If it floats, flies, or fornicates, rent it.

What about the placebo effect?

That seems like a big issue in psychology for psychology to address its origin or magnitude in effects towards drugs that treat many mental disorders, no?

I don't know if I'm the only person feeling this vibe; but, requesting that for science to explain the facet of the human psyche seems quite off the trail, in my opinion. It seems that for this to be true, then one must be quite strict about behaviorism rather than psychology, which are related; but, not the same.

Part of the problem is that externalities that are difficult to calculate for differing countries of the world are already hard to calculate, and only the EU has taken steps to internalize these externalities with carbon tax credits.

But my philosophy always prioritises the relation as fundamental; the observer and the observed are both united and only exist in the observation. The observation is reality; the observer and the observed are 'aspects'. — unenlightened

Aspects of what? Aspect of a relation?

Science is the selfless observation of the world, and one cannot have a selfless observation of the self. — unenlightened

I'm not entirely sure why; but, Buddhism seems like a way of life originating from a selfless observation of the self by Buddha. Why isn't Buddhism more popular in psychology?

Science operates on the assumption that atoms do not understand atomic theory - in general that the objects of scientific study are not altered by the theory on has of them. At the quantum level, this becomes difficult because the act of observation itself affects the observed and this leads to the uncertainty principle. However, in psychology, the objects of observation are themselves observers, scientists, and psychological theorisers. Their theories of psychology radically affect their own psychology. — unenlightened

Is this subjectivism or relativism at its core? Just wondering, unenlightened-dono.

And that's one of the reasons so much of the philosophy of ethics is baloney. — T Clark

That's pretty scary, no? That people have to think of reasons to love another nowadays.

I've said this before - psychology is not psychotherapy. — T Clark

How much of this does it differ from other aspects of psychology? Seems interesting to point out that psychology or psychotherapy aren't that distinct from another since one can be more theory based, with the other much more hands on and active.

Psychology is the scientific study of behavior. — T Clark

That's actually funny to talk about, since that's by definition behaviorism. I don't think behaviorism is the same as psychology, as is cognitive science the same as the study of thinking.

But you're right, some, but not all, forms of psychotherapy do involve self-examination. — T Clark

It would be interesting to note, that what types do not involve this form of analysis?

I'm not sure. A lot of posters are posting questions about why there are so many flavors of psychology.

@unenlightened, do you know why this is, if I may be so bold?

Ethics and morals are heavily influenced by psychological factors, and they weren't ignored either. — T Clark

Nothing about deontological or consequentialist ethical theories really incorporate the psyche into their analysis. The trolley dilemma neither does incorporate the analysis of the biases of the lever switcher into the conceptual landscape. Don't these issues mean that philosophy still is in need of a rational analysis that is non-economic and calls for more psychological insights or is this an issue that psychology faces as a field that simply doesn't adhere to the same sort of analysis philosophers require(?)

Psychology is not "examining one's life." It is the study of (mostly) human behavior. — T Clark

Yet, when a patient enters the office of a psychologist, they would sit there and recollect questions they have to the psychologist about their life. It's important for a psychologist to be asked questions about one's life and provide a narrative from an unbiased observer about them. In my opinion, it seems naive to say that they only are there to provide support as their profession is about the importance of external or internal factors that are causing the patient to feel unwell or mentally ill.

What do you think about old Socrates and the unexamined life not worth living? What claim does psychology have over leading an edifying and fulfilling life as philosophy would prescribe?

Yes, but the Serenity Prayer is more geared towards AA and NA members... Hmm...

I'd like to postulate that it seems to be true that when it comes down to ontological ascriptions in formal languages, with a 1 to 1 relation, then isn't it necessarily true that this is a correspondence theory of truth?

Whereas in natural languages, it seems that coherentism is more apt to assume as true?

Sorry, but I'm still confused about what you mean by "this has a place".

What do you mean by that?

What do you think, @Banno?

And additionally, does the difference between the ontological commitment we make for Alaska or Pegasus only boil down to senses?

How is that true?

It seems that another interesting topic related to the heap issue is one of whether the truth or falsehood of applying the bivalence principle to the heap issue is de facto an issue if one professes a correspondence theory of truth toward realism?

In my opinion this is at face value false to say that the correspondence theory of truth in fact adheres towards the use of the word "heap", otherwise, what does "heap" correspond to?

Instead, I think, that the heap issue presents a novel representation of coherentism in language.

Thoughts?

There's only a "paradox" if you insist on the truth of contradictory premises, such as:

P1. objects have a set of attributes that are necessary to their identity (essentialism)
P2. no specific number of items is necessary for a collection of items to be a heap
P3. heaps exist

The "solution" is to reject one of the premises. I reject the first. Essentialism isn't the case. — Michael

It isn't so much a attribute, but, an issue of vagueness. I'm not sure if you follow that line of reasoning or care to.

And, anticipating Banno, I don't think language itself solves the issue. It seems corollary to saying that tall isn't vague because we can use it a certain way to precise its meaning.

Here's from the SEP entry, which I've been concerned about as to what a heap constitutes:

Another possible route to knowledge of the boundary locations is blocked by the fact that our knowledge of the application of a vague term is inexact. Inexact knowledge is governed by margin for error principles, viz., principles of the form ‘If x and y differ incrementally on a decisive dimension and x is known to be Φ (old, blue, etc.), then y is Φ’.[2] For example, where knowledge is inexact, we can know of a blue object that it is blue only if objects whose colors are incrementally different are blue as well—hence, only in clear cases. In contrast, in the borderline or “penumbral” region of a sorites series for ‘blue’, where the boundary lives, some shade of blue is only incrementally different from, indeed may look the same as, a shade that is not blue; and we cannot know where this difference lies. Consequently, if we classify the former shade as blue, that classification is correct by luck, and so does not constitute knowledge. (On the plausible assumption that seeing that something x is blue is sufficient for knowing that x is blue, it follows that some blue things are such that we cannot see that they are blue, even under ideal viewing conditions.)

The virtues and the appeal of the epistemic theory are significant, and it has earned its share of supporters. At the same time, the view may be hard to accept. Even its proponents grant that epistemicism is intuitively implausible; and it seems to multiply mysteries. As a first approximation, the epistemicist says that

vague terms have unknowable sharp boundaries that are fixed by an unknown function of their unknowable (i.e., not fully knowable) patterns of use. — SEP

You are misusing bivalence. — Banno

This is clearly defined in the SEP entry to be an issue of bivalence for epistemic criteria for what constitutes a heap.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/#EpisTheo

"Heap" is a label we put on a phenomenon we observe in the world. The word is artificial, human-made. Is that what you mean by phenomenological? — T Clark

No, I think that it makes sense to state that it is phenomenological; but, don't think that's what I'm trying to say.

Mainly, when we say that a 'heap' exists, what does that mean about how we perceive reality? In a direct-1-1-correspondence of the word to a pile of sand? Then how does that make sense when the pile of sand cannot be specified precisely?

Other interesting questions could be, "can a heap be specified more precisely"?

How is it not context? — Tom Storm

On a face value reading, it might seem as a context issue. But, I'm not trying to look at this through a lens of preciseness only. I think, it also seems to me to be an issue about inherent vagueness in language for not only 'heaps'; but, something of the sort of, 'the worn out sole of my shoe', 'the smelly bathroom', or 'the tall man'. If it's so apparent, then doesn't this warrant what's going on language that this is so easy for it to arise?

Can you show me a specific example of how this language imprecision cause harm or an insurmountable problem? — Tom Storm

In determining valency or affect in language as a general measure? I think there's the issue of realism in language or whether it's really all a correspondence theory that's on shaky grounds?

What does "heap" correspond to?

We starting confusing ourselves when we lose track of the difference between the world and the words we use to describe it. That's what we're talking about when we talk about paradoxes. — T Clark

So, what kind of world does the ontology of a 'heap' inhabit? Purely, "worldly" or phenomenological; because the law of excluded middle wont let both be satisfied at the same time, no? I might be wrong; but, a heap comes off as a epistemological problem, as specified by philosophers and their criteria for other terms such as 'holes' or heaps upon heaps.

It's context. If someone says to me; 'I'll give you heaps of money." I might ask, "How much is heaps?" But if someone says, "There's a heap of wood in the back yard for the fire", I probably will be satisfied by this. — Tom Storm

How is it context? I'm no specialist in language theory; but, to me this is such a phenomenon widespread in informal languages, that I don't really see this as a way of meaning as use. More akin to treating 'tall' as a relative term, a 'heap' or a 'hole' seem to be associated with the problem of the principle of bivalence not being able to suffice for the way that term is used by philosophers.

Which, is puzzling and interesting as to why the principle of bivalence or even fuzzy logic might not even help.

I just thought this article might be more useful than me trying to get across the vagueness of these predicates by logic alone.

Have at it:

https://aeon.co/ideas/on-vagueness-when-is-a-heap-of-sand-not-a-heap-of-sand

Well, I beg to differ.

Let's assume that vagueness arises where the law of bivalence is not clearly defined or sharp, for a heap. Therefore, what can one say about this problem of the valence of what a "heap" actually is.

An untidy collection of objects, place on top of each other. — Banno

But you understood that, and as a competent speaker of English you use the word correctly, as well as in jest.

SO what is the confusion? — Banno

An epistemist might ask you a question such as,

"Does the Sorites paradox entail a too strict principle of bivalence by (what you call) a prejudice of the arising doubt or is there any need to maintain the principle of bivalence towards what constitutes a "heap"?"

I can state this more eloquently, as,

"Why does epistemicism cause confusions around what constitutes a "heap"?

SO give an example of that confusion. — Banno

It might seem trivial; but, once you see the vague predicate and assume doubt it instantly becomes a problem rather than not.

Such as,

'What is a "heap"?'

My own instinct is that language has usage, not meaning and for everyday functioning such words have been more than adequate. — Tom Storm

Well, it's a prime example in philosophy, and with my concern over epistemic discursions over criteria I think, it's a really interesting case example to argue for a more formal way of using language.

I would even argue that cognitively a "heap" is what can be called a phenomenological expression if its so inexact.

Contrary to what you are implying, that the use of pile is adequate perhaps by the latter Wittgenstein, I think there's reason for doubt or concern by other philosophers. These vague predicates are very heavily loaded with human perception and often cause confusion in language.

Or another way I just thought is that for the case of the heap of sand is where phenomenological issues manifest in language.

Have you heard of the Problem of the Criterion?

Well, yes; but, the paradox is still pertinent.

Asides from that, I understand that "heaps" or "holes" have this vagueness that irritates philosophers. I'm not necessarily asking for a more precise meaning as much as asking why do these words make philosophers talk about them at length?

And, even counterfactually, what does this reveal about language and human perception in language games?

Unsure if you might find this more interesting than the other thread, @I like sushi?

I haven't read much of Husserl. I do think that intenstion and determination matters. My opinion on the matter seems to be related to what is called "ontological", where if one can specify epistemic content as a set of criteria, one might have a better discussion in total rather than discussing ontology.

I think, that there's something to the Sorites Paradox that touches on this.

To refer back to Pegasus and Husserl … spot the difference in meaning between these two sentences:

- I can imagine a limbless Pegasus.
- I cannot imagine a Pegasus without limbs.

These are on the surface contrary. Technically speaking what I am saying by ‘without limbs’ here is that I cannot ‘unknow’ an animal that has limbs and then except them that way. Pegasus is a flying horse, a horse has legs, and if I saw a horse without legs I would notice it didn’t have legs or assume they were hidden from sight because horses have legs.

Does that make sense? — I like sushi

Yes, I think so. I believe it makes some sense to mention a square-circle and the idea of a square-circle. Two different things?

I don’t think it is really ‘anthropomorphic’ to say something like ‘the Sun rises’ as that is merely an expression of what we see rather than imbuing the Sun with human qualities. It is also a ‘fact’ that it rises and not a ‘fact’ (because the Earth merely rotates - depends on context).

One of the most interesting things I like to look at is how we’ve repurposed and measured ‘events’ into something called ‘time’. — I like sushi

Yes, I have been concerned with historicism as of late, as distilled knowledge based on facts.

Not sure what more to comment on here. Thanks.

I see.

I'm more concerned with the issue if a patent that can contribute to greater efficiency in the economy or as you say, a social and environmental benefit, is bought out by a firm to prevent losses to their company, and if that were true then should the government intervene?

What do you think?

I think, that the issue is one of anthropomorphic perception or understanding. I mention that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same entity by investigating into the direct referent of the object in question. This seems to me to be an investigational issue about the source origin of the name for Venus at dawn and twilight.

Now, with Hesperus and Phosphorus in mind, I think treating confusing entities like a "hole" which is related to human perception is tantamount to talking about human perception in part also, which brings one to the point... at which point does authentic knowledge enter the discussion about "holes" or Pegasus or Santa? If it really is all epistemic, then aren't we confided to talk about criteria?

Depends on the discussion, no?

If its ethics and morality, it seems ad homs are more prevalent.

In essence, if a patent contributes to efficiency in the marketplace, but is bought out by a large firm that doesn't want to see a net decrease in (their) profits, then shouldn't someone intervene or is this just laissez faire at work?

Anthropomorphism is basically a psychological point. You used the term in a context I’ve never seen before. — I like sushi

I'm just pointing out that it constantly goes on in what you say as antonyms in human reasoning towards objects in the world, and I think this was most apparent in stating a hole is (according to SEP) an ontologically parasitic entity.

Have you looked into the linguistic uses of the various antonyms at all? I wasn’t describing anything as a ‘relational pair,’ but some could argue that in part all ‘items’ must be relational pairs to some degree maybe? — I like sushi

I haven't; but, that's an interesting point.

Is any of this getting at what your interest is? Anything relevant? — I like sushi

Well, I must admit, the OP is a mish-mash. Sorry for any confusions, and hope I clarified as many as there are or actually are!