I mean, Nietzsche seems to be seething with resentment for the "slave morality" which is pretty equivalent to Rand's "collectivists" not letting the elite industrialists, inventors, artists, and scientists reach the necessary heights they are capable of. And a Randian would argue that by allowing the maximum individual freedoms of these individuals, it WOULD unleash a magnanimous outcome for humanity. — schopenhauer1

I just want to know what John Galt and co. eat and who is cleaning their toilets.

In other words, Rand always struck me as a plebeian attempt to reimagine, reinvent aristocracy, with all its entitlements.

People spread germs which can harm a strong person etc etc, a weak person might try to entrap a strong person to child payments etc etc. — Vaskane

How can someone still rightfully be called "strong" if they can be overcome by germs, entrapments, etc.?

It’s more a matter of constraining the impulses of strength within oneself. By ‘strength’ Nietzsche meant a will to continual self-overcoming ( not personal ‘growth’ as in progress toward self-actualization, but continually becoming something different). The weak path is toward belief in foundational morality, a god who favors the meek, universal truth and the supremacy of proportional logic. — Joshs

You first said:

Especially the part about morality being a trick of the weak to constrain the strong. This is what Nietzsche called ressentiment. — Joshs

I don't understand. How is morality "a trick of the weak to constrain the strong"? Where's the trickery? Even when it is in reference to self-overcoming?

Since Trump was elected Plato's warning about how democracies degenerate into tyrannies through demagogues has frequently pointed to. The demagogue poses as a champion of the people. Because they feel powerless and unable to make things better for themselves they turn to someone who promises to do it for them. They are willing to cede power in order to get the results they hope for, but rather than seeing this as ceding power they believe they are gaining power. — Fooloso4

Things like this are often said, but I need something more to become convinced of this. From what I've seen of Trumpistas and the like, they aren't "buying into" what "their leader" says. They haven't been "deceived" by a "demagogue". It's simply how they are already.

Saying that they're "buying into" what "their leader" says etc. seems to be primarily a rhetorical move by their critics. But if it's more than just a rhetorical move, if the critics actually believe that, then it seems it's because the alternative (and what it implies about human nature) is too scary. It seems to be easier to propose that people are basically good, but weak; than to consider the possibility that people are basically evil and strong.

I'm just patiently waiting for the US to implode due to its corrupt and vacuous politics. — Benkei

Let's just hope it doesn't take (much of) the rest of the world with it.

Orbán has Trump's back.

'Evil is eating away at Western democracies,' says Hungarian PM Orban — jorndoe

What many people don't seem to realize is that this, too, is democracy. The problem isn't Trump, isn't Orban, it's the very phenomenon of democracy itself. In a democracy, people defend their own interests. And this inevitably leads to tensions. A common way of coping with those tensions is to try to discredit the others.

O sancta simplicitas!

Thus, ego-friendly. With a vague approach like yours, you can always feel good about yourself and always feel that you have prevented or relieved more suffering than you caused.
:lol:

They are not simply biased tribalists either, as is evidenced by how they cut ties with or get rid of those who no longer serve their cause.
— baker

It's because they're Trump loyalists who will buy into whatever argument Trump advances regardless of the evidence supporting it or the logical consistency of it.

His supporters bought into and still buy into the argument there was a nationwide conspiracy to rig the election in every contested district across the country. Despite no evidence, he continued to try to obstruct the result, all the way down to convincing his followers to physically standing in the way of it. — Hanover

Are you saying this because you actually believe this, or are you saying it merely for rhetorical purposes?

If you say so ... — 180 Proof

It's vital to the topic at hand. (Waiting for @Joshs to chime in.)

"Measure" what? I didn't propose to quantify anything. — 180 Proof

You said:

'Prevent or relieve more suffering than you cause'. — 180 Proof

If you want to "prevent or relieve" _more_ "suffering than you cause", then, clearly, you need to have some measurement in mind. How else can you know whether you're preventing or relieving more suffering than you cause?

Tread more carefully in your attempts to describe Jewish theology so as not to appear anti-Jewish. I don't trust that your description of the way Jewish theology describes evil is entirely a misunderstanding, but I am more convinced it's a desire to cast the religion in a bad light. — Hanover

Actually, I heard about the need for hatred from you for the first time. I was quite taken aback.
But some things started to make sense.

Instead, I'll just tell you to end your Judaism bashing.

Is it even possible to say something about Judaism without the Jews feeling offended?
Religious/spiritual people tend to have toes all over the place, it's impossible not to step on them.

So why don’t we dump moral realism and moral subjectivism and all other moldy conformist dictums stuck in the 18th century, which blithely ignore all the exciting ideas coming from current research in evolutionary biology, anthropology , psychology and language studies? — Joshs

We don't dump them because in order to be able to dump them safely, without adverse consequences for ourselves, other people would have to dump them as well. But this, clearly, isn't happening.

Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to continue as you were? — Michael

I have been faced with similar situations when I approached some religions/spiritualities. But I wasn't actually sure that something I enjoyed was wrong, and I wasn't sure that something I'm disgusted by was right -- instead, I felt enormously pressured to have such surety, and my continual involvement was predicated on at least aiming for such surety. I couldn't stand it for long, though, and eventually broke off my involvement with them. I'm also facing such situations in relation to politics, and as things stand, my current means of coping is cynicism.

But, realistically, as years pass, I can see on my own example that Kohlberg's theory of moral development applies, esp. the part where he notes that changes in moral reasoning happen gradually over long periods of time, through personal experience, discussions with others, reading, reflecting, as opposed to people changing their moral beliefs simply after reading a syllogism. For me, this manifests in having developed a new framework for understanding religious/spiritual claims and expectations, and a kind of -- not exactly stiff upper lip -- but a certain, let's call that, inner, non-verbal rigidity because of which those religious/spiritual claims and expectations can't take much hold of me (unlike they did in the past).

If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned.

While a person's moral stances can remain the same for long periods of time, things can change. External events might provoke one to think and act in ways that one previously thought unimaginable, not only impossible.

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

What is the practical difference between these worlds?

It seems to me that only moral beliefs matter. Whether or not the beliefs are true has no practical relevance. — Michael

The problem is the bit about _everyone_. It's usually not the case that everyone thinks the same way. This is why the issues of whether moral facts exist or not and whether a belief is true or not come into play. As soon as someone is "different" than the majority, this will have some practical consequences for the person (often adverse ones), and the person will try to make sense of this being different and of how other people treat them because of it.

Perhaps I should have said that it isn't necessarily a sufficient reason. If I were to somehow know that I have an obligation to kill children, I would need a more convincing reason to carry it out. That I am obligated isn't reason enough for me. — Michael

Because you haven't internalized the metaphysical framework needed for said obligation to make sense.

So what is the motivation to obey God's moral laws? — Michael

For most people who (claim to) obey God's law, that motivation appears to be pre-cognitive; ie. they have internalized it before they were even old enough to think about it.
For many of those who first turn to obeying God's law as adults, there's some trauma or crisis.

I, for one, am not motivated simply by the belief (or knowledge) of what I ought to do. — Michael

Moral obligation only makes sense in a religious framework to begin with.

I can't make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable. That's really what I'm trying to show here. — Michael

As is inevitably the case for someone who is not religious or whose sense of morality is not shaped after religions.

If it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to harm and if it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to not harm, and if there's no practical difference between being morally obligated to harm and being morally obligated to not harm, then moral obligations are a vacuous concept.

Because moral obligations only make sense in the framework of religion. Only religion has the metaphysical underpinnings needed for making moral obligations intelligible (and the practical means for raising prospective believers).

Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno

If only it would be clear what "moral" means, in any particular instance. Hating your enemies (the persons), like the Jews do? Stoning infidels, like some Muslims do?

Perhaps we could say that it is best for us to live the truly moral life. But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible?
/.../
Would you accept a morality that stands in stark opposition to your personal values? What would it mean for you if you'd found this to be the case? — Michael

Insanity.

And what difference would it make if there was no morality at all?

Insanity.

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make?

It seems to me that the implicit assumption in all this is that people don't know, aren't sure about what is moral and what isn't. That there is a fundamental possibility of moral doubt (in every person?).

Usually, people don't seem to indulge in such moral skepticism, so your thought experiment is moot for them. A philosopher cannot just ignore such things about people. It seems that most people are intuitively and absolutely sure about their sense of right and wrong, and this surety being intuitive and absolute is essential to their sense of morality.

If you told me baby murdering were ethical, I guess I'd have to murder babies even if it made me sad to wrestle them from the hands of their mothers and dash them upon rocks. — Hanover

While you believe in a god who kills babies en masse.

So you argue in favor of physicalism?

Are we to simply presume that what these terms stand for is transparently obvious to everyone? — Joshs

It seems the OP and several other posters here take for granted that the meaning of hate/harm (as well as goodness, evil, etc.) _should_ be transparently obvious to everyone. And that if a particular person doesn't think/feel the way they do, then the fault is with that person (ie. said person is "morally or cognitively defective").

Isnt the problem of interpretation the central issue of ethics? And doesn’t this problem make all ethical questions inherently political?

Yes and yes, I agree.
There are many issues here. To begin with, how do we account for the fact that different people have different ideas about what counts as "good"? Should those who think differently than oneself simply be written off as "morally or cognitively defective"?

More or less – I'd put it: 'Prevent or relieve more suffering than you cause'. — 180 Proof

How do you propose to measure this?

And yet there are people who pretty much live like zombies, at least some of their time. Not people in a coma, but people who mindlessly peruse Facebook and such.
— baker
Those people are not physically identical to us, and so aren't relevant to Michael's argument. — wonderer1

What do you mean? That people who mindlessly peruse FB have mush for brains?

Are these sorts of maxims ultimately just variations on, 'Do not cause suffering?' — Tom Storm

Or, to quote you, "Don't be a cunt."

It's just that for Harry, Dick is a cunt, and for Dick, Harry is a cunt, and neither of them think of themselves as cunts. Now what?

To begin with, iIf something is a "commandment", who is the one doing the commanding, to whom, under threat of what penalty?

Do you still want to go with "commandment", or would something like "motto" be better for your purposes?

The OP thought-experiment mentions "commandment" for nonreligious persons. Nothing I've said here has any whiff of "divine command theory". — 180 Proof

Of course it does. Your system of morality is structurally the same as a religious one, except that in your case, it isn't a god sitting at the top. But you operate from the same assumptions of objectivity and universality of morality as religion does.

commandment for anyone that isn't religious — mentos987

Commandments in terms of morality/ethics only make sense within religion. Outside of religion, the very concept of a commandment (in terms of morality/ethics) is unintelligible.

society — FrankGSterleJr

More and more people nowadays don't believe there is such a thing as "society" to begin with, which renders the topic of society's responsibility for children moot.

I don't see why he's fighting to be on any ballot considering he's already told us the elections are rigged. Why does he want to enter a contest where he knows the result is already decided against him? — Hanover

Probably because he and his supporters are not anarchists. They do value the idea of various institutions and institutes, but not necessarily the particular persons who (currently) hold those positions. So they, for example, respect the office of the president or the democratic process of elections, but not necessarily Joe Biden or the 2020 presidential elections. They are not simply biased tribalists either, as is evidenced by how they cut ties with or get rid of those who no longer serve their cause.

But you believe commands command and orders order.
— NOS4A2

Yes, just as guns kill.

I’m just trying to wade through the magical thinking here.
— NOS4A2

It's not magic, it's common sense. The problem is that your position is nonsense. — Michael

It's a kind of thinking that completely refuses to acknowledge authority or the power of others. As in:

Judge: I order you to pay this fine.
Refuser: Duh. [You're not the boss of me.]

The part in brackets is usually intended but left unsaid.

To a person like that, it also makes sense, for example, to say that A didn't simply kill B by shooting him, but that B allowed himself to be shot and/or that B was too weak to withstand the bullet (and so B's death is actually B's fault).

It's a kind of thinking that takes the motto "everyone is solely responsible solely for themselves" to its logical consequences.

It's democracy at its most American finest: everyone is equal, everyone can be equally dismissed and ignored (whether a stranger in the street, a family member, or an officer of the law). If someone says something to you, it's on you and entirely on you how you will take it, whether you will even feel addressed by it at all.

I think the most reasonable perspective on p-zombies is that they are an incoherent idea. — wonderer1

And yet there are people who pretty much live like zombies, at least some of their time. Not people in a coma, but people who mindlessly peruse Facebook and such. As if they were robots. Even when they talk about their "hopes and dreams", it all sounds so rehearsed and artificial that one cannot but wonder whether there is actually anyone at home there.

I wonder if people realize that this thread in a nutshell explains why Trump might win a second term.

The disdain for ordinary people, the "all means necessary" approach confirming one's own moral bankrutpcy while pretending to have a moral high ground, etc. — Tzeentch

Yes. This can't be pointed out enough.

That same disdain, ridicule, and supremacism on both sides. Were it not for mere names, one couldn't tell who's who.

What kind of person would do what Giuliani did? You ruined people's lives, and for what? To prove your loyalty to Trump? — GRWelsh

Not loyalty to Trump per se, but to what he is taken to represent: a ruthless will to win, the belief that life is a struggle for the upper hand.

Many people have this will, this belief (including many of Trump's critics), which is precisely why Trump's chances for victory are so good.

How he can remain a candidate in light of all this beggars belief. He's seeking popular support to overturn the constitution. The electors want the right to overturn elections. Makes zero sense. — Wayfarer

Things like this are not new, just look at the history of monarchies and big religions. People fighting for power.

This is the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Moral realism – like non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and error theory – is a theory in metaethics. Utilitarianism and deontology are theories in normative ethics. — Michael

I don't understand how metaethics can be so neatly separated from normative ethics.
All ethics are, by their nature, normative, that's the point of ethics. How can there be any talk about ethics that is not normative?

I would expect that an infant sees what I see when it looks at a flower, despite it not having any sense of what is socially agreed upon. — Hanover

This is doubtful, already physiologically.
A human infant's vision is qualitatively different from that of human adults; also, infants have not yet mastered object permanence.

This concept would apply cross-culturally as well, lending support to the idea that we reach out to the flower to pick it not due to some inter-subjective, socially agreed upon basis, but because we think the flower it out past our hand ripe for picking.

The standard counterargument to this is the complexity of color words across different languages: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_term

I know you can't drop all that nonsense about things in themselves and phenomenal states of consciousness, and although it provides a basis for some wonderful pretence, in the end it confuses you. — Banno

But @Hanover is a lawyer, right? He has to make sense of things in a way that is consistent with his profession.

You're a lawyer, right? What one can readily see in practice is a gross inequality before the law, depending on one's socio-economic status. If one has money for a good lawyer, one can get out of pretty much anything. If one doesn't have such money, even an administrative mistake by a government official can mean the end of one's existence. We're not living under the rule of law; we're living under the rule of money. Money, with which law can be bought. And so for someone who doesn't have much money, dealing with the state really comes down to might makes right.

(I studied law for a while, btw.)

If it bothers you that I'm labeled with a disability, and that I outperform you in most ways. — Vaskane

Yet you can't have an ordinary conversation with ordinary people.

The flower has four petals regardless of what you suppose. — Banno

Much of what people call "petals" are actually bracts.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bract
Since it's the season, what you see in a poinsettia, those Christmasy bright red things are bracts, not petals.
Just so as to be botanically clear.

This difference between bracts and petals is another good example of how our perception of things is socio-culturally shaped.

Ah, if only we were in a court of law. I would object to your "response" as being unresponsive, and I think any Judge in the external world would sustain the objection. — Ciceronianus

Exactly. You're thinking like a lawyer, not a philosopher. Except that we're at a philosophy forum.

But in this unhappy, imperfect universe we must make judgments without the benefit of absolute knowledge, on the best evidence available at the time we make them. And we do, in real life, if we're wise. — Ciceronianus

But must these judgments amount to a certainty that justifies burning people at the stakes? For a lawyer, perhaps, certainly.

People who are not lawyers and otherwise not in the business of professionally judging others, can get by just fine without pronouncing definitive judgments upon others, and can instead live with tentative.

Have you ever thought that those children in pre-Renaissance painting actually were little adults? Or just that the artists who painted them thought they were?

That was actually the prevailing belief back then: that children are just like adults, only smaller. The belief was that children were only quantitatively different from adults, but not qualitatively. (I read somewhere Kant believed children cried because they were angry because they couldn't use their bodies properly yet.)
In the 20th century psychological theories of cognitive and moral development put forward the idea that the differences between children and adults are in fact qualitative.

Ask yourself when you last acted as if there were no other people, no things, no animals, i.e. nothing other than yourself. — Ciceronianus

The psychological equivalents of solipsism are narcissism and egoism. Which are fairly common, and appear to be on the trajectory to becoming virtues.

When did you last believe, and treat, people you see across the street from you as if they were only, e.g., 6 inches tall because that's how they appeared to be when you saw them, and thought that they became 6 feet tall when they crossed the street to speak to you?

When did you last ponder whether the car you're driving was in fact a car having the characteristics of a car as you understand them to be, or instead something else you can never know (if, indeed, it was anything at all)? When did you last question whether the office building in which you work remained the same building, because it looked one way when you entered it in the morning, when the sun was out, but did not look the same as it did then when you left it at night?

Chances are you never did anything of the sort.

Actually, children do such things, according to Piaget's theory of cognitive development. :)
It covers also issues of perspective, object size, object permanence.

Object permanence is the understanding that whether an object can be sensed has no effect on whether it continues to exist. This is a fundamental concept studied in the field of developmental psychology, the subfield of psychology that addresses the development of young children's social and mental capacities. There is not yet scientific consensus on when the understanding of object permanence emerges in human development.
/.../
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_permanence

I don't say certain philosophers are hypocrites, or even that they're disingenuous when they contend that what we see and interact with every day without question isn't real, or can't be known, but when what we do is so contrary to what we contend, or what we contend is so unrelated to what we do as to make no difference in our lives, I think we have reason to think that we're engaged in affectation.

Western philosophy has affectation built in as a feature, in the assumption that an argument can somehow "stand on its own", regardless of who is making it; "a fallacious ad hominem" is considered a pleonasm, as if every argument against the person is automatically fallacious.

And so we have a whole philosophical culture of people saying things they don't mean and that aren't meant to be taken seriously, at least not by everyone.

Does the world have any kind of coherence at all without us providing a point of view and the language to 'demonstrate' the relationships we see? — Tom Storm

How could we possibly know?