I do not think it is that complicated. — Banno

It's not. The sentence "gold exists" doesn't exist if the English language doesn't exist (unless sentences are mind-independent Platonic entities). The sentence "gold exists" exists if someone says or writes "gold exists".

So, with that in mind, if we have:

P1. The sentence "gold exists" is true if and only if gold exists

We eventually conclude:

C1. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist

There's nothing here about "being an element in the domain under discussion"; there's just the ordinary sense of "exists" that is described in the opening paragraph of this discussion.

But now you should go on to ask yourself how it is that you are claiming, "(It is true that) gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false." — Leontiskos

But I didn't say "it is true that gold still exists". I said "gold still exists".

You're not wrong.

Gold exists and, if said, "gold exists" is true and "gold does not exist" is false.

If nobody says anything then gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false.

"true" and "false" are just adjectives used to categorize speech and writing and thoughts and beliefs.

Although I'm not sure what you mean by this:

then those gold deposits exist, as does the state of affairs in the statement. — AmadeusD

The gold exists and the state of affairs exists? These aren't two different things. There's just the gold.

I'm happy to go along with it's being valid, with some reservation about what it means to use existential generalisation over a truth statement. That is, it's not clear what <"There is gold in those hills" exists> is saying, beyond that "There is gold in those hills" is an element in the domain under discussion. — Banno

It's just the ordinary sense of "exists": the Earth exists but ghosts don't.

So is it clearer if the argument is phrased like this?

P1. The sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true then the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

So what do you take it to imply? Where does this lead? — Banno

It leads to C3, which suggests either that the sentence "there is gold in those hills" can exist without the existence of language or that gold being in those hills depends on the existence of language.

It is literally saying that the easy argument entails Platonism about propositions and that many philosophers reject propositions because of that. If it were just discussing whether or not rocks exist without us then it would only be the few idealists who take issue with it.

I suggest you re-read it carefully because it is clearly you who is misunderstanding it.

It was literally in the SEP article you referenced:

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote <there are rocks>, does not entail the existence of any beings that have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is possible in the broadest sense for <there are rocks> to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now, if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states, then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence of at least some propositions.

...

But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about propositions seems ruled out.

...

Many philosophers deny that there are propositions precisely because they accept the validity of these Easy Arguments (and the truth of certain attitude ascriptions).

There are people who claim that mind-independent truth-apt propositions exist.

So we can add all things on top of just gold and sentences. — frank

That's not what I was getting at. I was getting at the suggestion there there is gold, there is the sentence, and there is the mind-independent proposition – with it being the proposition rather than the sentence which is either true or false, and which is either true or false even if nothing is said.

This is what I find nonsense.

If a 25 year old says "I am 25 years old" then what they say is true.
If a 26 year old says "I am 25 years old" then what they say is false.
If a 27 year old says nothing then nothing true or false is said.

There is a person and there is, optionally, a truth-apt proposition-sentence. That's all we need to make sense of the above.

There's certainly no need to bring up mind-independent abstract objects that exist even if language doesn't.

I keep it simple:

1. How old are you?
2. I am 25 years old.

(1) is a question and (2) is a proposition. Both are sentences.

Question-sentences aren't truth-apt, proposition-sentences are.

If a 25 year old says (2) then what they say is true, and if a 26 year old says (2) then what they say is false. And if nobody says (2) then nothing true or false is said.

There is a) the Earth orbiting the Sun and there is b) the sentence "the Earth orbits the Sun". There's no need for c) the proposition that the Earth is orbiting the Sun, distinct from (a) and (b).

We just need (a) and (b), with (b) being true if (a) occurs and false if it doesn't.

I dunno, when I look up the definition of "proposition" on wikipedia, and it says that they are "the type of object that declarative sentences denote", then it is not clear to me that "the type of object that declarative sentences denote" should depend on the existence of language. Is that a faulty analysis? — Apustimelogist

There is gold and there is the sentence "gold exists". Why add some third thing? Having a piece of gold, a sentence, and a proposition is superfluous.

You're denying that propositions and states of affairs are the same thing. — frank

I like to keep things simple. Gold exists and we either truthfully say "gold exists" or falsely say "gold doesn't exist" (or we say nothing, and so nothing true or false is said).

Anything more than this is unnecessary.

That there is gold in hills in the absence of minds follows from your worldview. — frank

What is my worldview?

The status of propositions doesn't really have anything to do with this. — frank

I'm just talking about the adjective "true" (and the adjective "false"). I am saying that a) being true (or false) is a property of propositions, that b) the existence of propositions depends on the existence of language, and so that c) if language does not exist then nothing exists that has the property of being true (or false).

I'm not the one claiming that the existence of gold depends on the existence of something which has the property of being true.

The existence of gold and the truth of the proposition "gold exists" are two different things.

So you are objecting to existential generalisation over a truth statement? — Banno

No, I'm asserting existential generalisation and then showing what follows from it.

Do you agree that the argument is valid? Do you agree that both premises are true? Do you agree that the conclusions entail what I suggest they entail?

But if you prefer, I'll make it simpler:

P1. "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

C2 and C3 appear to entail either Platonism about propositions or that the existence of gold in those hills depends on the existence of language.

It's saying that they mean the same thing, much like "bachelor" and "unmarried man" mean the same thing.

What's your point? — Banno

This sentence is true:

1. If the King of France is bald then the King of France exists

And this sentence is true:

2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists.

Now let's assume that another sentence is true:

3. "there is gold in those hills" is true is semantically equivalent to there is gold in those hills

It would then follow from (2) and (3) that this sentence is true:

4. If there is gold in those hills then "there is gold in those hills" exists.

It would then follow via modus tollens that this sentence is true:

5. If "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

It would then follow that this sentence is true:

6. Either Platonism about propositions is correct or the existence of gold in those hills depends on the existence of language.

So to avoid (6) it would appear that one would have to deny (3).

Presumably they are the same in at least this way: whatever truth value you assign to one, you must also assign to the other two. — Banno

Sure, but that's not the same as semantic equivalence.

Take these two biconditionals:

1. John is a bachelor if and only if John is an unmarried man
2. John is the Prime Minister if and only if John was appointed as Prime Minister by the King

With (1), the antecedent and the consequent mean the same thing and so (1) is true a priori.
With (2), the antecedent and the consequent do not mean the same thing and so (2) is not true a priori; it is true a posteriori, subject to whatever law determines how someone becomes Prime Minister.

So given these two biconditionals:

1. "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if it is true that there is gold in those hills
2. there is gold in those hills if and only if it is true that there is gold in those hills

In either case are the antecedent and the consequent semantically equivalent?

There's an ambiguity in "truth" such that "a truth" is also used to talk about a state of affairs that is the case - It is true that there is gold in those hills. — Banno

So we have three different claims:

1. "there is gold in those hills" is true
2. it is true that there is gold in those hills
3. there is gold in those hills

Are you suggesting that (2) is semantically equivalent to (3) rather than semantically equivalent to (1)?

Either way, I think the use of (2) is confusing matters. Perhaps it's better to just stick to (1) and (3) as there's less ambiguity.

Michael is here trying to use language in the absence of language. — Leontiskos

I'm not trying to use language in the absence of language. I'm using language in the presence of language. Language exists and I'm using it.

And I can use language to talk about what the world will be like without language, just as I can use a pen to write about what the world will be like without pens.

One day, websites will no longer exist but stars will continue to exist.
One day, the English language will no longer exist but the Earth will continue to exist.

There's no contradiction in me using the English language on a website to assert either of the above.

We are talking about Platonism.

See for example the SEP article on propositions that you referenced:

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote <there are rocks>, does not entail the existence of any beings that have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is possible in the broadest sense for <there are rocks> to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now, if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states, then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence of at least some propositions.

...

But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about propositions seems ruled out.

I disagree with Platonism.

A truth is a true proposition. Propositions do not exist in the absence of language and so true propositions do not exist in the absence of language and so truths do not exist in the absence of language.

But gold does exist in the absence of language. It's very straightforward.

That last sentence only makes sense as an assertion at a possible world. — frank

Language currently exists and so I can assert the true proposition "gold will continue to exist even after all life dies".

But the claim that the true proposition "gold exists" will continue to exist even after all life dies is Platonic nonsense.

If there are no truthbearers, there is no truth... about anything. — frank

Given that "a truth" means "a true proposition" your claim is just the claim "if there are no truthbearers there is no true proposition about anything". Well, yes. Nothing true is being said or written or believed, etc.

But there's still gold.

You're saying that if there are no humans, there is no truth. — frank

I'm saying what I said here:

What some are saying is that "a truth" means "a true proposition" and "a falsehood" means "a false proposition", that a proposition requires a language, and that a language requires a mind.

This is not to say that a mind is sufficient; only that it is necessary. The (often mind-independent) thing that the proposition describes is also necessary (to determine whether or not the proposition is a truth or a falsehood).

So the claim is that when all life dies out there will be gold in Boorara but no truths or falsehoods because there will be no propositions. — Michael

This was it. This sentence doesn't make any sense. I think we agree on that now? — frank

It does make sense. Propositions are features of language; ergo if there is no language there are no propositions.

Yes, the word "proposition" has a technical meaning in philosophy, but that meaning does not entail Platonism. See for example the section titled "The Nature and Status of Propositions" where they discuss various conceptualist arguments against the claim that propositions "exist in the absence of all mental states."

Maybe you disagree with conceptualists, but they are quite welcome to talk about propositions without committing to Platonism.

One does not need to believe that propositions are abstract entities that continue to exist even after the death of all life to talk about propositions.

You're doing what I said, which is making an assertion at a possible world. Asserting P is the same thing as saying that P is true. — frank

You're not paying attention to tense.

1. It will rain tomorrow
2. "It will rain tomorrow" is true
3. "It is raining" will be true tomorrow

(1) and (2) are the same, but (3) is different. This is more apparent with a different example:

1. All languages will die out eventually
2. "All language will die out eventually" is true
3. "All languages are dead" will be true eventually

(1) and (2) are the same, but (3) is different. (1) and (2) are true but (3) is false because an English-language sentence that asserts that all languages are dead contradicts itself.

So in our case:

1. Gold will exist after languages die out
2. "Gold will exist after languages die out" is true
3. "Gold exists" is true after languages die out

(1) and (2) are the same, but (3) is different. (1) and (2) are true but (3) is false. "Gold exists" cannot be true after languages die out because "Gold exists" cannot exist after languages die out.

I don't know how you come to that conclusion. I think you're overthinking it.

There's gold in Boorara. If I say "there's gold in Boorara" then what I say is true. If nobody is alive to say "there's gold in Boorara" then there's still gold in Boorara even though nothing true is being said by anyone.

A proposition can be assessed at a possible world, which might be the actual world. The proposition isn't inside the world. Propositions don't have location or temporal extension. — frank

I’m not a Platonist, I don’t believe in the existence of abstract entities. There are just meaningful sentences that we describe using the adjectives “true” and “false” when certain other conditions are satisfied.

Any talk of there being true propositions in a world without language is mystical mumbo-jumbo.

Well, instead of a sentence we could consider a painting.

Obviously if there was someone around to paint the landscape then there could be an accurate (or inaccurate) painting, but it doesn’t make sense to talk about there being an accurate painting if there is nobody to paint the landscape.

I’m not sure what purpose there is in imagining a painter being there.

So we have at least one truth. — Banno

What some are saying is that "a truth" means "a true proposition" and "a falsehood" means "a false proposition", that a proposition requires a language, and that a language requires a mind.

This is not to say that a mind is sufficient; only that it is necessary. The (often mind-independent) thing that the proposition describes is also necessary (to determine whether or not the proposition is a truth or a falsehood).

So the claim is that when all life dies out there will be gold in Boorara but no truths or falsehoods because there will be no propositions.

Right, just Janus then if I’m reading him correctly.

So we have three different ways of talking:

1. “It is raining” will be true tomorrow
2. It will be true tomorrow that it is raining
3. It will be raining tomorrow

(1) is true only if the proposition “it is raining” exists tomorrow.

The question, then, is whether (2) means the exact same thing as (1), the exact same thing as (3), or something different to both (1) and (3).

Janus and Banno seems to believe that (2) means the exact same thing as (1), and so that (2) is true only if the proposition “it is raining” exists tomorrow.

I don’t believe any of us are disputing (3) (although I think the case can be made that if eternalism is incorrect then propositions about the future are neither true nor false).

I think that's the same problem. It would seem that to say, "Tomorrow X will exist," involves saying, "Tomorrow it will be true that X exists." — Leontiskos

What is the "it" that will be true tomorrow? If truth is a property of sentences then what you are saying is "tomorrow, the sentence 'X exists' will be true". Which is true – but only if the sentence "X exists" exists tomorrow.

This is commendably clear, but it comes up against the same problem. "Language will die out," implies that there will come a day when it is true that language has died out. — Leontiskos

Again, what is the "it" that will be true one day? If truth is a property of sentences then what you are saying is "one day, the sentence 'language has died out' will be true", but this is impossible.

So I assume you disagree with the claim that truth is a property of sentences?

You are trying to say something like, "X will exist but it will not be true that X will exist." — Leontiskos

I think he's saying that the sentence "X will exist" is true but the sentence "X exists" will not be true.

As an example of this, the sentence "language will die out" is true but the sentence "language has died out" can never be true.

Well, yes, that's kinda the point. — Banno

What do you mean? You're the one who brought up ¬p → ¬◇Kp, not me. I am simply explaining that this is not true a priori because ¬p ⊬ □¬(p ∧ JBp).

Are you saying this is invalid? — Banno

No, I'm saying that ◇Kp ⊬ p, just as ◇p ⊬ p, and so ¬p ∧ ◇Kp is consistent, just as ¬p ∧ ◇p is consistent.

So both the antecedent and the consequent of your biconditional are false. This should be apparent after you performed the substitution:

¬p → ¬◇(p ∧ JBp) ↔︎ ◇(p ∧ JBp) → p

This is unsound because:

◇(p ∧ JBp) ⊬ p
¬p ⊬ □¬(p ∧ JBp)

The issue here is how to formulate antirealism so that it is constant with there being things we don't know. — Banno

That's been done. As the article says:

The intuitionistic anti-realist takes solace in the fact that she is not committed to the blatantly absurd claim that all truths are known.

...

Notice that T-knowability is free of the paradoxes that we have discussed. It is free of Fitch’s paradox and the related undecidedness paradox.

...

Dummett’s knowability principle or DKP, like Tennant’s, is not threatened by the knowability paradoxes, and for the same reason.

The antirealist claims that there are unknown truths but that all unknown truths of the appropriate kind¹ are knowable. With respect to ontology, there are unverified truths but there are no verification-transcendent truth conditions.

_{1 e.g. p exists and has property q}

you think realism inconsistent in all cases? — Banno

I'm not arguing against realism. I am explaining that you are misrepresenting anti-realism. It isn't what you think it is; it neither claims nor entails that all truths are known, it isn't idealism, and it isn't phenomenalism. That there are things we don't know and that things exist even when we don't see them doesn't refute anti-realism.

Or to phrase this differently, it is possible, logically speaking, that your are indeed a vat brain - Putnam's argument fails to show otherwise. — Banno

It certainly does attempt to, arguing that the correct theory of meaning entails that it is not logically possible that we are brains in a vat. But I'm not trying to argue about the merits of Putnam's argument against the possibility of brains in a vat; I'm simply explaining why the case is made that "it counts against realism that it might permit global skepticism".

If something is not true then it is not possible to know it is true; hence if it is possible to know something then it is true. — Banno

This is not how modal possibility works. Again, you confuse ¬p ∧ ◇Kp with ◇(¬p ∧ Kp).

◇Kp means ◇(p ∧ JBp), where JBp means that p is justifiably believed. ◇(p ∧ JBp) does not entail p and so ◇Kp does not entail p.

Again, I'm suggesting that the choice between applying realist and antirealist logics is context-dependent. So I do not agree that "every meaningful declarative sentence is either true or false" and hence I do not agree that counterfactuals must be either true or false. — Banno

So you're an anti-realist about counterfactuals?

No. Realism is applicable when "a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on", and to this list we can add knowledge. In cases where truth is dependent on anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, or knowledge, then antirealism might be applicable. — Banno

And now you're back to failing to distinguish between Kp and ◇Kp.

The antirealist allows for p ∧ ¬Kp, regardless of what Fitch might think. The anti-realist very explicitly says that there are things we don't know.

The relevant concern is whether or not something exists that is impossible to know exists. The anti-realist says that nothing like this exists. If something exists then it is possible to know that it exists (even if we don't in fact know). As Dummett says, there are no verification-transcendent truth conditions (which is not the same as saying that there are no unverified truths).

There is a relevance argument against BIV. You take Realism ⊨ ◇BIV, which i thinks is overreach. I say Realism → (BIV v ~BIV), and for independent reasons ~BIV. — Banno

Assuming the law of excluded middle, BIV ∨ ¬BIV is a truism, and is true even if ¬◇BIV. Realism entails more than this, as explained in the IEP article:

This general characterization of metaphysical realism is enough to provide a target for the Brains in a Vat argument. For there is a good argument to the effect that if metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is also true, that is, it is possible that all of our referential beliefs about the world are false. As Thomas Nagel puts it, “realism makes skepticism intelligible,” (1986, 73) because once we open the gap between truth and epistemology, we must countenance the possibility that all of our beliefs, no matter how well justified, nevertheless fail to accurately depict the world as it really is. [See Fallibilism.] Donald Davidson also emphasizes this aspect of metaphysical realism: “metaphysical realism is skepticism in one of its traditional garbs. It asks: why couldn’t all my beliefs hang together and yet be comprehensively false about the actual world?” (1986, 309)

So, again, R → ◇BIV, ¬◇BIV ⊢ ¬R.

◇Kp does entail p. — Banno

No it doesn't, just as ◇p does not entail p. You appear to have confused ¬p ∧ ◇Kp with ◇(¬p ∧ Kp), despite my suggestion not to.

Another, again separate, point is that if p ⊭ (q ∧ ¬Kq) then p ⊨ (p→(q→Kq)). If p doesn't entail that there is something we don't know, then it entails that we know everything. — Banno

I don't understand what your logic is here.

I am saying nothing more than that if a sentence like "it is raining" is true then it is possible to know that the sentence "it is raining" is true, but that the same reasoning does not apply to a sentence like "it is raining and nobody knows that it is raining". It very explicitly does not allow the substitution that is central to Fitch's paradox.

What you describe here is as compatible with realism as antirealism. — Banno

I addressed this in an earlier post:

But then maybe we need to distinguish between two types of realism; one that denies phenomenalism/idealism and one that denies the (restricted) knowability principle. Labels notwithstanding, Devitt's "realism" might be consistent with Dummett's "anti-realism". — Michael

Semantic realism claims that every meaningful declarative sentence is either true or false, which entails that either the counterfactual sentence "if Hitler hadn't killed himself then he would have been assassinated" is true or it is false. This is not compatible with the claim that if such a counterfactual is true then it is possible to know that it is true, because it is impossible to know whether or not such a counterfactual is true.

I've brought up counterfactuals several times now, but I don't recall you ever addressing them, so perhaps you can now. Are counterfactual propositions like the above truth-apt?

...realism holds that ...stuff... is independent of what we say about it; anti-realism, that it isn't. — Banno

There is a difference between p → ◇Kp (if something is true then it is possible for someone to know that it's true) and Bp → p (if someone believes that something is true then it's true). If you are suggesting that anti-realism is arguing the latter then you misunderstand anti-realism.