However if a community can exist with only disagreements to hold it together — FlaccidDoor

No, what "holds a philosophy discussion forum together" is a measure of commitment by its members to a very specific tradition of discussing things in a specific way.

why can't it simply exist in friends and family? I personally feel like friends or at least family is far from polite society.

Sure, friends and esp. family sometimes are not "polite society", but they are not intended to be a philosophy discussion forum and don't serve that purpose.

I find it hilarious that when it comes to these forums future conditionals go out the window in the name of "metaphysics". — schopenhauer1

Not in this case.

It's like having compassion and empathy for fictional characters in a book or a film. It's not a meaningful way to have empathy and compassion.

It's a compassion and an empathy that doesn't take the other person into consideration as they actually are, as persons -- and it can't, because that other person doesn't actually exist. It's not emapthy and it's not compassion. It's pity and it's patronizing. And people have plenty of that indeed. It seems to make them feel really good!
— baker

Um, so if a couple KNEW that by procreating there is a 100% chance that the child that would exist would live a horrible life, they should not take this into consideration? Get outta here.

I'm sure there's a name for this fallacy, but I can't be bothered to look it up.

But you're evading the point. I'm saying that your antinatalist has motivations that are lowlier than empathy and compassion. I'm saying that your antinatalist has merely pity and patronizing. Or possibly worse.

Buddhism is its own can of worms. Even though technically suffering can be achieve with antinatalist policy within a generation,

Not according to Buddhism; and this is because merely dying doesn't guarantee cessation of suffering.
Your "solution" to the problem of suffering doesn't solve it; it amounts to "no man, no problem". It's akin to saying that the solution to global warming is to nuke planet Earth out of existence.
But Buddhism proposes a solution to the problem of suffering that people can actually experience.
Not that I'm a Buddhist, BTW, I'm just comparing your approach with another one.

It goes back to what's in it for the antinatalist.
— baker
Preventing yet another person from suffering. Keep it nonexistent please.

What do _you_ get from other people not being born?

How many times do I need to repeat my question?????

Um, any activity you do outside of childrearing or related to childrearing. That's literally millions of things. Sports, hobbies, recreation, entertainment, anything.

Granted, one can try to find happiness those ways. The operative term being "try". The problem is that there is no lasting happiness to be found in those things.

I'm saying you can't deliberately (!) get from A to B if you don't know how to get from A to B.
Further, you can't deliberately (!) get from A to B if while in A, you don't have the ability to get to B.

I think this is the case with humans and morality. It's not clear whether a change in human morality can be brought about deliberately, or whether such a change is necessarily a side effect of other things. It seems to me it's the latter.

Do a person's notions about what is moral and what isn't change over time? Yes, they do. Do they change because the person was told so? Usually not. I already mentioned Kohlberg and his theory of moral development. He hypothesized that people don't move from one stage of morality to another by an act of will or by contemplating moral issues (such as by reading texts in favor of a particular type of moral reasoning), but that the change appears to come about due to a complex mixture of factors, these factors being time, life experiences of the person, moral reasoning they have done themselves and the one they've been exposed to, and possibly more. It's so complex that the prospect of deliberate, guided moral change seems hopeless.

They who "...aren't swayed by arguments" don't know what an argument is. The way a debate with arguments proceeds is, to my knowledge, all about what must be true given certain assumptions and/or claims and how that, on occasion, is denied, the resulting contradiction proving the incoherent nature of an individual's or group's position. — TheMadFool

So what if their position is proven wrong? Will they poof out of existence?

What's in it for you if you prove someone else's position wrong?


Remember, this thread's theme is Philosophy vs. real life!

Does anybody in the West still want to be free? — synthesis

Freedom from what?
Freedom to do what?

Still not answering the question. Yes, countries are not races and nationalism is not the same as racism, but we knew that already. The question is: why is one good and the other bad?

You could say: "just because," and leave it at that, and that would be a legitimate answer. But then you have nothing more to say on the topic. If you think you do have something to say, then you need to tell us what it is that makes racism objectionable and nationalism unobjectionable - other than them not being the same, that is. — SophistiCat

Like I said: nation states are the default, as such, they are neutral. Fretting about nationalism (insofar as it has to do with nation states) is like fretting that the sun rises in the East.

Such as?

If arguments would indeed have the power you speak of earlier, then how do you explain that there's plenty of people who aren't swayed by arguments?

"It's not that way" doesn't mean "it can't be that way".

The entire point of moral theory is figuring out how to change things. If they can't be other than they already are, there's no point. — Pfhorrest

In order to change things, you need to start with how they actually are.

Compassion and empathy are meaningful only in relation to already existing entities.
— baker

Not true, otherwise people would have no consideration whatsoever for the outcome and welfare of a future person, baby, child. — schopenhauer1

False. Consideration can be motivated by other things than just empathy and compassion. Habit, pathological altruism, pride or the desire to look good in the eyes of others can result in acting in ways that can seem as being motivated by empathy and compassion.

The compassion and empathy you're talking about are idle perversions.
— baker
Not sure why it can't be extended to people that would exist but are prevented from doing so if otherwise not precautionary.

It's like having compassion and empathy for fictional characters in a book or a film. It's not a meaningful way to have empathy and compassion.

It's a compassion and an empathy that doesn't take the other person into consideration as they actually are, as persons -- and it can't, because that other person doesn't actually exist. It's not emapthy and it's not compassion. It's pity and it's patronizing. And people have plenty of that indeed. It seems to make them feel really good!

Defective? Damn look who's harsh here. Ok, well, new social norms have and can be implemented. One where compassion extends to people who might exist, but can be prevented from doing so. Compassion the harm that could have taken place.

All along, I've been privately comparing your antinatalist stance with the antinatalism that can be found in Early Buddhism. I don't recall ever seeing the argument that the reason why one should be celibate is out of compassion for others (although the point does come up in popular Buddhist discourse).
I certainly don't find your line of reasoning convincing, even though I would, for all practical intents and purposes, describe myself as at least a selective antinatalist.

It looks more like the final drop of pleasure that the antinatalist is trying to squeeze out of life.
— baker
Final drop of pleasure-- because it is suggesting to current people born to not screw with other people by procreating them? They are not saying to not do X, Y, Z for themselves.

It goes back to what's in it for the antinatalist.

There's many ways one can try to find happiness without it involving other people's states of being.

Do list at least three such ways.

Likewise, a sound argument has the same power of persuasion that a loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple has. One is always, without exception, forced to accept the conclusion of a sound argument.

It seems that either way - whether you're in the presence of a philosopher presenting a good argument or whether you're under duress to believe something - we're being forced on pain of injury, death, or looking like a fool. — TheMadFool

Not at all, given that two people can be presented with the same argument, and one feels forced to accept it (because he thinks it's so irresistibly good), and the other one doesn't (because he thinks it's dumb).

IOW, an argument's strength doesn't somehow exist objectively, independently of persons, as an inherent trait of the argument itself. Rather, strength is ascribed to it by people, and different people will ascribe different strengths to it.

*sigh*
Talk about consumer philosophy ... life as a matter of consumption ...

Grammatically, why does it say "Do not go gentle into that good night", when there should be an adverb there, "gently"?

It very explicitly does not. That's the point of replicating others' experiences: so we don't have to take their word for it. — Pfhorrest

But one cannot replicate others' experiences.

For example, I don't drink coffee, because it makes me sleepy. Many people drink coffee in the morning specifically for the purpose that it "wakes them up". So which is it? Who is right, who is wrong? Who has the right experience of drinking coffee in the morning? I or they? Is there an objectively right way to experience drinking coffee in the morning?

You never explained your bizarre "empathy is incompatible with objectivism" comment, but I'd guess from that that you take "objectivism" to mean what I called "transcendentalism", which would require taking someone's word for it, which is why I'm against that, as I explicitly said. The only sense of "objectivism" I support is "universalism", the view that something being good or bad doesn't depend on what anyone thinks or says... because that would just be taking someone's word for it too.

Objectivisms are authoritarian and assume to be impersonal/suprapersonal. Yet, contrary to that, it is always a particular person, a Tom or a Dick who makes the claim that X is really such and such, and that Harry is in the wrong if he doesn't see it that way.

There is no room for empathy in objectivism, because the objectivist already assumes to know better.

Just like (according to a scientific worldview) reality doesn't depend on what anyone thinks about it, but there's still nothing about reality that's beyond observation: it's not relative, it's universal, but it's also not transcendent, it's entirely phenomenal.

But it still comes down to whose observation matters.


The problem you're actually indirectly talking about is the problem of epistemic dependence.

There nevertheless must be an element that discerns the meaning of dharma and elects to pursue it. — Wayfarer

It's not clear how this is the case. Up until stream-entry, such discernment is impossible anyway.

What does the Euclidean theorem look like? The ability to grasp a rational idea of that kind is different to a sensory impression, surely.
/.../
Also the Buddhist ‘manas’ is something like ‘organ of perception of ideas’. There are other terms for intellect in the Buddhist lexicon, notably, Buddhi, and also Citta, but considering all of those details are out of scope for this thread. The key word in western philosophy was ‘nous’ which has sadly fallen out of use. — Wayfarer

What started off this tangent was this:

Seems to me that hedonism always wants to avoid this conclusion - to say there’s no real difference between pleasant sensations and eudomonaic happiness (which is the happiness that comes from the pursuit of virtue.) One can, for example, attain happiness in the contemplation of verities, which surely can’t be reduced to sensation alone, and which only a rational mind can entertain. — Wayfarer

And we're back to the problem of who gets to be the arbiter of what is virtue and what isn't.

What does the Euclidean theorem look like? The ability to grasp a rational idea of that kind is different to a sensory impression, surely. — Wayfarer

I think that depends on the measure of epistemic autonomy that an individual person is assumed to have.
The more epistemic autonomy a person is assumed to have (ie. the more the individual person is identified with their mind), the starker the difference between the first five senses and the intellect. And vice versa.

Eudomonia in Aristotelian philosophy is linked with virtue and with fulfilling your life's purpose (telos). — Wayfarer

But how does a particular person know what their life's purpose is?

Surely the ancient Greeks weren't individualists who believed that every man and woman (!) is able and should define their own life purpose for themselves, quite divorced from the social roles and expectations placed upon them by other people.

I don't think it's difficult to differentiate those kinds of aims from the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure.

I think it depends on the particular life purpose for the particular person.

Take, for example, a professional culinary connoisseur. A person like that eats, tastes food for a living, it's their telos. Eating, tasting food is also a hedonistic pursuit of pleasure. So where's the difference between such a person's telos and hedonistic pursuit of pleasure? Can this be answered without demoting the profession of culinary connoisseurship to something unvirtuous?

But how is it that racism is less acceptable than nationalism or ethnocentrism, when they are so similar? — SophistiCat

Probably because countries around the world tend to be conceived of as nation states, not as race states.
For example, prior to the influx of immigrants of different races into Germany and Austria, Germans and Austrians were the same race -- yet considered eachother to be different nationalities.
In that sense, nationalism seems to be relatively neutral, in the sense that it is a given -- it's simply about countries being countries.

There nevertheless must be an element that discerns the meaning of dharma and elects to pursue it. — Wayfarer

Which is not incompatible with considering the intellect to be a sense.

Why should there be a problem with considering the intellect to be a sense?


(Note a parallel in Western antiquity, what "common sense" originally meant.)

The belief that everyone else "has it all figured out" and I'm the one who doesn't, and that I need to keep up.

Of course. Thinking is a means to an end.

When talking about how the world should be, saying "but it's not that way" is non-sequitur. — Pfhorrest

Developing a moral theory as a "pipedream, unlimited" ...

Yay, for you're the one who is despaired!!

However the philosophy forum is filled with people with just that, but even seem to be happy to continue butting heads for exactly that reason. If a community exists with only irreconcilable differences in opinion to bring them together, I don't see how they can't be accepted by friends or family. — FlaccidDoor

But people at a forum like this typically are not friends or family. We're not a community.
Discussing issues in a philosophical-ish manner is not conducive to friendship.

There's a saying: "You shouldn't discuss politics or religion in polite society." I add philosophy to the other two. Such discussion makes society impolite.

I would like you to explicate those assumptions. Like I said:

"There are several assumptions in "putting things aside" and "moving on". If these assumptions aren't elucidated and if they aren't the right ones, "putting things aside" and "moving on" can do more harm.

For example, the assumption can be "I should just move on, let it go, because I am worthless". If this is one's assumption for "putting things aside" and "moving on", how is "putting things aside" and "moving on" helping one??"


It is my assumption that there is no need to specifically "put things aside" and "move on", but that "putting things aside" and "moving on" occur naturally as a side-effect of holding certain assumptions about oneself. Such as "Doing my work is my highest priority" or "Doing X is beneath my dignity".

Merely focusing on "putting things aside" and "moving on" can move one away from some problem, but not automatically toward a valued direction in life. While moving toward a valued direction in life takes care of everything else.
(It's similar to the difference between running from danger and running to safety.)

So the premise of hedonism that pleasure and pain determine what is good and bad seems to me inherently flawed. Our senses are simply too easy to fool. — Tzeentch

Humans also have a social dimension; they are epistemically dependent on other humans; they have internalized and have access to knowledge accumulated by other humans, which can help them navigate individual deficiencies.

Social trust and epistemic dependence on other humans can give us reason to doubt our particular experiences: experiences that can be temporarily pleasurable, but harmful in the long run. Beside that doubt, they can also help us navigate them and endure the temporary displeasure that comes from depriving ourselves from things that are temporarily pleasurable but harmful in the long run.

Left to oneself, one single human doesn't seem likely to be able handle the problem.

- - -

To sum it all up, we need to move on/away from what, by my analysis, is a rather superficial understanding, perhaps even a total misunderstanding, of happiness/sorrow which is to think that happiness/sorrow are themselves objectives either to attain/avoid and arrive at the truth that the state of wellbeing is the real goal. With this realization we can perhaps get rid of the go-betweens viz. happiness/sorrow and all the complications/paradoxes/problems/dilemmas that go with them. — TheMadFool

How do you think this can be put into practice?

So like I concluded, the alternative is “because someone said so”. — Pfhorrest

But your moral objectivism amounts to the same thing.

Eudomonia in Aristotelian philosophy is linked with virtue and with fulfilling your life's purpose (telos). I don't think it's difficult to differentiate those kinds of aims from the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure. Nor do I find it difficult to differentiate the faculty of reason from that of sensation. — Wayfarer

In Early Buddhism, they speak of the six senses, with the intellect being the sixth. And if you look at the suttas, they talk about taking pleasure in ideas/thoughts as being simply yet another pleasure, like the pleasure of eating or engaging in sex. They do talk about gross and refined pleasures (and gross and subtle forms of suffering); but the point is that these pleasures (or sufferings) are considered as being on a spectrum, not different categories.

As things stand, I'm finding it difficult to relate to the differentiation you make (and which I am aware is very common in Western culture at large).

(In Dhammic religions in general, philosophical pursuits (seeking and taking pleasure in thoughts, ideas) is considered a hedonistic pursuit, mind you, hence the characteristic anti-intellectualism that can be sometimes found among their practitioners.)

I don't understand how your mind works, Harry. THis seems to me to be a non sequitur. — Banno

Who decides whether a person is male, female, or whatever?

My issue is not with whether people choose to identify as non-binary, but with the projection of expectations upon others based upon this choice. Language evolves as a function of collective use, not selective pressures. And it is a slippery slope. What is to prevent me from identifying as a completely unique gender, and applying all kinds of linguistic constraints which other people then not only have to respect, but follow in general usage? If a minority of a few thousand has this authority, why not a minority of a few hundred? Or one? — Pantagruel

Great question. It seem obvious to me that there are people that can identify as something that they are not. — Harry Hindu

Exactly. There are ways to make oneself seem special and thus demand to be given special status and to be allowed not to play by society's norms. In a culture that has a strong tendency toward political correctness, such people who demand such special status can do very well, as the politically correct majority tries to accomodate them.

What makes sex/gender so special that people that identify as something that they are not and then their assertions simply accepted without question? Take, for example, my assertion above that I am a Dark Sith Lord. Why do you question my self-identification, but not a man who says that they are not a man, but something else?

Good question.

This sounds like you're lashing out at me suggesting you being scared of non-binary people is a psychological problem of yours, not a social problem of theirs. — Pfhorrest

*sigh*
I suppose US culture is different. Here, we have reverse isms. Such as reverse racism, where there is the trend to think of people of other races more favorably than of one's own; and so letting them get away with shit that if done by us would be punished; and being pressured into letting them get away with it.
There's a trend to favoritize minorities (and those who wish to be seen as such) and to give them special rights (even legally), even at the expense of the "natives" and the "ordinaries".

This is why I feel consternation whenever some new identity signifier becomes popular: because it means that yet more people will be able to get away with doing things that we, "the ordinary" couldn't get away with, and we, "the ordinary", will be expected to give them right of way, or be stigmatized as racist, homophobic, anti-Christian, or whatever.

Do you believe in objective morality?
— baker

Objective as in universal, non-relative, yes. — Pfhorrest

Well, this explains everything then. Empathy and moral objectivism are mutually exclusive.

Seems to me that hedonism always wants to avoid this conclusion - to say there’s no real difference between pleasant sensations and eudomonaic happiness (which is the happiness that comes from the pursuit of virtue.) One can, for example, attain happiness in the contemplation of verities, which surely can’t be reduced to sensation alone, and which only a rational mind can entertain. — Wayfarer

But what would justify this difference?

What do you guys think? Is a difference in language an accurate way to perceive this divide? — FlaccidDoor

No. It's a difference in stances. It is to be expected that people holding different stances cannot be friends or form a harmonious family.

IOW, it's not (bad) discussion of politics that tears families and friendships apart. It's that discussion of politics reveals the irreconcilable differences that are there between the people, and which have possibly been there from the start of the relationship.

What makes conduct moral, if not refraining from hurting people (not inflicting suffering), and helping them (enabling enjoyment)? — Pfhorrest

The obvious example is from monotheistic religions: moral is that which is in line with God's commandments. Acting in line with God's commandments can lead to (other) people's happiness or suffering. But making (other) people's happiness or suffering the reference point for what counts as moral or not would be a grave mistake in the context of monotheism.

The Christian references are relevant for our discussion, because we are discussing morality against Christianity's backdrop and within its conceptual framework.

I find myself just flabbergasted at the notion of reckoning something as good or bad regardless of (or even in spite of) whether it makes anybody feel good or bad. — Pfhorrest

Yet it's an idea that can be found in some major religions. Like when Christians say that believing in God and following his commandments has nothing to do with your happiness. In fact, doing the morally right thing is possibly going to or is even supposed to make you feel crappy (a burden you should gladly accept, given the massive sacrifice God has already made for you).

One of my favorite parts of the Republic is when Socrates' brother stares down Thrasymachus and assures him that any wager made would be satisfied if he should lose.
Thrasymachus left the room shortly afterwards. — Valentinus

IOW, Socrates' brother appealed to might makes right, and apparently had the wealth and the power to back up his challenge. No surprise there.

Why is this a favorite part of yours of the Republic?

I agree with you, but how do you argue the case against someone who doesn't accept the power of rational persuasion? — Wayfarer

And further, how do you make sense of being the loser/victim/underdog in such a situation?

Gandhi and the Indians used some passive resistence methods of rebelling against the British. And those methods worked: but only because the British were honorable enough to be persuaded by those methods.

In contrast, such a passive resistence proved futile in many other cases, such as for the Native Americans against European colonizers or the Jews against the Nazis.

A massive boulder rolling down a hill on a trajectory to run you over does not accept the power of rational persuasion, and you wouldn't expect it to anyway. But normally, one expects humans to be open to rational persuasion, esp. when they themselves open the communication with you by appealing to rational persuasion.

Making the step from seeing other people as humans (who are open to rational persuasion) to seeing them as no different than massive boulders rolling down a hill on a trajectory to run you over requires some considerable change in one's outlook on life. It's not clear how that change can be made.

There is a wide body of literature in the foreign policy and security studies fields that shows that norms (e.g. rule of law, honor culture, etc.) shape and constrain the use of force. Even when there is total state breakdown and no monopoly on force, not every battlefield regresses into the maximum apocalyptic scenes of say, the Liberian Civil War.

Philosophy shapes thoughts, which in turn shapes actions. Might makes right isn't necissarily the case even in warfare. I'd argue it's generally not the case in day to day life. Otherwise, after a lifetime of weight lifting and martial arts practice, I wouldn't wait in lines anymore. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Might isn't limited to brute force. Might is everything that other people can use as leverage against you, and that can be anything from brute force to blackmail.

My point is that it is possible (and perhaps even preferrable) to hold people morally responsible without having any theory of free will or determinism to back this up, but to instead follow one's "gut feeling". This way, one at least has a definitive answer as to whether the person is guilty as charged or not, as opposed to getting lost in an endless effort to prove/disprove free will/determinism.

Oh, the irony.