We might put a dog down if it kills someone, buy we don't do it for punishment. — Patterner

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_trial

Animals, including insects, faced the possibility of criminal charges for several centuries across many parts of Europe. The earliest extant record of an animal trial is often assumed to be found in the execution of a pig in 1266 at Fontenay-aux-Roses.[2] Newer research, however, suggests that this reading might be mistaken and no trial took place in that particular incident.[3] Notwithstanding this controversy, such trials remained part of several legal systems until the 18th century. Animal defendants appeared before both church and secular courts, and the offences alleged against them ranged from murder to criminal damage. Human witnesses were often heard, and in ecclesiastical courts the animals were routinely provided with lawyers (this was not the case in secular courts, but for most of the period concerned, neither were human defendants). If convicted, it was usual for an animal to be executed or exiled. However, in 1750, a female donkey was acquitted of charges of bestiality due to witnesses to the animal's virtue and good behaviour while her co-accused human was sentenced to death.

Is there a name for the logical fallacy that "P is repugnant, therefore not-P." — fishfry

Appeal to consequences?

Is inductive reasoning what you mean by "empirical logic"?

True enough, we are not running out of space, and mass starvation has not ensued. — BC

https://insideclimatenews.org/news/10062021/agriculture-greenhouse-gas-emissions-food-production-climate-change-paris-agreement/

Emissions from food production, already considered one of the biggest contributors to climate change, have been underestimated for decades, potentially skewing the pledges that countries have made under the Paris climate agreement to cut their greenhouse gas emissions, according to new research.

In a study published this week in Environmental Research Letters, researchers found that the food system was responsible for as much as 40 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions from human activities.

“When you count it all up, across the food system, it’s enormous,” said Cynthia Rosenzweig, a researcher with Columbia University’s Earth Institute and the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies. “So it offers countries really enormous opportunities.”

If you'd really like to compare thinking between us, a simple review of this thread only will reveal the true quality of Farmir of Gondor (me). — Chet Hawkins

:rofl:

One reason, I think, (other than Dennett's provocative style) is that lay people often see the relatively few public figures like him as representative, if not wholly constituent of their field, whereas in reality, the field is both more crowded and more diverse than they realize. As a result, those public figures are seen as more significant and/or controversial on the outside than on the inside. — SophistiCat

:up:

Opus read my mind and understood everything that I was driving at. Llama 3 does sound like a stochastic parrot; Claude 3 not at all. — Pierre-Normand

It is impressive what Llama 3 can do on such readily available hardware, but yes, Claude's response is so much better.

I think it's a really strange thing that some peoples first inclination on hearing about the death of someone is to try to discredit them or list all the things you disagree with them about. — flannel jesus

"Strange" isn't the word I would use, but yeah.

This progress doesn’t get us closer and closer to the way things ‘really are’, it just gets us fresher and farther from who we used to be. And it also opens up increasingly intimate and peaceful ways of understanding each other that I believe will eventually allow us to jettison our blame-based moralisms. — Joshs

I think the tendency to blame is innate, and it seems unrealistic to me to think we will "jettison" such an innate tendency. I'd think at best humanity might come to have better recognition of the nature of blame arising in our minds, and the value in dealing with such in a skillful way.

Anyway, I'd be interested in hearing about how you imagine such a jettisoning occurring.

It sounds like you might appreciate The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation by Peter Tse.

Like this:

While people who have been blind since birth do indeed dream in visual images, [...]
— https://www.wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2020/02/11/do-blind-people-dream-in-visual-images/ — Lionino

Seems rather weak. As best I can tell from that article, the claim is based on detecting activity in the occipital lobe of people born blind. (As well as what may be spurious eye movements.) However - https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/body/24498-occipital-lobe:

Occipital lobe activity in those blind from birth or early in life
In those with early or congenital blindness, their occipital lobe is still very active. However, that activity happens when they use their other senses, such as smell, hearing and touch. The occipital lobe of a person with blindness also becomes more active when they’re speaking or listening to others talking.

This reassignment of the occipital lobe is a form of neuroplasticity. That’s the term for the brain’s ability to adapt itself to an unusual circumstance or condition.

According to the scientific method, a statistical significance of five sigma is accepted as the criterion for reliable knowledge of unobservable entities like the Higgs boson. — Michael

Think how much greater than five sigma confidence people would have to have in all those distal objects such as measurement instruments, computers, and a bunch of scientists, to have a reason to believe a five sigma level confidence for the Higgs Boson.

That seems non-productively reductionist to me.
— wonderer1

It seems consistent with the scientific evidence. Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the brain. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael

This just seems another example of how this discussion doesn't seem to be about much more than semantic preferences.

It is quite consistent with scientific evidence to say that experiences occur in space-time regions, and an example of such an occurrence would be light reflecting off a cow and into my eye, resulting in my recognition that 'there is a cow playing a causal role in my experience'.

This way of conceivng of experiences allows, "I shared the experience of seeing the total eclipse with...", to make sense. Conceiving of experiences in a way that doesn't allow for shared experiences is not a way of thinking that I would expect scientists to be very inclined to.

Neither of those say, "human life can be ultimately reduced to, and explained in terms of, the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's'".

So it still looks like were misrepresenting Dennett and Dawkins to me.

But as far as biology is concerned, and as the evolutionary ideologues such as Dennett and Dawkins continually say, human life can be ultimately reduced to, and explained in terms of, the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's' (Feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction.) — Wayfarer

Looks like misrepresentation to me. Citations?

...but in that trashy book of lies, the guardian, so you won't have seen it. — Banno

For almost a decade after qualifying, Duxbury worked as a livestock specialist and a stud person for national farming companies.

Is that some UKian agricultural usage which is very different from USian usage?

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

That seems non-productively reductionist to me.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. — Michael

It seems to me that some elaboration is needed, on what you mean by "constituent".

If I see a cow, the distal object is a part of the causal web of events including the sun shining, sunlight striking the distal object, part of the sunlight being reflected off of the distal object in the direction of my eyes, my retinas encoding the light pattern falling on them into nerve impulses sent up my optic nerve, etc..

I'm not seeing a good reason not to consider the distal object to be a constituent of the causal process that results in my seeing the cow. Why would the cow be any less a constituent of the causal process which results in me seeing a cow, than are the photons that enter my pupil?

Is there a reason we can't see consciousness in either context? Not necessarily now, but in principle? — Patterner

The fact that we are in the position of only making somewhat educated guesses as to how consciousness emerges, for one thing. I've designed electronic circuits, the complexity of which cause your average electrical engineer to question their life choices and go into marketing or management.
Such designs are pathetically simple compared to the evolved complexity of brains.

It is impossible to make accurate predictions, because AI is already beginning to give us capabilities for understanding the complexity of what is going on in our brains, and such learning via AI will surely accelerate, barring civilization collapsing. However I'd guess it will be hundreds of years before the neuroscientists of the day look back on the neuroscience of 50 years prior and say, "That was when neuroscience reached a mature stage."

But the double-thinking human mind with its complexity and linguistic agility guarantees that this species is unique in its internal conflict and the variety of ways it can go mad. — Vera Mont

:100: :up:

True, none of us act as if animals are machines, but the mechanistic metaphor still holds considerable sway over the scientific attitude. — Wayfarer

As compared to what? The religious attitude?

Can you hear the bigotry in the phrase "the scientific attitude"? Do you not recognize scientists as individuals?

:lol:

And BTW... Good to see you! :grin:

Anyway, I don't see anything there worth reading, just an offensively neutral (scrupulously circumspect) regurgitating of stuff the three of us said, with a little linguistic connective tissue. I find it grotesque that these AIs thank you for every thought you share with them and note how interesting that thought is. That's programming, not interest. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that Claude 3 style is awfully cloying. Still, assuming @Pierre-Normand didn't bring up conspiracy theorists to Claude 3, I am quite impressed that Claude 3 associated the usefulness of such a way of communicating with dialog with conspiracy theorists in particular. (See particular excerpt below.) My own recognition of the usefulness of such communication was highly influenced by my long term involvement in discussions with Christian apologists.

Of course I'm not suggesting that conspiracy theories and Christian apologetics are directly linked, but the degree of overlap is far from insubstantial.

[Claude 3:] As an AI interlocutor, I find this framework highly relevant for navigating interactions with users who may hold misguided or potentially harmful beliefs, such as conspiracy theories. The temptation in such cases might be to directly confront and debunk the problematic belief with facts and logic. However, the insights above suggest that this direct approach may often be ineffective, as it fails to address the deeper intuitive and inferential patterns that sustain the belief.

A more productive strategy, drawing on wonderer1's approach, might be to patiently explore the user's specific ways of reasoning about the issue, and to look for opportunities to plant "subconscious hooks" - new information, perspectives, or lines of inquiry that could gradually lead them to question their assumptions. This might involve asking probing questions, pointing out potential inconsistencies or blind spots, or introducing alternative frameworks for making sense of the relevant facts.

Crucially, the goal would not be to immediately dismantle the conspiracy theory, but to seed doubts and openings that could mature over time into a more substantive reconsideration. By tracking the user's deontic scores - the ways they commit to or become entitled to certain claims in the course of our exchange - I could look for subtle leverage points to encourage a re-evaluation of their belief system. — Pierre-Normand

I think he is delusional and talks nonsense! — Truth Seeker

Well, that link is to a chapter of Stephen Law's book, Believing Bullshit. :wink:

There are trillions of such things that I can prove. — Truth Seeker

You left off, "...to a reasonable person."

Unfortunately Chet's schtick is going nuclear all of the time.

Bird wings and airplane wings have many similarities and many differences. Artificial neural networks have become increasingly different from their biological counterparts since the 1940s or 50s. — jkop

Right. There are similarities and difference between the biological and the artificial in the case of wings and neural nets. Still, we see effective information processing emerge from neural nets in either context, just as we see aerodynamic lift emerge from wings in either context.

Here is the reaction from Claude 3 Opus. — Pierre-Normand

Thanks immensely for running that by Claude 3! (Despite the fact that Claude 3 is giving away the persuasive secrets to my methodological madness. :wink: ) Prior to reading Claude's response, I'd never encountered 'anyone' developing an understanding of what I was trying to convey, to the extent that @Srap Tasmaner did.

Again, it seems really freaky to me, to see a machine getting it like that. Although I suppose it shouldn't be that surprising to me, given the extent to which Claude 3 has been trained to understand itself.

It sounds like I should read some Brandom. Any pointers on where to start?

We also comment on the passing away of Daniel Dennett: — Pierre-Normand

Dennett's notion of "intuitions pumps" definitely provided reinforcement for my recognition of the effectiveness of such a communication style. Though I often wished Dennett had developed a more connectionist perspective, he did a lot to promote serious thinking about the mind/brain relationship. And as modern philosophers go, he was better than most at earning the respect of scientists.

Interestingly (but meaninglessly) the author of Darwin's Dangerous Idea died on April 19th, as did Darwin.

Evolution would favor a rational brain? Not necessarily. Even we have irrational biases drilled into us through evolution. — khaled

Not 'perfectly rational', just 'rational enough'. Evolution has many Rube Goldberg like results.

:up:

Beautiful cinematography.

Whether the processing is designed or coincidental doesn't matter. The objection refers to isomorphism and the false promise that by being like the biological process the artificial process can be conscious. — jkop

I'm certainly not making any promises that artificial neural nets will ever be conscious in the sense that we are.

However, my point was about the relevance of isomorphisms. Pointing out that there can be irrelevant isomorphisms such as between a constellation and a swarm of insects, doesn't change the fact that there are relevant isomorphism. (Such as between the shape of bird wings and airplane wings, or between biological neural nets and artificial neural nets.)

Or, there is a very nice documentary — Vera Mont

Unfortunately, Youtube says the video is unavailable.

:up:

:rage:

Could we per chance be at a point where our knowledge of nature's laws are advanced enough that we are simulating evolution. If so I don't think it's impossible to get a similar outcome from such processes -namely sentience. — Benj96

Interesting thought. I would think that there is a sort of evolutionistic survival of the fittest going on in our brains, at the level of different neural nets encoding different competing paradigms with which to model reality. The more adaptive neural net/paradigms are the ones that are rewarded/strengthened by yet other 'higher level' neural nets, based on which lower level neural net/paradigm are recognized as providing a better fit to observations.

Mind of a Bee is pretty cool. — Patterner

Dammit! Stop making me think that I need to read that book.

:ok:

I don't think so. I like to think that there are others reading but not commenting. I think of the written exchange as only part of it. I do occasionally get a PM from someone appreciating something I said. — Fooloso4

:up:

I always appreciate hearing your perspective.

Careful, if you think about this too much you might come to understand how words do things.