That would be a good question to ask Biblical LIteralists next time they knock on your door.

But this is a philosophy-forum. The notion of Hell as the result of a judicial decision is simplistic anthropomorphic Biblical Literalism.

So is the belief in omnipotence--evidently shared by Atheists and other Biblical-Literalists

Why do you so firmly and unshakably believe in a judicial decision that sentences people to Hell?

...and in God's power to make all of us in such a way that none of us will ensnarl ourselves in things that we later might not like?

In fact, the notion of "Creation" is, itself, anthropomorphic. No one is more Biblical-Literalist or Fundamentalist than an Atheist.

Should we believe in God's omnipotence to make custom-made worlds and people to order? And-- while we're at it--to contravene logic, and make a statement be able to be both true and false, and to make two contradictory true propositions or facts?

Michael Ossipoff

In the ongoing context of your long failure to support your comments, or to answer or listen to others' comments, eventual blunt language is inevitable.

But, in this thread, I didn't say anything about existential-angst as fashion. I didn't criticize you. It's you who are making it personal, ad-hominem, by changing the subject to my allegedly bad manners.

I wasn't rude to you in this thread.

Michael Ossipoff

I support what I say. You don't support your sweeping generalization about life being overall bad.

Michael Ossipoff

I bring up a lot of the negative aspects of the human experience

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We get that from the news too.
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, and the structural suffering of life

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Exactly—It’s largely or mostly in the societal structure.
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But no, you won’t change that.
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I guess this can be construed as complaining.

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No sh*t.
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But then, I am bringing up disapproval of a negative state of affairs. In this case, it is the negative state of affairs of life itself.

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You say it, but you don’t support it.
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Yes we all know that, to varying degrees, there’s misfortune and suffering in life. …not justifying your sweeping generalization.
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Philosophical discussion should consist of more than assertions.
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It is perhaps to catalyze people to look at it for what is going on to us as a whole.

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You mean, “…in part”. When you speak of what’s going on for us as a whole, you’re speaking without support.
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Barbara Ehrenreich said something to the effect that death doesn’t interrupt life, but rather life interrupts sleep.
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Her statement is about which is the natural, rightful, usual, normal state of affairs, and which is the temporary interruption.
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Of course you realize that this life is an interesting phenomenon, and that it’s temporary, a temporary interruption of the usual state of affairs.
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What more is there to be said about it? The meaning and point of your complaining about it isn’t clear.
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(Strictly-speaking, it would be more accurate to say that life, overall, doesn’t really interrupt anything, because there was no “You” to initially experience not being in a life, because the person “You” consists of a complementary part of that life-experience-possibility-story.
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If there’s reincarnation (and there probably is), then of course now life and sleep interrupt eachother for a while. …until the temporary interruption of sleep by life ends, after a very many lives, at the distant end-of-lives.)
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One reason why your complaining about being in a life doesn’t make sense is that (as many have already pointed out) there was no “You” before you were in a life. …because, as I said above, you consist of a complementary part of your life-experience-possibility-story.
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In other words, there was no “You” for life to happen to. Consider that before you complain about being in a life. Nothing happened to you, because there wasn’t any you other than the one in this life. There was no other way you could have been, other than in this life.
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Or do you believe in disembodied spirits that were there before they somehow later ended up in a life?
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If you’re right, and there’s no reincarnation, then life will be over for you at the end of this life. Yes, in the meantime, some hardship (more for some than others) is part of the nature of life. It’s temporary.
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Regardless of whether you agree with any explanation for why you’re in a life, it, as I said above, is an interesting temporary phenomenon.
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Michael Ossipoff

I was playing a simple game, and I had this realization that life may be devoid of meaning; but, still be enjoyable.

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Of course. That’s what I’ve been saying all along, when such matters are discussed at these forums.
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Firstly, one can say many things about life, that it sucks, is full of suffering, that they wouldn't want to bring children into such a world, and so on... But, despite all this, life is a mystery nonetheless. We came about by a stroke of chance, depending on whether you're religious or not.

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No, that’s a theory, an unsupported assumption, and one that I don’t agree with. But we can agree that our being in a life is remarkable and astonishing, even though it has an explanation.
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As things are, scientists explore nature and in their own way feel the mystery of life through reason.

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A valid study, but without bearing on metaphysics. (…except that some specialist experts on QM say that it lays to rest the notion of an objective physical world.)
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But sure, the physical world is mysterious, even as a physics study.
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Religious types might feel similarly; but, instead of 'reason', it's faith.

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It isn’t a matter of “instead”. Religious faith in no way contradicts science’s reason. …nor vice-versa.
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I will most likely never be too religious a person, although I'm sure many scientists might have become religious over the sheer complexity of nature or elegant simplicity. I'm too firm a believer in reason to be persuaded by storytelling.

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That’s the story that True-Believers in Materialism and Science-Worship tell themselves. As I said, contrary to popular belief, reason doesn’t contradict religion. And the Atheists’ notion of religion as “storytelling” is simplistic. Do some religions tell stories? Sure. Does that define and characterize religion? No.
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By all means, enjoy science! But have the humility and modesty to not expound, unsupported, on other matters.
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Michael Ossipoff

”You believe in an un-acknowledged and unsupported assumption that the physical world that we live in is the "actual", "existent", "physical" and "real" one, in some (unspecified) sense in which the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds aren't.” — Michael Ossipoff
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I do not deny the existence of other universes in a multiverse

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I agree with the usage of those who define “this universe” as our Big-Bang Universe (BBU), and any physically-inter-related multiverse of which it is part. In other words, the BBU and all else that it’s physically-related to. Physical relation includes origin, common-origin, shared spatial-continuum, physical influence or interaction.
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, or even independently.

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I interpret that as referring to other possibility-worlds, logical systems. Our physical universe is one of infinitely-many such logical-systems—or at least there’s no reason to believe otherwise.
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As David Lewis suggested, each such physical possibility-world is “actual” for its inhabitants (if it has any). The word “actual” is best defined as an adjective to denote the physical possibility-world in which the speaker resides.
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I am only saying that, as we are not in dynamic contact with them, they are epistemologically irrelevant.

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…whatever that means. Their “existence” as systems of inter-referring abstract implications is uncontroversial. They’re relevant because we live in one of them.
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”there's no reasons to claim that they're [the physical possibility-worlds]"real" or "existent", whatever that would mean.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Anything that can act in any way exists. That is sufficient reason to think that things that act to inform me are real.

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By your definition, then, hypothetical physical worlds are real, because their constituent things act on eachother.
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”There's no reason to believe that your experience is other than such an abstract logical system.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Of course there is. The things I experience act on me and I am aware of their action on me. Abstract logical systems do not act on me in the same way.

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That’s circular. It assumes that your experience-story itself isn’t an abstract logical system.
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Of course your experience is of things acting on you. That’s your experience-story. It’s about the interaction between you and your surroundings. It’s about your surroundings acting on you. That hardly can be given as a reason to say that it’s more than a hypothetical story about you and your surroundings’ interaction with you.
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”If you claim that this physical world is more than the setting for the hypothetical logical system that is your experience-story, then in what respect to you think that this physical world is more than that.” — Michael Ossipoff

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Because mere hypotheticals can't act on anything.

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Of course they can. They can and do act on other hypotheticals, including the physical animal that you are, in a hypothetical experience story about the experiences of that physical animal in its physical surroundings.
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”Do you believe in unparsimonious brute-facts and unverfiable, unfalsifiable propositions?” — Michael Ossipoff
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No.

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Good. Then you don’t believe in an “objectively existent” (as opposed to hypothetical) physical world whose existence you can’t explain, and whose more-than-hypothetical “reality” and “objective physical existence” you can’t define.
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In other words, you aren’t a Materialist. Good.
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Michael Ossipoff

speaking of worlds as simply "possible" allows one to confuse logical, physical and ontological possibility. — Dfpolis

...distinctions whose advocates can't specify what they mean by them — Michael Ossipoff


I can. I said :

"P is possible with respect to a set of facts, S, if P does not contradict the propositions expressing S." — Dfpolis


Logical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the facts we know.

Physical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the laws of nature.
Alternately, one may mean the proposition is consistent with S = the laws of nature plus the facts we know about a physical state.

Ontological or metaphysical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the nature of being qua being. — Dfpolis

Your symbolic jargon is getting in the way of your knowing what you're saying. Better to say it in English.

So, without the jargon, can you say what it would mean to say that this physical world has physical or ontological reality or existence that the hypothetical logical system that I described doesn't have?

And if you say that the difference is that this physical world is "actual", then of course I'll ask what you mean by "actual". ...I mean I'll ask if you have a better answer than your previous one.

Is there a physics experiment that can establish that this physical world is other than a logical system, a system of logical and mathematical relation--as physicist Michael Faraday suggested in 1844?

Michael Ossipoff

True, "That one" or "This one" has a pointing connotation, which could sound rude, or make someone uncomfortable.

Michael Ossipoff

"But you don't know what you mean by "actual". Or, if you do know what you mean by it, you're keeping it to yourself." — Michael Ossipoff


By "actual" I mean operational or able to act. — Dfpolis

Characters in a story act on eachother. Are they actual?

Maybe best to stick with Lewis's definition of "Actual":

"in, of, part of, or consisting of, the physical world inhabited by the speaker".

By that definition, this physical world is "actual" when spoken of by you, even if it's entirely hypothetical with no objective existence. If you think it has objective existence, then what do you mean by "objective existence"?

As mere hypotheticals can't act, they aren't actually facts.

There are genuine abstract facts about hypotheticals.

" "Fact" is often or usually defined as a relation among things, or as a state-of-affairs". — Michael Ossipoff


OK. As long as the things and states are actual, I have no problem with this.

No, that isn't part of the definition. A fact can be about things that are entirely hypothetical, and which aren't actual to anyone in this physical universe.

"If there were Jaberwockeys, Slitheytoves, and the property of being brillig, and if all Slithytoves were brillig, and all Jaberwockeys were Slitheytoves, then all Jaberwockeys would be brillig."

"in what regard, in what manner, do you think this physical world is different from merely the setting for your hypothetical life-experience-story, consisting of a hypothetical logical system such as I've described?" — Michael Ossipoff


Because a hypothetical story represents actions and states of affairs that did not occur.

Wrong. The story's actions occurred in the story. You haven't said in exactly what manner this physical world is more than the setting of that hypothetical experience-story. Things occur in your experience-story.

What's a test-able difference between things occurring in your experience-story as I defined it, and things "actually" occurring?

That's what I'm asking when I ask you what you mean.

Tomorrow morning I'll reply to your posts that I haven't replied to yet.

Michael Ossipoff

Thanks for the reasonable grammatical comments, which I agree with.

But:

Forms like "this one" are "stylistically raised" and not equivalent to pronouns. "Jo ate the cake, but this one didn't like it." vs. "Jo ate the cake, but they didn't like it." I much prefer "they". — Dawnstorm

Maybe "Jo ate the cake, but that one didn't like it" would be better.

When I took Latin, we routinely said "that one" in translations. I just like it because it doesn't contradict other grammar.

But, as you point out, the singular "You" contradicts previous grammar, and so such grammatical changes to a language do happen. And the singular "they" already has gotten fairly well-established.

-----------------

"Y'all" sounds regional and has cultural connotations about the speaker. And, because "Y'all" is used so much as singular, some consider it necessary to say "All y'all" for plural,

"You-Lot" is specifically British, and when I used it, someone asked me in what part of the South (where I was living) they said that.

"You folks" is too informal sometimes, and also has some cultural connotation.

"You people" seems to carry a disparaging sound.

"You Guys" is out of the question when it calls females "guys".

Maybe I should go back to "You Lot".

Michael Ossipoff

Someone who rejects gender, implicitly rejects my gender as well as their own. — Marcus de Brun

I don't see how, unless it's taken to the extreme of criticizing the rest of us for accepting the physical nature that we were born as. ...if it's a cultural creativity thing, and if it turns critical of others who don't share that cultural path (if that's what it is).

But all that is getting outside of what I was talking about, which was just a grammar-convenience matter.

Gender rejection as such is little different to homophobia.

Notwithstanding that, the rejection of one's gender implies the existence of a dis-ease with ones genetic gender.

I didn't want to address the question of whether the person professing no-gender, or gender-non-binary-ness (but who is physically of definite gender, as nearly all are) is right about themself, or deceived about themself, or just following a cultural pursuit.

That isn't for me to say. But progressives usually agree to allow everyone's individuality, of whatever form, as long as no one else is wronged or harmed.

Anyway, this is just about grammar. ...a language-philosophical, largely hypothetical, question. As I mentioned in another reply, hypothetical questions aren't unusual at a philosophy-forum.

When we respect the choice of others (as we apparently must do) we also ignore the pain that lies behind the disassociation.

Well, there's nothing we can do about that. We can't get into someone else's head and understand them, much less fix them, or know if that's possible or needed.

But surely, if someone whom you knew were professing that attribute, you might ask them if they're really sure about it, and why they think so, etc. There's something to what you say, in the sense that a counselor, therapist or medical professional should talk to the person some, instead of immediately assuming that they're right about themself. Surely sometimes uncritically taking someone at their word is a dis-service. ...but I'm not saying that the person should be pressured.

(On a related topic, I don't understand why "sex-change" surgery is done on physically-normal people, I can't believe that doctors do it. But that's a whole other topic.)

People have the right to choose that their pain should be ignored by self and by others. However that which is ignored can rarely be ameliorated.

As I said above, I don't think it should be completely ignored,

Michael Ossipoff

They should be as progressive as they want; just keep it in the family. — Bitter Crank

They are. It's just a question of form for those who want to observe that particular progressive courtesy. No one's suggesting that any grammar should be compulsory.

They seem to want everyone to march in lock step. Surely progressives don't want to be dictatorial, do they?

No, it's just a discussion regarding how that (at least presumed) preference by some could best or most easily be accomodated by those who choose to.

But I haven't read anything by professed nonbinary-identified people regarding that grammatical question, and so that's why I used "presumed" in the previous paragraph.

Is it important? Are some people of definite physical gender really inborn-ly gender-nobinary? Or is it just cultural? I won't claim to have the answer to that. That's a whole other issue. I was just addressing the grammataical issue, a simpler subject.

But, just to speak thoroughly, of course there are a very few people who are genuinely physically not of specific or definite gender. They're so few that practically none of us would have any use for this grammatical question in regards to them, but it's a hypothetical question. ...and philosophy forums like hypothetical questions.

Michael Ossipoff

But many progressives want there to be a wide progressive unity, as wide as possible. ...including when something doesn't seem very important to most, but is important to some (without regard to whether we agree on the importance). ...especially in any instance when there are people who are perceived to be, or arguably are, on the wrong end of things.

You didn't say "PC", but I'll just add that things like that don't qualify for objection as "PC" unless someone is wronged by them. We're talking about something that's harmless, and so it isn't problematic.

Michael Ossipoff

My own mother tongue has a gender neutral word for the third person: "hän". The word hän refers to both sexes, hence a Finn cannot now exactly which gender one is from the word. Yet I don't think this changes the culture or gender relations in any particular way. — ssu

How is it pronounced?

It would be quicker and easier to say than "This one", "That one", "This person" or "That person"

Michael Ossipoff

You said:

Facts are actual, not merely possible

But you don't know what you mean by "actual". Or, if you do know what you mean by it, you're keeping it to yourself.

Possible worlds might be a consistent set of posits, they are not a consistent set of facts

[/quote]

You see, that's where you're wrong.

There are infinitely-many completely hypothetical worlds and stories that consist of consistent sets of facts. I spoke of hypothetical life-experience stories that consist of complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and the many consistent configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions.

Those abstract implications that I referred to above are facts.

An implication is an implying.

In logic usage, it's an implying of one proposition by another proposition.

"Fact" is often or usually defined as a relation among things, or as a state-of-affairs.

An implying of one proposition by another proposition fits both of those definitions.

But we needn't quibble about what you think "fact" means. I said what I meant without using that word. The question was, in what regard, in what manner, do you think this physical world is different from merely the setting for your hypothetical life-experience-story, consisting of a hypothetical logical system such as I've described?

Regarding your other posted answers, I'll reply to them tomorrow morning.

I just wanted to correct your above-quoted statement in this post today.

Michael Ossipoff

What makes it the case that one thing in one possible world and one thing in another possible world are the same thing? — Michael

As David Lewis pointed out, there's no need to say that those identical things (or persons) in other possibility-worlds are the same person. Instead, call them "counterparts" of that thing or person.

It depends on how you define "same". Lewis's suggestion was that "same" doesn't meaningfully and usefully apply to someone or something in a different possibility world, It's a different world, necessarily with different (even if identical) things.

After all, usefulness is a consideration when defining a word.

Michael Ossipoff

Is it really so odd to see it used this way when it's for an explicitly gender neutral person? It seems exactly the same to me. — MindForged

Yes, I see what you mean. "They" is already in wide use for referring to some unspecified one person, and so why not use it to refer to a specified one person.

But wouldn't it be better to instead:

1. Use subject-less verbs, as so many other langluages allow? ...and even object-less transitive verbs?

2. Use "This one", "That one", "This person" or "That person"?

3. Or adopt a gender-neutral singular personal pronoun from a different language?

So, I'm not so much criticizing "They, Them, Their" for that purpose. Mostly, I'm just suggesting something better.

By the way, would you use a singular verb with "They"? That doesn't have the long-established usage we spoke of, and it's a further direct contradiction in a sentence.

Michael Ossipoff

speaking of worlds as simply "possible" allows one to confuse logical, physical and ontological possibility. — Dfpolis

...distinctions whose advocates can't specify what they mean by them.

You believe in an un-acknowledged and unsupported assumption that the physical world that we live in is the "actual", "existent", "physical" and "real" one, in some (unspecified) sense in which the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds aren't.

David Lewis, more realistically, defined "the actual world" as the world in which the speaker resides.

And then, while advocating the unique existence, actuality and reality of our own physical world, people then wonder why there is that thing that they assert their belief in. :D

What we can all agree on is that there are abstract implications, in the sense that we can refer to them and mention them.

There's no reason to ask why there are such things, and there's no reasons to claim that they're "real" or "existent", whatever that would mean.

There are infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, with the many consistent configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions.

...with no particular reason to believe that any of the antecedents of any of those implications are true.

Some of those abstract logical systems fit the same description as your experience. There's no reason to believe that your experience is other than such an abstract logical system. I call such systems "hypothetical life experience stories".

If you claim that this physical world is more than the setting for the hypothetical logical system that is your experience-story, then in what respect to you think that this physical world is more than that.

More "actual", "existent" or "real"? Then what do you mean by those words.

In what context do you want or believe this physical universe to be "existent", other than its own?

I don't claim that this physical universe and its things don't have some other (unspecified) kind of "existence" (whatever that would mean), as a superfluous, unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, one of the infinitely-many abstract logical-systems that I referred to above.

Do you believe in unparsimonious brute-facts and unverfiable, unfalsifiable propositions?

Michael Ossipoff

Much, most or all of the discussion about God here is from Atheists.

But, to answer your question, Benevolence is its own purpose, and doesn't need any other purpose.

God is often spoken of anthropomorphically as an individual or a being. Likewise the word "create" is anthropomorphic

So I don't use the word "God" except when replying to someone who has used that word.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd like to emphasize that I'm not saying that David Lewis speaks for me.

I just wanted to mention that he said some things that I say, but I also mentioned some differences, and found more at SEP.

Michael Ossipoff

By now it seems you've begun to speak as if your complex system of hypothetical propositions is a thing that "exists", even apart from and independently of any physical world. But this claim is extremely controversial. — Cabbage Farmer

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Aside from the fact that I didn't say that it "exists" (whatever that would mean), let me comment on the following:
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...independently of any physical world.

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What? Some of the complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications are no different in kind for what I suggested that our physical world is. (I asked you in what way you think this physical world is different from or more than that--a question that objectors never seem to be able to answer.)
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Is it that Cabbage Farmer feels that a physical world needs observers/experiencers? No problem:
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In the hypothetical experience-stories that I speak of, the experiencer and the physical world of hir (his/her) experience are complementary to eachother. ...mutually-complementary parts of the same system.
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The physical worlds aren't independent of an experiencer. The physical worlds are only the complementary setting for the experiencer's experience in the hypothetical experience-story.
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Here, quoted from a Wikipedia article about David Lewis’s Modal Realism, is a good assessment of people’s problem with Modal Realism (…and what the objections to my metaphysics always really come down to):
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Catastrophic counterintuitiveness The theory does not accord with our deepest intuitions about reality.

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Yes, but intuition isn’t always helpful in philosophy.
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This is sometimes called "the incredulous stare", since it lacks argumentative content, and is merely an expression of the affront that the theory represents to "common sense" philosophical and pre-philosophical orthodoxy.

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Yes, that basically what the objections to my proposal come down to. But of course people try to portray their objections as arguments. …but always turn out to not know what they mean by the terms used in their objections.
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Lewis is concerned to support the deliverances of common sense in general: "Common sense is a settled body of theory — unsystematic folk theory — which at any rate we do believe; and I presume that we are reasonable to believe it. (Most of it.)" (1986, p. 134). But most of it is not all of it (otherwise there would be no place for philosophy at all), and Lewis finds that reasonable argument and the weight of such considerations as theoretical efficiency compel us to accept modal realism. The alternatives, he argues at length, can themselves be shown to yield conclusions offensive to our modal intuitions.

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Michael Ossipoff

Quite right. Many parents are emotionally &/or morally unqualified to be responsible for children.

Parenting should be a privilege for those who are qualified, and not a right.

But a (impossible) better society would be needed in order to implement such a system. You can't lift yourself by your bootstraps.

Michael Ossipoff

I’m posting this as a reply to Cabbage Farmer, not because there’s any longer a reason to try to communicate with him, but only because, as a matter of form and propriety, he should be notified of this reply to something that he asked that I hadn’t yet answered. Otherwise it could be suggested that I’m posting furtively,
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But this post isn’t to Cabbage Farmer. It’s to anyone else who notices this thread.
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Then why am I posting this answer (below in this posting)? Because, unlike some people, I answer questions that are asked of me.
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Of course the “conversation” with Cabbage Farmer ended as these conversations always do: …with Cabbage Farmer being asked what he means by some of his words, and not answering. …because he doesn’t know what he means.
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I posted this as a reply to Cabbage Farmer as a matter of form and propriety, because I don’t want to seem to be posting furtively, trying to evade possible criticism or refutation of what I say.
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Here’s Cabbage Farmer’s question that I didn’t answer:
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Do you have something like the "possible worlds" of modal logicians in mind here?

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I didn’t answer because I’d already said what I meant, and answered questions about what I meant, and invited specific questions about particular sentences, terms, words or statements that Cabbage Farmer might not understand the meaning of—and questions about the justification of conclusions.
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…and because it seems best to let modal logicians speak for themselves about their positions.
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But I’ll say that, regarding the relation of our “actual” physical universe to the other hypothetical physical universes, David Lewis’s “Modal Realism” says much of what I say.
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Before I paste some of what I found about it, I’ll just say that one difference is that I speak of a subjective experience-story instead of an objective world-story.
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Here’s some of what I found:
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An important, but significantly different notion of possibilism known as modal realism was developed by the philosopher David Lewis."[1] On Lewis's account, the actual world is identified with the physical universe of which we are all a part. Other possible worlds exist in exactly the same sense as the actual world; they are simply spatio-temporally unrelated to our world, and to each other. Hence, for Lewis, "merely possible" entities—entities that exist in other possible worlds—exist in exactly the same sense as do we in the actual world; to be actual, from the perspective of any given individual x in any possible world, is simply to be part of the same world as x.

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According to the indexical conception of actuality, favoured by Lewis (1986), actuality is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds have relative to themselves too. Actuality is an intrinsic property of each world, so world w is actual just at world w. "Actual" is seen as an indexical term, and its reference depends on its context.[6] Therefore, there is no feature of this world (nor of any other) to be distinguished in order to infer that the world is actual, "the actual world" is actual simply in virtue of the definition of "actual": a world is actual simpliciter.
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At the heart of David Lewis's modal realism are six central doctrines about possible worlds:
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Possible worlds exist – they are just as real as our world;
[…but I make no claim that the hypothetical physical worlds (consisting of systems of abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and of self-consistent configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions) exist other than in the sense that we can refer to them and speak of them.
In agreement with Lewis, I speak of our own “actual” physical universe as really no different in kind, or in existence-status, from all the other hypothetical logical systems called “physical worlds”.]
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Possible worlds are the same sort of things as our world – they differ in content, not in kind;
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Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic – they are irreducible entities in their own right.
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Actuality is indexical. When we distinguish our world from other possible worlds by claiming that it alone is actual, we mean only that it is our world.
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Possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal interrelations of their parts; every world is spatiotemporally isolated from every other world.
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Possible worlds are causally isolated from each other.

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Michael Ossipoff

Reason is in fact the path to faith, and faith takes over when reason can say no more.” Thomas merton — Rank Amateur

Exactly.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd like to correct some wording that didn't say what I meant:

Since when does a Roomba care if you turn it off, or accidentally spill water into it, or if it falls downstairs? — Michael Ossipoff

Of course, I assume, a Roomba is designed to avoid going over the edge of a stair-step at the top of a staircase. So of course that means that it does care if it falls downstairs.

...but only when it's time to avoid that. It's like us in that regard. We too are designed, by natural selection, to protect ourselves from harm.

Acting on a preference when it's time to act on it doesn't mean having an attitude about the outcome after it happens. Like the Roomba, we, as purposefully-responsive devices, are about the actions toward our design purposes. Period. That's why I say that we aren't here for things to happen to. We're just the one who acts for our purposes and preferences when called for. That's why I said that we're about our likes and preferences.

Hinduism speaks of life being primarily for play ("Lila").

Michael Ossipoff

Of course there's something to what you say. There was a Twilight-Zone episode in which a criminal died, and found himself in a place where he could have whatever he wanted, for the asking. Always surrounded by adoring women, jewels, cash,, liquor, and he never lost at the roulette table.

Eventually it was all so easy that he was bored of it, and told he proprietor that he wanted to go to the other place. The proprietor said, "This is the other place."

And of course having robots, or well-meaning people, do everything for us wouldn't be any fun.

But you're ignoring the really horrible things that can happen to someone. You can't tell me that those things would make you happier, or that the fact that some of them might happen to you makes you happier.

As do I, you feel that what-is, is good. ...that things are really alright. They are. But not for the reason you're saying. Those horrible fates really are undesirable. The risk and possibility of those horrible things really is undesirable.

Is it good that unarmed Black people are being killed by police on a continual regular basis? Explain that to their mothers.

Likewise all the many other intentional massacres, torture and other atrocities that we all hear about, which, likewise, are being done regularly, continually and routinely. You and I, where we live, aren't subject to that risk. It's easy for someone who is safe from it to say that it's a good thing, but try explaining that to a family that has lost someone in that way.

Imagine a world where there was NO adversity. No problems of any kind. No bad weather, no conflict, no natural disasters, no famine or death... You know what would inevitably occur? The analytical centers in your brain would essentially begin to atrophy, having Nothing To Process. Meanwhile, more and more of your brain would be used to process enjoyment and creativity. Eventually all rationality would be lost until all that was left was a brain that could only operate on instinctual satisfaction of desire. — Lucid

The point is that adversity, struggle, and conflict are an essential part in what has given us the intelligence and awareness we so appreciate, and without which, we would be little more than animals with a sense of wonder. — Lucid

No, those things wouldn't happen if the weather were always good, and no one were perpetrating massacres or torture. There are plenty of other sources of happiness, plenty of other things to like.

I grew up where there are no tornadoes or hurricanes, Just the occasional earthquake. We heard about tsunamis, but never encountered one. But I doubt that anyone's happiness depended on the risk of a fatal earthquake or tsunami. I grew up during the Cold War, and yes of course anything dangerous is of interest, but there's no evidence for saying that a reasonable person couldn't have been happy without that danger.

When I was a kid, I liked to be told, read &/or ask about everything dangerous. Volcanoes, earthquakes, quicksand, the various kinds of really dangerous weather events, venomous snakes and spiders, crocodiles, large carnivore mammals that sometimes eat people. I suggest that it's natural and adaptive for us to be interested in things that could threaten us. That information could be helpful for survival. One reason why you and I were even born is because some ancestor of ours wanted to find out about things that could threaten his safety, and thereby survived something that he otherwise wouldn't have survived. The ones who didn't, many or most of them don't have any descendants now. We inherited that attribute.

Of course I liked those subjects. But there were also plenty of other things to like, and I don't think that we'd all have been miserable and bored without those dangerous things.

And the horrors of all the human-perpetrated atrocities and horrible diseases, etc. don't contribute to anyone's happiness.

Oh, one curious thing. One day in '64, they said that there was some small chance that a tsunami might arrive near or at our town. So my mom's guest, and my sister and I all drove down to the beach, and joined the crowd of people there who didn't want to miss the tsunami. :D

People sometimes seem to seek danger. Evel Kenieval is an example. But that's usually the exception.

Michael Ossipoff

Correction:

At the end of my post before the most recent one, I mean to say that there isn't a possible omnipotence like the advocates of the Argument from Evil seem to want to attribute to Theism.

Michael Ossipoff

Sorry, but I've added this edit-addition to my post before this one, and I want to add it here in a separate post too, in case you've already read the other post.

Since when does a Roomba care if you turn it off, or accidentally spill water into it, or if it falls downstairs?

Have the wisdom of a Roomba.

Sure we care about what happens to us--enough to do our best to achieve what we like, want or prefer, and, to that end, to last as long as we can.

But we're about our likes and preferences--as we act on them, when it's time to act on them.. We're not about the outcome when it happens.

Kentucky Buddhist Ken Keys pointed out that we don't have needs.. ...only likes and preferences. — Michael Ossipoff

Michael Ossipoff

I intend to come back through and reply to those who have replied to me. I will admit, I'm not quite sure how to respond, in some cases.

For now, a question. When a writer writes a book. Are they condemned as evil for the horrors in which the characters experience? Unless the book is merely just a cover for the author to live out some fantasies, no. Why is this? Because adversity makes the story interesting, in a most cases.

Yes it's possible to have stories without any conflict or adversity, and yes they can be enjoyable; but they're often short, and simple, and thus proclaimed as children's stories.

So when the author writes of this crazed psychopath who unleashes his killing rage and murders hundreds of people, what makes this acceptable? Not merely the fact of it being a story, because if it was clear that it was just the guise for murderous fantasy, and held nothing in the way of plot or resolution, we would be sickened. — Lucid

If he freely, unnecessarily and wantonly writes such a story, in which the fate of everyone (except maybe a few brutal criminals) is bad, then it can't be said that he's benevolent with respect to his characters.

Of course if he does so because he's constrained by a plot-requirement of delayed justice and postponed good results, including a literary necessity for undeserved bad results for some, then it could be fairly-argued that he isn't omnipotent regarding how he write his story.

I asked in an earlier post to this thread, if Atheists claim that Theists should believe that it's possible to make there be statements that are both true and false, mutually-contradictory facts, mutually-contradictory true propositions, and, in general, impossible contraventions of logic.

And I asked, "Because otherwise, what is the "omni-" in "omnipotent" supposed to mean.

Do Atheists want God to be omnipotent in that regard?

Lives are hypothetical experience-stories, consisting of complex logical-systems, systems of abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. ...with configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions..

The life that you're in is because of you. --you being protagonist in one of those infinitely-many experience-stories.

So do you think it would be possible to make there be a system of mutually-contradictory facts, or mutually-inconsistent truth values for propositions?

Because, if not, then don't expect God to make there be such a physical world, a made-to-order physical world in which everything is fair, good and right.

Among the infinity of possibilities for life-exprerience stories, you have free rein to make yourself consistent with whatever kind of story you will. Evidently you've stumbled, or you wouldn't have been born in a societal world like this one. A stumble can result in behavior that temporarily compounds and worsens the stumble. You're in worse surroundings, leading you to even worse conduct, leading maybe to a temporary worsening multi-life sequence resembling a multi-car pile-up.

But don't hold God responsible for the infinity of possibilities or the particular ones that you (maybe unknowingly) choose.

Forgive me for asserting my metaphysics here--I feel that it's necessary, at some point, to get down to specifics a bit.

If we lived in a perfect world... We'd die of boredom or lose our capacity for intellectual examination of life, much as the creatures in hg wells the time machine became simplistic and juvenile after completely dominating their environment. — Lucid

So you couldn't be happy in a world in which people weren't suffering horrible fates? Does one person's enjoyment or happiness depend on someone else's horrible suffering?

Many people have brought up various diseases. But isn't it the point of a disease for us to overcome it?

I could give numerous examples of irreversible things that can happen to someone, and ask, "How would you overcome that?" You get the idea.

It's when we are in the story and unable to see the true scope of things that we find evil so tragic and intolerable.

That's a bit more like what I'd said: This life and this physical world are only one life and one world, among infinitely-many.

These experience-stories are really insubstantial in their nature. ...implying an open-ness, ethereal-ness, and lightness to them.

But, even for the Materialist, things aren't really so bad. By their account, as animals, we're just purposesfully-responsive devices.

Since when does a Roomba care if you turn it off, or accidentally spill water into it, or if it falls downstairs?

Have the wisdom of a Roomba.

Sure we care about what happens to us--enough to do our best to achieve what we like, want or prefer, and, to that end, to last as long as we can.

But we're about our likes and preferences--as we act on them, when it's time to act on them. We're not about the outcome when it happens.

Kentucky Buddhist Ken Keys pointed out that we don't have needs, or even wants. ...only likes and preferences.

By the material account, then, if we're fulfilling our evolutionary design-purpose as best we can, what more is needed? We aren't here for things to happen to. We're just here to act optimally, for our built-in purposes as purposefully-responsive devices. So what's the big deal?

Don't worry about it. Just do your best. Buddhist have written that when you've acted on, or chosen how to act on a situation, then you've dealt with it.

And, still in the Materialist account, your supposed "free will" is mythical. Your choices are determined for you by your (built-in or acquired) preferences, and the circumstances around you.

So you're relieved of the burden of those "choices".

So: Where's the problem about your "choices" and the outcomes?

And additionally, this life, and even this entire sequence of lives, is temporary. And the sleep at the end-of-lives is final and timeless. ...and therefore is the natural, normal, usual and right state of affairs.

This life, or these lives, is the exception. Barbara Erenreich said something to the effect that death doesn't interrupt life--Rather, life interrupt sleep, the natural, normal, rightful and usual state of affairs.

So: Two answers to the Atheists' Argument from Evil:

1. There isn't a possible "omnipotence" like the Atheists posit.
2. Things aren't as bad as Argument-from-Evil advocates think.

Michael Ossipoff

”You’re confusing “different from” with “in conflict with”. “ — Michael Ossipoff
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No I'm not.

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How’s that for a compelling and irrefutable argument !
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Re-assertion of a criticized claim, used as a supposed answer to a refutation or criticism of that clam.
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…a common trademark-tactic and identification-mark of Internet-abusers.
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I refer you to my comments regarding that matter, in my most two recent posts to this thread.
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If only you could just tentatively let go of your ideology for long enough to just listen to yourself.
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Thank you for giving us an excellent verification, demonstration and example of what Jake was referring to when he said:
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Many or most vocal Internet atheists are actually heretics to their own chosen methodology. They're eager to apply reason to the other fellow's beliefs, but not to their own, which reveals they're not actually interested in reason at all, but have instead confused it with ideology.

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You said:
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You're confusing line spacing with full stops.

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Often, jamming sentences end-to-end in a line or paragraph means that they distract from eachother, sometimes making them less noticed or less easily found, and sometimes losing some clarity.
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Sometimes different sentences should get their own line or paragraph, for emphasis, better visibility, or clarity.
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So I often like to separate them with a line-space, for that reason.
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Another unconventional practice that I admit to:
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A long sentence, or one with added clauses, can lose clarity. So I often use ellipsis (…) to separate an added clause from the main sentence.
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A few other departures from standard “style”:
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I capitalize names of religions, belief-systems, and philosophies, etc., or their adherents or advocates. In general, in fact, I capitalize categories in whatever topic I’m discussing. At sundial forums I capitalize the names of sundials. At map-projection forums I capitalize names of map projections. At calendar forums, I capitalize names of calendars.
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I do that to clarify, distinguish and identify references to main categories in whatever topic the forum discusses.
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I often hyphenate when standard style doesn’t, to clarify that some particular pair of words are part of a phrase that is used as a word. …most frequently, but not always, a noun-phrase. In fact, I sometimes even hyphenate-together two adverbs (but also words of whatever same or mixed part(s)-of-speech), one of which modifies the other, when it would help to clarify their relation, first to eachother, before their relation to the rest of the sentence. It’s akin to the use of parentheses in mathematics or logic notation.
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But I also recognize that standard-style’s avoidance of those capitalizations and hyphenations could be justified on the grounds of writing-ease. But I usually prefer to put clarity first.
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I was once accused of impersonating the Michael Ossipoff who’d written elsewhere. I answered that if I’m not Michael Ossipoff, then I’m doing a thorough job of imitating his unusual style.
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Your "Atheist Science-Worshipper!" over the top rhetoric

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First, are you sure that I’ve used the words “Atheist Science-Worshipper” together? .
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Additionally, even if I’d used that word-combination), are you sure that I had an exclamation point after it?
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Sapientia, we use quotes only for ]direct quotes. We don’t use quotation marks with combinations of words &/or punctuation-marks that the person quoted didn’t use.
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Merriam-Webster’s definition for “rhetoric” that’s closest to the unfavorable meaning that you want to imply, is about insincere or dishonest implication or exaggeration, as opposed to accurate or reasonable factual statements or claims.
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It’s meaningless, inappropriate and rhetorical (by the above unfavorable definition) to apply “rhetoric” to an accurate or reasonable factual statement.
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In another thread, I quoted definitions from Merriam-Webster and Houghton-Mifflin, for “Religion” and “Materialism”. …definitions by which (from both dictionaries) Materialism is a religion.
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Additionally, in my post-before-last to this thread, I quoted John Searle regarding Materialism as religion and faith.
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Additionally, next in that same post, I quoted the well-known Materialist philosopher William Lycan, a quote in which he admitted that his belief or faith in Materialism is a result of his “science-worship” (his term—When I use that term I capitalize it, because I capitalize names of religions).
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Michael Ossipoff

Faith is believing something when there is insufficient evidence for a more formal conclusion. Sometimes when there is no evidence at all. Much of the time, this is reasonable. — Pattern-chaser

Yes, when there's also no proof or convincing evidence to the contrary.

Yes, that's what Sapientia doesn't seem to get at all, because Sapientia is using his own personal, unusual definition of "conflicts with", equating it to "is different from".

Michael Ossipoff

What's interesting about this phenomena is that it illustrates how faith is a human issue, not a religious issue. — Jake

Yes, and, in particular, a social issue and an image issue. There are a lot of people, some of them here, who need to perceive themselves as the scientific debunkers, champions of science.

As Searle pointed out, Materialism (or Science-Worship) is the prevailing religion of our time. In the minds of a lot of people here, proclaiming and championing science establishes one's credentials as one of the scientific, rational people. There's a perception of status in aligning oneself with the prevailing belief-system. .more scientific than thou.

Yes--aligning oneself with perceived authority.

There's no fundamental difference between vehement theists and vehement atheists, it's the same process at work in both cases.

Yes, I sometimes suspect that the people who are loud Atheists and Materialists now, would, in medieval days, have been loud and aggressive persecutors of accused nonbelievers in the official authoritative-perceived religion of that time.

Michael Ossipoff

”Incorrect. If it's not in conflict with established fact, or in conflict with reason, then it's reasonable.” — Michael Ossipoff
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What a pointless "if". It is, by its nature, in conflict with reason, else it wouldn't be a matter of faith.

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You’re confusing “different from” with “in conflict with”.
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If you want to claim that faith that there’s God is in conflict with reason, then you’d need to prove, by reason, that there isn’t.
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Can you show objective proof that Theism isn’t true?
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No, there’s no scientific evidence, registering on Geiger-counters or ammeters. Your problem is that, as a Science-Worshipper, you firmly, faithfully, and unshakably believe that matter is all of reality, and science covers all. To you, Theism must be wrong because it conflicts with that premise. Yes, that’s what it conflicts with.
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John Searle said:
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“Materialism is the religion of our time, and, like more traditional religions, is accepted without question, and provides the framework in which other questions can be posed, addressed, and answered. “
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He also said:
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“Materialists are concerned with a quasi-religious faith that their view must be right.”
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William Lycam (Lycom?) admitted that his “own faith in Materialism is based on Science-Worship.
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”The matter of God, or the matter of the nature or character of Reality as a whole isn't amenable to, or a topic for, proof, reason or logic.” — Michael Ossipoff
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No, that's not true with regards to the matter of God. This very discussion, as well as others, attest to that.

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I would have dismissed all that discussion, but I’ve read a little about the cosmological argument, and it sounds like something that occurred to me too, but more ambitious than what I’ve been saying. I read a good defense of that argument. But I don’t know how it would work with my metaphysics.
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But the cosmological argument, and the other similar arguments, take the matter a lot farther than what I say, It’s much more ambitious that what I’ve been saying, which has just been about impressions and feelings. I don’t know if it’s possible to rightly say as much as the cosmological argument, and similar arguments, say. But I can say that such arguments aren’t necessary to Theism or faith.
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I’ve spoken about there being reasons, in philosophy and in common-sense, for those impressions. Those aren’t claimed to be, and needn’t be, proof. But I won’t go into those here, because they’re outside the scope of this thread.
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I emphasize that belief isn’t the same as assertion.
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But what about pure faith, aside from any reasons for belief?
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That’s valid.
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Some Definitions of Faith:
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Simon & Schuster pocketbook:
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“unquestioning belief “
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or
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“complete trust or confidence”.
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Merriam-Webster:
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“firm belief in something for which there is no proof “
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(Notice that it doesn’t require that there be conflict with proof to the contrary.)
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or
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“complete trust”
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Houghton-Mifflin:
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“belief not based on logical proof or material evidence”
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(Notice that it doesn’t require conflict with logic or material evidence.)
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or
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“confident belief in the truth, value or trustworthiness of a person, idea or thing”
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Nothing can be proved about the character or nature of Reality as a whole (unless one or more arguments like the cosmological argument are right—something that I don’t claim to know—or unless you can prove that there isn’t God.)
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…so I’ll just say that, so far as I know, nothing can be proved about the character or nature of Reality as a whole.
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Therefore, one person’s impression, opinion or trust is as valid as that of another.

.There’s nothing unreasonable or contrary to reason, about someone expressing trust that Reality is good. …unless you can prove otherwise.
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Yes, I’ve heard the problem-of-evil argument. I’ve answered it in another thread. For one thing, it depends on an assumption of omnipotence. For another thing, it over-rates what happens in one life, in one physical world. You can disagree with that opinion, but you can’t prove that the worse things that happen in a life an in a world represent the whole character and nature of Reality as a whole.
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It isn’t unreasonable for someone to trust something good about Reality, merely because it would be the good way for things to be. …and therefore arguably the natural way for things to be. Before you challenge that, remember I’m talking about something for which there isn’t proof either way.
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So, trust, faith, isn’t unreasonable, even without any evidence. And anyway, in other threads I’ve spoken about reasons why things are pretty good overall. Let’s not get into it here. It’s off our topic, and I’d have to write another 10 or 20 pages.
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I suspect that your error here is treating the matter of God as if it is the matter of God as per your personal take on it, whereby you've made it such that God is a special exception. You don't get to have exclusive say on God.

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When Atheists claim that there’s no God, or that any belief that there’s God is in conflict with reason, their statement isn’t about any one particular conception of God. It’s a blanket denial of all conceptions of God.
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Further questioning reveals that the Atheist’s One-True-God to (loudly) disbelieve in is the God of the Biblical Literalists and Fundamentalists.
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“And, regarding a matter that logic and reason don't apply to, the only way to be in conflict with reason would be to try apply reason to that matter. ...as you're attempting to do.” — Michael Ossipoff
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No, you don't seem to understand that a matter of faith, by nature, conflicts with a matter of reason.

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You keep repeating that as a faithful chant of dogma. When “reason” doesn’t say anything about a matter, then, about that matter, it would be rather difficult to conflict with reason.
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That has been explained to you several times, by several people.
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They are chalk and cheese. If where I live were a matter of faith, which it clearly isn't, then there would be no conflict with my faith that I live on a boat in France, even though reason leads to the belief that I live in an apartment in England. Is a boat an apartment? Are England and France the same country? No, the two sets of beliefs, as well as how they were obtained, clash. They are in conflict.

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In that instance, your faith that you live on a boat in France would indeed be in conflict with verifiable fact.
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No one denied that faith can conflict with known fact. But it can’t conflict with reason on a matter on which reason has nothing to say.
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Michael Ossipoff

If your theism is a matter of faith, then it's not reasonable — Sapientia

Incorrect. If it's not in conflict with established fact, or in conflict with reason, then it's reasonable.

The matter of God, or the matter of the nature or character of Reality as a whole isn't amenable to, or a topic for, proof, reason or logic.

And, regarding a matter that logic and reason don't apply to, the only way to be in conflict with reason would be to try apply reason to that matter. ...as you're attempting to do.

, and if it's reasonable, then it's not a matter of faith.

See above.

Your belief, given that it is held as a matter of faith, is in conflict with reason

...or would be, if reason, logic, science, etc. were universally-applicable. But they aren't. ...except in the mind of a type of pseudoscientist known as a Science-Worshipper, who has unduly grandiose beliefs about the range of applicability.of reason, logic and science.

No, there's no chance of proving to you that your supposed "reason" doesn't cover all of Reality.

So let's just say that it's acknowledged that you think it does, and agree to disagree.

Michael Ossipoff

we, or maybe it is just me, are not communicating well. I have no clue how any of that applies to what I think. — Rank Amateur

Oops! Sorry if I misinterpreted you. ...and I evidently did. I thought that you were trying to shore-up the Atheist problem-of-evil argument, by arguing that Theists believe in omnipotence. It's such a familiar theme, that I just took it for granted that that was what you were doing.

I agree with you both, that our tools may well be inadequate to understand such a thing as God. — Rank Amateur

Yes. I've been arguing that argument, logic, assertion, debate and proof are only applicable to the describable realm, the world of describable things. ...which doesn't cover or apply to Reality itself, or any issue or description about God.

And this point is at the heart of skeptical theism, which I believe to be true.

Though I consider the use of the word "God" to unrealistically-anthropomorphically imply an individual or a being (...and thereby activate the Atheists), I designate myself a Theist, if people are divided into Theists, Atheists and Agnostics, because it's my impression that Reality is Benevolence itself. I don't assert that, I don't argue it, I can't prove it..

But it seems, we as human beings have some inherent drive to understand our reason for existence.

That's why I like metaphysics (by which I mean metaphysics of the describable). And I do assert about that.

So, what are we to do? Use the tools we have, as feeble as they might be? Or throw up our hands and ignore the drive?

Description, argument, assertion and debate are applicable to describable metaphysics, but not to matters relating to Reality itself, or God.

Contrary to many people here, I believe that definite things can be said with certainty about describable metaphysics, and I've been saying some of them, in other threads.

I claim that, just as all that happens in the physical world has a physical explanation in terms of other p physical things, then so all of describable metaphysics--the world of describable things--is explainable, noncontradictory, and consistent within metaphysics. In no way does that conflict with Theism.

Personally, my theism is a matter of faith.

Of course. It's a matter of impression. Logic, argument and proof have a range of applicability that's limited to the describable realm.

But it is important to me that this belief is not in conflict with fact or reason, which would than make me a fool. I believe we have the tools, as weak as they are, to wrestle with the question that theism is or is not reasonable.

We can describe what influences our impressions., When that's done without assertion, it doesn't constitute argument. For example, in other threads, I've discussed metaphysical reasons that lead to my impression about Reality. I feel that metaphysics, philosophy-of-mind,and common-sense suggest, support and point to that impression. But that's an issue for a different thread.

Michael Ossipoff

:up: :up: :up:

Before we continue with all this wonderful logic dancing, could somebody please prove that human logic would be at all relevant to anything the scale of a god?

It seems that discussions such as this one pretty much always assume without questioning that reason is relevant, and then proceed in earnest based on that assumption. That process might be compared to a theology convention where everyone takes it to be an obvious given that the Bible is the word of God, and then from that unquestioned assumption proceed to have a Bible verse interpretation debate.

If you're an atheist, imagine you are at that theology convention. You probably won't get sucked in to the Bible verse interpretation debate, because you will first ask for proof that the Bible is anything more than a pile of human opinions. That is, you will reasonably challenge the authority the entire debate is built upon before agreeing to engage the Bible verse interpretations.

That's what I'm asking for, before we dive in to logic dancing could someone please demonstrate that something as small as human reason would be at all relevant to something the scale of gods? — Jake

I am not sure I have ever heard of someone claiming theism, acknowledging omniscience, and benevolence but excluding omnipotence. — Rank Amateur

Here's a better answer:

Good--Admitting that you don't know what you're criticizing or disbelieving is the first step to some kind of progress. The next step might be realizing that it doesn't make any sense to build an argument for Atheism on something that you don't know about.

...to loudly assert disbelief in a belief that you don't know if anyone here believes in.

But yes, we get that you disbelieve in Biblical Literalism and Fundamentalism. But do you really think a philosophy forum is the place to find the Biblical Literalists and Fundamentalists with whom you disagree? You need to take your disagreement to the people you disagree with.

For example, you could hand out leaflets in front of the church of the main door-to-door-nuisance denomination (...which I won;t name, but which you know).

(...unless you're afraid to talk to people who really disagree with you. )

Go for it!

Michael Ossipoff

I can't see how any of this waffle explains the creation of Loa loa filariasis.

God remains culpable. — Banno

...because you firmly and unshakably believe that God is omnipotent.

By the way, your use of the word "creation" is unnecessarily and unrealistically anthropomorphic. Do you also believe that that creation was accomplished in 7 days?

Michael Ossipoff

I am not sure I have ever heard of someone claiming theism, acknowledging omniscience, and benevolence but excluding omnipotence. — Rank Amateur

For one thing, why the issue? The science of Theist-ology? There are plenty of Theists who'll be most glad to talk to you....like the promotional ones who knock on your door. So ask them. ...instead of speculating.

But why is it important to know if there are Theists who acknowledge omniscience and benevolence, but exclude omnipotence? Surely when they're trying to convert you, they'll tell you about beliefs, even if you don't ask....but especially if you do ask..

As for omnipotence, do you think that Theists should believe that it's possible to make there be statements that are both false and true, or, in general to make there be mutually-contradictory facts or mutually contradictory true propositions? ...to contravene logic?

...because, otherwise, what's the "omni-" in "omnipotence" supposed to mean?

Michael Ossipoff

I suspect that it's just that some people like the sound of the word "Atheist", and want to have that self-designation while dodging the burden-of-proof that goes with actual Atheism..

The problem with such "Agnatheists" is that typically in the next breath they're making genuinely Atheist assertions. So, in a way they're right to call themselves Atheists: They're Atheists except when they're professing Agnosticism by another name.

Obviously an assertion of Atheism or Theism has equal burden of proof. But it isn't a matter for assertion, argument, debate or proof. ...not that we let that stop us, right?

Michael Ossipoff