I'm here just to show some pig pictures. That's all I care about nowadays.

My avatar is of a pig called Charlotte.

I set myself up for failure too often to be happy.

Yes, well put. Wouldn't it be even easier to postulate that because Schopenhauer derived his pessimism from the central concept of impermanence and desire in the human mind, according to Buddhism?

I do have a question though given Zapffe's more Western oriented approach.

Zapffe's view is that humans are born with an overdeveloped skill (understanding, self-knowledge) which does not fit into nature's design. The human craving for justification on matters such as life and death cannot be satisfied, hence humanity has a need that nature cannot satisfy. The tragedy, following this theory, is that humans spend all their time trying not to be human. The human being, therefore, is a paradox. — schopenhauer1

Speaking about the paradoxical, whom would Zapffe choose as the ideal human being? Or the human most comfortable with whom he or she is?

Is that what we mean when we say Santa Claus exists? That the concept of Santa Claus exists? If that is what we mean, why don't we just say that instead? — busycuttingcrap

Do you agree that Santa Claus exists as a concept?

There's not much hope to entertain when your pessimistic about things. That's just my experience with pessimism.

I don't thlnk "want" has anything to do with this. — 180 Proof

I'm trying to delineate between typical depressive pessimism and philosophical pessimism.

My own take on the matter is that philosophical pessimism can be fruitful with knowledge and wisdom, whereas the emotional appeal leads to boorish and maladaptive beliefs. So, can I have the realistic outlook of pessimism without the maladaptive beliefs and behavior?

Yes, well, why would anyone want to be a pessimist?

I guess this way of framing the issue is the following:

How does one adopt the matureness of philosophical pessimism without falling for the emotional side of pessimism with regards to emotional resignation, sadness, and lack? I'm sure you can do it because I have read about cheerful pessimists and joyful absurdists like Cioran or Schopenhauer or Camus...

Yes, where are we to demarcate between philosophical pessimism, which isn't a reflexive attitude, or disposition and the generic pessimism of resignation or lack that one feels in life?

For one, I have nothing against philosophical pessimism, as I feel that there are certain truths about philosophical pessimism rather than the resignation and sadness of generic emotional pessimism?

I have not met a pessimistic child myself so it seems like it is not a disposition. — Andrew4Handel

It thus, seems to be an attitude that arises based upon past experiences, no?

Some people believe that pessimism is a more realistic view of life, and that pessimism is more rational.

But, this raises the central issue of this thread, perhaps, in that how does a person become pessimistic, and why?

I have an interesting question to raise. Namely, do you think philosophical pessimism is an attitude or disposition towards the world? How does it arise in the philosopher or more aptly in the individual professing it?

I would think pessimism came after adverse circumstances. — Andrew4Handel

So, according to what your saying, pessimism is a reflexive response to adversity?

At most we can say that the concept of Santa Claus exists (if you don't mind the untenable language about concepts existing "in" minds), not that Santa Claus exists (because he doesn't- he is fictional). — busycuttingcrap

Why would that be anything untenable if that is what we mean when we say "Santa Claus exists". Furthermore, Santa routinely escapes his description realm when people (mostly children) start believing that he lives at the North Pole.

Hence, "Santa Claus exists" and "Santa Claus exists at the North Pole" are distinct, wouldn't you say?

All behaviour occurs within a social and emotional context, rendering the mere rationality of past behaviour an inaccurate account of the reasoning behind it. — Possibility

I do believe you are right about the incongruence between social and emotional contexts; but, I think the issue isn't overdetermined by those factors.

Human behaviour is by definition a manifestation of an ethic, which is a specific instantiation of ethics. In other words, all behaviour is ethical (or unethical) as the case may be; all behaviour is interpretable in ethical terms. Isn't it? — Pantagruel

I believe that every behavior can be interpreted as ethical but we aren't bound to be ethical at all times. Unless, they're in the military or something.

You probably noticed by now that I don’t subscribe to pragmatism or utilitarianism in ethics. I do get the attraction, however. It does seem easier. But I don’t think it can achieve anything more than assessing or justifying the rationality of behaviour AFTER the fact. — Possibility

Actually, pragmatism and utilitarianism are very consequentialist, so I don't see how else to asses the moral worth of an action rather than after the fact with those two rationale's.

When it comes to ethical debate the real work is internal and excruciating… we are never willing to truly expose ourselves to ourselves let alone anyone else. Ergo, ‘ethical’ claims are far beyond the reality of the individual. — I like sushi

In other words the immediacy of ethics in every day is what is burdensome on making these decisions and freely talking about it? I think, I would tend to agree.

Meta ethics approaches these problems where ethics does nothing as it is never under investigation of itself as a concept. — I like sushi

I see your point, but what can be said about meta-ethics other than analyzing the differing methodologies. In my opinion utilitarianism has triumphed over other methods of assessing cogent and rational behavior. But, that's just how socio-,economics seems to have played out.

Statements of law and order alone cannot accurately determine ethical ways of behaving without reducing our perception of human capacity, and yet we continue to reformulate and enforce them as if they could. — Possibility

It rare for me to do this but I hope in faith that @Hanover would like to address this. What I would say from my side would be something like, we work with an imperfect model and we do the best we can with it. It sounds pragmatic, to say so, but we aren't all behind a veil of ignorance to asses these issues, only judges are.

And in doing so, we judge others’ utility by their disobedience rather than their diverse situational capacities for reasoning. Because it’s easier. — Possibility

Well, are you talking about society or the application of law itself? Please clarify.

Just a thought: what if we strived for ‘efficiency’ in terms of ‘more accurate’ instead of ‘easier’? — Possibility

It seems that pragmatically we address the issue in terms of the benefit conferred to the total, that is society. We can only be as intelligent as the conduct that is expected of us.

So, you can see utility cropping up again in how I phrase the issue.

In general I do find the generall view of ‘ethics’ to be garbage. I am more about meta ethics as there is undeniably (as far as I can see?) a pretty strong case to state that ‘ethics’ is more of a political tool than a real investigation into the human conidition. — I like sushi

I don't think the field of ethics is, to say, exploited; but it certainly can be as in the case of virtue signaling in consumer behavior. All these advertising companies are always seeking to change or even modify consumer behavior in small amount, which over time can become quite profound on socioeconomics in any capitalist system. Does that sound like something you were alluding to?

Otherwise the previous comment was with regard to designating who you are as a unit in our social sphere that is the Internet or socio-economic reality.

The ‘most efficient outcome’ from what perspective? — Possibility

I think efficiency in decision making is called utility or intelligence.

It's hard to classify someone as intelligent nowadays without metrics swarming around you with advertisements and pixel tracking on a phone. Does that make sense?

@180 Proof kinda explained it. But, yes, we're all taxed on what's the most efficient outcome and seem to believe that rational self interest is possibly representative of our true selves.

By 'moral compass' do you mean values that determine behaviour in a wide variety of situations? — bert1

Yes.

Of something more than that, perhaps. If it were just that greed could be a moral compass in that you can decide what to do in a situation based on what results in the most material gain. — bert1

I believe your right about this. In my opinion, what matters most are volitions such as a desire to do good. It goes without saying that consequentialism typically is what the hoi polloi have adopted as their calculus or rationale to make these decisions.

What are your thoughts about this?

the history of ethics is about recording the pangs and stresses of human interaction and prescribing a means to soothe them. For reasons of health a man must account for his passions as he navigates his inevitable and awkward proximity to others. — NOS4A2

I believe that this doesn't follow. I mean, homo sapiens has done well even without conceptual frameworks allowing a person to make decisions based off of the ethical framework. Yet, modern day man finds it easier to function with a set determinate way of behaving according to law and order. Just my two cents.

I'd just like to point out that if the brain can have dreams that are often mistaken as reality, then it doesn't seem farfetched that the brain is a virtual reality generator.

Who needs drugs, when you can have fantastical dreams about anything you desire. Make a wish for a happy dream tonight.

It may be true that what your saying is true; but what it seems to amount to in my mind is that we know what's ethical but don't necessarily act on those impulses or aspirations. We normally default on rational self interest as a calculus to govern our behavior, no?

Substitute maintain homeostasis for "do good" and healthy for "ethical" and the question need not be asked. — 180 Proof

So, you're assuming that we are by nature ethical. I find this argument in lacking in the real world.

You mention habit, which I'm in agreement with; but, in the context of the question am not quite sure if it is already equipped in our natural homeostasis function.

I would like to provide some more examples in reference to the OP, as it seems a difficult question in general just on face value.

My assumption is that with ethical theories like deontological or consequentialist ethical theories, we have a conceptual framework to go about here that guarantees us some methodology to go about by in addressing choices or decisions to make in response to certain situations. With these conceptual frameworks, we rely on the prescriptive ethical theory to determine our behavior. Our behavior is seen in terms of what is appropriate to act on in terms of the most ethical decision at our disposal at the moment. Dispositions and preferences aside, as they are biases that affect our decision making, I believe that one is compelled to address these situations as best we can with the information we have at hand, again referring to the prescriptive ethical framework we have at our disposal (or what we choose to believe in).

Do you think that the sense of Santa's existence belies itself in the cultural context of the sum total of his depictions and literature? Because, I think that as to answer this question by appealing to "meaning as use" is one of the few alternatives for addressing the instantiation of Santa's existence. Other than that one can entertain the notion that the realm-description of Santa guarantees his fictional existence. Does that make some sense?

In it it said that we have plenty of work to do becoming what we are, never mind becoming what we are not. I guess that means we already are what we are not. — bert1

I see this as a cognitive distortion, as to not knowing who we are until confronted with a situation that demands a choice. Apathy or ignorance can be detrimental to ethics and knowing what to do. Maintenance of ourselves with respect to potential eventualities are encompassed by having a set and steady way of behaving in the world when confronted with decisions that inconvenient to us. Having a moral compass is essential, don't you think?

I'll provide an example from Frankfurt. What he calls, 'wanting', are higher order volitions. In the Kantian sense of the term, 'volition', I find myself asking if I have a lack of higher order volitions?

How does one instill a higher order volition without appeal to ethics and the good?

Some further though on internal consistency in my mind arise with respect to ethics mainly, hence the mention of Frankfurt.

If I have an ethical goal (the highest good), or an ideal, wouldn't it be a sine qua non to maintain myself with respect to that goal, always to behave truthfully?

The counterfactual would be to deviate from that goal and that would not be desired to realize that goal.

Anyone think that's true?

It's not necessarily a conflict arising in the individual at stake here; but more of an issue of internal consistency. I guess, @180 Proof called it 'integrity'; but, I side with being consistent with oneself.

I suppose one has the goal of ideal in mind first and then the rest follows, in that, when I want to become happier I no longer engage in the habits that cause my neuroticism or addiction. If I want to be, want to be, in wanting the issues arise and some discomfort also arises. So, why suffer with so much wanting?

Why do people conflate existing in a realm with existing in a realm-diagram or a realm-description? — bongo fury

Yes. Why is that?

But, Santa's ontology exists in the fictional realm. Why do people conflate the two?

To argue the blanket statement "fictional characters don't exist", accepting that fictional characters don't exist in the world, you must also be able to argue that fictional characters don't exist as concepts in the mind. — RussellA

No, it can follow that Santa only exists as a concept or idea and not an individual or object in the world.

It would be incredible to point out and even conclusively think that schizophrenia is actively negated by a rationalist attitude of modernity, as you describe.

@Banno and @Sam26, I beg your pardon, but would you prefer to splinter off the discussion you both had into a seperate thread about the distinction of concepts from ideas and use as traditionally utilized by Wittgenstein?

I just don't want to jumble up all this talk about descriptors, beliefs, and qualifiers into the discussion ongoing between other users.

For the matter, I think Banno is right about use instead of concepts existing in separate categories of existence.

There are many concepts, especially in fiction and mythology, that have no actual or real existence or referent. The only thing that's real is the concept, or conceptual idea. — Sam26

I'd like to focus on this a little bit more, as this opens up a can of worms and I'm not too sure if Wittgenstein would have agreed with this. What do you think, @Banno?

Was your experience with psychedelics positive? (If I may ask) — 0 thru 9

Mostly, no. It's not for everyone, and I suffered psychosis from psilocybin. It should be noted that there's a bias towards reporting positive experiences on the internet that makes psychedelics look warm and friendly, even if you're down and depressed internally, which can contribute to a bad trip.

How about you?