I concur with you on the matter of misanthropy being far more commensurate with a personality than a philosophy. As far as generalizations are concerned, however, are they inextricably tied to the concept? As there haven't yet been profound axiomatizations of the idea, isn't there a considerable degree of liberty with regards to what it truly is? Couldn't one structure variants of misanthropy that express a rationalized contempt for certain human behaviors, as opposed to condescending human existence altogether? Disliking humankind for its own sake isn't of any utility - that's for certain. For me, however, lamentation isn't an objective; it's the consequence of recognizing mankind's worst follies, and a precursor to transformative changes in that same regard.

'In what way are their perspectives different?'

Two structurally and phenomenally identical minds that exist in simultaneity will bear the same edifices and beliefs, but will necessarily be identified by the distinctiveness of their waking states under certain rarefied events.

The most immediate results of this dichotomy can be studied under mutually exclusive constraints.

For instance, account for the propositions below:

1) Two minds, A and B, are observed in the same manifest domains and are equivalent, meaning that under naturalistic influence (sans intervention), they will act identically when confronted with a stimulus.

2) Both Minds A and B are intimated with a Nash Equilibrium with respect to one another.

3) You, a hitherto spectator, are now designated the liberty of electing either mind to occupy the perspective of, and participate in the Nash Equilibrium with finite resources and time. Abstaining is not an eventuality that can be indulged.

In the event that either mind shared the same perspective, then there must necessarily be no difference between selecting either Mind A or Mind B. This is precisely what one observes prior to the game commencing.

However, consider the same circumstances above, but wherein you are not asked to occupy either perspective instantly:

A) Mind A stimulates the domain of all utility by entertaining a mixed strategy.
B) You are now asked to partake in either perspective.

In the latter example, the two perspectives share different utility functions upon the activation of a choice, and are therefore distinct. Despite being both biologically and phenomenally interchangeable, imparting judgments with one mind is not tantamount to doing so with another.

Naturally, this sequence of reasoning is only a mathematical distillation. For all practical purposes, it may be repurposed to justify the distinctiveness of any two abstract self-aware entities.

'Because I’m directly aware of 4 and 5 and can directly ‘see’ the difference between the two. On the other hand, I cannot directly see any person behind the two accounts. When I say “4 ≠ 5”, I’m predicating not-selfsameness of an ordered pair of entities. That’s because when I use ‘4’, I mean the number four, and likewise for ‘5’. By contrast, when I say “The person behind the account @Aryamoy Mitra is distinct from the person behind the account @magritte”, I’m not predicating non-identity of any one ordered pair of things.'

That's a very commendable sequence of reasoning that I hadn't gauged prior. I'm inferring, on the basis of your arguments, that self-sameness is what engenders direct awareness in the first instance (4 ≠ 5), as opposed to the second. In essence, presupposing a non-identity amongst one ordered pair is epistemologically weaker than hypothesizing non-self-sameness amongst that same pair. They're identical in terms of their outcome: mutual exclusion. What differentiates them though, is that in the case of the non-identity, nothing is meant with regards to the accounts themselves. It is merely that the hypothetical circumstance of individual operating both accounts is disallowed. When non self-sameness is posited (4 ≠ 5), one can predicate a statement of them directly, which constitutes a basis for knowledge.

'Insofar as its existence can be rationalized as being independent. It's just that there isn't a universal distillation from 'experience' to 'existence' in terms of one's mind.'

I meant through this statement two implications. Firstly, the existence of the mind is not, by some prerequisite constraint, subject to the condition of the world's existence. The foundational pretext of solipsism, existence can only be confirmed through experience, however, is nonetheless contested. When the mind is used to justify the non-existence of external reality, and concurrently its own existence, it is necessarily complemented by the truth of experience. That's precisely why the philosophy is seldom falsifiable; experience outside the immediacy of the human mind is unattainable.

'Since the mind is abstract and can “see” other abstract things, as you and I seem to hold, there’s no reason to believe that it can’t directly ‘see’ other minds as well.'

That's a very adept observation. What is of pertinence here, I believe, is that it isn't superficial experience or thought upon whom the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the mind are predicated. It's perspective. Two minds can be physically and phenomenally identical ie. they can be indistinguishable in terms of both biological circuitry and thought, but they will still share a unique perspective. How do you transfer from one such perspective onto another?

I entirely concur. I was merely conveying that given the character of the quote, one would hypothesize the above. 'You' was used interchangeably; I wasn't referring specifically to your quotation, but was rather inferring a conclusion from it.

So for any two things, I either know that they’re the same, or I know that ther aren’t. How, then, can it be that I don’t know whether or not King Cniva and King Cannabaudes are the same? How can it be that I don’t know whether a pair of people on this forum are the same person or not? Because I can only hypothesize about them based on their accounts, right?

I may have misapprehended your arguments, but isn't this a conflation between apriori truths and infallible truths? Your self-equivalence of X is too a hypothesis; it is merely that the degree of conviction that you hold with regards to its truth is far more pronounced than in the example concerning 2 people on this forum. If the same argument sustains, then one may infer that a confirmation of existence through belief is unattainable, and that the fact of your mind is no less falsifiable than the fact of an external experience ie. one must concede to non-existence in its totality.

"What’s wrong with my soul having no body?"
Materially, there's no philosophical conundrum that arises from that proposition. The human mind, in my estimation, is dichotomous: it conceives of abstract states and is in and of itself abstract. There's no instantaneous obligation that impels its attachment to an exogenous being or variable, (or 'body', for that matter), insofar as its existence can be rationalized as being independent. It's just that there isn't a universal distillation from 'experience' to 'existence' in terms of one's mind. What there does seem to be a consensus on (in my opinion) is the mind being the essence of all experience.

"Hell is other people" ___Sartre
You'd hypothesize that one of most history's most revered Existentialists would confer a greater value onto the material subject of his philosophy.

I have a slight misgiving with regards to the characterization of most individuals 'disinterested' in such modes of thought as being 'average' (presumably the case, should one infer from the title of this thread). That may be wise in a statistical context, but not a philosophical one.

That being said, 'most' individuals are enslaved by Darwinism, live to satiate their most fleeting impulses, dream no further than the practicality of their life and are inevitably constrained by their own imagination. Truthfully engaging in philosophy (not merely as a pastime) necessitates a sacrifice of some, if not all of those dimensions to one's character.

'Sometimes philosophy can help someone become less angry, anxious, and depressed when bad things happen, or when things don't go their way. Maybe philosophy can actually prepare them for these times?'

I couldn't agree more. In fact, the overwhelming majority of therapeutic treatments are in some form or measure, underpinned by humanistic branches of thought; Existentialism and its psychological applications are a prototypical example.

It seems to me, however, as has been illustrated by others above, that the philosophies that are identified by cognitive operations of the highest abstraction solicit the least degree of interest amongst their participants. Discussing the metaphysics of the mind or the structure of human perception is, superficially, tangential to one's foremost motives and predilections.

How one is to react, believe and mediate themselves out in a chaotic world is the very essence of several philosophies. In terms of moral or transcendental values, they have invariably been of tremendous insights. Despite this, however, they remain accessible only to those who are willing to abandon all presuppositions, apprehensions and instinctual constraints (far easier said than done) they may be subject to.

Philosophy commits no promises, vows or certainties of any kind; it is a journey you elect to embark on without any knowledge of where it shall take you, or what it may bring to you. For many, that's candidly unappealing.

One of the numbers in the Schrödinger equation is imaginary.

If I may interject with an elementary understanding, the necessity of mathematically complex representations with regards to traditional wavefunctions is born out of their dichotomous formulation (ie. a real and complex phase and amplitude respectively), as opposed to a philosophical construction. Classical mechanics dictate one-dimensional representations, which are wholly or partially insufficient in describing quantum states. The mathematical underpinnings of QM, apart from a few rarefied experimental instances, are not observable, thus rendering their complexity/imaginary components arbitrary in and of themselves. When both components are considered universally, their definitive result will necessarily be real and descriptive of a physical state. If I interpret your suggestion correctly, the metaphysics of Schrodinger's equations are, if existent, not attributable to their imaginary parts.

Here's an outline I've used to build my comprehension of the above, in confirmation of my inklings.

https://phys.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Quantum_Mechanics/Book%3A_Introductory_Quantum_Mechanics_(Fitzpatrick)/02%3A_Wave-Particle_Duality/2.03%3A_Representation_of_Waves_via_Complex_Functions

'While it is true that we are influenced so much by the past I think that it is easy to become a victim of it. The experience we have do affect us so much on a subconscious level as to be able to destroy us if we allow it.

That, in my estimation, is a very meaningful assertion. Discussions curated around the 'past' per se. are bound to illuminate the psychoanalytic implications of its acknowledgement, as you've done.

For all purposes of practicality, an individual's past is a function of their memory. Every prominent or life-defining experience, falsehood, sentiment and relationship that one has either created or committed to is encapsulated in their memory, barring a number of neurological anomalies. Within this faculty of cognition, lies the entirety of one's history and breadth of their life. One of the degenerate consequences of such an idea, and one that Existentialism valorously defends against to this day, is the attitude that knowing one's past is the equivalent of knowing oneself.

If one were to adopt this attitude, nihilistic proclivities are likely to follow almost in immediacy. If one's self-worth and identity is constrained entirely to their past, they're deprived of an ideal by which to orient themselves, and consequently,a meaning to ascribe to their lives altogether.

Consider an individual enslaved by this mentality, whose live has been ridden intermittently by tragedy (such as being bereaved of one's family, or lacking one altogether). When constructing a distinction with regards to themselves and the world, the individual in question will almost necessarily invoke tragedy as a determinant of their identity, and possibly even concede to it. If not, they'll perpetuate it themselves, subsequently completing a self-fulfilling prophecy. Herein, the affirmation of existential value is rendered permanently elusive, only becoming available on the condition of unshackling oneself from one's past.

It is precisely for this reason that the 'past' can become unbelievably pernicious. At the highest degree of philosophical abstraction, it comprises none other than a set of precedents that can disintegrate one's will if left unchecked.

I remember reading a number of journalistic articles that cited astronomical increases to S&P 500 stocks, and consequently the net capital owned by the world's most active industrialists and businesspeople. I may be wrong, but I think this trend has been prominent for quite a while now.

'Yet it happens because the monetary policy that causes asset inflation and the basically the idiotic index investing that is pushing stock prices to hilarious levels. You already have stocks with P/E ratios of 1000 meaning that in orders to get back your money in earnings, you would have to wait 1000 years.'

Exactly. Such mismatches between equity and dividend value are precisely what in my estimation cause stock bubbles.

'But if nobody has bought a house in your neighborhood for a while, but then one is sold for twice the price as the last time, congratulations home owner! Your house has suddenly is twice worth than yesterday. And that's basically the asset bubble we have today... And I'll guess people will again then ask where did the trillions of dollars go when the market crashes.'

That's a really interesting analogy. It brings to light precisely how cyclical and sensitive today's economies really are with regards to demand and prices. Asset inflations result in commodities becoming unaffordable for those who don't possess them at the status quo, and subsequently detract demand from sellers - which ultimately results in stagnation. In order to combat this stagnation, central banks deploy expansionary monetary policies, which cause asset inflation and reinitiate the entire cycle all over again.

I

I'm entirely in accord with the arguments you, and this forum, have previously put forth. A number of the distresses we've seen become pronounced are attributable to structural and maladaptive measures (such as the neoliberal market-oriented policies you've described) that were present prior to the pandemic.

I don't believe that the economic fallouts of the pandemic will be responsible for a greater number of deaths than the pandemic itself (I apologize it came across that way), but I believe they've exacerbated these distresses for many, and in the process, dispossessed developing classes of the most elementary economic freedoms.

For instance, in countries with high Gini coefficients and income asymmetries, families that weren't poor, but were incrementally advancing up the socioeconomic hierarchy, are likely to have suffered a setback that isn't easily recoverable from. Meaningful investments, such as Real Estate, have remained inaccessible to many of these families - a pattern that will almost certainly sustain itself for a considerable amount of time given their now absent, or diminished incomes.

There's a similar mechanism by which the neoliberal markets you've described have treated the business world. Small-scale entrepreneurs have borne the brunt of changes to consumerist mentalities in developing economies, whilst multinational conglomerates have been diversified enough industrially to reconstitute their business models. The conclusion of the matter has been an acceleration in the rate at which wealth gaps have been increasing, not an 'increase' per se (since I agree with you on the front that solutions to these predicaments must be devised independently of the pandemic).

Finally, the agrarian laborers, and several former white collar employees that have slipped down the socioeconomic ladder, are no longer economically liberal enough to be invulnerable to governmental stronghold and possibly tyranny. I may be mistaken in my judgment, but political motives are being indefensibly ascribed precedence over the truthful provision of state welfare around the world.

I feel as though the most defining victim of this infamous pandemic, aside from its egregious death toll, has been the socioeconomic mobility developing economies were characterized by prior to it emerging. Incomes have been either erased or diminished, and will not be recouped in entirety for several agrarian and industrial sectors around the world for at least 5 to 6 years.

Food security appears to be perilously on the verge of vanishing at this point. Millions have slid into poverty, or will succumb to insufficient healthcare. It's truly tragic.

We've also seen a very prominent vice of human psychology illuminated. Political dissension in the United States has exponentiated. The two individuals at the forefront of the election responsible for determining how the world's strongest (apparently) country is to be spearheaded, are two near-octogenarians incapable of articulating themselves without a teleprompter, demented comment or racist remark inbetween. Ethno-national governments have expanded their stronghold quite inexorably.

In the midst of all of this, having exploited the nature of sheer capitalistic brilliance, the world's billionaires have generated over half a trillion additional dollars to their name.

The latter, of course, highlights the inevitability of Pareto inequalities in free markets. Apart from Marxists, or adherents to intermediate doctrines such as Fabian Socialism, I don't believe many will reproach the outcome's philosophical nature. Having said that, it has far from constituted a cause for celebration.

If you've ever housed dormant misanthropic proclivities, now would be a fitting time for them to manifest.

If I understand your analogy correctly, a physician loses power of all consequence when a disease becomes incurable - but the intent to save the patient in question sustains. Is that it?

That's a very interesting take. I'd never thought of intent and consequence being two halves (possibly even two sides of the same coin) of action, but perhaps they are.

I think metaphysics is a reifying of schematic architecture as transcendental essence. Kantian Idealism located this architecture in the nature of the mind, identifying the schematization of reality as resulting from the essential structure of reason and perception, his conditions of the possibility of experience.

I find it by no means an epistemic concession that transcendental idealism put forth these notions of schematic architecture, and contextualized them in the structure of human experience. That's an easily justifiable assertion.

My question, however, was directed to cognitive hybridization, and why it was a determinant to the metaphysical propositions that gave rise to Kant's work.

Are you implying that historically mutated syntactical and semantic architectures were what engendered metaphysical thought? If that's the case, then you're developing an anthropological argument that re-traces the nascent birthplace of philosophy in the human mind.

That's a profound question, but what precisely are you invoking in the juxtaposition of cyclical and linear time? Isochronous events that exhibit periodicity are the most trivial example of a physical state recapturing itself with the progression of a time interval. A swinging pendulum, or any other manifestation of harmonic motion, can act as a cycle.

Nonetheless, one must describe material time in relation to another observable phenomenon; for most, this is motion. If motion serves as an inalienable function of time, then entropy necessitates an arrow of time that is non-recurring. This isn't a speculative conclusion.

The linearity of time is merely a consequence of its unidirectional (presumably) nature. Cyclical time is inexistent with a few rarefied exceptions (such as closed time-like curves in Minkowski spaces).

If one ventures out of the purely physical continuum and into the philosophical and psychoanalytic domains, therein they discover your question truly emerging. If one redefines time by virtue of the structure of human experience, one may then posit that the regularity of one's exercises, banalities of one's life and truth of one's motives constitute a cyclical life. Ultimately, we're all slaves to Darwinian ends, aren't we?

Additionally, with regards to analytic psychology, it is oftentimes the case that one's present conscience is a function of their past and their archetypal predispositions. Time herein is of significant result too.

These are very cogently put forth thoughts on the metamorphosis of human imagination and expression, but what are their philosophical underpinnings?

The predominating argument made above is one based on indivisibilities in physics; Nietzsche's assertions are not pertinent here, because they're philosophical extractions. You can't have a transference between a material and metaphysical idea without closing the chasm inbetween. Secondly, stating that time is a dimension of reality's unknown aspects is very ambiguous. What are you attempting to convey? A 'dimension', when used abstractly, connotes a plane on which a phenomena unravels (herein, presumably the unknown aspects of reality). How do you suppose this happens? What aspects are you referring to? Time is, at least in this case, an observation defined by one's perceptual threshold - not a purely immaterial process.

Instantaneous truth, or truthlikeness even, seems to me as a more reliable judgement than infalliblism. You've already cited the inevitability of change in the refutation of absolute facts. If you're attempting to demonstrate an eternal truth, you can't. Knowledge doesn't consist of a component of foresight: it is tractable. In the information we garner, facts are rendered untrue through either instrumental or analytic improvement, eventually. This isn't because claims are false at their conception, but because the contexts in which they are ensconced are unavoidably going to change. Newton wasn't quite incorrect. He demonstrated a truth of existence, 300 years prior to Einstein illuminating a larger one.

Your speech construction is characterized by several polysyllabic words, but a rare few of them are legitimately derived. Be precise. Why have you introduced short term memory? Why is it consistent with synctatical creativity?
'The only species for which this confluence has in some measure emerged are probably songbirds, dolphins and humans.'

Are you certain that these determinants aren't eminent in primates evolutionarily proximal to human beings? The most intelligent of them may share synesthetic cognitive workings, in addition to bipedalism. Moreover, when you invoke the prehistoric human beings that facilitated the hybridization of artistic and material expression, are you referring to the ancestral roots of the homo genus, or merely homo sapiens in themselves? That's an important distinction to be made.

Wow. I've never contemplated that particular contrast - between wholistic ideas, and imperceptible details.

I too quite possess quite a cursory and disjointed conception of all philosophy, meaning that this is a novelty to me too. I don't feel quite as entrapped by it as you appear to, however.

From what I can gather, your impasse isn't one that can be combatted easily. It's not to be underappreciated; the existential crisis that results from a lack of belief in the concrete world is terrifying. What is a criticism of external reality, soon evolves into a disbelief of all external existence, and finally, a refusal to believe in and of itself.

Irrespective of whether or not you find an answer, I insist that you not succumb to nihilistic proclivities that may arise as a consequence of this. Affirm what you find meaning in, and do so trusting that you will find rationalizations to those affirmations later.

I imagine the grandiloquence your writings exert isn't deliberate, but concision in language might lend itself to be of utility to your arguments. Inordinately long sentences are not easily discernible, and thus cease to catalyze meaningful discourse. Nonetheless, having stated that;

'While the first crude language was not infinitely generative, for short-term memory had yet to mutate into its modern form of limitless chronologicality, it was certainly a more openendedly abstract “train of thought” than phenomenal ideas of dimension with their close relationship to the causes and effects amongst concrete constituents of the material world.'

How do you parameterize how chronological short term memory is? In a psychological capacity, short term memory is defined as being a precursor of working memory: a faculty of one's cognition responsible for tentatively storing information that has been encoded prior. How does a mutated STM result in a generative language? Are you invoking Noam Chomsky's theories of the innate faculty of language - a disposition that is congenital to all individuals?

Your argument on the 'phenomenal ideas of dimension' is a commendable one, though. Are you indicating that the spatial constraints associated with perception act as hindrances to abstract 'trains of thought'? That's what I gathered.

'The species started experimenting with ecology to suit a variety of analytical goals, which gave rise to selective breeding and agriculture. Thinking in terms of flexible schemas of structurality, what can be called conceptual frameworks, provided much benefit to cognitive function even beyond the direct modeling of numerous causes, for it enhanced memory as a kind of cognitive scaffolding to which experiential detail affixed, reinforcing the preservation and cumulating of encyclopedic knowledge.'

This is a rather ambitious, biologically grounded claim. If memory was in fact subject to an analytic metamorphosis (ie. a growth necessitated by the fulfillment of the two objectives), then the genealogical divergence of the human species must indicate a weakened memory in the now extinct primates of the Homo genus (such as the Homo Habilis). While there may be anthropological evidence to this, I'm not aware of any.

'The openendedness of syntactical abstraction and the proportional relativity of dimensional abstraction were combined as a conceptual substrate of inferentially structural form, a kind of system-building abstraction that is the basis for advanced analytical reasoning, which would be developed and academically studied as applications of arithmetic, geometry, logic, algebra, and their derivations.'

What precisely is the phrase 'proportional relativity of dimensional abstraction' attempting to convey? Dimensional abstraction, in the most intelligible meaning I can extract, is the cognitive reconstitution of material objects and their spatial features, into a generalized notion of how those spatial features assimilate in the real world. Is my definition compatible with yours? It's not particularly inferable from your writings.

Your arguments on hybridization may be meritorious, but the way in which you have formulated them make them far too incomprehensible from an exoteric point of view - especially on a forum dedicated to philosophy.

Dabbling in solipsism is a perilous prospect; it attempts to beguile you, and should it prove to be successful, you find yourself inescapably immersed in a vacuum with neither a confirmation of existential reality, nor a mechanism of attaining one. Part of the conundrum is that solipsism is, as you iterated, not subject to falsification. It's akin to knowing how to solve a problem, but not having the tools to do so. You're entirely justified in claiming that nihilism a natural corollary to the idea, but I believe a resolution, in practicality, still exists.

Kant's transcendental idealism is a precursor to this resolution. The mere subject of experience, which was stressed on both by Kant and other Existentialists, is what dictates the matter of experience - in that the perception of physical structures is a result of our senses, but not the structures themselves. We can't restructure the world to suit our experience, if an external 'world' isn't existent.

There's another argument to be made. A reality that can't be concretely demonstrated is not equivalent to a reality that is false. Most people spend their entire lives presupposing a priori judgments because they have been passively instructed to do so. The external world not being an illusory facade is another such judgment.

Nonetheless however, should one cease to find faith in either resolution, solipsism gifts you with a number of meaningful comforts. If the existence of your mind is all that can be known, then contemplate this: the entirety of the universe, its most dazzling recesses, the very nature and history of man and all its discoveries - in short, the complete and exhilarating narrative that has complemented your consciousness thus far, is a consequence of your own imagination.
How reassuring an eventuality is that?

Ultimately however, the very nature of solipsism necessitates that you either accept either an axiom of ignorance, or concession to it. There lies no middle ground.

If a forum such as this is to sustain its meritocratic structure (which it commendably does), a user's alienation merely on the basis of him/her exhibiting unconventional beliefs (preposterous as they may be) is indefensible. What is defensible, is an alienation on the basis of blatant disrespect of either other members, the forum's objective or of what philosophy entails altogether. Facetiousness in the form of meme sharing is likely to be representative of such grounds, but that's only my estimation.

Free will is yet still a philosophical novelty from my perspective (in all truth, to whom is it not?), but I believe that the degree of abstraction at which this problem is unearthed is precisely what determines its solution.

In my estimation, there are three intellectual domains that underlie this discussion: a metaphysical, psychical and practical one (the latter pertaining the reality of experience as we know it to be). Metaphysical illustrations in this regard, such as cosmic and ancestral determinism, run contrary to physical ones (the reality of experience, as you so articulately pinpointed).

If one accepts the proposition that mere consequence of one's being is a result of indivisibilities beyond one's control (the abiotic constituents of all physical matter and their inertial motion, for instance), then the biological perception of free will is illusory. We may choose to exercise it, but those choices originate outside the Cartesian self, in the materiality of the universe. Consequently, there exists no innate mode of choice, but merely the illusion of choice conferred upon the consciousness of biological beings by their physical constitution (such as their cellular composition).

Should one allow for the definition of free will to circumvent this hurdle, a psychical conundrum arises. If the undeterred self is said to lie underneath the Freudian Ego, and its illicit instincts are stifled by the necessity of ethical and social adherence, then distilling one's free will from one's behavior is entirely meaningless. In fact, this is a reconstruction of the 'partial free will' concept you delineated - one can't necessarily exercise an unequivocally free will without liberating his/her unconscious.

Finally, should this notion too be discarded, and the practicality of free will ascribed solely to the conscious, thinking and acting being (even by Darwinian means), then the deterministic argument begins to capitulate. Conscious beings act on ineradicable perceptions of their own 'will', and do so believing that their actions are at the behest of their will. Nietzsche pointed this out too. There is both a command and a subservience to the carrying out of the human will; but that the will exists is incontestable.

On a tangential note, the arguments underneath this thread are genuinely invigorating.