kettle itself isn't boiling at all, if we choose to use the general name "kettle" to only refer to the metallic kettle, and not the water inside. It's only because we agree upon what "the kettle" picks out that we can even check the material world in the first place — Moliere

But we still have to check the material world because it is the material world that determines whether or not the sentence is true. All you’re saying is that we decide what the sentence means. The meaning of a sentence isn’t the truth of the sentence. The truth depends on the meaning, but it also depends on the material world.

Unless something is true by definition, “S means p, therefore S is true” is an obvious non sequitur.

But here's a question people might be inclined to answer very differently: if you understand all the T-sentences of a language, do you also understand a world? Or maybe even the world? Either answer is interesting. — Srap Tasmaner

I’d say no. Understanding that “snow is green” iff snow is green and that “snow is white” iff snow is white isn’t understanding that snow is white. For that you have to actually look at the material world/experience it.

Only because we care about truth in relation to the material world, though. English is set up like that — Moliere

Yes, and I’m trying to describe how truth works in the English (or other natural) language. So I don’t understand this response.

So it's not the definitions of words which make it true, as you say, but it's still how we use language that makes a particular sentence true or false — Moliere

It’s not just how we use language. I say “the kettle is boiling”, you say “the kettle is not boiling”. One of us is right and one of us is wrong, and the thing that determines that isn’t me saying one thing and you saying the other (else which of us is right?).

It’s the existence of a material object (or set of material objects if you prefer, or mental phenomena if idealism is correct) and its behaviour that determines which of us is speaking the truth.

Though I imagine that quibbles are very possible since the argument doesn't contain the phrase "linguistic", so the opportunity to put non-linguistic stuff into semantic content still seems available to an opponent. I believe this was the strategy Banno gestured towards later; that it's a category error to think that the non-linguistic stuff is "really" non-linguistic since arbitrary environmental objects can be brought language practice as semantic content. — fdrake

Even if you put non-linguistic stuff/environmental objects into semantic content it is still the case that this non-linguistic stuff/environmental object is a determinant for truth. "The kettle is boiling" being true depends on the existence of the material object referred to by the phrase "the kettle".

I really didn't think that this would be such a controversial point. The world isn't just a conversation we have with each other. The materialist will say that there are material objects that exist and have properties, irrespective of what we say; the idealist will say that there is mental phenomena that occurs and has qualities, irrespective of what we say. That our language "carves up" this stuff isn't that this stuff isn't there, or doesn't factor into a sentence being true.

It's not the case that we just define every sentence in our language and the truth of every sentence follows from those definitions, so it must be that something which isn't our language plays an essential role. That is what my argument tries to show.

So if the same thing decides that two sentences are true, then they are the same sentence - they mean the same thing. — Banno

This is ambiguous.

John being a bachelor determines that "John is not married to Jane" is true and that "John is not married to Jake" is true.

"John is not married to Jane" and "John is not married to Jake" are not the same sentence; they do not mean the same thing.

Yes.

...and...? — Banno

Not sure what more you want. I think I covered it when I said that a) a rigorous account of truth should cash out the consequent of the T-schema, and that b) the truth of a sentence often depends on more than just its meaning; it often depends on a material object, or on a mental phenomenon, etc.