Thanks. I tried to read the linked article but it goes over my head. It seems it is impossible to explain this issue to non-mathematicians.

Suppose a mathematical theory/system T.
G=This sentence is not provable in T

Either G is provable or not provable

1. G is provable. So G is unprovable
2. G is not provable

So, there is G in the theory T

Have I got it right? — TheMadFool

For me the problem starts with 'This sentence is not provable'. This is meaningless. It does not state what is not provable. It would make no more sense to say 'This sentence is provable'.'This sentence' is not a statement and is not even a sentence. It is not provable or unprovable.

I wish someone would explain incompleteness in a way that it seems plausible to non-mathematicians. But explanations always it seems to depend on taking the liar paradox seriously, which try as I might I cannot do. , . . .

So, if people like this emerge and write about it, would we even be aware they exist, would we even consider their work? — Skalidris

Sure. I'm one of them, and I get some attention. .

Or are we stuck with slow changes? And by slow changes, I mean derivations from the main method that don't challenge it to the core.

If a change doesn't challenge the approach of academic philosophy to the core then it's unimportant.and leaves the situation unchanged.

P.S. I'm guessing a lot of people would disagree with premise 4, especially since philosophy seems so intuitive for some people that it would be hard to imagine how it could be done differently.

I would disagree with premise 4. I'd say there are essentially just two ways to do philosophy.

As for academic philosophy, I'd say it's dead and has no chance no evolving. It hasn't evolved since Plato. What may happen, however, is its transformation. This could happen if it ever decides to take the Perennial philosophy seriously. Until then it will keep going round and round in circles for the benefit of nobody.

Really there are just two philosophies, one that states the world is incomprehensible and the other that it is comprehensible. These are dualism and non-dualism. Every philosophical theory falls into one of these two categories. Academic philosophy is typically n the first category. The only way forward for it is to abandon dualism, and in evolutionary terms this would be a catastrophe rather than part of a gradual evolution. . . . . .

What say you? — Bob Ross

I would say you have a very common but wildly incorrect view of metaphysics. It's almost as if you haven't read a book about it.

Suppose you ask whether the universe begins with something or nothing. You'll find that both ideas don't work. What has this got to do with imagination? It's a simple piece of logical analysis. There is a good reason why metaphysics is often described as a science of logic. William James characterises it as 'nothing but an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly', and this is what it is.

Also, you place tight and unjustifiable limits on human experience. You're dismissing the claims of those who go beyond these limits with no argument, which is not a sensible practice.
.
Clearly metaphysics requires some imagination, but the whole point of it is to overcome imagination and get at the facts. ,

There is a matter of perspective here. You should have seen the state of things 36 years ago, when I started looking into the subject. The progress in understanding since then has been substanantial. Considering the complexity of the subject under study, the technological difficulties in gathering detailed information, and the (IMO) warranted ethical restrictions faced by researchers, I'd say we social primates are doing pretty good. — wonderer1

At least the scientific community now accepts that consciousness exists and this is certainly progress. I don't share your view that it is making progress otherwise, but don't rule out the possibility. I suspect we'll have to wait for one of Kuhn's generational paradigm shifts. .

I feel 'flimsy pseudo-science' is an apt description for modern academic consciousness studies. .

It is flimsy because it has no metaphysical foundation and pseudo-science because it does not study consciousness scientifically. .

I subscribed to the Journal of Consciousness Studies for three years and was disgusted by the poor quality of the work. It's not an area of study but a club for people who need to get published. .

Pardon my strong views. I feel;the general public are being duped and scientific standards are being abused, and that academics should behave more responsibly. . .

1)The universe cannot be perpetually reducible. — AlienFromEarth

Agreed.

2) of course, if the universe is perpetually reducible, there is no smallest particle.

Agreed.

3)The universe must have some kind of fundamental level of existence. In other words, it can't be reduced beyond a certain point/

Agreed.

4)This fundamental level of existence must therefore have some kind of shape.

Muddled thinking. For a fundamental theory extension must be reduced. This deals with propositions 5, 6, 7 and 7 and 8.

So what is the scope for original possibilities and are there questions which have not been touched upon at all. Or are we coming to a dead end in this post postmodern era. — Jack Cummins

One person's;new idea is someone else's old one. I look forward to the time philosophers consider it part of their job to study the Perennial philosophy, for this is a still a new idea for most trained philosophers. It seems to me that university-style philosophy died some some ago and rigour mortis.is well advanced.

As you say, the internet is a crucial consideration, It is now possible for anyone to examine the facts. This gives me hope that they will see the poverty and ongoing failure of mainstream western philosophy and move on. . . .

Yep. There are all sorts of ideas out there, But only one survives close analysis.and has the ability to explain philosophy. For nondualism the subject-object distinction is of a functional order only and must be reduced for a fundamental theory.

This theory states that nothing really exists or ever really happens, so it is quite easy to distinguish from the ideas you mention. For the mystic the explanation of one phenomenon is the the explanation for all of them, so phenomenology is a doddle. At present, however, phenomenology is unable to explain even one phenomenon, since to do so would require a systematic metaphysical theory.
As there is only one reality and only one way that it works there is only one fundamental theory.that works.


. .

How does making consciousness prior to experience eliminate the hard problem, which results from separating body and mind, subject and object? It seems to me that your approach reifies dualism by hardening the separation between these aspects of being. Dont we need to find a way to think subject and object, mind and world, inside and outside, feeling and thinking, experiencer and experience together, rather than giving one side priority over the other? — Joshs

Yes! This is exactly what we need to do. The only way to do it is to assume consciousness is fundamental and prior to all the distinctions that give rise to dualism.

This requires assuming that intentional or 'subject/object' consciousness reduces to the the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. This is nondualism, the rejection of all the distinctions that you say we should reject.

We seem to agree but maybe use the words differently.

I am sorry, I don't feel there is much fruitful to be gained in continuing this specific conversation. I find it very difficult to engage with your way of writing, it all seems very vague — Apustimelogist

Sorry about this. It isn't at all vague but perhaps it looks that way. My basic point is that your idea of consciousness is bound to lead to problems. Rogue AI makes the point is a different way.

[quote="Count Timothy von Icarus;840524" Modern scholars do accuse Shankara or falling into the excluded middle and violating bivalence. I'm not familiar enough with Shankara to really weigh these appropriately, but it's interesting in that it's another example where religion seems to clash with analytical techniques that, IMO, might be being misapplied.[/quote]

Modern scholars often make this accusation. I would argue that that they are misunderstanding bivalence and abusing Aristotle;s logic. Nondualism requires no changes to the rules but only their stricter than usual application. This can be demonstrated and is not a matter of opinion. Graham Priest accuses Buddhism of being full of contradictions, and I cannot imagine a more profound and unnecessary misunderstanding. It seems utterly perverse. , .

Maybe, that's sort of the perennialist take on Eckhart. But the man maintained throughout his life that his doctrine was in keeping with Catholic orthodoxy, granted we could imagine this was partly due to social pressure and threats.

It seems mostly to be bang in line with the orthodoxy, but clearly he restricted what he said for the reasons you mention. In mysticism Jesus us usually regarded as m authentic teacher who was misunderstood by the later church. For instance, in Taoism Christ is the True Man who resides within each of us.

Personally, I can't buy it. The man's work is too covered in scriptural references, practical references to living in the type of Christ, love as loving Christ in others, etc. I'm by no means an expert on his vast corpus, and I originally got into Eckhart reading the perennialist interpretations, Eckhart as a pantheist, but Bill Harmless and others make a pretty convincing case for a more orthodox Eckhart based on his correspondence and practical advice.

I feel pantheism is a confusing red herring so won't go there. It seems inevitable that people who do not understand nondualism are bound to misread Eckhart, Jesus and all others who teach the same doctrine. I had to study Buddhism in order to make sense of Christianity and I've heard many others say the same. . . . .

But we can't know for sure, right?

I think we can know for sure. He writes with great care and clarity.

Theology is cool in that way, a bit freer than philosophy is some ways.

Hmm. I rather think the limitations of theology are made clear in the name. Philosophy has to start with no assumptions about God. I'd recommend replacing theology with metaphysics and starting with a clean slate. Still, if you're talking about what passes for philosophy in our universities then I'd probably agree. . .

To me the whole issue is summed up in Lao Tzu's comment, 'True words seem paradoxical'. This would only be the case if the advaita doctrine is true, so his brief words reward a lot of study. .

If there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not then you can simply clarify those senses in a bivalent way by breaking the statement down into atomic propositions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can, yes, and then both statements would be untrue.

Of course, it is not a violation of logic to say that a natural language sentence appears contradictory, but actually isn't.

Of course not. But most people would say that the statement 'We are and are-not; is a contradiction and find it difficult to see how it can not be one. .

And I think this is what is meant in some statements that might seem contradictory or heretical at first glance. Like Eckhart's claim that he preexisted God. This is a claim about the potentialities within God, including humans, pre-existing creation, versus the human conception of God as God only existing temporally. No contradiction there.

Eckhart is saying that God is a concept and that consciousness and ultimate reality is prior to concepts. He is saying that God is not fundamental, thus that monotheism is wrong. He is merely agreeing with the pagan philosophers he so admired, who say that God is a misunderstanding. So yes, no contradictions are implied.

But Saint Denis's claims about a light that is darkness doesn't yield to the same sort of breakdown.

I think you;ll find ti does, but I don't know Dennis so don't know the quote or the context. If it is a contradiction in the way that he meant it then he is not thinking clearly, but I expect he;s endorsing the same view I'm defending. .

I'm not sure what you mean by "rules of logic," here. There are many logical systems. Multivalued logic is not any less rigorous or less logic. Second, I don't know what you mean by "nondualism" here. Generally the term refers to ontological dualism, in which case, yes, Plotinus and Plato are absolutely dualists in key respects. But it seems like you might be talking more about rejecting bivalence?

I was speaking of the rules for the dialectic as proscribed by Aristotle. This is necessarily bivalent, and because of this must be transcended for nondualism. Nothing wrong with the rules though. It's just that reality would not be bivalent. It would be 'advaita or 'not-two', undivided, undifferentiated and best described as a unity, or as Plotinus describes it - a one without a second. ,

The idea that Plotinus was a dualist is one I've never encountered previously. To see that he is not would require a study of nondualism. If you don't know what this word means then Plotinus and the entire literature of of mysticism will be incomprehensible.

You clearly know your stuff theologically, but I feel you're missing out on the view that opens up when one lets go of monotheism. The idea of God confuses the issues since it is so emotive and vague. Plotinus and Eckhart ask us to look beyond this idea.

I suspect even Aquinas would have agreed since he endorses the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, and nothing could be simpler that the unity or 'One' that serves as the Ultimate for the Perennial philosophy.. .

Thanks for an interesting discussion. . . .

Who actually has a suggestion though? — Apustimelogist

Have you examined the suggestions of the Buddha, Lao Tzu and the Upanishads? Afaik there is no other explanation for consciousness that works. .

When I say experience is primitive, I just mean in a kind of epistemic sense - experiences are immediately apparent and intuitive to us and they don't have an explicit characterization... I just see blue, I cannot tell you what it is/

Okay. But I''m speaking ontologically. I'm suggesting that consciousness in its original state is prior to experience and is known simply as what it is. . .

My whole experience (tentatively I would say consciousness) is just a stream of these things. They cannot be reduced further... they are the bottom and foundation for everything I know and perceive. That is to say nothing about reality but just that experiences are the primitive, irreducible foundation of what I know and perceive.

If you explore your consciousness I predict that you'll eventually discover that consciousness is not a stream of things. These 'things; are the contents of consciousness, not the phenomenon itself. Meditation is the practice of seeing beyond these things to their underlying basis. This basis is beyond time and space, and knowing this is what 'enlightenment' means in Buddhism. . .

Not sure what you mean by experience-experiencer duality beyond conventional dualism. I am not sure what "experiencer" means.

An experience requires an experiencer. I;m suggesting that if you explore your consciousness you are capable of transcending this duality for the final truth about consciousness. The task would be to 'Know thyself', as advised by the Delphic oracle. When Lao Tzu is asked how he knows the origin of the universe he answers, 'I look inside myself and see'. . .

Again, my notion of primitiveness just relates to the immediate, irreducible apprehension of experiences after which there is nothing more basic epistemically.

This is a very bold assumption. I wonder whether you realise that what you're proposing is that the nondual doctrine of the Perennial philosophy is false,. .

I don't think you can have consciousness free of information nor do I understand why you think this is required for a solution.

An information theory without an information space is not fundamental or even coherent. You may believe that consciousness cannot be free of information, but it is telling that having made this assumption you cannot explain metaphysics, consciousness, or the hard problem. Have you considered that your problems may be caused by your own assumptions? .

I don't think there is priority here. If there is information, it exists on an information space; n information space is defined by the information in it. One doesnt come before the other

In order to draw a Venn diagram one must first have a blank sheet of paper. .

I don't see what your alternative suggestion could possibly be if you don't believe dualism is true. Regardless of what you think the fundamental reality is, the evidence is overwhelming about how consciousness relates to or can be characterized in terms of brains in a functional sense (I hope you understand what I mean when I say functionally). What is your alternative characterization?

My suggestion is that consciousness is prior to number and form and that its function is simply knowing. All the rest is cogitation, intellection and conceptualisation. If you cannot imagine my alternative suggestion then this can only be because you've not studied philosophy beyond the walls off the Academy. You'll find the same suggestion in every book you ever read on mysticism. Those who investigate consciousness rather than speculate come back to report that at its root consciousness is prior to number and form and free of concepts and ideas. . ,

I am starting to think you haven't understood anything I have said at all. Its hard to believe now that you could have said my previous post was perceptive and a good summary if you really understood it. Neither have I been trying to think about some fundamental theory that resolves the hard problem. My initial post said that I didn't think the so called hard problem could be solved at all.

Yes. So I chipped in to say it was solved long ago and is easy to solve. The solution would be to abandon dualism and pay attention to what those who study consciousness have to say about it. It is astonishing how few people bother to do this, and so not at all surprising that so many people struggle with the hard problem. . . .

I would say that the need for a paraconsistent;logic that you speak of is a misperception.

My point was merely that these traditions embrace paraconsistent descriptions as better, if still flawed ways of conceiving of that which is beyond all description. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They're not paraconsistent descriptions, albeit they seem contradictory. They are a rejection of all extreme views and descriptions requiring no modification of ordinary logic. .

There are two crucial issues here. First, those who describe the Ultimate in seemingly contradictory terms do not say this is God. Eckhart and Plotinus, for instance, deny that this is God. To think of The One as God, says Plotinus, is to think of it 'too meanly'.

Second, the contradictory language associated with the nondualism of Eckhart and Plotinus strictly obeys the rules of logic. When Heraclitus states 'We both are and are-not' he is not abandoning logic, but saying that there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not. As a consequence, it would be unrigorous to state 'we are' or 'we are not'. These are extreme positions and all such positions are rejected by nondualism.

The point would be that the propositions 'we are ' and we are not' would not form a legitimate contradictory pair, since it would not be the case that one is true and one is false. Thus to reject both requires no modification to dialectical logic. .

Lao Tzu tells us 'true words seem paradoxical', not that they actually are. I suspect that this point about logic is vital for an understanding of Eckhart and the mystics, since otherwise it will seem that they speak in riddles and have no respect for the laws of dialectical logic.

I don't see it as pessimistic at all or that anything is lost. What does a solution to the hard problem look like? I don't think there is a good one I can think of which doesn't imply some sort of dualism which I fundamentally disagree with. — Apustimelogist

You're right., Dualism is hopeless. The solution would be nondualism.

I am not suggesting looking for a fundamental ontology based on computation but an explanation for why knowing about fundamental ontologies are out of reach.

I'm suggesting such knowledge is not out of reach. To show that it is out of reach would require ignoring all the people who claim to have such knowledge, or proving they do not. . .

I think the explanation is actually already there, it just has to be articulated and demonstrated. Like you said, experiences are primitive.

Ah. I didn't say this and would argue against it. You're conflating consciousness and experience, but I;m suggesting that the former is prior to the latter. Bear in mind that experience-experiencer is a duality that must be reduced in order to overcome dualism. . .

We know experiences are related to the functional architecture of our brains. We can transfer or demonstrate the concept of this kind of primitiveness into the architectures and functional repertoires of A.I. We use A.I. to demonstrate the limits of what kinds of information is transferable from the environment, what kinds of concepts are created and what information they don't or can't include, and then see what kind of metacognitive consequences this has. Does a. A.I. come up with primitive phenomenal concepts on a purely functional basis that it cannot explain, similarly to our hard problem? This is a totally plausible research program even if it may not be possible right at this moment.

There are no primitive concepts or experiences. This was shown by Kant. For a solution one would have to assume a state or level of consciousness free of all concepts and prior to information. Don't forget that and information theory requires an information space, and the space comes before the information. .

Not sure what you mean here but functionally, yes we are just intelligent machines. We are just brains.

If you believe this you will never have a fundamental theory and will will have to live with the 'hard' problem. forever. I wonder what leads you to believe this when it is just a speculation. If you believe this then much of what I'm saying will make no sense to you. I would advise against making such assumptions, or indeed any assumptions at all. , .

To be sure, there is a religious tradition, starting more with the Enlightenment, that tries to use a more classical sort of system to analyze God. You see this with folks like Alvin Plantinga, who would be a great person to read on for a classical, bivalent logic based analysis of this sort of thing. But such logic and methodology seems totally alien to the religious thinking of Saint Denis, Saint Bonaventure, Eckhart, Boheme, Merton, etc.

There, you often see paradoxes set atop each other as a mode of description of the divine essence, or even the argument that all description and analysis ultimately causes us to lose sight of God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I liked your post as it raises interesting issues, but do do agree. I'd be interested to know why you believe Eckhart's view requires that we abandon ordinary logic.The dialethists claim this but their arguments don't withstand analysis.

It would be because the Ultimate lies beyond the categories of thought that it cannot be conceived and must be described in partial and contradictory ways, but these would not be true descriptions, just the best we can do. For Eckhart the truth would lie beyond the possibility of contradictions or, as De Cusa puts it, 'beyond the coincidence of contradictories'. Thus beyond all contradictions. This view requires no modification of ordinary logic, just the recognition that bivalent logic cannot describe the unity of the Ultimate. The Buddhist philosopher-monk Nagarjuna explains this in his doctrine of 'Two Truths', and Eckhart endorses the same world-view.

Just defending Eckhart. .

.


. .
. .

What creates suffering if god created the world ? [/quote]

If we assume God created everything then we must assume this includes suffering. If He hadn't created anything then there wouldn't be any.suffering . I find it an odd question. .

f you assume anything is primitive, you can answer the same "how" question. How does consciousness arise? — flannel jesus

If it is primitive consciousness doesn't arise. What would arise is intentional 'subject/object consciousness,

It's primitive. How does life work? It's primitive (see Vital Force, an idea which lost favour when scientists were able to build up a picture of life working via electro chemical processes).

Life is a different issue.

Some things are primitive, of course, and it may be that consciousness is, but it feels more like a non answer to me than an answer. It feels like giving up.

Why do you think this? It allows us to construct a fundamental theory. This is the answer given by Perennial philosophy, for which no hard problems arise. Rather than giving up this is the only way forward.

Maybe it's fundamental, but probably, I think, we just don't have the answer yet, and the idea that it's primitive will start disappearing when we have a picture of the mechanisms involved, like life itself.

This the dream of the materialists, but you've just argued it's a pipe-dream.

The idea that consciousness is primitive will never disappear. The 'Perennial' philosophy will never go away since it is not conjectural and it works. The problem is only that few people take any notice of it. Then they cannot make sense of metaphysics or consciousness and conclude that nobody ever will. It's an odd and rather surreal situation. .
.

I don't believe it's possible to define the hard problem in such a way that it cannot be solved or has not already been solved. Chalmers originally defines it as the problem of explaining how consciousness arises from matter. and in this form it isn't even difficult. The problem seems to be ideological rather than philosophical.

There's no possible characterization of consciousness. It is utterly primitive to us as information-processing creatures. — Apustimelogist

Very much agree. So did Kant. He placed the origin of the both the world and the intellect prior to the categories of thought. If you assume it is primitive then you have solved the hard problem. There are still plenty of difficulties to overcome but none that are intractable.

I found your post above perceptive and a good summary of the situation, but unnecessarily pessimistic/ .

I think fundamental ontology is likely impossible to comprehend and the next step is a computational or informational explanation of why that is and for how that hard problem arises in intelligent machines like us in the first place.

This would be a hopeless approach for for the reasons you give. A fundamental theory must look beyond computation and intellection.

But if you think human beings are are intelligent machines or one of Chalmers' zombies then I'm afraid you're stuck with the hard problem for all eternity. This assumption renders the problem impossible. .

.

. .

I broadly agree, with caveats. There's still a bunch of questions left over with my view. I'm interested though, what explanation do you favour? — bert1

The Perennial philosophy, aka mysticism, nondualism, advaita. This states that consciousness and realty are the same phenomenon. It is endorsed by all those who study consciousness deeply and first-hand rather than speculate. What questions do you have left over? I could perhaps give the answers this philosophy would have for them. . .
.

How is this explanation tested? Do any unique predicttions follow from this explanation? Please elaborate. Thanks. — 180 Proof

It may be tested in experience and logic. The problem for me is that this is a big topic and deserves a thread of its own.

Perhaps the most obvious test is that the explanation I have in mind predicts that all metaphysical questions are undecidable, and they are. No other fundamental theory can explain this.

In physics the proofs tend to be negative, but it seems telling that the explanation allows a workable interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is explained by Ulrich Mohrhoff.in his book The World according to Quantum Mechanics: Why the world Makes Sense After All.

I feel this is too big a topic to deal with here and also I have other things to do right now, but it's a great question and if you were to start a thread asking it I'd participate. . .

think your critique of Moore is a bit over the top. — Sam26

Perhaps you're right. I don't know him but am focusing on his argument about hands. If he cannot see the obvious flaws in this argument then I'm not tempted to read him.

he dogma "not yet means never will" (i.e. unknown = unknowable :roll:) has always been mysterian / idealist – pseudo-philosophical (i.e. religious / magical thinking) – nonsense. — 180 Proof

I;d say it has been explained. The point is that it can't be explained within a materialist framework, and can't be studied by poking around in the brain. This is not a religious position or conjecture about the future but a result of analysis and a kosher philosophical view. . .

I agree with this, although I think there is a scientific reason of sorts - without an assumption of physicalism, science can't be done. Scientific = measurable (or at least observable) = physical.

That doesn't mean I don't think consciousness experience can be studied scientifically.
18 hours ago
Reply
Options — T Clark

Agreed. I wasn't suggesting it can't be done.

From a scientific perspective, I'd say physicalism should be seen as a working hypothesis for which there is a lot of supporting evidence and a dearth of reliable falsifying evidence. — wonderer1

I would disagree strongly and suspect you just haven't examined the counter evidence.

But leaving that aside, how can an untestable theory be scientific? Physicalism is an ideological position or guess, not a scientific theory. Even if we discount the fact that it fails in metaphysics and explains nothing there is no scientific reason for endorsing it. For physics it makes no difference whether it is true or false.

It seems clear to me that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is a prime example of a bedrock belief. It's definitely prelinguistic, and it generally cannot be doubted, at least in most contexts without having to doubt the whole of our inherited background. — Sam26

Exactly. Moore's arguments are metaphysically naive. They assume that the true reality of our naively realistic extended world cannot be doubted. These 'bedrock' beliefs you speak of may be pre-linguistic, but they are also pre-philosophical.

If Moore's ideas worked we could falsify Buddhist doctrine simply by pointing out that we have hands. This idea is plainly absurd.

I think some confusion arises here over the difference between believing we truly exist as individuals but doubting we have hands, which would be madness, and doubting the true existence of perceiving individuals and their hands, which is a metaphysically sound position.

Actually Moore is appealing to what seems to be obvious to all of us, viz, having knowledge of his hands. The skeptic makes the same mistake that Moore makes, viz., not only is there no knowing these Moorean propositions, but there is no doubting them either. The radical skeptic is even further out on the limb than Moore. — Sam26

Why do you say there is no doubting them? It is not only possible to doubt the existence of your hands (as any more than appearances), but also your existence as a perceiving subject. There is a widely popular view for which nothing really exists and Moore argument seems no threat to it. I don't know him well but he seems to be a particularly naive realist.

The effect of general anesthesia in suppressing consciousness.

The effect of mind altering drugs.

The fact that human intuition 'looks like' the result of the way information processing occurs in neural networks.

All sorts of ways minds can be impacted by brain damage. — wonderer1

All good examples. They're all about the information processing aspect of cognition, however, and leave open the possibility that this functional level of consciousness is superficial. I was being sloppy suggesting there is no evidence,and should have said no overwhelming evidence.

There is no physical experiment that could prove consciousness has a physical basis, and while this does not prove it doesn't it might be argued that it's an unscientific claim. What would be your view on this?

I've decided not to just leave it, but you can ignore this if you want.

I said that metaphysical dilemmas and antinomies are examples of a faulty use of logic. Specifically, they break the rule for legitimate contradictory pairs.

What is your objection? I didn't see an objection in your previous posts so wondered what point they were making.

↪FrancisRay

More wasted time ...Bye, bye for good now. — Alkis Piskas

Hmm. No argument then. What was wrong with what I said at the start? .

Because the person took a serious look at the evidence, perhaps? — wonderer1

Or is because they did not take a serious look?. This would my view.

What evidence is there that consciousness arises from matter?

Actually Moore is appealing to what seems to be obvious to all of us, viz, having knowledge of his hands. The skeptic makes the same mistake that Moore makes, viz., not only is there no knowing these Moorean propositions, but there is no doubting them either. The radical skeptic is even further out on the limb than Moore. — Sam26

Why do you say there is no doubting them?

The disconnect between mind and matter comes from a "spiritual" view of the world. The brain is clearly material and material processes produce our minds. Hence, the mind is material. — BC

It's a good job that philosophers usually think more deeply than this. Have you not heard of the 'other minds' problem. It wouldn't arise if minds were material. .

No 'thing' is solid, if by 'solid' you mean that it has some essence or substance at its heart. This was observed by Kant. It is shown by the philosophical 'problem of attributes'. In the Upanishads this is explained as the 'voidness';of things. I'd be surprised if any serious philosopher or scientists thinks physical objects are solid. The nearest to solid these days is 'fields on fields'. . .

We seem to be in a similar situation: no understanding of physical processes, however complete, explains consciousness. — Art48

Quite so. I wonder why anyone is surprised. Why would anyone think matter gives rise to consciousness?

Chalmers defines the hard problem as a problem for materialism, not for everybody. . ,

Moore must think sceptics are idiots. As if they;re going to read his argument and go 'Oh yes, I have hands, I hadn't notice that before'.

About as useful as Berkley kicking a rock.
.

I would respect your opinion if it weren't evasive and meaningless: "I don't undestand your comments" means nothing. There's a big difference between us in how we handle comments and debating in general. You would thrive as a (Greek) politician! :smile:
Anyway, it's better this way. We'll both avoid wasting more time. — Alkis Piskas

I'm sorry that you've not understood my posts but it's a bit cheeky to blame it on me.

I can only assume you have no relevant objection to what I said in the first place.

My belief is that no 'thing' is metaphysically real. It may be real as an appearance, but appearances are reducible,

This is Kant's view, or one way of interpreting his calculations. If it were possible to prove the true realty of even one 'thing' then it would be possible to falsify the Perennial philosophy. Fortunately, as Kant shows, it cannot be done.

But in the end it would depend on how we define the words 'real' and ;thing'. . ;.

;

I don't think that logic can enter in the above example. As I said, the contrassting elements are too abstract to be considered as evidence for truth or falseness. So, saying that neither answer is correct has no meaning. — Alkis Piskas

Yes. Just as saying both answers exhaust the possibilities is guesswork. This is my point. You cannot prove there is such a thing as a metaphysical dilemma. .

You;re right - I don't understand your comments. They seem to miss the point. As yet you've said nothing that would count as an objection. I fear we are misunderstanding each other. .