So one person's epistemological ontological grounding of language or meaning may be another's psychologism(If youre Rorty all epistemology is psychologism). — Joshs

Yeah, so hence why I ask if a demarcation between psychologism and antipsychologism can be drawn? It seems like one of those false dichotomies like the objective-subjective distinction.

Let me know about your take on Rorty. Quite interested.

I'm curious whether any historical philosopher (that we would know about any way) really committed themselves to a psychologism. I know there were early refutations of this in Frege and Husserl, but I'm not sure who they would have addressed other than maybe early psychologists, or people who thought logic and mathematics were mind-dependent entities. Always seemed like nonsense. — Marty

Just off the top of my head, Hume advocated psychologism with the problem of induction. Kant seems to have advocated an antipsychologism take on philosophy with his Critique of Pure Reason. It can go both ways with Kant.

Some other notable philosophers that seemed to have proponents of psychologism were Schopenhauer, existentialists (kinda broad definition), and phenomenologists.

What do you think?

I'm not sure how you get the impression that the later Wittgenstein believed in psychologism. For he rejected the "picture theory" of meaning, arguing against the reduction of linguistic understanding to mental states or immanent experience. — sime

I was under the impression that Wittgenstein was advocating an intuitionalist conception of language in the Investigations. You can see it in his famous example of a lion who could speak but we would never understand it.

But since his methodology was solipsistic, one shouldn't to go so far as to say that he believed linguistic meaning transcended experience, only that semantics cannot be given a constructive universal definition in terms of immanent experience. — sime

What do you mean by "solipsistic" methodology?

Hmm, you seem to have approached the problem from the wrong angle in my opinion.

I think the Stoic ethos is the right way to approach the issue without unnecessary baggage of sin, redemption, and love. The end product might be displeasing though. Namely stoical apatheia.

Is there any ethics that is not based on will - on volition or choice? — Fooloso4

Utilitarianism?

I would like to jump into the reading group. About where is the group in terms of section in the text? — SapereAude

I figure we're kind of doing this at whim, so feel free to address any part you find confusing from the book and we will try and address things as they come along.

Cheers.

I just wanted to say thank you to @Fooloso4 and @Pussycat for entertaining this thread. I don't have much to say; but, thanks.

:blush:

:cry:

There's Donald Trump bad and then there's Roger Stone bad.

...if the stuff in Meinongs Jungle aren't really empty names, then what are they?

SO empty name does not mean a name that does not refer. — Banno

Then what does it mean to say that stuff in Meinongs Jungle are actually empty names?

Aren't they empty names?

So, what's a characteristic of entities that reside in Meinongs Jungle? That they have no reference to real world things?

Well, Wallows is you; "Pegasus" is a word. — Banno

Am I really Wallows? Is Pegasus only a word?

Yes, what are they?

Or as in how does the name work? What reason is there to think that "Pegasus" works differently to "Phar Lap" - except in naming something else, of course. — Banno

Yes. What does the name "Pegasus" or Wallows represent then?

How do you call something that is either real or existing but not both, such as Pegasus?

The point here is that being real and existing are not the very same. — Banno

Yes, then what do you call that?

The property of being an empty name?

Santa is not real. The stories about Santa, they are real. In logic, we might say that there is something that has a beard and lives at the north pole and so on, but not that there is a Santa.

Of course, we can't say that there is a Wallows, either. — Banno

So, Pegasus or Wallows exists but doesn't.

Is there some term for this fluxual state of existence?

Meinongianism isn't entirely off the table nowadays (oddly enough) but it's a bitter pill to swallow... — MindForged

Why is that? I like Meinongianism.

There are some relevant topics on our website:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3951/is-ayn-rand-a-philosopher/p1
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1632/what-did-ayn-rand-actually-say/p1

Well, it seems you boiled down the issue of 'truth' being accessible to only the correspondence theory. Which theory meshes with "saying true things about objects that don't exist"?

Or do we just salvage the correspondence theory by adding in things (empty names) into the scope of the theory?

It's called "logicomix". I can't do a specific Google search for the clip I presented.

Here's some more:

http://existentialcomics.com/philosopher/Ludwig_Wittgenstein

I overslept and missed the lecture.

Where are we in the text, @Fooloso4?

That's fine.

Given that this thread is concluding, do you want to recap on the things you have learned from Kripke's Naming and Necessity?

What do you mean taken a step or two backward?

When this comes to the light of day and one resorts to saying "semantics", there's not much else to say to that person... — creativesoul

Meh

@Fooloso4

I think I got sidetracked with the whole Rhino and induction thing. Let me know where we left off.

Sorry and thanks.

Hume’s problem of induction is not about what can be verified empirically here and now, such as whether there is a rhino in the room, but about what we infer will be the case based on prior experience. For example, if every time I walk into Russell’s room there is a rhino I might after numerous times infer that there will be a rhino in his room the next time I visit. There might, but then again, there might not. That is something I cannot know until I visit. It does not follow logically that because there has been a rhino in the past there will be one in the future — Fooloso4

I have my contention with this due to Wittgenstein explicitly stating in proposition 5.1361:

The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present.

Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. — Wittgenstein

Although he does change his views later in the Investigations.

If you read my posts you will find that I have addressed all of this — Fooloso4

I'm a little slow, please bear with me. Here is a good paper on the issue of there being a rhino in the room.

I just found this article really elucidating on the magnitude of Ramsey's pragmatic approach to philosophical issues having influenced Wittgenstein's transition and later period. Hope someone enjoys it:

https://aeon.co/essays/what-is-truth-on-ramsey-wittgenstein-and-the-vienna-circle

I don't see how any of this discussion relates to the OP. Can you guys clarify?

Logic determines what is possible. It tells us nothing of what is actual. — Fooloso4

So, with the above in mind, does Wittgenstein ever make the claim that, logic and the world, are one and the same? Or is there some distinction drawn between the two? Or in other words, how does logic relate to the world, if as we've discussed the metaphysical self lies beyond it?

I do not know if this is what you are inquiring about though. What do you think about Wittgenstein's answer to Hume's problem of induction in the Tractatus? — Fooloso4

Well, according to this website, answers the question about why Wittgenstein denied Russell's empirical claim that "there is no rhinoceros in the room". How does this relate to the issue about Hume's problem of induction is that Wittgenstein basically affirmed the issue of the problem of induction by the assertion that empirical claims like Russell's rhino in the room are just as untenable as knowing that the sun will rise the next morning, which according to Hume is just a psychological belief, not a certainty.

Do you agree with all this or not?

Pragmatically speaking, if it serves them some utility and doesn't harm others, then whatever floats their boat.

You mean you're entitled to your opinion? I guess that works too.

I've never understood the issue here. We can imagine things that aren't the case. What's the big mystery? — Terrapin Station

On the contrary, "Santa Claus" is about a real thing, which is a story, and refers to a real feature of that story, which is one of its characters. — andrewk

What do you think @Banno?

What does W mean by the following?

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

What does logical necessity mean here?

See:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/249463