Well, if you don't like the word 'obligation', then instead of trying to convince the judge that you have no obligation to fulfill your contract you should convince him that you need not fulfill the contract and that you need not be punished. After all, why must you fulfill the contract? Why must you be punished? Why must you do what the law tells you to do? Why must you do what you said you were going to do when you signed the contract? — Leontiskos

The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their contract then they are to be jailed". The judge then rules that I did not fulfil the terms of my contract and so orders the bailiffs to take me to jail.

Again, the existence of some supposed obligation is utterly irrelevant.

Well, suppose your judge is a good philosopher, and he admits that laws cannot be premised on non-existent realities. And really, wouldn't any logical person affirm the same? So why not explain to the judge that you agreed to the contract when you signed it, but you disagree with it now? Do you think you would have a plausible argument to convince an impartial judge? Do you think you have good arguments to convince him that there is no metaphysical basis for obligations, and therefore obligations cannot exist, and therefore you do not owe me $25,000? If your arguments are sound, then why not apply them in real life? — Leontiskos

The terms of the contract simply say "Michael is to build the house or pay a fine". The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their contract then they are to be jailed".

Neither the contract nor the law depend on the existence of obligations, and so arguing that obligations don't exist is an irrelevant argument.

But why? Why not reason with the authority and explain to him, like you did to me, that you intended to fulfill the contract when you signed it and now you've changed your mind? If you are not obliged to pay the contract, then surely you are not subject to further punishment...? — Leontiskos

I can say whatever I want. I doubt it would convince a judge. The contract states that if I do not build the house then I am to pay a fine. The law states that if I do not pay the fine then I am to be jailed. So I build the house, pay a fine, or go to jail. Unless I have very good lawyers, I have to choose between one of these outcomes.

That's all there is to the matter. I don't see what role obligations have – or even what obligations are, as both you and Banno refuse to make sense of them.

Earlier you told me that you honestly believe that you can just change your mind and decide not to fulfill a promise. Why can't you just change your mind and decide not to fulfill a contract? Why not just tell the authority that you've changed your mind and decided not to fulfill the contract? — Leontiskos

I can do all of that. And then I will presumably face some further punishment.

Did you tell him you changed your mind? — Leontiskos

I don't understand the relevance of the question. If you're asking what I would do in real life then I would either pay the fine or hire lawyers to find a way to save me from paying the fine.

Why is the authority fining you? — Leontiskos

For not doing what I was contracted to do.

As in, "If I don't build the house on time then some authority will fine me."

This is true if in the terms of the contract. But this does not prima facie entail "I ought build the house" (or "I ought pay the fine").

Well, you are the one who told me that you owed me the money. What did you mean when you affirmed that proposition? — Leontiskos

I was thinking of it in terms of the conditional "If I don't do X then Y will happen", and that this proposition does not entail "I ought X".

So if you change your mind and renege, do you still owe me the money, or not? — Leontiskos

Right, by "owe" you mean "obligated to give you the money"? Again, you haven't told me what it means to be obligated to do something. I just either do it or I don't.

Why couldn't you just say, "I changed my mind," like before? (↪Michael) When I say that you owe me $25,000, why couldn't you change your mind? — Leontiskos

Well I can certainly change my mind and not give you the money, and then face whatever punishment follows.

I don't really understand your question.

then you seem to be claiming that making a promise is not undertaking an obligation — Banno

Yes. I've been very clear on that. This is true even using Searle's definition of a promise. Your claim that if S promises to do A then S has undertaken an obligation to do A is as of yet unsupported.

Take a contract. You tell me that you will build me a house in a year, and if you don't complete it in that time you owe me $25,000. The year completes and the house is not completed. Do you owe me $25,000? — Leontiskos

Yes.

If you do not agree that someone who undertakes an obligation is not thereby obligated, then I have no more to offer you. — Banno

That's not what I'm saying. I am saying that Searle's conditions – even with conditions (7) and (8) – do not entail that when one promises to do something one is agreeing to undertake an obligation.

You are just reasserting the very thing that needs to be justified.

I am curious whether you think contracts exist. If no one is obliged to fulfill a promise, then surely no one is obliged to fulfill a contract? — Leontiskos

Yet again you still haven't told me what it means to be obliged to do something.

You will say, I think, "There is a penalty but no obligation." But then what is the one who breaks contract being penalized for? Is there something he failed to do? — Leontiskos

He didn't do what he was contracted to do and so as per the terms of the contract (or the law in general) he is penalized.

That's all there is to it. I don't understand what this additional thing – the "obligation" – is, or what part it plays.

Without (8), the promise does not count as undertaking an obligation. — Banno

Even with (8) it doesn't count as undertaking an obligation.

Here are two propositions:

1. S intends to produce in H the knowledge that the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A.
2. The utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A.

Searle uses (1), and (1) does not prima facie entail (2).

Perhaps an obligation is a binding of an individual to the performance of an act. — Banno

This is yet another thing that needs to be explained. What does it mean to be "bound" to the performance of an act?

I just either do it or I don't. What are these other things you're trying to introduce?

So for Michael promises don't exist — Leontiskos

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions:

1. Promises exist
2. People promise to do things

If (1) and (2) mean the same thing then I agree with (1). If they mean different things then I need an explanation of this difference.

Michael is presumably saying that obligations don't exist — Leontiskos

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions:

1. Obligations exist
2. People command others to do things

If (1) and (2) mean the same thing then I agree with (1). If they mean different things then I need an explanation of this difference.

The backstop here is the way you will also claim that terms like 'ought' and 'should' make no sense to you if they are interpreted in their colloquially normative sense. See our conversation where you do precisely this: link. — Leontiskos

The colloquially normative sense is just to treat a command as if it were a truth-apt proposition. It's fictionalism. If you think there's more to it than that then I'd need an explanation and a justification for them.

Sorry - can you give an account of what making a promise is, that does not involve placing oneself under an obligation? — Banno

Searle's conditions 1-6 that you linked me to. I would copy them here but I cannot copy and paste from that document and I'd rather not manually type it all out.

Is it your contention that one ought not keep one's promises? — Banno

My contention is that a) it hasn't been explained what obligations are and b) it hasn't been explained how/why promises entail obligations. Even Searle's account doesn't explain this.

It appears we disagree as to the nature of "obligation". — Banno

I don't even know what an obligation is, if something more than a command. I have asked several times for an explanation.

Can you offer an alternative meaning for "promise" — Banno

Searle’s conditions 1-6 seem sufficient. But again, even 7 and 8 don’t entail the existence of an obligation.

As a first response, if you are given a command, by someone with the authority to command you, then "do this" does imply "you ought do this" — Banno

The problem with this claim is that I cannot make sense of the difference between “do this” and “you ought do this”. At best it just claims that “do this” entails “do this”.

You seem to have missed the point. The utterance of T counts as placing S under an obligation to do A. — Banno

I haven’t missed it. I’m asking you to justify this claim. It doesn’t follow from Searle’s list of necessary and sufficient conditions. His conditions only talk about intending to be placed under an obligation, but intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

Your mention of Anscombe was interesting. Do you care to fill it out? — Banno

Here are two sentences:

1. You ought do this
2. Do this

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference between them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. It’s make-believe a la fictionalism.

Considering that analytic philosophy, as it is today rather than relating to Frege and the Vienna Circle, is a phenomenon particular of the English-speaking world, I wouldn't say so. I at least have not seen any book written in German about what 'wissen' mean or in Spanish about 'conocer'. — Lionino

Well, Plato certainly asked that question in ancient Greek. It's where "justified true belief" comes from.

I'm sure people of other languages make the same arguments about the words in their language – some of which may be exactly translatable into English with no change in meaning, and some of which may not.

Is this like "analysis of knowledge" in analytic philosophy where whole books are written about the meaning of a specific word because the dictionary definition is not specific enough for the taste of the philosophers in question? — Lionino

Something like that.

For example, I think that this is a sufficient account:

a) I promise to do something. If I do it then I did as I promised. If I don't do it then I didn't do as I promised.

Whereas others want to bring in talk of obligations and being held to a promise and of promises existing. It isn't clear what any of these things mean, or what they add to (a). To borrow from Anscombe, they seem like terms with "mere mesmeric force" and no real substance.

I'll make this exceptionally simple for you @Banno, as it seems I must.

Prima facie these are two different propositions:

1. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A
2. The utterance of T will place S under an obligation to do A

In Searle's list of necessary and sufficient conditions, he uses (1) – and (1) does not prima facie entail (2).

As a comparison, these are two different propositions:

3. S intends to do A
4. S will do A

In Searle's list of necessary and sufficient conditions, he uses (3) – and (3) does not entail (4).

To defend your position you must either show that (1) entails (2) (and justify Searle's claim that (1) is a necessary condition) or find some other way to justify (2) – as well as actually explain what obligations are.

Michael, how odd. — Banno

The only oddity is why you continually misrepresent what I am saying.

I am saying that you haven't shown that anyone places themselves under an obligation when they promise something.

It certainly doesn't follow from Searle's account, even if his conditions (7) and (8) are correct. Intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

And that is the sort of thing you tell your professional clients? — Leontiskos

No.

What relevance is this question?

Sufficient to avoid the conclusion that your promise was insincere. — Leontiskos

My promise was sincere because I intended to fulfil it when I made it. I was being honest at the time. I just happened to change my mind after making it.

What will he say to you? What will you say to him? Will it be sufficient to tell him that you "chose not to" meet with him? — Leontiskos

Sufficient for what? I don’t really understand the question or how it relates to my comments to Banno.

Right, and is it not also true that if a promise is sincere then one will do what they promised (unless some unforeseen impediment intervenes)? — Leontiskos

No, because I may choose not to, i.e. I changed my mind.

Why can't you? — Leontiskos

Because a promise is sincere only if one intends to do as one promises.

Huh? I'm reiterating/agreeing with your claim that "it doesn't matter whether you put the halving ad infinitum as an antecedent in a conclusion or as a premise - it's logically the same"?

It doesn't matter whether you put the halving ad infinitum as an antecedent in a conclusion or as a premise - it's logically the same. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, it makes no difference if it's an antecedent in a conclusion or as a premise. Either way, the supertask is the completion/end of an infinite/endless sequence within finite time (e.g. I have stopped pushing the button by 12:00) and is an inherent contradiction, irrespective of what the task is. Having the task be to push a button that turns a lamp on and off is just a means to demonstrate the impossibility of a supertask and not the reason for its impossibility, and neither having the button be broken nor having the lamp spontantously turn into a pumpkin allows for the supertask to be possible.

But completion is not in your premises. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is my argument.

Notice the antecedent of C6: "If the button is only ever pushed at 11:00, 11:30, 11:45, and so on ad infinitum...".

If I am only ever pushing the button at these times then I am not pushing the button at 12:00 or at any time after 12:00. Therefore, my (infinite/endless) button-pushing has ended by 12:00.

That's what supertasks are. They are an inherent contradiction, irrespective of what pushing the button actually does. It is as metaphysically impossible to have performed a supertask on a broken button as it is metaphysically impossible to have performed a supertask on a working button. Having the button turn the lamp on and off, like killing my grandfather before my father is born, is just a means to better demonstrate this impossibility and not the reason for it.

P5 is an inherent contradiction, just as travelling back in time is an inherent contradiction.

The lamp being neither on nor off at t₁ and killing one's own grandfather before one's father is born are secondary contradictions to prove the inherent contradictions.

The possibility of P5 does not depend on whether or not P1-P4 are true, e.g. having the button be broken does not make it possible to push the button an infinite number of times within two hours.

The definition of a super-task is as you say. But your listed premises don't say anything about completion or ending. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The infinite button pushes ends after two hours. That's the premise of Thomson's lamp (albeit minutes in his specific case). In his own words, "after I have completed the whole infinite sequence of jabs, i.e. at the end of the two minutes, is the lamp on or off?".

If, as per the premise, I only push the button at 11:00, 11:30, 11:45, and so on ad infinitum, then I am no longer pushing the button at any time after 12:00. My infinite button pushes has allegedly ended.

The very thing we're discussing is the possibility of supertasks, i.e. can an infinite sequence of operations end in finite time?

The contradiction is: The lamp is either On or Off T 12:00 and the lamp is neither On nor Off at 12:00.

But that contradiction comes from a set of premises, each of which is not logically true, and dropping any one of the premises blocks deriving the contradiction. It would help if you would at least tell me that you understand that. — TonesInDeepFreeze

That's one of the contradictions. If one drops or adds or changes any premises, e.g. by stipulating that the lamp spontaneously and without cause turns into a pumpkin at 12:00, then you have resolved the contradiction regarding the state of the lamp at 12:00, but doing so does not then allow for the possibility of supertasks; it does not resolve the contradiction in claiming that an infinite sequence of button pushes has come to an end.

It is begging the question merely to declare it is a contradiction that denumerably many tasks can be executed in finite time. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It's simply true by definition. An endless sequence of operations cannot end. An infinite sequence of operations is an endless sequence of operations. An infinite sequence of operations cannot end.

It merely says that metaphysical possibility may be logically possibility and that there's another notion that the article describes ostensively. So is it just the same as logical possibility, and if not what is a proper definition that is not merely ostensive? — TonesInDeepFreeze

I'm not the authority on the matter. I am simply arguing that supertasks are more than just nomologically impossible. I use the phrase "metaphysical impossibility" rather than "logical impossibility" simply because it's the weaker claim. Call it hedging my bets if you will.

@TonesInDeepFreeze

As a different example, consider the grandfather paradox. I don't just take this as a proof that one cannot travel back in time and kill one's grandfather before one's father is born; I take this as a proof that one cannot travel back in time.

The premise of having one kill one's grandfather before one's father is born is just a tool to prove the impossibility, not the reason for the impossibility.

I didn't say they end. — TonesInDeepFreeze

A supertask is an infinite sequence of operations that ends in finite time.

Again, the contradiction comes from the conjunction of the premises. — TonesInDeepFreeze

One of the contradictions does; the state of the lamp at 12:00. This isn't the only contradiction. The other contradiction is the inherent contradiction of an endless sequence of operations coming to an end. The former is simply a tool to better demonstrate the latter.

Finding some way to resolve the former does not also resolve the latter.

Just in case you missed my edit to my previous post:

Let's even assume for the sake of argument that this wizard will only appear with a probability of 0.5, and that this is determined only at exactly 12:00, i.e after the performance of the supertask. It must already be possible for the supertask to be performed for him to even appear, and so his appearance cannot retroactively make the supertask possible, even if half the time it resolves the secondary contradiction regarding the state of the lamp at 12:00.

(3) We don't have a satisfactory definition of 'metaphysical possibility' here. — TonesInDeepFreeze

See here.

All I mean by it is that supertasks are more than just physically impossible. No alternate physics can allow for them.

It's not a contradiction in and of itself. — TonesInDeepFreeze

An infinite sequence of operations is by definition an endless sequence of operations. An endless sequence of operations does not come to an end. That's what makes the premise of a supertask an inherent contradiction.

Having the operation be to push a button, and having this button turn a lamp on and off, is simply a way to make this inherent contradiction even clearer.

If you accept that this proves that this button cannot have been pushed an infinite number of times then what is the reasoning behind the claim that if some wizard steps in at 12:00 to magically turn the lamp on then this retroactively makes it possible to have pushed this button an infinite number of times? Let's even assume for the sake of argument that this wizard will only appear with a probability of 0.5, and that this is determined only at exactly 12:00, i.e after the performance of the supertask. It must already be possible for the supertask to be performed for him to even appear, and so his appearance cannot retroactively make the supertask possible, even if half the time it resolves the secondary contradiction regarding the state of the lamp at 12:00.

I don't think you're really grasping what distinguishes a supertask from an abstract infinite sequence.

So you think that S can intend that the utterance T will place him under an obligation, and utter T, but not thereby consider themself under an obligation. — Banno

I didn't say that.

I'm saying that Searle's necessary and sufficient conditions (1)-(9) do not entail that if S promises to do A then S is obliged to do A.

S can intend that the utterance T will place him under an obligation, and utter T, but not thereby be under an obligation.

If "...it isn't clear to (you) what obligations are" and you do not think there are such things as obligations, then you are not going to understand what is involved in making a promise. — Banno

That's why I'm asking you to make sense of them (and then justify their existence).

As it stands, I am content with accepting Searle's conditions (1) - (6) as being sufficient for promises.

But also as previously mentioned, not even Searle's conditions (7) and (8) require one to actually be placed under an obligation; they only require that one intends to be. So even under Searle's account obligations are seemingly superfluous.