In my initial post to this thread, i forgot to mention another large set of combinations:

Suppose you have a piece of drawing-paper 2 feet by 1.5 feet.

How many monochrome drawings could be made on that paper, if each effective pixel is a micron across? (A micron is now called a "micrometer". It's roughly the size of a small protozoan or a large bacterium.)

The answer is 10^(83.9 Billion).

That's roughly close to (World Popuation)!!, the number of orders in which could be arranged a list of the orders in which could be arranged the world's population.

Well, it's almost a trillion times as large, but, for such large numbers, that's close.

But I don't know if most paper has texture as fine as a micron. So maybe there could really only be more like about 10^(1 billion) different monochrome drawings made on that piece of paper.

But that's still roughly the 5 millionth power of the number of Planck volumes in the observable universe.

Michael Ossipoff

you like big numbers? Youtube Graham's number, and then Tree(3). — tim wood

SCG(13) has TREE(3) beat, big-time.

It's difficult to find authoritative, reliable information about this, but it's said that SCG(13) > TREE(TREE(TREE(...TREE(3)...))), where the nesting is iterated TREE(3) times.

...and that TREE(3) > g(g(g(...g(64)...))), where the nesting is iterated g(64) times.

I don't know if that's true, but I've heard it from googology hobbyists.

The largest 3 numbers that I've heard of that are mentioned by a proved mathematical theorem are all from theorems about graphs.

Yes, those graph theorems mention some numbers that are incomparably, incomprehensibly larger than what's gotten by orderings, combinations and permutations, and make (World Population)!! look like 1.

Michael Ossipoff

they are both [reincarnation and ??] incompatible with present human understanding of the physical; there is no conceivable mechanism by which they could be actualities. — Janus

Physics, the study of "the physical", is only about the workings of this physical world, and the inter-relations and interactions among its parts. For example, it describes the events observable in your life-experience. But it says nothing, one way or the other, about reincarnation, the matter of what world or experience-story you're in.

Reincarnation is metaphysically supported, but isn't incompatible with physics, because physics says nothing about it, one way or the other.

Science-Worship, the religion whose devotees want to apply science outside its legitimate area of applicability, is a form of pseudoscience.

Michael Ossipoff

If you prefer to continue with your evasive self-justificatory bullshit — Janus

Angry grunting noises, instead of specific objections.

Evasive? I've been repeatedly inviting you to give a specific objection to a specific statement in the proposal. You've been evading, via vague angry-noises, and the typical Internet-abuser's resort to namecalling as an "argument".

rather than offering up for assessment and critique just one central statement from your purportedly uncontroversial metaphysics

I offered all of it for assessment and critique. If I haven't named a "central statement", it's because I honestly don't know what you by that. All of it is equally essential to the statement of the metaphysics.

But I can guess at what might qualify as the most "central" statement. Something that best summarizes the overall point that distinguishes the metaphysics from other ones?

How about the statement that there's inevitably a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, whose events and relations are those of your experience? ...and that there's no reason to believe that our world is other than that? That summarizes what characterizes this metaphysics.

...or the statement that any fact about this physical world can be said as an if-then fact. And the statement that any statement can be one of the hypotheticals of an if-then fact. ...either all or part of an if-then fact's "if " premise, or all or part of its "then" conclusion.

...or the statement that, because anything said about our world can be said as an if-then fact, then conditional grammar describes our world. That alone is enough to justify the statement that there's a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, whose events and relations are those of your experience.

I don't refuse to name the most central statement, but I don't know exactly what you mean by that. A number of statements are all equally necessary parts of this metaphysical exposition.

There seems to be a popular misconception that metaphysics has to be speculative, and that it's a matter for relativism. No, as I've said, definite things can be said about metaphysics. It has things in common with science.

Definitions should be well-specified and consistently-applied. Statements should be supported. Unverifiable and unfalsifiable propositions are suspect. Assumptions and brute-facts are to be avoided if possible.

I've proposed a metaphysics without assumptions or brute-facts. ...unlike "Naturalism."

I've invited suggestions about what can be disagreed with. Someone expressed disagreement with a statement, and I've told my justification for that statement.

Michael Ossipoff

"All I said about that was that I can't prove that the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in doesn't superflously exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes". — Michael Ossipoff


I don't see how this is a metaphysical statement. You have stated that you are incapable of proving something. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was part of a metaphysical proposal. ...in the sense that it's a clarification about something that the proposal doesn't say.

It's a statement that my proposal doesn't say anything about whether or not the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in might superfluously exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes.

"Yes you have. I've posted a long version of it in these discussions with you. You acknowledged how long it was. Remember?" — Michael Ossipoff


Oh now I remember, I couldn't make sense of your metaphysical proposal.

Then feel free to specify which statement, term, word or phrase you didn't understand the meaning of. If you do, I'll clarify what I meant. What more should I offer?

Well, the statement that "there's inevitably a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, that comprises a story whose events and relations are those of your experience, — Michael Ossipoff


This is a speculative assumption. And I disagree with it.

On what grounds do you disagree with it and claim that it's speculative?

As I've pointed out, anything that can be said about this physical world can be said as an if-then fact.

"There's a traffic-roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine."

"If you go to 34th & Vine, then you'll encounter a traffic-roundabout."

The world can be described in conditional grammar. We're used to declarative, indicative, grammar, and of course it's convenient, but we're unjustifiably believing our grammar.

Additionally, a statement, a hypothetical maybe-fact, about the physical world is also a hypothetical comprising either the "if " premise or the "then" conclusion of an if-then fact. ...or both, with respect to different if-then facts. ...in other words, a part of one or more if-then facts.

As I've mentioned, a set of hypothetical physical quantity values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a "physical law"), are parts of the "if " premise of an if-then fact.

...except that one of those physical quantity values can be taken as the "then" conclusion of that if-then fact.

Michael Ossipoff

I'll find it elsewhere and paste into a posting to this thread.

Michael Ossipoff

The abstract if-then facts that I've mentioned as examples, including the Slitheytove & Jaberwockey syllogism, and the fact that, if the additive associative axiom is true then 2+2=4 (...with 1, 2, 3 & 4 defined in in an obvious natural way, in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), will be found to be true, by anyone, in any other sub-universe of a multiverse that we're in, or in any possibility-world.

That makes it difficult to claim that those abstract if-then facts are our creation,and that we're prior to them.

Anyway, whatever your opinion on that, it's still correct to say that there are abstract if-then facts. That's undeniable and uncontroversial.

What would you say is the difference between abstract and concrete facts? — Janus

A "concrete" fact is a fact about a physical thing or event in the possibilitiy-world in which the speaker resides.

And the word "actual", as I and some others define it, means:

"Part of, or comprising, the possibility-world in which the speaker resides."

Maybe the difficult-to-accept part is that our seemingly "real, concrete and physical" world is a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals.

But i remind you that anything that can be said about our physical world can be said as an if-then fact, and also as the hypothetical "if " premise, or the "then" conclusion. that's part of an if-then fact. There's no reason to believe that our world is other than a system of if-thens. ...a world of "If", rather than a world of "Is".

Michael Ossipoff

I liked that Clarke story, "The Nine Billion Names of God".

Michael Ossipoff

Actually, I think that all metaphysics is by definition speculative, so I don't know what you're talking about here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm talking, here, about the fact that you can't name a speculative statement in my metaphysical proposal.

And please note that I didn't say that the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in doesn't exist. Such a statement isn't in my metaphysics.

All I said about that was that I can't prove that the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in doesn't superflously exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes.

So I'm not speculating about whether that Materialist world exists or not. I'm merely saying, about it, what I said in the paragraph before this one.

Yes, you think that all metaphysics is speculative, Stating what you think, and telling specifying which statement in my metaphsycal proposal is speculative, aren't quite the same thing.

I haven't seen your proposal

Yes you have. I've posted a long version of it in these discussions with you. You acknowledged how long it was. Remember?

, but judging by what you say about it (it isn't speculative, has no assumptions, and no brute facts), I assume it's a little bit of nothing.

...because you believe that a metaphysics that's "something" must be speculative, or have assumptions, or have brute-facts? :D

In other words, your pre-judged, faith-based belief that a metaphysics must be nothing, or speculative, or have assumptions, or have brute-facts.leads you to a firm conclusion, even though you admit that you can't specify a speculative statement, or an assumption, or a brute fact in my metaphysical proposal.

...or is "nothing".

Well, the statement that there's inevitably a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, that comprises a story whose events and relations are those of your experience,

...and that there's therefore no need to ask why there's something instead of nothing...

...and my statement that, if the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in exists, then it superflouslys exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes--

You're saying that all that's nothing?.

It's a statement of what metaphysically is, and what it metaphysically consists of. That's all that a metaphysics needs to specify

Michael Ossipoff

You need to try harder. First read more carefully; I didn't say I disagree with all the statements on your "system", I said I cannot find any that I could either agree or disagree with — Janus

Yes, you said that you cannot find any statement in that metaphysics-proposal hat you could agree with.

Yes, and that's why I said you should feel free to specify one that you don't agree with.

Then I said, "That shouldn't be hard, because you said that you don't agree with any of the statements in my metaphysical proposal."

You also said that the statement of my metaphysics has unfounded assumptions. I invited you to feel free to specify one.

You also said that it has statements that I didn't support (but which need support). I invited you to specify one..

Second, use you imagination; "keystone" is a metaphor. A key stone is one without which an arch will collapse.

I'd expect that an arch wouldn't support anything if you removed any one of its stones.

The function of the keystone at the top of the arch, is to direct downward force longitudinally along the arch's row of stones.

You're asking me which particular statement, if falsified or brought into question, would discredit my proposal. Any of them, I'd say. Falsify one of them, or bring one of them into question.

Michael Ossipoff

In one posting, Janus said:
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I don't believe there is any "uncontroversial metaphysics", because all metaphysics start from unfounded assumptions.

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Alright, Janus should feel free to name an unfounded assumption in the metaphysics that I’ve been proposing.
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Earlier, he said that there were unsupported statements in that my proposal of that metaphysics, but, when invited to specify one, he was unable to.
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In the reincarnation discussion, I’d said:
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Certainly reincarnation is incompatible with your present human understanding of the physical, if you believe that the physical world comprises all of Reality.
— Michael Ossipoff

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Janus replied:
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It's not a question of whether the physical "comprises all of reality"; different answers to that question will be given depending on different interpretations of the terms. It is really a more or less meaningless question. In any case reincarnation is incompatible with any testable understanding of the 'how' of the actual world; the world we find ourselves in, the world we sense, feel and attempt to explain.

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He’s saying that reincarnation doesn’t have a physical mechanism, doesn’t have a mechanism in terms of the beliefs of a Materialist. I’ve already agreed to that.
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First he says “It’s not a question of whether the physical ‘comprises all of reality’ “, but then he says that his point is that reincarnation is incompatible with any “testable understanding of the ‘how’ of the actual (physical) world; the world we find ourselves in, the world we sense, feel, and attempt to [physically] explain.”
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Janus’s objection, quoted above, to reincarnation, amounts to an objection that reincarnation isn’t compatible with Materialism. But Janus, in an earlier post, claimed to not be a Materialist.
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He’s saying that there isn’t a physical mechanism for reincarnation, a mechanism compatible with Materialism. As I said, I’ve already agreed to that. I said that reincarnation is implied by a different metaphysics. I didn’t say that it’s implied by, or compatible with, Materialism.
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But if that physical world doesn’t comprise all of reality, then a suggestion isn’t at all discredited by the fact that isn’t observed and reported by physical science?
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But, in no way is reincarnation incompatible with physical science. Physical science is about the events within this physical universe, the interactions of its parts. That topic doesn’t bear on the question of reincarnation.
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It is also incompatible with my own personal experience

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Incorrect.
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, as I have no sense whatsoever that I have lived prior to this life.

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I’ve said that there’s no reason to expect someone to remember a previous life.
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What Janus means is that his own personal experience neither confirms nor refutes reincarnation.
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Actually, it isn’t just that we don’t remember a past life, or know if there was one. I suggest that the matter of whether or not there was one is indeterminate in principle.
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This life is the result of your inclinations and predispositions—your perspective, in the words of another poster.
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This life began because, among the infinitely-many timeless life-experience possibility-stories, there’s one with a protagonist who has the inclinations and predispositions—the same perspective—that are your inclinations and predispositions, your perspective. …because that hypothetical protagonist in that hypothetical story is you.
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…regardless of whether or not you lived a life before this one.
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…regardless of whether there’s reincarnation.
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It isn’t true that there was a past life for you, or that there wasn’t.
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If someone remembers, or believes they remember, a past life, then obviously they will not feel or think reincarnation to be incompatible with their experience.

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I don't believe this kind of experience is common, though; although I don't doubt quite a few people may mistake their fantasies for experiences that actually indicate something about reality; humans can be gullible.

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Don’t forget hoax.
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In any case, if you reincarnate but don't remember your previous lives; then I can't see what relevance it could have to you, now, in this life.

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That wasn’t the topic. As I said, not only is it unknowable whether or not you lived a life before, it’s also indeterminate. It isn’t true that you did, or that you didn’t.

I'd said:

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"But, as I said before, reincarnation is implied by an inevitable, uncontroversial metaphysics--the one that I've been proposing

. — Michael Ossipoff

You replied:
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You may think the metaphysics you propose is "inevitable and uncontroversial", but I don't share that assessment

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Yes, that’s why I asked you which statement in the proposal you disagree with (or which one you don’t agree with, or which one I needs support that I didn’t supply, or is an "unfounded assumption"). You haven’t specified one.
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All we hear from you is the usual grumbling, grunting noises.
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; and I doubt many others would, since belief in reincarnation, at least in the modern West, is very much a minority viewpoint; and would seem to be extremely rare among philosophers.

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Though the metaphysics that I propose implies, or at least plausibly implies, reincarnation, it’s uncontroverial-ness doesn’t depend on whether you think there’s reincarnation.
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Maybe you don’t like its implications, conclusions, or consequences. But the metaphysics is still uncontroversial if there’s nothing in the statement of that metaphysics that you can specify that don’t agree with, or that is unjustifiably assumed, or that needs support that I didn’t supply.
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…and your census-estimate regarding the beliefs of Western philosophers isn’t relevant to the matter.
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Time for a reality check, dude

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The reality of this discussion is that, in spite of your grunting noises, you haven’t specified a statement in my metaphysical proposal that you don’t agree with, or that needs support that I didn’t supply.
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As for reincarnation, though it’s at least plausibly implied by my metaphysics, I don’t claim that there is, or even could be, observable evidence or proof about reincarnation.
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Michael Ossipoff

"No one ne has named any statement in that metaphysical proposal" — Michael Ossipoff


I can't even "name any statement in that metaphysical proposal" that I could either agree or disagree with. :-} — Janus

Fine. Then feel free to "name any specific statement in that metaphysical proposal" that you don't agree with. That should be easy, since you've just said that you don't agree with any of them.

How about you present a 'keystone' statement and I will tell you whether I agree or disagree, and why?

First, how about you present a definition of " 'keystone' statement". I searched the Internet for a definition, and didn't find one.

Michael Ossipoff

There is no obtaining of the fact that there could be nothing. If there were nothing there would be no facts to obtain. — Janus

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Yes. I was just mentioning that someone could argue that there could have obtained exactly one fact: ... a fact that there are no facts other than itself, the fact that there are no other facts.
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But I told a reason why that wouldn't make sense.
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But if you, too, are saying that it wouldn't make sense, then you aren't expressing any disagreement with what I said.
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You are still confusing yourself by applying as universal your limited human perspective. It may indeed be impossible that there could be nothing, but that has nothing to do with "abstract if-then" facts which only find their province in human thought unless there be other beings capable of abstract thought

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What you're expressing is a belief, not an undeniable or consensus truth. You’re treating your belief as a starting premise.
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You're expressing your belief that we, as a product of a concretely, fundamentally, objectively existent physical world, are the creators of all the abstract facts. What amazing powers you attribute to us.
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So first, in the beginning, the concrete objectively-existent fundamentally-existent physical world, and then us, and then, lastly, abstract facts created by us.
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That’s a metaphysics that you believe in, but you’re so used to believing in it that you regard it as a starting-premise.
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Well, I agree that our world is nothing other than our experience. …the setting for our life-experience possibility-story. …except that I say that that life-experience possibility-story consists of abstract if-then facts.
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Here’s an inevitable abstract if-then fact that I’ve been citing as an example:
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If all Slitheytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
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That abstract if-then fact is true even if none of the Slitheytoves are brillig.
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That abstract if-then fact is true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves.
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That abstract if-then fact is true even if there are no Slitheytoves and no Jaberwockeys.
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Nor does it depend on you, me, or anyone else to know about it. But, in the event that there be someone to hear that proposition, they’ll agree that it’s true. …because it is true. …and not just because of the hearer. The fact that its truth is independent of who hears it, or when, or in what world they reside, makes it difficult to claim that it’s dependent on a hearer, knower or experiencer.
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You continued:
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…or unless God exists. It is only on the assumption that God (an infinite mind) exists that the idea of universal if-then facts becomes relevant, otherwise it is an anthropomorphic projection onto the cosmos.

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…based on the origination-hierarchy that you believe in. You think that abstract if-then facts are posterior to a mind.
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You’re trying to invoke God directly in the creation of abstract logical facts, just as the Biblical Fundamentalists try to invoke Him directly in the creation of the Earth and the human race. But yes, of course it’s common to want to portray God as an element of metaphysics.
(Why do Atheists talk about God so much?)
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And I emphasize that, though abstract if-then facts are universal in the sense that they’d be true for anyone, in any world, they aren’t universal in their manifestation or “actual”-ness. A system of inter-referring abstract if-thens isn’t, and needn’t be, real or actual outside of its own local inter-referring context, and is quite independent of anything outside that context. There’s no global context or medium in which such a system needs to be.
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Michael Ossipoff

To begin, one of the most fundamental question that has bothered me since I can remember is: why is the world the way it is? — darthbarracuda

The world that we experience, and the detailed world that physicists find, when they closely investigate and examine the world, must, of course, be a world in which your existence is possible. It must be consistent with there being you. Your experience must be consistent. A set of inconsistent propositions aren't facts.

For example, why is there quantum mechanics? Answer: Because life, at least the kind of life that we are, requires atoms that are stable, and are of consistent particular kinds. That requires discrete-valued quantities. A way of achieving that is via standing waves.

Hence wave-mechanics, matter-waves.

Michael Ossipoff

When I was born, how did 'nature' conjure up my perspective into this body? Why and how did it decide that my perspective is the right one? These were questions that I asked myself since I was 9 years old. Why am I me? Why am I not my brother? How did 'I' happen to be?

Anyway, this is the thought I never had the chance to discuss with anyone. I tried raising it with my friends but none of them had any good answers. Would really like to gain some insight from someone who has delved very deep into this subject matter — Susu

Sometimes a seemingly difficult question like that is just the result of metaphysical assumptions that aren't valid. For example, the metaphysics of Materialism has been hammered into us from elementary-school on.

Materialism has several aliases. A currently fashionable one is "Naturalism". Also, the word "Nominalism" is often, currently fashionably, used to refer to what is really another way of wording Materialism.

Sometimes, answering questions such as the ones that you expressed, requires a completely different metaphysics.

I'll answer that in terms of the inevitable and uncontroversial metaphysics that I've been proposing here.

I've posted the whole proposition at so many discussions in these forums, that I shouldn't repeat it all here.

But, to just summarize:

All that you know about the physical world is from your experience, in fact all of it is your experience. That's all there is, for you.

There are abstract if-then facts. There couldn't have not been abstract if-then facts. And, just as inevitably, there are complex inter-referring systems of inevitable abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals.

In fact, there are infinitely-many such complex logical systems.

In fact, there's one whose events and relations are those that you encounter in your experience,

That complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract logical facts about hypotheticals is your life-experience possibility-story,

Let me re-quote your question:

When I was born, how did 'nature' conjure up my perspective into this body? — Susu

Your perspective is prior to this life. Your perspective consists of your inclinations, predispositions, etc.

Those are attributes of the protagonist of one of the infinitely-many life-experience possibility-stories.

So, why are you in a life? Because you, someone with your perspective, is the protagonist of one of the infinitely-many life-experience possibility-stories.

Being in a life is part of the your nature, as the possessor of your perspective, the protagonist of a life-experience possibility-story.

So it's no surprise that you're in a life. That's why this life started.

Why and how did it decide that my perspective is the right one?

Your perspective is what it started from. ...your perspective and the life-experience possibility-story whose protagonist has that perspective.

So there's really no question of why it's the right perspective for you. It is you, and it's the reason why this life started.

Michael Ossipoff

I don't think reincarnation or resurrection, for that matter, are logically incompatible with materialism. But they are both incompatible with present human understanding of the physical; there is no conceivable mechanism by which they could be actualities. — Janus

I'm not posting this to advocate that there's reincarnation, but just to answer the above-quoted comment.

Certainly reincarnation is incompatible with your present human understanding of the physical, if you believe that the physical world comprises all of Reality.

there is no conceivable mechanism by which they could be actualities.

Not in Materialism :D

But, as I said before, reincarnation is implied by an inevitable, uncontroversial metaphysics--the one that I've been proposing.

Michael Ossipoff

The trend today is to have people with little or no training in metaphysics venturing into metaphysical speculations — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, most metaphysicses seem speculative, or to need assumptions.

The metaphysics that I've been proposing isn't speculative, and neither makes nor needs any assumptions, and doesn't post any brute-fact.

And it doesn't say anything that anyone would disagree with. Though several people have expressed vague grumbling disapproval, no one has named any statement in that metaphysical proposal that they disagree with.

Michael Ossipoff

Abstract facts are only inevitable from the "point of view" of existence. You will object that if there were nothing, then there would also be the abstract fact that there is nothing; but there would not; because this is a contradiction. It only seems to you that there would be such an abstract fact 'there is nothing' because you are looking at it 'from the outside', so to speak.

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You mean it wouldn’t be meaningful to speak of complete Nothingness being the state-of-affairs, because there wouldn’t be anyone to experience it, know about it, or discuss it? Yes, maybe that’s a good argument against saying that there could have been complete Nothingness, without even abstract facts.
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But there’s another argument that I like:
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For there to obtain a fact that there are no other facts than that one fact that there are no other facts, implies that there’s some global continuum or space that facts share, in which one global fact can have jurisdiction or authority over the existence of other facts. I don’t think there’s any reason to believe that. There’s no justification for suggesting that entirely separate and unrelated facts have such a relation or shared continuum or context.
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So I’ve been emphasizing that a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts needn’t have any existence, reality, relevance or meaning other than in its own local inter-referring context. It’s completely independent of any global prohibition, and doesn’t need any larger context, permission or medium in which to be factual.
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And there couldn’t have not been abstract if-then facts.

Michael Ossipoff

There might be even more mundane and immediate questions, that science cannot answer, even though everyone thinks it can.

Do animals possess qualia?

How are qualia created?

I think these might be philosophical questions. — tom

Or they might be (are, actually) Spiritualist mumbo-jumbo.

An animal is unitary. No separate body and mysterious "Mind", with its mystical speculative, fictitious qualia.

Do animals have experience? Of course. Do their experiences resemble ours? Of course. What do you think we are, if not animals?

An animal is a purposefully-responsive device that has resulted from natural selection. A purposefully-responsive device's experience is its surroundings and their events, in the context of that device's purposes.

An animal's "Consciousness" is its property of being a purposefully-responsive device.

It probably isn't necessary to point out that humans are animals, and therefore are purposefully-responsive devices.

Michael Ossipoff

Why something and not nothing is of course a dead-end causal inquiry. — apokrisis

Quite so, if you believe in a brute-fact, and ask the "Why" of your brute-fact. :D

So it depends on what you're saying there is. If you're committed to Materialism (aka "Naturalism"), then yes, any discussion of its "Why" is most definitely a dead-end.

But a metaphysics doesn't need a brute-fact, or any assumptions.

Why is there something instead of nothing? Because abstract facts are inevitable. There are abstract facts, and there couldn't have not been abstract facts, and no one denies that. So, complex systems of abstract facts are inevitable too. ...including the one whose events and relations are those that we observe around us.

But of course you can still believe in a brute-fact, such as an objectively, "concretely" existent physical world too, if you want to. ...as a superfluous duplication of the system described in the paragraph before this one, and as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact...believing it to superflously exist alongside, and duplicating, the system described in the above paragraph. ...and then you can ask why it is :D

Michael Ossipoff

Is there really any question about it?

There are numbers.

They're abstract objects. They're things. Things are what can be referred to.

Things are what facts relate or are about.

"Exist" isn't metaphysically-defined, and so anyone can have their own opinions about what does or doesn't "exist".

Michael Ossipoff

According to science, we can change what we will. — tom

What falsifiable, tested and long-unfalsified scientific theory says that?. — Michael Ossipoff

The theory is quantum mechanics — tom

Incorrect. Quantum mechanics doesn't say that we can change what we will.

But yes, I admit that, at philosophy forums, quantum mechanics has a big pseudoscientific mystique.

And I also admit that there are some people here who are all confused about the difference between, and the boundaries between philosophy and science (quantum mechanics is particularly popular in that regard).

Anyway, I didn't say we can't change what we will. Dieters do that all the time (some of them succeed).

What I said was that a person's actions are the result of their preferences and inclinations--hereditary and acquired.

You can go on a diet, if you already want to. Ultimately, your wants, preferences and inclinations trace back to your heredity and environment.

I'm not saying that the criminal isn't responsible for his actions. He still did it because he wanted to...regardless of the ultimately hereditary and environmental reasons why he wanted to.

I'm not saying that QM doesn't have any philosophical relevance. A recognized authority, a physicist specializing in QM, wrote that QM lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world.

The deduction is that the human brain can be arbitrarily programmed; the Mind instantiated on the brain can be changed. This is a basic physical fact. — tom

As I said, your actions are the result of your preferences and inclinations--hereditary and acquired-- and your surroundings.

And I (and others) said, of course people can sometimes train themselves to have or not have a preference or inclination.

As I said, that's what people do in dieting.

The do that because they already want to.

We already have several techniques for altering Minds, some rudimentary, some relatively sophisticated.

"We"? :D

See above.

In order to erect a barrier to us being able to alter our minds as we choose,

You haven't read the previous postings to this thread, have you.

Have you ever tried to reduce your craving for some nutritionally-undesirable kind of food?

People often train themselves to have or not have some preference or inclination.

Oh wait, i already said that, didn't I, in a previous posting :D

...as have others as well.

By the way, why is there QM?

Because life, our kind at least, requires stable atoms, and specific, consistent kinds of them. That requires discrete-valued quantities. A way of achieving that is via standing-waves.

Hence wave-mechanics, matter-waves.

...because, upon investigation and examination, physicists of course unsurprisingly find things that are consistent with our existence.

Michael Ossipoff



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1) We need at least two choices for a decision
2) We can be conscious of one choice at any given time
3) Therefore conscious decision is impossible — bahman

Say you have a choice between two courses of action.

Consider each of the two options separately, one at a time, writing down its merits and demerits.

Now, repeatedly look from one option's merit list to the other option's merit list. Remembering how you felt about the first option's merits, do you feel as strongly about the 2nd option's merits?

Do the same with the demerits.

Follow your impression, your intuitive feeling.

Michael Ossipoff

There isn't free-will. It has been famously said that we do what we will, but don't will what we will. — Michael Ossipoff


According to science, we can change what we will. — tom

What falsifiable, tested and long-unfalsified scientific theory says that?.

A person can train himself/herself to not want so much high-calorie food. ...if s/he already wants to do so.

When I said that what you do is determined by your preferences and inclinations, of course that includes hereditary ones, and acquired ones too, including ones that you'd set out to train yourself to (because you wanted to).

Also, it seems apparent that people do this all the time.

Sure. That's the goal of dieting.

It's not as if we can be genetically determined to be astrophysicists.

There's obviously a hereditary component, for the talent for such things, just as there is for Sumo wrestling, bodybuilding-competitioin, etc. No amount of wanting and effort would have qualified most people for Sumo wrestling or international championship bodybuilding. People are born with predispositions and ability, including, but not limited to, physical ones.

It's common for long separated identical twins to both be in the same occupation.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, Compatibilism doesn't make sense.

There isn't free-will. It has been famously said that we do what we will, but don't will what we will.

Our actions depend on our preferences and inclinations, and our surroundings.

That's a good thing. It unloads from us the burden of "our" choices.

Michael Ossipoff

Conscousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device. You can call that a "product of the brain" if you want to word it that way. But that wording approaches the Spiritualism known as Dualism, when you speak of there being a "product" called Consciousness, as if it's something new, separate, and different from the animal, the body.

The animal is unitary, not a combination of separate body and Mind, or Consciousness, or whatever you call it.

Experience is a purposefully-responsive device's surroundings, and events in those surroundings, in the context of that device's purposes.

Michael Ossipoff

Some people object, to me, "You say that our world just consists of abstract facts, but how does that be real, how does it make our real world?"

Well, I haven't claimed that it's objectively, "concretely" (whatever that would mean) real.

We've had it hammered into us, from elementary-school and on,that it goes without saying that there's this "concrete", objectively real, brute-fact, physical world.

And, whether explicitly expressed, as it always is, by naive Materialists, or just felt and not expressed, by subconsciously Materialist people familiar with philosophy, who know better than to actually say it, I claim that that long-ingrained teaching referred to in the paragraph before this one, is the basis for why people have a problem with logical Idealism.

Another objection that I sometimes hear:

Some people object that a logically-based metaphysics, based on inevitable abstract facts, takes away the indeterminacy that they expect or want.

Of course there's indeterminacy, even in metaphysics. I can't prove that the objectively-real physical world of Materialism doesn't superfluously exist, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the inevitable logical system that I describe.

But there are definite things that can be uncontroversially-said in metaphysics. But metaphysics doesn't embody or describe all of Reality. There's definitely indeterminacy, and matters that we don't and can't know--But, for the most part, they aren't in metaphysics.

Metaphysics has a lot in common with science. Definitions need to be well-specified, and consistently-applied, Statements need to be supported. Assumptions should be avoided. Unnecessary brute-facts should be avoided. Definite things can be uncontroversially-said.
Unfalsifiable, unverifiable propositions are rightly suspect.

And, like physics, metaphysics isn't, and doesn't describe, all of Reality.

Michael Ossipoff

"ll that you know about this world is from your experience" — Michael Ossipoff

Berkeley's subjective idealism, right? — fishfry

Subjective Idealism, sure.

The world "outside" is irrelevant

No. The physical world is the setting for your experience. It's a necessary part of your experience.

, all I know is my sensory impressions.

Of course.

And of course there are all of the abstract facts, and it would be chauvinistic to say that the ones in your experience are the only valid ones and are somehow different or more true. I don't take Anti-Realism that far.

But the fact remains that your experience, the system of abstract facts that comprise your experience-story, is quite independent of other abstract facts, and is a universe unto itself.

And why do my sensory impressions seem consistent from moment to moment?

That's a good question, and I don't claim to have a completely satisfactory answer to it. I'd like to hear others' explanations, from other Idealists.

Of course, if your experience-story were inconsistent, then it would no longer consist of inter-referring facts. Mutually inconsistent propositions aren't facts.

Why is there something instead of nothing? Because abstract if-then facts, and complex inter-referring systems of them, are inevitable. But, if mutually-inconsistent, they wouldn't be facts.

But who says experience has to be factual and consistent? Well, your experience is of life in a physical world, and, right there, that means that it's about a logical system of inter-referring facts. Would it be meaningful to speak of a physical world without facts? Only in a cartoon?

There are all of the abstract objects, but how much do they mean without the relations among them that we call "facts"? "Things" could be defined as what facts relate. ...parts of facts. By that definition, things would be meaningless and undefined without facts.

Does that come close to an explanation for why our experience is consistent?

Maybe the "Why is experience consistent?" question comes from the fallacy of believing in metaphysically-meaningful isolated things.

That seems confirmed by the Witgenstein quote that there are no [independently metaphysically-meaningful?] things, just facts.

Of course, if things are defined as what can be referred to, then facts are things. But when referring to something, you make a statement implied to be a fact, which just means that fact can also be a thing, as part of another fact, something that another fact or claimed-fact is about.

God did it.

Just as we tell a Biblical Literalist, "What makes you think that God needed to contravene the physical laws of His creation? What makes you think we weren't created via and in keeping with physical law?", we could ask the same thing, with respect to metaphysics, of someone who wants to portray God as an element of metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

All that you know about this world is from your experience. ...is part of your experience. That's what your life is. The world surrounding you is merely the setting for that story.

Other people? Of course it goes without saying that your experience-story, to be self-consistent, must have you as a member of a species that begat you. Necessarily, in that story, there are other members of that species.

And, among the infinity of life-experience possibility-stories, there inevitably is one about the experience of each of those other beings too.

They're just like you, basically.

Michael Ossipoff

Isn't "Solipsism" just a namecalling word used by advocates of Realism?

There's some sort of supposed, pretend-consensus, stigma implied, so that, if someone says, "That's Solipsism.", that's supposed to settle the matter against whatever position is being called "Solipsism".

My metaphysics is an Anti-Realism. There's no reason to speak of a fact-system other than (each of) our own llfe-experience story..And that system of inevitable abstract facts about hypotheticals is as valid as any other abstract fact or system of them, and is completely independent of those.

On the other hand, plainly there are plainly other abstract facts too. And the ones that make up your life-experience possibility-story aren't really different from those. And it would be chauvinistic and circular to say that the facts that aren't part of a living-being's experience-story are less valid, because validity means being part of someone's experience.

That's why I say that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.

Michael Ossipoff

Does Witty say that a fact is certain and true?

I don't know what W would say to that, but, by definition there's no such thing as an untrue fact.

If a statement isn't true, it doesn't state a fact.

A statement is a claim about a fact.

A fact is a state of affairs, or part of the way things are.

As for "certain", often we can't be certain whether or not a proposition or a statement states a fact.

Michael Ossipoff

A thing doesn't exist. Only facts do. — Posty McPostface

That's right, as long as it's clarified that "thing" is being used with a restricted meaning that explicitly excludes facts, or is maybe even limited to "physical" things.

There are only facts. There are no things other than facts.

Is a thing a fact? — Buxtebuddha

Strictly speaking, all facts are things.. ...unless the meaning of "thing" has been specifically limited to exclude facts.

But not all things are facts. For instance a statement isn't a fact, but only a claim about a fact. Of course there's a fact that a statement has been made, or that there's a potential statement that could be made.

The state of affairs that is a fact is a state of affairs that relates some things. Those things, while not facts, could be called parts of that fact. ...what the fact is about. ...comprising the topic of the fact.

In general, unless otherwise specified, things are whatever can be referred to, and that includes facts as things too.

When it's (truly) said that there are no things, just facts, what is meant is that there are no things other than facts. I agree with that statement.

Michael Ossipoff

Suppose that there are an infinite amount of universes and that everything that can happen does happen in some universe. So there's a universe just like ours with a planet identical to earth (lets call it earth-2), and everything on earth-2 is identical to earth to the last atom. So there's a Purple Pond user just like me typing this thought experiment. I'm atom for atom identical to the Purple Pond on this different universe. The question is: even though I'm separated from by an unimaginable distance, and we belong to different universes, am I the same person? — Purple Pond

It depends on what kind of an other world you're talking about.

Here are two possibilities:

1. Physically-Related Places:

If you're talking about a physically-related "universe" that's really just a different region of this universe, or just a different sub-universe of which our Big-Bang Universe is a sub-universe, then of course that place is really physically there, and your duplicate is really physically there, as we mean physical reality for things in our universe. (even if we can't actually know or detect his existence).

Then of course you aren't he. You experience your own life, from your point of view, not from that of someone many trillions of lightyears away, or in a different physically-related universe.

Just as, if someone in a different town built a robot that's a perfect copy of you, You don't experience from its point of view. If it stubs its toe, you don't feel that.

2.

Different possibility-world

If it isn't a physically-related place, but is, instead, a different possibility-world, then it isn't meaningful to speak of it, because, if it's identical to this world, then it's the same possibility-world. There's no meaningful difference. That world isn't a different one. It isn't located at a different place in this universe or physically-related multiverse (which would make it spatially different and separate).

-------------------------

So, possibility #1 is the only meaningful one to speak of.

Max Tegmark estimated that, if this universe is infinite, or really huge, and if its physics is the same out to a great enough distance, and if it's density isn't systematically different, then the most likely distance, in meters, to a Hubble-volume that's identical to the Hubble-volume we're at the center of, is about 10 to the power of (10 to the 118th power).

If you're willing to settle for an identical hundred-light-year radius sphere, then it's probably only ten to the power of (10 the 92nd power)

If you'll settle for just an identical you, then the likely distance is only 10 to the power of (10 to the 28th power).

Michael Ossipoff

:

k

And I'm not primarily saying that for other people. I'm saying it because making one's own decisions is a basic right, and everyone, including me, should have that right. ...in all individual matters, including the matter of if and when to choose assisted auto-euthanasia. — Michael Ossipoff


I agree. Who would not? But again, this is fine for those for whom society works; for those who have not had their autonomy curtailed. — Banno

But our autonomy is already curtailed, denied, if we aren't allowed to make our own life-choices. And that denial of autonomy is causing widespread suffering and misery.

Even if we don't require a doctor to assist, it would be enough to not use the law to forbid the assistance.

If anyone is concerned that vulnerable &/or dependent people will be subtly coerced to auto-euthanasia, then the law could be written so as to prevent that. But, ultimately, if it isn't possible to ensure that a dependent, elderly or severely-disabled person hasn't received any persuasion, or hints, or subtle coercion, then we just have to accept that the fact that someone's personal choices could conceivably be influenced by someone else, but that doesn't justify taking away people's right to make those choices.

That would be like making it illegal for anyone to go outside, because they could get murdered somewhere while they're away from home. It would be like saying that elderly people shouldn't be allowed to receive a pension, because someone could swindle them out of their check. ...or that they shouldn't be allowed to have any control of their own money, because maybe someone will cheat them out of it.

If we're saying things like that, then we aren't just on a slippery slope, we're already slid to the bottom.

We could make a good, and at least almost entirely successful, effort to write and enforce laws that prevent the auto-euthanasia option from being abused.

That first "Basically you're right" meets with various constraints and checks on consideration.

The only limitation that I'd impose would be that, if we had a good society where people had a fair chance to live (but we don't), assistance for auto-euthanasia wouldn't be permitted for people who obviously don't have pain or disability that a fairly reasonable person could conceivably consider entirely unacceptable or intolerable. That's the only "soundness of mind" consideration that I'd require.

But even that restriction would be meaningless and inappropriate in a society of harm, predation, unnecessary misfortune, inequality, etc.

But, in any society, if someone has pain or disability that isn't obviously trivial or minor, then they should be eligible for assisted auto-euthanasia upon request, no matter whether or not they're of sound mind, whatever that means.

Assisted suicide is no way to solve issues of equity.

Who says issues of equity can be solved? Haven't people been talking about that for centuries, completelyi futile-ly?

It isn't a solution for equity issues. It's just that denial of assisted autoeuthanasia makes no sense, for anyone, in a bad societyi. It's a moral issue. I believe that suicide (unnecessary auto-euthanasia) is a really bad idea. But it can't justifiably withheld or denied in a bad society.

Michael Ossipoff

Obviously, as I too said, people, including disabled people, should have a fair and equal chance in life. Justice, equality, fairness,.opportunity. But, even with those things some people find their disability unacceptable or even intolerable.

Stella Young certainly has the right to make her own choices and preferences. ...as does each person, each disabled person in particular, even if they don't agree with her,and if their wishes aren't the same as hers. Therefore I don't think one person has a right to decide what options should be available to someone else.

In my previous post here, I certainly didn't mean to imply that auto-euthanasia would be the right choice for disabled people. That's their choice, their decision. All I meant was that, if someone feels and insists that their disability is intolerable, or even unacceptable, for them, in their opinion, and if they request assistance for auto-euthanasia, then they have a right to it.

And I'm not primarily saying that for other people. I'm saying it because making one's own decisions is a basic right, and everyone, including me, should have that right. ...in all individual matters, including the matter of if and when to choose assisted auto-euthanasia.
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Basically you're right.

Certainly, if someone has a disability (old or new, resulting from injury, disease, old-age, or any other cause) that that person feels unacceptably reduces hir (his/her) quality of life, then s/he should have state-supported medical assistance for humane "suicide". (...but, under those conditions, I don't call it "suicide". I call it medically-justified auto-euthanasia.)

Where I disagree with you is when you require the applicant to be of sound mind. If someone has any disability (as outlined above) that anyone could call unacceptable, then the applicant shouldn't have to be of sound mind. Anyway, a serious injury or disease or other condition that spoils your quality of life could very likely also affect your soundness of mind...physically or emotionally. How sound of mind would you be if something really bad happened to you?

As for people without a disability, that's more difficult.

Ideally, they don't need auto-euthanasia. Yes, they didn't choose this life. Didn't even choose life...or did they? I claim that we're in a life because we're someone, prior-ly a hypothetical person, who is predisposed for life, wants or needs life, or is involved with it in some way.

In any case, you're certainly involved in life now. You're not done till you're done. Some suggest, and i agree, that life-completion can require many lives.

Therefore, you're here for a reason. The fact that you're here indicates that you aren't done.

Ideally, there would be counseling and all kinds of help for people who think they don't want to live.

But we don't live in an ideally-run world--not even close.

And, in a world such as this one, I claim that anyone less fortunate has a right to assisted suicide upon demand, even without any disability, just because of their disadvantaged station in this world.

You can't treat people the way that they're sometimes treated in this world, and simultaneously tell them that they don't have a right to assisted auto-euthanasia.

So, in our world, anyone, without exception, should be able to get assistance for auto-euthanasia.

That's just an obvious moral fact.

But, I still emphasize that, unless there's an intolerable disability (and only the person hirself should be the judge of that intolerability), auto-euthanasia would be a big mistake, even in our world. ...for the reasons i expressed earlier in this post. ...because we're in a life for a reason, and we're obviously not done.

It's just that it's necessary to emphasize a distinction between the rightness and advisability of auto-euthanasia, and the moral right (under our societal conditions) to it, even if it's a big mistake. The moral right is there, even when auto-euthanasia is highly inadvisable.

No one should do auto-euthanasia without an intolerable disability, even in our monstrous world.

Without the justification of an unacceptable disability, auto-euthanasia is suicide, and suicide is a big mistake.

But there are also those who think they understand metaphysics, who, from my inexpert opinion, really don't. It's like the thousands of people who line up for talent shows who think they can sing or play piano — Wayfarer

One thing that there's too much of in these discussions of metaphysics is vague criticism, unspecified disagreement, expression of emotional feelings about what others say, instead of specific objections that you can answer for and justify.

But, sure, there's much metaphysical confusion here. Some think that it's completely indeterminate and speculative. Maybe that notion comes from Western academic philosophers, who use the supposed indeterminacy, relativism, speculativeness, to the hilt, to ensure that their debates, discussions, issues will go on forever, ensuring that there will always be something to publish, in keeping with "Publish or Perish".

On the contrary, metaphysics isn't a vague, speculative, relativist subject. Definite uncontroversial statements can be made. Definitions need to be well-specified and consistently-used. Statements need to be supported.

Yes, metaphysical "debate" here is interminable and without progress. It resembles the Democrat convention, in its seriousness and objectiveness.

In proposing my metaphysics, I made a point of only saying things that no one would disagree with.

Though a lot of people here have made angry-noises about my metaphysical proposal, no one has expressed disagreement with a statement in that proposal.

Michael Ossipoff

By the way, I've encountered "physicists" on forums before.

One of them (what a coincidence) said that he, too, had a PhD. ...but he miss-spelled PhD.

Another said that his PhD was in physics. But later, when he said something so ridiculous that that pretense wouldn't work, he suddenly changed into a population-ecology scientist.

Michael Ossipoff

My PhD was in Computational Quantum Mechanics. — tom

Sure :D

Not if what you've been posting is any indication.

I'd said:

Didn't Wittgenstein say something about remaining silent on things that you're clueless about? —

You replied:

I think he was referring to you.

No, I don' think so, because I'm not the one expounding on physics, or trying to bring it into a philosophical discussion.

I'd said:

There are ample effectively-isolated systems whose energy can be measured at successive times.

You replied:

Choose one of these systems, and describe how measurements of the total energy might be made.

Have a piece of solid matter in an insulated vacuum container, supported from the top by strings, so that it has as little contact with anything as possible.

The container's inner surface is completely reflective, or maybe the piece of matter is at thermal equilibrium with the thin inside layer of the wall when both temperature-measurements are made.. The piece of matter is of a material that won't undergo a reaction or decay (to any degree that would affect the temperature-readings).

Measure its temperature by infrared sensing, or any temperature-measurement that won't significantly affect the object's temperature, at two successive times.

If its temperature changes, when it's effectively-isolated, then Conservation of Energy is falsified.

Depending on how sensitive you want the experiment to be, the isolation could be made more elaborate.

Michael Ossipoff

Tell me more about "infinitely-many life-experience possibility-stories, one with you as protagonist".

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Gladly. Ask me something specific. And feel free to say, if you feel that the meaning of something I said isn’t clear. But be specific.
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Is such a story like any of the narrative discourses that abound today(Charles Taylor, Jerome Bruner, etc)?

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When I looked at articles by Bruner and about Taylor, I didn’t find a topic in common with what I’ve been talking about.
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So, in answer to your question, I’d say "Not that I’m aware of".
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Where does it fit within the analytic tradition, in relation to lingustic [sic] models of meaning proposed by authors like Fodor, Searle or Putnam, for example?

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I wasn’t speaking of linguistics. But this website has a Philosophy-of-Language forum that you might be interested in.
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I don’t doubt that Fodor, Searle and Putnam could, and do, ramble endlessly about models of meaning….if what I’ve found so far is any indication.
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You’re asking me how those things fit around what I’ve said. Then I encourage you to read those things, and judge for yourself.
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Or are you saying that you need me to interpret those topics and authors for you?
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When I looked up Fodor, he was described as a philosopher-of-mind. Philosophy-of-mind is garbage.
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Is your question about Searle & Putnam, too, a matter of philosophy-of-mind?
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From what I’ve read by Searle, he believes in Mind as something nonphysical, something meaningful to speak of apart from the body, but believes that “of course” the physical world is the ultimate origin and explanation for everything.
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Is it closer to a corespondence (sic), coherence or pragmatic model of truth?

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You thought maybe I was talking about pragmatic matters? :D
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First, the article that I found, about those 3 theories of truth, was talking about the truth of statements.
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Have I been speaking of statements?
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I’ve been speaking of facts.
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A statement is an utterance claiming a fact.
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But, since you ask:
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A statement of a genuine fact would be true by the correspondence meaning of truth.
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Western academic philosophical writing is a beautifully vast resource for a humungous amount of verbal diarrhea. …meaningful and relevant only to those who spew it forth (if even to them), and to the few people who follow them.
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I prefer to speak in plain English, and I try to speak concisely and to the point. If academic philosophers limited themselves to that, they wouldn’t be able to publish all that filler. Remember the “Publish-or-Perish” imperative.
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If an author wants to propose, present or offer his ideas to me and to most people, then I invite him to say it concisely in non-jargon English. (or whatever is the language of those he wants to say it to).
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You could ask me how what I’ve been saying relates to parts of it (the vast academic verbal diarrhea) , and (if I were willing to go along with that), this kind of question-and-answer could go on for many decades. No, thanks.
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But, if I may get back to the topic:
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As I said to Janus, feel free to specify which statement(s) of mine you disagree with, or which statement(s) I didn’t support, or which statement(s), word(s), phrase(s) or term(s) you don’t know the meaning of.
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But be specific.
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If you don’t disagree with any of it, that’s fine too.
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Michael Ossipoff