Okay, then I had it backwards then. Thanks.

I see you.

A terminological thing here: a name doesn't have a rigid designator according to Kripke, it is a rigid designator. A rigid designator is a kind of term or word. A name has a referent. — Snakes Alive

I will let Banno clarify my confusion. I've always held that objects are rigid designators to the act of baptism of a name.

I digress and hope you guys can flesh this beast out.

Objects have meaning? — Banno

Not in isolation. This goes back to the Tractatus; but, objects have meaning in relation to other objects, which are states of affairs, deriving from atomic facts.

So Kripke says the following on page 33:

For example, if someone said 'Aristotle does not exist' means 'there is no man doing such and such', or in the example from Wittgenstein, 'Moses does not exist', means 'no man did such and such', that might depend (and in fact, I think, does depend) on taking the theory in question as a theory of the meaning of the name 'Moses', not just as a theory of its reference. Well, I don't know. Perhaps all that is immediate now is the other way around : if 'Moses' means the same as 'the man who did such and such' then to say that Moses did not exist is to say that the man who did such and such did not exist, that is, that no one person did such and such. If, on the other hand, 'Moses' is not synonymous with any description, then even if its reference is in some sense determined by a description, statements containing the name cannot in general be analyzed by replacing the name by a description, though they may be materially equivalent to statements containing a description. So the analysis of singular existence statements mentioned above will have to be given up, unless it is established by some special argument, independent of a general theory of the meaning of names; and the same applies to identity statements. In any case, I think it's false that 'Moses exists' means that at all. — Saul Kripke

What does he mean by saying that a description need (not) to refer to an object for that object to have meaning in the first place? Am I sounding confused here?

For example, what are causal links according to Kripke and how do they obtain in the world or possible world's?

I'm still playing catch up. But, if you want to hear my dribble then a name attains meaning when it has a rigid designator that instantiates a concepts or a web of beliefs about it or otherwise known as definite descriptions in the world. My only concern is how do definite descriptions obtain wrt. to rigid designators.

Again, modality is eluding me here.

I feel as though we should pause and go through the process of how names attaining their meaning through baptism, which is further instantiated through causal links. Care to explain and where should we be looking at in the text?

Thank you.

Modality of meanings deserves a mention too.

So, how does a name attain meaning? Through baptism?

How does baptism occur for names and their referring rigid designators?

Sounds awfully like the placebo effect to my ears.

I hope we can get by without too much formal logic here; but possible world semantics will always be sitting there, watching. — Banno

I wouldn't mind at least mentioning it. I like the juicy parts of a thorough analysis.

But then, on the other hand, if we remove the radical change dream, then few of these guru guys could make a living selling books etc. Maybe the radical change dream is necessary to keep such writers in the marketplace of ideas? — Jake

So, then I must conclude from the above, that these men are con artists. Luring people into an idea that they realize that nobody can ever achieve through following in their footsteps. So, Krishnamurti was right in dismissing the very organization that was dedicated to following in his footsteps towards enlightenment. Is that correct?

I will wait for other members to catch up or contribute. Thanks.

A definite description picks out one and only one individual. Agreed? — Banno

Yes; though, when we talk about the qualitative aspect of things or facts, they can be different than the quantitative aspect of that thing or fact.

And it can be successful even when it doesn't work - as the man with the champaign example shows. — Banno

I'm not aware of this example. Can you please explain it to us folk?

And the thing a proper name or a definite description picks out is its referent. — Banno

A proper name ought to have a rigid designator. Definite descriptions not necessarily so.

Some curious stuff about unicorns that we can come back to. — Banno

Yes, what's your take on empty names like Harry Potter, Pegasus, or the definite description of the member of this forum who lives in Australia known as "Banno"?

Proper names, then.

They are not definite descriptions.

Any questions? — Banno

I will wait for other members to address this claim. But, can you explicate the rationale behind this conclusion?

How is a better question. It's already been answered. — creativesoul

Please tell me again, for I am dumb and slow.

Thank you.

What sort of question is that Posty? Ask a better question. — creativesoul

Okay. Then, I shall ask the very basic question as to whether thoughts can exist independently of emotions. Your answer to this question was a "no". Now, I ask why?

Your confidence does not exist independently of your thought/belief. — creativesoul

How so?

Are you uncertain, certain, or neither? — creativesoul

My confidence statement (of how certain I am about ascertaining the truth of the proposition) exists independently of the truth of the proposition that 1+1 is 2. Can there be any other way of understanding such a statement?

For sure. I may not be able to participate assiduously, but, if this gets going, I'll likely comment occasionally. — Pierre-Normand

Right on! Thanks for getting on board. I hope @Banno can assist us in the interpretive part of understanding the main gist of the book. Some narrative is always needed on these sort of things, IMO.

'Kripkenstein' is a reference to Kripke's particular take on Wittgenstein on interpreting a rule, which he (Kripke) expounded in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The topic is quite different from the topic of Naming and Necessity. — Pierre-Normand

Oh, sorry about that mistake. I stand corrected. Do you care to join us on this reading group Pierre?

Will you start at the beginning, or before that, at the preface? — Banno

I'm not certain. I feel as though elucidating Kant's ideas about categories and a priori and a posteriori needs some elucidating if someone is unfamiliar with those notions. There's also a lot of Wittgenstein in Kripke or known as Kripkenstein.

Do you care to lead this reading group? Pretty please?

As before, the emotional content is not always a part of 'expressed' correlation except that there is - at the very least - fear and/or contentment 'buried' somewhere in all the thought that led up to asserting and/or expressing that proposition. The expression is built upon and/or grounded by some previous thought. Somewhere along the 'line', fear and/or contentment is part of the correlation itself. It is one of the things being connected, as compared/contrasted with being just a smaller part of one of the things being connected. — creativesoul

But, there really isn't anything emotional about expressing the proposition that 1+1 is 2. Is there?

What's your take on speculative trading @ssu? I know emotions drive a lot of decision making in the financial markets.

(I'm not a psychologist and I don't know if this is any use to you Posty, but my 2 cents.) — ssu

Not necessary to have psychologists explain the idea. I think you did a good job at explicating the overt and rational mind contrasted with the implicit and ambiguous emotive aspect of reasoning. Which I wonder about, is the reciprocal relationship between the emotive aspect of reasoning with the rational and logical elements to reasoning? How do they influence one another?

I'll do it. — Snakes Alive

Great to have you on board @Snakes Alive!

The Investigations thread is dying out as we speak, so I hope we can get this one started.

No — creativesoul

But the proposition such as 1+1=2 is an emotionally devoid proposition. No?

Well, on my view that's not always easy because there is always an emotional element somewhere within thought/belief. Emotion is not always part of the immediate correlation. It is often 'buried' somewhere within one of the things being correlated to one another.

I just offered a simple account which 'separated' the two... — creativesoul

So, can one have a thought without emotion? I feel a certain way; but, this does not correlate with my thought. Therefore what?

You may not be enlightened; but, you are very close to it!

Yes, but how do you delineate between the two?

I think anyone enlightened would never claim to be enlightened. Hence being unenlightened.

I consider @unenlightened to be pretty close to being enlightened.

Ah. I don't have depression and only rarely have anxiety. So I don't have much experience with how they work. — Terrapin Station

They are fickle beasts. They nag on emotions to get their work done, or lack thereof.

If thinking can make it so then just think that you're happy. — Terrapin Station

But, that's not how depression or anxiety works. First comes the thought that you feel like crap, and then come to the endless rationalizations as to why.

How about the cognitive distortion re the idea that we should be seeking approval from moderators about how we can divide up topics? — Terrapin Station

What do you mean??

Probably because feeling directs and is more crucial to thought than we think. Just a guess. Am relating this to disqualifying the positive for wallowing in the negative. — Nils Loc

Wallowing is fine. Some wallowing is healthy for the soul.

What, exactly, is our distress, and why would you be trying to pinpoint a singular cause for it? — Terrapin Station

Just distress in terms of emotional health. When emotions fail us, then things go sour? I think that I'm unhappy, therefore I am?

"I feel therefore it is. "

Moodie De Cartes — Nils Loc

Haha, but, that's wrong? How do you get out of it then?

There is a more severe tension (or dissonance) between expected, normal or good behavior and the behavior of someone suffering anxiety or depression and this is reflected in thought by rationalization. — Nils Loc

Yes; but, what makes the mind of a depressive more prone to cognitive distortions?

I read K, in my teenage years. It taught me some important lessons about the value of knowing what I don't know. Don't know how to phrase it differently.