Prior to acquiring knowledge that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we first focus upon the thing we're calling water. — creativesoul

I don't understand. What's the point being made about this? It is a fact that H2O is water and that it is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Yes?

I do not call them "atomic constituents", and no, they are not self-evident. — creativesoul

You may not call them that; but, that is what they are called in analytic philosophy to the best of my knowledge.

If they were, there would be no need for first focusing upon the composite in order to acquire knowledge that they are - in fact - a composite. — creativesoul

I don't understand this, please expand.

Parts that a thing is made of, all of which are necessary for that thing to exist, and none of which are existentially dependent upon being a part of that thing. — creativesoul

I see. So, the simplest atomic constituent is self-evident? Isn't this logical atomism or Leibnizian monadology rehashed?

It's putting knowledge of elemental constituents to good use. — creativesoul

What are elemental constituents?

It's about existential dependency. — creativesoul

Yes, via accessibility.

All of these things are existentially dependent upon their elemental constituents. — creativesoul

So, it's logical atomism again.

I will refrain from posting about accessibility since, if I correctly recall, you're still the leader of this reading group, Banno.

There are these two threads where this can be explored further:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4712/existential-quantification-and-counterfactuals
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4718/accessibility-relations-across-possible-worlds

Accessibility is about which possible worlds can be stipulated, given other possible world stipulations. — Banno

You're being obstinate for no good reason. Accessibility is what enables one to stipulate. Yes, they aren't the same, I agree.

Yeah. That just doesn't make sense. — Banno

It does because quantification of modality is a thorny issue in logic. Don't you think? The SEP entry on it would illustrate that.

I've already tried to separate this discussion in other threads but curiosity gets the better of me.

Why the interest in accessibility, anyway? — Banno

It just stood out as something pertinent. I am also interested in satisfying accessibility for modal operators, in other words or worlds(?), to be able to determine what is possible from necessary.

What does bipolarity have to do with this? — Pussycat

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4290/principle-of-bipolarity

If you are going to include accessibility in your thinking, then you really must distinguish between what is necessary in all possible worlds and what is necessary in only those worlds that are accessible because of our stipulations. — Banno

But, you can't stipulate (quantify) without referring back to our own world (instantiation, I think). Can you satisfy accessibility without adherence to our own world?

Although it seems to me, very circular, to say that accessibility is granted through stipulation.

Thoughts?

What do you think accessibility is? — Banno

To parrot your style although I think there's much more that can be said here than what I am able to, stipulation.

This seems relevant to the discussion we're having:

A final complication in the semantics for quantified modal logic is worth mentioning. It arises when non-rigid expressions such as ‘the inventor of bifocals’ are introduced to the language. A term is non-rigid when it picks out different objects in different possible worlds. The semantical value of such a term can be given by what Carnap (1947) called an individual concept, a function that picks out the denotation of the term for each possible world. One approach to dealing with non-rigid terms is to employ Russell’s theory of descriptions. However, in a language that treats non rigid expressions as genuine terms, it turns out that neither the classical nor the free logic rules for the quantifiers are acceptable. (The problem can not be resolved by weakening the rule of substitution for identity.) A solution to this problem is to employ a more general treatment of the quantifiers, where the domain of quantification contains individual concepts rather than objects. This more general interpretation provides a better match between the treatment of terms and the treatment of quantifiers and results in systems that are adequate for classical or free logic rules (depending on whether the fixed domains or world-relative domains are chosen). It also provides a language with strong and much needed expressive powers (Bressan, 1973, Belnap and Müller, 2013a, 2013b). — SEP

So, to answer my own question @creativesoul, quantification of counterfactuals actually is a large and growing body of science or philosophy. What are your thoughts, you, and others?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#QuaModLog

This is relevant. Quine was opposed to quantification of modal relations.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#QuaModLog

This is relevant. Quine was opposed to quantification of modal relations.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#QuaModLog

Then we can only "measure" counterfactuals by an accessibility relation to own own world. Therefore how can we assert something as necessarily true in all possible world's? @andrewk, @Banno?

But what your saying is tantamount to asserting the existential onus on a form of Platonic essentialism or "forms"? Yes?

They are existentially dependent on our own world, I think. They have accessibility relation to our world. Yes?

No.

How so?

So, counterfactuals have existential dependency?

Are those the only two choices? — creativesoul

What else do you propose when talking about simples (atomic facts, logical simples, monads?)?

Liebniz monadology or logical atomism?

They are equivalent in my view.

Well the entire scope of dimensionality is the same wrt. to God. It's up-down not bottom-up.

@Banno or someone care to help me out?

Interesting answer, can you expand? — Devans99

What do you want me to expand on?

If "god" were a dimension, then why call it "god" and not just "dimension"? — Harry Hindu

I generally agree with this. I see nothing fruitful from thinking God is in the sky somewhere.

I'd call it pantheism if I were hard pressed.

Dimensionality.

God exists as an independent dimension above all others. S/he/It encompasses all other dimensions, such as space and time.

Yes, but this most famous proposition is a bit ambiguous, isn't it? — Pussycat

Depending on whether you adopt the principle of bipolarity, not so much.

But what kind of "work" you mean? — Pussycat

Deeds, acts of kindness/charity. That kind of "work".

I'm quite interested to get into the logical aspect of this book. If I can assert a possible world or stipulate something about it, then existentially that stipulation will always be dependent on this world.

But, if you stretch the concept to the extreme, then what about possible worlds where accessibility relations fail? And, more to the point about counterfactuals, then it would be tautologous to say that they some are necessary or possible.

@Banno, what does Kripke have to say about accessibility relations between possible worlds? Does he even go into this important topic?

Waiting with great anticipation @Mentalusion!

But he maintained a relaxed version of what he called Russell's Principle: that a person cannot be thinking about an object unless he knows, in some non-trivial way, which object he is thinking about. — Pierre-Normand

Isn't that the principle or knowledge by/of acquaintance stated another way?

I think it would be way too difficult, given the length of the thread, to dissect the existing thread into reading group and debate. — andrewk

I'm banking on your or another's willingness to take up that challenge. I have seen valuable insights over the last three or four pages as to the issue of identity and time tracking contra essentialism.

Ok, so let's start.

What is a set of possible world(s)?

What is an accessibility relation?

What is a value assignment?

If you can recommend a good book available online I'd greatly appreciate that.

Or to phrase the question differently, why don't existential quantifiers apply to counterfactuals?

That's why you have separate modal logics which include PL + the modal operators. — Mentalusion

Could you or someone else expand on this? What type of logic is that?

Someone should turn this thread into a book.

Is, so then why?