Why do we, as societies, desire normativity? I'd say it is because we care about social harmony. We don't need to establish normativity when it comes to bare perception; the commonality is there for us, it is not something engineered by us. Psychological normativity and moral normativity are pragmatic concerns; a society functions better and people are happier if there is harmony. — Janus

But the results of perception are normativized. There is a clear pressure in society to see things in a particular way and to believe that this is "how they really are", and to further believe that when one sees things that way, one "sees them as they really are".

I've been talking about perception not politics. — Janus

So when people talk about politics, they don't have perception?

I would have thought that knowing reality as it is in itself cannot be known in principle, because reality as it is in itself is defined by its nor being reality as it appears to us. On this definition it follows that anything we know is not reality as it is in itself.

But I don't consider reality as it appears to us to be any less real than reality as it is in itself. Reality as it appears to us is a function of reality as it is in itself, because reality as it appears to us is on account of the effect the environment has on us precognitively. — Janus

So let's apply this to a practical example:

When the critics of Trump and his followers make claims about them, they (ie. the critics) believe that they are making claims about how things really are.


How do you comment?

What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth. (That, I contend, is the major source of 'scientism' and a major weakness of naturalism, generally.) — Wayfarer

I think this is so by design, because otherwise, any kind of normativity is impossible. And without normativity, society and culture are impossible.

I’m careful to explain that I’m not claiming that things go into and out of existence depending on whether they’re being perceived,

but that, absent an observer, whatever exists is unintelligible and meaningless as a matter of fact and principle. — Wayfarer

How do you propose to build a system of morality based on the above idea?

Going off now on a psychological tangent, the other thing is that I think that underlying these 'materialism vs idealism' debates is very often a concern that things should be a certain way, in accordance with what various people want to be the case. So, there are affective concerns at work behind the scenes, otherwise these questions would not be so compelling, having, as they do little to no practical significance for our everyday lives. It seems that some folk on both sides of the debate see these questions as representing a battle between the forces of good and evil, or at least enlightenment and endarkenment, that will determine the fate of humankind. — Janus

It's about more than merely affective concerns: It's about normativity.

The traditional focus on objectivity can also be seen as an effort to establish normativity. Epistemic normativity, psychological normativity, and especially moral normativity.

Allowing for subjectivity and perspectivism (as in: individualism) in any way undermines the very notion of an objective, binding system of moral claims about what is right and about what is wrong.

Under this, subjectivity is acceptable only in a trivial sense: "it's in an individual brain that all these processes happen".

One of the important features of the paper is that it isn’t trying to posit consciousness as an ineffable, inner sanctum. On the contrary, Bitbol emphasizes the irreducibly intersubjective nature of experience.

“…objectivity arises from a universally accepted procedure of intersubjective debate. — Joshs

How does Bitbol account for the possible power differential in such debates?

For example, a teacher and a student may have a debate in class, but because of the power differential between them, the student will tailor her input to the debate for fear of getting a poor grade (or worse). As such, the debate is automatically slanted in favor of the teacher.

The same pattern repeats all over in other settings.

This intersubjective construction of objectivity is what phenomenology is about , not ‘introspection ’, which is a common misunderstanding of its method. — Joshs

Great point!

How does phenomenology explain the existence of disagreement between people? And how does it propose that disagreement be resolved?

Cuz I can’t make heads or tails out of self-knowledge. — Mww

A guy once broke up with me and he stated as his reason, and I quote, "I question the wisdom of continuing a relationship with someone who barely knows herself".

Somehow, "self-knowledge" tends to be about thinking of yourself the way someone else wants you to think of yourself.

Sometimes it seems to me that the quest to gain glimpses of transcendence is more about self-aggrandizement or a kind of metaphysical tourism. — Tom Storm

Yes. And to control the masses, of course.



We fool you.

Of course.

The US Miranda warning:
You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions.
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.

The equivalent for England and Wales:
You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.


Posters are still citizens and subject to laws.

but in fact there are also rational fears that need to be overcome by courage, and this is one of those.

The OP is talking about the fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation. There is also a fear of criticism that that leads us to write write quality posts (checking our spelling, — Leontiskos

How about being aware that your posts here might someday be read by, say, an FBI agent or an IRS agent? Or your boss?

How can it be extrapolated? That a person's psychological, social, economical situation is also a type of topography?
— baker

Well, I would like to suggest that social and psychological situations along with social constructs are all real, but I don't have that map to hand, if there is one. Humans are territory rather than map, is more my point, whereas physics is map. — unenlightened

I like the idea with topography, but it's not clear how morality and normativity can be worked out with it.

For most moral realists, of course there is a need to discuss the moral facts so that we can discover them.
/.../
Moral realism is the position that (1) moral judgements are cognitive and (2) there are objectively true moral judgments. — Bob Ross

If moral facts are something that some people still need to discover and some already know them, then on the grounds of what should the thusly ignorant trust those who propose to have said knowledge?

Secondly, how do you explain that people disagree on what the moral facts are? And what should they do when they disagreee about them? And especially, when such disagreement is between people where one person has more socio-economic power than the other person?

Like I've been saying for a long time, I think you're overestimating his influence on people and underestimating the option that many people are like what you call "inoculated against reality" regardless of Trump.

Oh, and as for "inoculated against reality". Talk about patronizing. It's no wonder the Trumpistas are digging their heels in even more.

Criticism is of course feared because of its connection with adverse consequences. That is itself a perfectly workable definition of fear: anticipation of future evil. — Leontiskos

Dou you think that posting at a public forum should involve no such fear?

Truly scary. He's succeeded by innoculating millions of people against reality. — Wayfarer

How so? Were they previously good, decent human beings who could easily tell reality from fantasy?

By saying Trump innoculated millions of people against reality, you're basically calling all those millions of people sheeple.

The truly scary thing is the idea that human goodness is weak and easily corruptible.

They do not want to give the enemy an equal say in how things should be. — Fooloso4

"Enemy" being the operative term here.

in the case of Crash, what is in front of your face is horrifying, psychopathic perversity

described as if it were normal. — Jamal

Have you compared it to Bret Easton Ellis' American Psycho?

I therefore conclude that perspective is not personal (as Banno points out if we swap places, we swap perspectives), but a feature of topography. — unenlightened

This is an interesting point. How can it be extrapolated? That a person's psychological, social, economical situation is also a type of topography? So that we can say, for example, that someone is a drug addict because of their psychological, social, economical topography (and that any person who would be placed in such a topography would also become s drug addict)?

For the purposes of this discussion, what is your definition of morality?

Buddhism is a sidenote here. My criticism is aimed at eclecticism and at disregarding the complex systemic context of claims.

I often get accused at these forums for arguing ad personam. But this is my point: the things being said are said by someone, by a person, they don't just impersonally appear somehow. One cannot just gloss over this, thinking that a philosophical problem could, should be solved with an impersonal syllogism. Thinking that such a solution exists or should exist already axiomatically presupposes some things that are not self-evidently true or non-controversial (such as that people don't really matter).

you're trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds
— baker

I don’t really accept that. This is a philosophy forum, and the medium of discourse is writing. — Wayfarer

But you hold that the things said, and said here, have an application beyond this forum, do you not?


More about trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds: The very act of joining a lineage, of accepting someone as one's teacher (with all the vows taken, all the bows, prostrations, money given, time spent, the other people witnessing it) has a real cognitive/epistemic effect on and for the person.
This effect can not be replicated merely by thinking about such sumbmission to a teacher, or reading about it.

It's like the difference between actually going to the bank and taking out a loan, signing documents and becoming subject to all the legal and criminal ramifications of having done so, vs. merely thinking about taking out a loan. Or the difference between actually eating an apple and merely thinking about doing so.

It seems that you're trying to get the benefits from Buddhism without really signing up for it. (If you really signed up for it, you wouldn't post here anymore, among other things.)

I don't see how it applies. The form of idealist philosophy that I'm advocating does not say that 'the world only exists in your mind'. — Wayfarer

Sure.

I'm referring to the mind - yours, mine, the mind that we as a species and culture share.

Yet there is *my* mind, *your* mind, and some minds are superior to other minds. This is my focus.

The mind is not an objective reality, it's not a material thing - yet we can't plausibly deny it! That's the elephant in the room, the fly in the ointment, for naturalism.

I would describe myself as an idealist, but with a concern for the practical everyday implications of idealism.

Besides, I don't think that Buddhist philosophy has a problem with solipsism, because the basis of solipsism is that 'consciousness is mine alone'. What Buddhist would say that?

I was asking how Buddhism overcomes the problem of solipsism. Every epistemic theory worth its salt has to overcome the problem of solipsism somehow, otherwise it falls into it.

I contend that it is not possible to make a case this way
— baker

Like I said, you want to uphold the taboo! Push it behind the curtain, declare it out of bounds.

No. I'm saying that you're trying to do too much with words, that you're trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds. (I'll keep bringing this up for a concise formulation.)

Look at the quote in the next post - that more or less re-states everything the essay says. (By the way, thankyou Josh, that passage really hits the nail on the head.)

Sure. But there is still "my lived experience" vs. "your lived experience" and the question of which is the right one, or at least superior.
We somehow need to account for epistemic individuality as well as epistemic commonality and epistemic normativity.

As I said, we inhabit a pluralistic secular culture which ought not to make such arbitrary exclusions,

And I contend that you're trying to do with words what can only be accomplished with physical actions.

and I believe the Buddhist perspective (which is really not a perspective!)

How is it not a perspective? (Because of your commitment to to it?)

Trump sitting at the right hand of Jesus? This isn't funny. The moral implications of Trump being considered righteous are immense.

A third and very common temptation is captured by Aaron Burr’s line in Lin Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton, “Talk less, smile more. Don’t let them know what you’re against or what you’re for.” Whether it is silence, sheepishness, or dissimulation, this is rooted in the fear of being criticized or being wrong. All of these temptations are aided by arguments which are opaque and difficult to discern. Transparency is a useful remedy. — Leontiskos

Surely that line wasn't meant in the context of a private (!) philosophy forum, was it?

In any interaction, it is vital to discern what type of interaction it (potentially) is. Is it a philosophical discussion? Is it a conversation behind closed doors in the boss' office? Is it an inquiry by the police? Is it something the priest is saying in a church? A teacher at school? And so on.

For every type of interaction, different rules about transparency apply. Not in the least because one feared being wrong, but because what one says or fails to say can have tangible adverse consequences, depending on the context of the interaction.

@Wayfarer
Paticcasamuppada explains what you're getting at in this topic, including @180 Proof's objections and the problem of solipsism. It's just that going with paticcasamuppada makes you a member of a Buddhist epistemic community, at the exclusion of memberships in other epistemic communities.

First you don't know that I don't recognize a guru. — Wayfarer

Well, you don't start off your posts by paying humble obeisances to a guru. :wink:

My reference to following a guru is about bringing to the forefront one's membership in a particular epistemic community, as opposed to assuming one can be beyond such membership and somehow talk about things "as they really are", as if from a view from nowhere; or as if one's view/perspective would be only one's own, idiosyncratic, solipsistic even.

I would like to make a case that stands on its own merits, in philosophical terms.

I contend that it is not possible to make a case this way. Because perspective and membership in an epistemic community are inevitable.

//oh, and I’ll say something else. One of the books that had foundational influence on me was Alan Watts The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who you Are, when I was aged about 20. I don’t know how well it reads now - but I think his intuition of the kind of knowledge he was speaking of being ‘taboo’ is right on the mark.

I once googled "how to be a genuine fake". That was how I formulated my inquiry! And Google gave me Watts' book! I was quite disappointed by it, though.

And I wonder if in saying what you’re saying, you’d rather see it observed.

*tsk tsk*

'The world' is really shorthand for the sum total of sensory experience, apperception, feeling, knowing and so forth — Wayfarer

Then how do you overcome the problem of solipsism?

How does Buddhism overcome the problem of solipsism?

At a deeper more optimistic level, I think it is quite enough to arrive at a point where you are aware that potentially all of your assumptions and values, your world are constructed and not an immutable, transcendent reality. It might well help us to be less dogmatic in our thinking and actions. — Tom Storm

I think it depends on one's particular starting point. For me, it's the default to think of perception as an active, volitional process, my default is perspectivism*. I take for granted that my opinions are constructed and subject to change. But these defaults are actually hindrances in daily life, and I wish I could be (more) dogmatic.

(*This probably comes from having to function in several languages from an early age and from having to function as a mediator between people. It's not based on a study of philosophy.)

This quote does resonate.

To me, it's self-evident.

Here, we could bring up the difference between an introvert and an extrovert. Not everyone feels equally bound to other people

For an extrovert, the experience of waking up in a foreign place or time could be more disorienting than for an introvert.

It's not clear where you're going with this. Obviously, I can't recognize something as the Amazon without having heard other people talk about it.

From some point on, though, what I have learned from other people is enough for me to develop a sense of self-sufficieny and independence. (This is easy and tempting to confuse for terminal self-sufficieny and independence.)

Suppose you went to sleep and when you woke up it was 1923 or 1823. Would you realize that this is not the same world it was when you sent to sleep? Or suppose when you woke up you were in some remote fishing village or with in tripe in the Amazon.

Would it be apparent that this is not this is not the same place you fell asleep in? — Fooloso4

Why wouldn't it?

Philosophy doesn't have to be about what one can prove empirically. — schopenhauer1

Indeed, but in order to philosophize, one needs axioms. Otherwise one is just manifesting mental-verbal diarrhoea.

At each point the proper remonstrance from his colleagues could have been, “Richard, stop stooping down to their level! Your zeal for science is only harming it.” — Leontiskos

But nomen est omen!

And clearly, people apparently want and need this type of discourse, otherwise there wouldn't be such things as scientism.
— baker

Want certainly. Need? I find that questionable.

In what sense do you mean "need"? — wonderer1

People have the uncanny ability to make a religion out of pretty much anything. Some people go about it systematically and explicitly, so there are the traditional religionists, and those who "created their own religion". Fans of celebrities, fashionistas, scientism, foodism, etc. etc. All these have in common a characteristic dogmatism that is of existential importance to the members, a community of devotees, a place of worship, the lives of those devotees revolving around certain persons, characters, objects, or ideas, and the willingness to defend them even by endangering their own existence.

Many people are not that systematic and explicit, but they still have that need for prevailing, for being right in what is of existential importance to a them and also having at least some other people on one's side, which is characteristic for religiosity.

IOW, what I mean here by "religious discourse" is a type of discourse that is characteristically dogmatic, of existential importance, and bound to a particular community. People generally do seem to exhibit this as a matter of a need (which, when unmet, manifests as narcissism/egotism).

I'm saying how do you justify social entities like community outside of individual perceptions of what the community is, means, etc. — schopenhauer1

You don't justify them, you take them for granted, axiomatically.

Everyone puts down their flag somewhere I guess. — schopenhauer1

And it helps to acknowledge that, otherwise we're stuck on a wild goose chase.

If there is such a thing as "moral facts", then there is nothing to discuss, no room for philosophy, only for pedagogy, dogma, and proselytizing.

Further, moral realism in its crudest form is the principle "might makes right". This means that what is right depends on whoever happens to have the upper hand, at any given time. This is a type of situational morality, transient and unpredictable. Philosophy is useless for such things.

You, too operate with axioms just not necessarily the same ones as other people's.

Hinge propositions can’t just stop theorizing as that hinge needs to be grounded further. — schopenhauer1

No. Hinge propositions are axioms, that's the point.

Of course. We need to navigate between the extremes of solipsism and non-individualism.

Other people is a reification of an idea. — schopenhauer1

That's solipsistic.