Why is it that if someone already existed and I forced them to play my game of limitations and harms with some good, THAT would be roundly rejected, but if I created someone from scratch (let's say snapped my fingers) THAT is considered fine and dandy? What makes that difference? I think people are misconstruing the idea that a person GETS to experience in the FIRST PLACE as some sort of untold condition of goodness.. But I don't see that as relevant. Thoughts? — schopenhauer1

As another poster suggested earlier in this discussion (in this or another thread), the actual issue is that existence itself is problematic.

Antinatalists (at least the variety one usually encounters in secular Western settings) don't go far enough in their criticism of procreation. It is existence itself they should be criticial of, not merely procreation.

The point is the choices are limited, the harms are known (and some unknown), and that there are immense assumptions being made for imposing them onto other people. — schopenhauer1

So what are you going to do about that?

If a leader makes decisions that the majority of people are against, then by definition, their decisions were not democratic. Simply calling it "representative democracy" doesn't actually make it a democracy. — Yohan

Which is why a democracy has the legal means to remove such a political leader from office.

I'm fairly certain I'd rather live in a democracy than any of the other available options. — Isaac

Then what exactly is your objection to the democratic system of political parties and the process of electing them via popular vote?

Anti-"antinatalism" does not entail pro-natalism. The "moral" arguments in favor of "antinatalism" proffered thus far have been neither valid nor persuasive. — 180 Proof

An argument can only be persuasive to someone, to a person. It cannot be objectively, suprapersonally persuasive.

Poverty is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering. Breaking your leg is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering.
— baker

You'll need to elaborate on that, though honestly what we call it may not be all that relevant. — Tzeentch

Hardship and suffering are two different concepts.
Hardship (pain) are the external and bodily circumstances that a person is subject to: poverty, a broken leg.
Suffering is a possible (but not necessary) response to these cirumstances.


Or, as another poster put it:

Insofar as an existing person maladaptively interprets / relates to her environment, she suffers. — 180 Proof

What gives us the idea we have a right to make such a decision for someone else in the first place?
— Tzeentch

Self-confidence, a "lust for life".
— baker

Why would self-confidence suffice in the case of procreation, when it clearly does not suffice anywhere else in life?

I answered your question. Self-confidence, a "lust for life" are what gives a person the idea they have a right to procreate, ie. make such a decision for someone else in the first place.

To go back to the sky-diving example, if I push someone out of a plane being extremely confident that they'll enjoy it, but instead they crash into the ground, does my self-confidence make any difference as to the nature of what just happened?

No. But if you wouldn't be thusly confident, you wouldn't push that person out of the plane.

For example, once certain people decided that the way to end their suffering was to kill all the Jews. And for at least some time, it worked. Per your formula, that _wasn't_ maladaptive.
— baker
Of course it was, and still is, maladaptive. They were mistaken and consequently acted on that mistake. — 180 Proof

Why was that maladaptive? Why were they mistaken?

Substantiate.

That's like asking whether breathing is of benefit to individuals and how would that be demonstrated.
— baker

No it's not. Breathing is completely unavoidable. Philosophy is avoidable. Odd comparison. — Tom Storm

Not at all. What is completely avoidable is formal study of philosophy. One can perfectly well avoid enrolling in a college program the topic of which is philosophy. One can also perfectly well avoid reading any books by or about people that are popularily known as "philosophers".

But what one cannot avoid is reflecting on the nature of things, on what constitutes truth, goodness, how it is that one knows something, etc. -- all of which are standard topics in philosophy.

The difference between philosophers and people who aren't that (or who make a point of claiming not to be philosophers) is in how systematically and how in accordance with the philosophical tradition they reflect on those topics.

Listing names isn't a description.
— baker

I would have thought that this is my point - such a description is not possible. You can't readily describe people who have chosen not to behave in the manner you have suggested without going into lengthy biography.

One of the assumptions in critical thinking is that it is possible to rationally, with arguments, summarize a person's stance on any given topic.

Am I not thinking clearly? I never said I thought clearly.

Oh, come on.

I don't feel like looking up images of concentration camp prisoners and such. "Largely an aesthetic experience".
— baker

Is this a non sequitur? Why mention concentration camps?

We were talking about the decrease of life quality in areas that are undergoing or have undergone suburbanization or gentrification. To classify this decrease merely as "largely an aesthetic experience" takes away the relevance of this decrease.

So it sounds like you won't engage with my question, but opt to dismiss it instead as poor thinking. Ok.

I've been trying to show you why your question is wrong, and why your persistent declarations of "not being a philosopher" are misguided.

I could.

Neither of which are voting. — Isaac

But perhaps your point is that you don't actually want to live in a democracy?

If vote (in a situation where I know I'm in a minority) I haven't done some small amount of good. I've done no good at all. The opposition party have won and get to enact their policies in exactly the same way they would have if I hadn't voted. Exactly the same. Not a small but insignificant difference (such as with reducing one's carbon footprint), absolutely no difference at all. — Isaac

Such is democracy.

Voting gives a slightly more accurate impression of how people feel politically than would be given if you didn't vote.

A well constructed survey would do a considerably better job of the same task.

Neither change the way things actually are, which is what determines who gets into power. — Isaac

Which is what happens when people don't believe in democracy, even though they nominally live in one.

In some cases non-voters are a large enough constituency to make moves outside of elections and with other means than the vote, so it’s not a complete waste. The problem is probably organizing other non-voters. — NOS4A2

And whose problem and fault is that?


This whole topic is about people who don't understand their role, their rights and their responsibilities as citizens of democractic countries. They are citizens of democractic countries, but they have the mentality of people living in a monarchy (or a cynical dystopia).

I question how much democracy is valued by someone who argues against participation in democracy
— praxis

I value the national health service, but I don't think unqualified people ought to participate in it.

To get closer to the OP, I might value education, but not participate in any teaching establishment because I disagree with their methods.

I can't see why this is at all controversial. One need not participate in everything one values. That seems pretty straightforward. — Isaac

You can escape teaching, practicing medicine, a hundred things. But you cannot escape being a citizen.

Being a citizen brings with it rights and responsibilities.

Voting is not a 'table' in any sense whatsoever. There's no discussion, no interaction. We're presented with choices and we decide which one we least hate. that's it.
/.../
Voting is not a fight. Not even in the slightest bit. It's an exercise in statistical bureaucracy to find out who people want to hold that office. There's not even the tiniest element of 'fight' in it. It's like filling in a census. — Isaac

Unlike professional politicians, you underestimate your role as a citizen of a democratic country and you're not willing to put in anywhere near the effort they did.

Maybe, but the question was about it's being a political position, not a protest. IF voting Labour is a political position (despite the fact that it might be only strategic, or habit, or defeatist), then so is not voting (despite the fact that it might be apathy, laziness or stupidity). — Isaac

If you don't like the current parties available, start your own. Of you don't like the constitutional system, take action. Nobody is stopping you from that.

In the UN general assembly and security council, abstention is a valid stance to adopt. What am I missing? — Agent Smith

Different deliberative assemblies or electoral bodies operate by different rules. They have diffferent rules as to what constitutes a quorum, the exact role of abstention, the value of the vote against the proposition, etc.

Some deliberative assemblies require, for example, a simple majority of votes to be in favor of a proposition in order for the proposition to pass. Others require absolute unanimity for passing. Etc.

Because of this, it's difficult to make generalizations about voting.

So the question remains, is refusing to vote a viable political position? — NOS4A2

Depends on the electoral system. Some countries have a quorum requirement even for parliamentary and presidential elections where it is the general population that votes. I couldn't find an English reference as to which, though. IIRC, it is, for example, some former Yugoslav republics that have this system. If not enough people show up for the elections, the elections are repeated until enough do. In such a system, not voting does make some difference (provided enough people don't vote).

Yes, refusing to participate would be opting out of the system, in a way. But it’s more like refusing to play baseball but having to remain in the dugout. — NOS4A2

In that case, you need to start a civil initiative, start your own party, start collecting signatures for a referendum for a change of constitution etc.

Democracies generally do have legal means of action for those people who are not content with the current system. Many people who are in one way or another critical of the system don't seem to be aware of those means. Or they think making use of those means is too tedious, expensive, or ineffective. In that case, it's those people who are at fault, though, for having unrealistic expectations.

Describe three.
— baker

Sally, Matthew, Mark, Rowena, Tony - there's five people I know well who live outside of a dog-eat-dog worldview. I know a few people who live in the nastier world you describe, but most do not. Unless you take any interaction with the contemporary world as an example of your point. — Tom Storm

Listing names isn't a description.

Is there evidence that philosophy is of benefit to individuals and how would that be demonstrated?

That's like asking whether breathing is of benefit to individuals and how would that be demonstrated.

So my question isn't about evoking a variation of Plato's cave. My question is can you (or anyone) demonstrate that philosophy is of benefit? What would it even look like for philosophy to be of use - would we see equality/world peace/environmental healing?

It seems your obsession with your status as non-philosopher is getting in the way of thinking clearly.

I think this example is a good one and this happened to us in our once rural area too twenty years ago. The quality and experience of life changes for the worse, but it's largely an aesthetic experience.

"Largely an aesthetic experience".

I don't feel like looking up images of concentration camp prisoners and such. "Largely an aesthetic experience".

Insofar as an existing person maladaptively interprets / relates to her environment, she suffers. — 180 Proof

I generally agree, but the problem with your formulation is that it is so general that it can also be applied in ways that would generally be considered immoral.

For example, once certain people decided that the way to end their suffering was to kill all the Jews. And for at least some time, it worked. Per your formula, that _wasn't_ maladaptive.

If you're born and you don't like life, you can always kill yourself — Agent Smith

This is what is so dismal about the pronatalists.

If life is so great, why can't they give a good reason for it? Why the exhortation to kill yourself if you don't like it? Why the implying that you're mentally ill if you have second thoughts about having children?

The antinatalism vs. natalism debate can be resolved if we can actually calculate the probability of someone being happy/sad with life. The math will speak for itself I believe. — Agent Smith

Irrelevant. It's not about what the stakes are, it's about what is at stake.

People will generally do something they value highly, even if the chances of success are very small.

And they will refrain from doing something they don't value, even if the chances of something going wrong at it are very small.


What you're describing is the mentality of gamblers, ie. people who don't want to decide on a matter, but use various ways to distance themselves from contemplating the morality of an action.

I think your neo-liberal hyper-individualism has been quite well expounded. I have no problem with the logic of your conclusion, given the premise that we are all selfish bastards who ought have no obligation at all to look after each other. I think it quite satisfying, in fact, that if one posits such a culture the logical conclusion is that it ought to wipe itself out. — Isaac

But on the other hand, there are the tribalist pro-natalists who only look out for their own tribe/family and who feel no obligation at all to look after those outside of their tribe/family. Many people are like this.
This is a natalist culture that wipes out others, outsiders and their families or tribes. You think that's a win?

Are we really coming down to nothing more than that the antinatalists want to be able to morally judge others but don't want others morally judging them?

You get to judge us for our actions, but your inaction is off limits and whatever your reasons are must be assumed good. — Isaac

But many natalists are doing the exact same thing. Just look at the severe judgment with which the antinatalists on this forum are being met.

What gives us the idea we have a right to make such a decision for someone else in the first place? — Tzeentch

Self-confidence, a "lust for life".

The decision to procreate is always one of force recruiting. — schopenhauer1

But people who procreate don't typically seem to see it that way. What do you make of that?

I think suffering is inherent to life. It even seems to be inherent to happiness (does happiness still have meaning without suffering to contrast it to?).

I genuinely cannot imagine what a life without any pain looks like, and I wonder if it wouldn't make the whole ordeal more meaningless? — Tzeentch

One of the core problems in these discussions is the usual failure to distinguish between hardship and suffering, and instead conflating them.
Poverty is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering. Breaking your leg is hardship, but it does not necessarily entail suffering.

More of the antinatalist goalpost shifting. — Isaac

*sigh*

Like I said more than once, I'm not an antinatalist.
I'm trying to bring some balance into the discussion. I'm critical of both the antinatalists as well as the (pro)natalists. If it seems I'm siding more with the antinatalists, it's because the charges against them are sometimes extremely biased and hostile. Which is strange, given that they come from those who claim to love life or at least deem it worthwhile. How is it that someone who presumably loves life tells others to kill themselves??

How are we to judge what matters morally - intention or outcome? Pick one and then we can have a discussion about how it relates to antinatalism. Keep shifting which depending on the argument and discussion become impossible.

I'm saying that there are ways in which some antinatalist arguments make sense. Such as in terms of the quality of intention.

But it would create a person whose existence would bring enormous benefits to the other humans already in their community. — Isaac

Except, of course, if the child is of the wrong skin color/ethnicity/socioeconomic class, has a disability, is one too many.

You keep ignoring this.

Because it makes us feel good. It's the pleasure of a clear conscience: "I didn't cause harm to anyone." For some people, it's one of the highest pleasures there is.
— baker

Do you think people would still feel that pleasure on a planet empty of all human life bar them? Would they look around a fell good that they're causing no harm? — Isaac

Some certainly would.

Personally, I doubt that, and what little information can be gleaned from isolation studies does not yield any evidence of contentment at having caused no harm.

Most studies in human psychology are done on college students (many of whom major in psychology) and who participate in those studies for credit points toward the final grade. So that's one set of reasons for being skeptical about those studies being universally applicable to all humans.

Secondly, psychology studies tend to assume that all people are essentially the same; that nurture, acculturation are only skin deep. And that there is only one normal way for humans to respond to a certain external stimulus.

For those who hold those assumptions, there is nothing that would detract them from doing so ...

By it, the simplest justification for having a child is that it will do more to improve the welfare of one's community (including the future child) than not doing so would. — Isaac

Except, of course, if the child is of the wrong skin color/ethnicity/socioeconomic class, has a disability, is one too many.

You keep ignoring this.

Yes. NU is as bizarre a ethic as any. Why would we eliminate harm with no-one around to enjoy their harm-free life? — Isaac

It's about the quality of one's intention. The one thing one always has to live with.

What have you to say for the group of people who are genuinely miserable as a result of their parents' choices, and for whom it can be said their parents' choice did go against their interests? — Tzeentch

That they

need to kill themselves asap. — 180 Proof

Getting the ball rolling is ultimately the parents' choice and no one else's, and if they must conclude that many things will be out of their control, then on what basis will they justify their choice? — Tzeentch

Having children is an act of faith, an act of confidence: The prospective parents have faith, are confident that the universe will prove to be a welcoming place for themselves and their children.

Refusing to have children can sometimes be seen as an act of capitulation, defeat, a loss of faith, a giving up on the whole project of existence.

In order to feel alive, many people feel they need to pass on life to others. This can be done by propagating plants, breeding animals, or, to make the lifeform as close to oneself as possible, produce children.

The actual problem is how to balance out the dog-eat-dog mentality with a life-is-good mentality.

A problem philosophers sometimes face is that they cannot come up with a viable alternative to the ordinary, or at least cannot show that their alternative is better than the ordinary.
— baker

Could be. 'The unexamined life is not worth living' resonates with some and doesn't with others. If you don't share that impulse and you are not exposed to examples of philosophy that pique your interest, why should you care? — Tom Storm

Ordinary people are in the position of power, so why do they play the victim?

Is there evidence that philosophy is of benefit to individuals and how would that be demonstrated?

If all you've ever eaten is cold pizza and you're closed off to the possibility of eating hot pizza, then the benefits of eating hot pizza cannot be demonstrated to you.

From my experience, there are many variations of an 'ordinary life' that do not necessarily involve a dog-eat-dog value system.

Describe three.

Do you have a view on where the boundary between reflection and 'proper' philosophy might lie? What I mean is, there are many people who reflect on their lives and purpose and values, without ever reading or learning philosophy - when does a partially examined life become actual philosophy?

When one stops whining and being silly.

A problem philosophers sometimes face is that they cannot come up with a viable alternative to the ordinary, or at least cannot show that their alternative is better than the ordinary.
— baker

Not sure what you mean. It seems you're referring to what artists/novelists do. — Jackson

To illustrate with an example:

I live in a once rural area that is undergoing rapid suburbanization and gentrification. Many new people are moving in, and the town is developing an anonymous, hostile, tense atmosphere that is typical for cities. The new settlers tend to look down on the old ones, they don't speak the local dialect. For the most part, they don't greet when one meets them in the street, not even neighbors. Material wealth is what matters the most. The preferred form of dealing with any problem in the neighborhood is to call the police, to sue. Twenty years ago, this was unthinkable, and instead, people tried to talk things over, or, more frequently, acted with consideration first, so that many problems didn't come up at all.

I think the quality of our lives has dramatically diminished, despite all the new fancy houses, all the new asphalt, concrete, infrastructure. The sensibility and consideration in relationships with other people that were once the norm are now becoming alien. One now has to walk on eggshells at all times, and live in constant fear of the nasty things the new neighbors will do.

Philosophically, it's hard to make a convincing case for why the old way of relating to people is better than the new one.

Normative according to whose norms?
— baker

Moral norms. — Bartricks

The question was about _whose_ norms, not what norms.

On the grounds of what should one person's moral norms be more relevant than another person's moral norms?

Indeed, you may be right, unfortunately. The fact that very significant impositions are taken for granted as fair and just, possibly shows this mentality. It doesn't thus make the impositions acceptable. It just indicates that it is harder for most to get. Not a problem of soundness but epistemology. A blindspot in ethical reasoning perhaps. — schopenhauer1

It comes down to you vs. them. And they are clearly happier than you are.

I see you've been reluctant to frame this as a matter of "my opinion vs. their opinion". You seem to be trying to argue from objective/absolute morality (which you represent and (some) others don't).
This discussion seems to have to do with antinatalism, but equally with more general issues of discussion, epistemology, and normative ethics.

But why come here and try to convince others not to have kids because of your own bizarre interpretation of life? — Xtrix

Why fight the antinatalists so much?

Why are we reducing harm when there's no one around to benefit from the lack of harm? — Isaac

Because it makes us feel good. It's the pleasure of a clear conscience: "I didn't cause harm to anyone." For some people, it's one of the highest pleasures there is.


See also ahimsa for a more explicit take on the matter:

Ahimsa (Sanskrit: अहिंसा, IAST: ahiṃsā, lit. 'nonviolence'[1]) /.../ is an ancient Indian principle of nonviolence which applies to all living beings. It is a key virtue in the Dhārmic religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahimsa

Besides the Nicomachean Ethics, these (more or less contemporaneous) works come to mind as proponents of secular morality: Confucius' Analects, Plato's Euthyphro, Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus, Epictetus' Discourses ... — 180 Proof

How are these not religious??

Each of these works out of a very specific metaphysics system respectively that are alien to the average Westerner. Perhaps this makes it so easy to overlook them, but they're there, and they're essential for the respective moral system to be intelligible and experienced as actionable.


And the OP question was:

I'm not asking whether morality can be justified without religion. I'm asking whence the idea that it can or should be. — baker

In short, I don't think you'll find much, despite the references. — Manuel

But surely Lacanian theory is about _something_?


Found this:

The medical agenda for reducing or eliminating symptoms is at complete odds with Lacanian therapy. Emotional suffering, in this regard, demands understanding by and for the patient alone. Implicit in this suffering lies a passion and desire that eludes direct linguistic expression, yet may be knowable from recognizing the limits set by language. Herein lies the neurotic dilemma of speaking the unspeakable to another who is likewise a divided self.

/.../

It is important to reiterate that the focus of treatment is the patient in relationship to others. This position is in contradistinction to those forms of psychotherapy aimed at altering psychic structures such as the ego and its defenses or in working toward the targeting of specific symptoms. Lacan adopted an epistemological stance consistent with systems theories. From this position, a patient’s psychic conflict arises from an effort to preserve sanity in the context of living among others.

https://www.psychstudies.net/how-lacans-theory-can-be-helpful-in-psychotherapy/

But what does this have to do with Lacan?

I edited the OP with additional information.

So why does the specter of Chidi/Hamlet in that ivory tower hang over philosophy? — Srap Tasmaner

It hangs there insofar a philosophy doesn't propose to have the final answers.

The other thing that comes to mind regarding the OP I can't quite articulate clearly yet, but I can so far summarize it as follows: one either lives by the 48 laws of power, or one thinks there should be more to life than that, and then uses philosophy to find out.

To be "ordinary", one needs to live in a very small world, have a small mind, have a dog-eat-dog heart. Many people live this way, and they seem to do just fine.

A problem philosophers sometimes face is that they cannot come up with a viable alternative to the ordinary, or at least cannot show that their alternative is better than the ordinary.

The weakness of your and @schopenhauer1 's line of reasoning is that it requires far more compassion and mercy than people usually have.

The other weakness is that it requires that people be not seen as objects, as things over which one rules. In contrast, people usually see other people as things, as their underlings, as beings to be ruled over (hence they have no qualms about procreating, or having abortions).

So your AN arguments are not fit for this world.

I'm asking you what you make of the fact that people are able to procreate (some people, at least; the ability to procreate is not a given).
What moral implications does this fact have, according to you? — baker

None. People are able to do immoral things. — Bartricks

Think about it. What does it say about the universe that people can do immoral things? What is more, they can do things that some people consider "immoral", and they are nevertheless happy and suffer no ill effects. For example, people can kill, rape, and pillage, and live happily everafter. Doesn't this strike you as noteworthy?

Like I say, you don't seem to be appreciating that this is a normative issue.

Normative according to whose norms?