I point out that any attempt to deny it assumes what it would deny. — Pie

I'm not quite sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that solipsism assumes other minds, that idealism assumes an external material world, that eliminative materialism assumes mental states, etc.?

You also seem to misunderstand Dummett. He doesn't say that every true statement must be recognized as true, he says that every true statement must be recognizable as true. The cat having fur (or not) is recognizable even if not recognized.

But that aside, the point I was making to Pie is that if he is to be consistent with his reasoning then he must accept that it is public norms that determine the meaning and proper use of the words "true" and "false" which is incompatible with realism which argues that the truth is not determined by our linguistic (or other) conventions.

Dummet wants to have a level of "true" and "false" outside of language — Banno

No he doesn't, that's the point. The principle of bivalence, however, requires that it is, as that is the only way that every statement can be determinately true or false.

creativesoul misunderstands and doesn't address the argument being made. Read the quote in the opening post.

A statement can be warranted but false or unwarranted but true. — Pie

And what public norm determines the meaning of "true" and "false" which distinguishes them from "warranted" and "unwarranted"? The exact kind of realism that you seem to argue for requires that there is more to meaning and reference than just what is publicly given to us in experience. The world isn't just what we see or hear or believe. — Michael

Also on this point see the opening post here.

A statement can be warranted but false or unwarranted but true. — Pie

And what public norm determines the meaning of "true" and "false" which distinguishes them from "warranted" and "unwarranted"? The exact kind of realism that you seem to argue for requires that there is more to meaning and reference than just what is publicly given to us in experience. The world isn't just what we see or hear or believe.

In terms of what we mean by something like "mind", we have one of our own. There is more to me than just what others can see of me. I have thoughts that I never express. I have the "raw experience" (e.g. qualia) that is inaccessible to others. And being the intelligent man that I am, I am able to imagine that there is, or could be, something like this first personhood that isn't me. There are unexpressed thoughts that aren't mine. There is "raw experience" that is inaccessible to me. There are private other minds. And the solipsist, understanding the meaning of a phrase like "private other minds", can argue that there are no such things (or that we cannot know that there are such things).

I don't see how we can institute a meaning for the mysterious X that the p-zombie is supposed to lack. — Pie

Not knowing how something can happen doesn't entail that it doesn't happen. Again, we have actual examples of words and phrases referring to private sensations, the self, one's will, thinking, dreaming, the soul, God, counterfactuals, etc. And they have a meaning despite the words not referring to something which is publicly accessible. Take these as a reductio ad absurdum against any simplistic account of language that tries to reduce meaning to an entirely public, functional behaviour.

And again, to paraphrase you; if everything is public then nothing is. And in the context of this discussion "public" and "private" have a particular meaning that isn't analogous to your example of a private phone call.

Those who posit this metaphysical private mind reject every public criterion for mindedness as not getting at it correctly, which seems to put them in the position of being unable to be sure that others are (truly ) conscious. — Pie

Yes, that's solipsism.

I don't understand what the rest of your post is trying to say.

My view is that we are bound by common, public norms in the application of concepts (these seem to be caught up in rules that license inferences). I don't pretend that these norms are exact or exhaustive or inflexible.

But one such concept is 'private.' Another is 'sensation.' — Pie

I don't really know what you're trying to say here, but if you're equating "other minds" as something given in experience then the types of mind that you're thinking of aren't the type that solipsists deny. The types of mind that they deny are the private kind that you also seem to deny, which makes me wonder how your view is distinct from solipsism.

I don't deny the value or coherence of the distinction in ordinary value. I imagine we both know pretty well how to use it, like when it'd be shady to make a private phonecall (at company expense) or to cruelly make something public (a friend's secret.) — Pie

But that's not the sense of "public" (or "private") that we're using in this discussion.

I'll paraphrase your own words from here: if everything is public then nothing is.

Your own arguments seem to entail that if some things are public then some things are private.

My objection is that you seem to imply that 'mind' somehow has a public meaning while simultaneously rejecting every public criterion for its detection. — Pie

Yes, what's wrong with that? There are plenty of words and phrases that work this way. The soul, God, the afterlife, counterfactuals, claims about the future, claims about distant events, fictions, private sensations, parallel worlds, etc.

The notion that words can only refer to things that are publicly accessible seems evidently false.

To be clear, I don't deny 'raw feels' and the rest. I'm just trying to point out their epistemological uselessness. If we want to establish something rationally, they can play no direct role. — Pie

No direct role in what? Public behaviour? That's exactly why seeing other "people" is no indication that these "people" have a mind, a self, a will, thoughts, private sensations, etc. We see things, we hear things, but that any of these things have a mind is only ever an assumption -- unless it can be argued that either 1) a mind is causally efficacious, and uniquely so, such that only a mind can cause certain behaviours, or 2) a mind will necessarily "emerge" from anything complex enough to behave a certain way.

And if either 1 or 2 then the idealist has his means of arguing for other minds without having to admit to anything like mind-independent "matter".

If minds are radically private somethings, then I can have no idea what you refer to by 'mind.' — Pie

Really? I think this is where some take too much faith in Wittgenstein's private language argument. I, personally, have no trouble understanding what words like "mind", "self", "will", "thoughts", "private sensations", etc. mean and refer to, and I also don't think that these are things that can be reduced to any public, physical thing, e.g. brain activity.

But if you honestly don't understand them then I don't know what I can say to have you understand them as I do.

Here's a summary. The concepts of logic and certainty (and concepts themselves! ) are inherently social. Claims and arguments to the contrary are performative contradictions. If you debate this with me, that implies acknowledgent of norms that both of us ought to respect, along with a share world that we can be right or wrong about.... — Pie

Do you reject the notion of the philosophical zombie? Do you not think it possible that the exact same public behaviours that we associate with other people can occur in the absence of other minds? Others have brought up Wittgenstein's private language argument to support the claim that there are other minds, which honestly seems quite misguided as the point of the argument was that only what is publicly accessible is relevant to language, and so a community of philosophical zombies can have a language.

Interesting. Which of the famous idealists are dualists? Isn't the notion that 'all which exists is mentation' eg, Schopenhauer, a monist claim? Number 2 is Kantian, right? I heard Kastrup say he doesn't consider this to be idealism as such. What's the distribution of 1's and 2's? — Tom Storm

@Metaphysician Undercover missed the next section of that quote which explained that 1 is ontological idealism and 2 is epistemological idealism. An epistemological idealist can be an ontological dualist/pluralist (e.g. Kant).

If everything is X, then we might as well say nothing is, for nothing is picked out — Pie

So you’re opposed to every monism and would suggest instead some kind of dualism or pluralism?

And? — NOS4A2

And it follows that the terms of agreement are only valid within the legal framework established and maintained by the government, and that the government owns the currency.

No it isn’t. — NOS4A2

You’re using money issued and backed by the government and the government enforces the terms of the contract.

If you’re that opposed to reality then establish your own currency, convince like-minded individuals to adopt it as tender, and trust in a gentleman’s agreement that you’ll be paid what has been agreed.

Consenting parties in the transaction. — NOS4A2

The government is party to your employment contract.

Do you really think it is just to take the fruits of someone else’s labor without their consent? — NOS4A2

Who gets to decide the worth of their labour?

This is strange statement that what matters is whether or not things independently have shapes….that they are perceived to have. Why should one worry about such a thing. — Richard B

If you're asking about what practically matters then I'd say nothing. I don't think philosophy has any practical ramifications at all. Whatever philosophical theory turns out to be correct, our lives will continue as they have always done.

But I'm not talking about what practically matters. I'm talking about what matters to the philosophical questions on epistemology and ontology. We want to know if the things we see exist independently of us, and if they are (independently) as they appear to be. We want to know if a thing's appearance justifies any claims we make about what that thing is (independently) like. If you're not interested in these questions then by all means ignore them, but if you are then you can't address them simply by arguing that "I see a tree" is the conventional way to speak in English, and this seems to be where so many in this discussion get lost.

I see myself as suggesting that certain theses aren't sufficiently meaningful to be worth taking a position on. In the usual practical sense, the world is as it is whether I'm aware of it or not. Cells existed before microscopes, and earth was here before carbon dating. An idealist can 'abuse' (or play upon the flexibility of) ordinary language and say otherwise. To me it's not so much that they are wrong or right. It's just not that exciting. It's something like a tautology presented as an empirical discovery. — Pie

Idealism is just a position opposed to materialism and substance dualism. I suppose one could argue that all such positions are effectively meaningless, e.g. Hempel's dilemma shows that it isn't even clear what it means for a thing to be physical/material, which will carry over to substance dualism, and then an analogous argument can made to show that it isn't even clear what it means for a thing to be mental.

Are you making such a claim, or do you think that materialism and substance dualism are meaningful positions to take? If the latter then I don't see why the same can't be said of idealism. It's just substance dualism minus the material/physical.

All I did was invite you to consider what arguments an idealist might offer against solipsism. You are not obligated to do so. But you might have enjoyed yourself. — Banno

Then the same to you re. showing how idealism leads to solipsism.

Oh, come on. You are better than such trite shite. — Banno

It's not "trite shite" to refuse to accept your shifting of the burden. You made a claim and are refusing to defend it. Don't try to make me out to be the unreasonable one.

And again, any argument I offer will be accused of being a homo paleas.

But if you insist that I am in error, try it for yourself. See how you go. — Banno

So you don't have an argument to defend your claim. Good to know.

So shifting the burden again. You're the one who claimed that idealism leads to solipsism so it's up to you to defend your claim.

No. I am supposing that the world is all that is the case. — Banno

Then I have no idea what you're trying to get at here. There are multiple minds if there are multiple minds. We don't need for one of these minds to express this fact in speech or writing for it to be the case. Just be your usual deflationist self about truth.

:lol: "P" is true IFF P — Banno

So you're saying that for everything that happens there exists a verbal (or written, or signed) description of that event? How does that work? Is there some God describing everything that happens? Or are there "free floating" descriptions of everything that happens within some Realm of Ideas?

For a self-proclaimed realist you're starting to sound a lot like an anti-realist.

...unless you are an idealist, in which case for there to be multiple minds, the truth "there are multiple minds" must be a mental phenomena... to try to put this into your odd wording. — Banno

See above.

If there are only mental phenomena, and if there are true statements, then true statements are mental phenomena. Hence idealism holds that all truths are mental phenomena. — Banno

We don't need for someone to say "there are multiple minds" for there to be multiple minds. You seem to be conflating "truths" as true statements and "truths" as the facts that are expressed by true statements.

Or just commit to your usual deflation of truth. That should get you out of your bind.

What? — Banno

I just explained why your logic is confused with my example of the Reimann hypothesis. Jane claims that the Reimann hypothesis entails solipsism and John rejects this accusation, so then Jane demands that John show how the Reimann hypothesis avoids solipsism. It's a nonsense demand. Even if the Reimann hypothesis cannot prove that solipsism is false it doesn't then mean that the Reimann hypothesis entails that solipsism is true.

If idealism does entail solipsism, then idealism is merely one form of solipsism. Hence, in order to show that idealism is not merely a form of solipsism, any mooted idealist must show that other minds exist. — Banno

And you're just shifting the burden. If you think that idealism entails solipsism then explain how.

Not I. — Banno

You literally just asked me to show how idealism proves solipsism false to save it from entailing that solipsism is true. Your logic is confused.

And I responded initially to your claims that "Idealism holds that for a statement to be true it must stand in some relation to mind" and "idealism is prone to fall into solipsism". I wasn't responding to OP's question regarding how idealism and solipsism differ, which DingoJones answered in the third reply.

How does idealism avoid solipsism?

We have: "only minds and mental phenomena exist"

Now reach the conclusion that solipsism is false. — Banno

You seem confused. Does the Reimann hypothesis need to reach the conclusion that solipsism is false to avoid solipsism? It just doesn't say anything about solipsism whatsoever.

And I don't know why you're trying to shift the burden of proof. If you want to claim that idealism entails solipsism then it's your job to prove it, not mine to disprove it.

Now follow that through. How is it that an idealist can conclude that there are other minds?

Work through the argument. See what the conclusions are. — Banno

Follow what through? In claiming that only minds and mental phenomena it follows that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It doesn't follow that only one mind exists. If you want to suggest that the latter follows then the burden is on you to explain how.

Idealism holds that for a statement to be true it must stand in some relation to mind — Banno

It says that only minds and mental phenomena exist (or can be known to exist). There existing multiple minds each with associated mental phenomena is consistent with this claim.

Yes, idealism is prone to collapse, as you mention. The problem is maybe a hidden tautology, a language trap. In order for a statement to be true it must stand in some relation to mind .... stand in relation to language ... be a statement. — Pie

I don’t see how materialism/substance dualism/truth realism avoids this. For a statement to be true there must be a statement. That’s the case for every metaphysics.

Of course you can say that the truth does not depend on there being a true statement, but then the idealist can say the same.

Edit: I may have misunderstood what you were trying to say here.

But it was offered to me and given to me for the services my employer and I both agreed upon. — NOS4A2

You're missing a premise from which you can then derive the conclusion that you therefore have the legal and/or moral right to that pre-tax income.

What matters is whether or not things independently have the shapes, colours, sounds, tastes, and smells that they are perceived to have and as they are perceived to be. Is the relationship between reality and appearance just casual or also representative/constitutional?

What is it isn’t the conventional English sentence for describing the act of perception has nothing to do with the ontology or epistemology of perception.

Seems like you're just losing your temper. — bongo fury

Losing my patience with irrelevance perhaps.

How else do you imagine proper ownership of property is determined other than by fiat? Do we ask God whose land it is? — Isaac

Pretty sure fiat currencies are owned by the government anyway. So technically all of NOS4A2’s money is the government’s. If he doesn’t want them taking any of their money back then he should manufacture his own goods and barter them for the things he needs.

The irony is that I suspect the only kind of non-taxed society that could work would be some kind of commune.