Colorado has legalized psychedelic mushrooms. Now what?

Not about hedonism; but, more about therapy with psychedelics.

I think it indicates that the American population is traumatised and self-medicating with anything it can get to reduce the pain and get through the day. It is at best misleading to call that 'hedonism'.

They are taught that if they are not rich, beautiful and happy they are themselves to blame, and the weight of guilt they are made to feel for the structural inequality of society, which adds to the trauma of an isolating uncaring community rife with desperate poverty, homelessness and violence set amongst images of fabulous wealth and beauty unavailable to them. — unenlightened

I'd counter that the pain caused by not being wealthy or beautiful is not apparent in smoking cannabis. If that were true, is Canada also traumatized with its own legalization of cannabis and burgeoning industry related to cannabis consumption? I know Holland is pretty calm in most regards; but, they have the most liberal laws for drugs.

Anyway, I think it is a victory for the hoi polloi, and there is some truth to your claims; but, not entirely true.

I liked the Blue and Brown books more, due to elucidating the nature of this thread. Thank God people took notes during his lectures at Cambridge.

Ethics is not a mute field. The Tractatus was a book about ethics in large part.

All I know is that legal Marijuana will in all likelihood be regulated by the FDA. Expect to see novel modes of delivery and safety + quality control. Isn't that awesome? — Agent Smith

Yes, it's still to my astonishment that I can buy 3.5g or 1/8 oz. of cannabis at a local dispensary. They can deliver it to my residence.

Hedonism is our schtick - if there's anything we humans are good at, it's how to have fun. We're fun-loving creatures! — Agent Smith

Yes, and one of the most addicted of all animals.

I don't see a quantitative change in self-indulgent behaviour, only in the venues whereby escape mechanisms are made available. — Vera Mont

Even though the hoi polloi collected and organized, contacted their representatives and then legalized hemp and cannabis across US states? I credit this with Obama allowing states to decide if they wanted cannabis for themselves, which seemingly is pointing to a trend of drug liberalization in US politics.

For the most part, the feds don't want to touch drugs in my opinion. Let them have cake, no?

So, his approach to meaning and the underlying structure of language is shown to be meaningless and nonsense by his approach. — Richard B

You might want to see what Frege meant by "nonsense" before reading the Tractatus. He borrows a lot of terminology from Frege and precise stipulations of it in the Tractatus.

This might not be emphasized enough, given that when he said his propositions are nonsense only after surveying the field of natural sciences. So, you have to climb the ladder first until you see the new way of how sense and nonsense emerge or dissolve after reading the Tractatus.

The logic in the Tractatus breaks down the proposition into it's smallest part (names), which has a one-to-one correspondence to the smallest part of a fact (objects). It's a picture theory or truth-function theory of meaning. — Sam26

I think in terms of how Wittgenstein approached the analysis of meaning in the Tractatus is most compatible with science. Thus, (and it's only my opinion here), that the logic of the Tractatus is most in correspondence with the language of science; but, that's just my personal liking I'm disclosing here, despite what you think of the superiority of the Investigations over the Tractatus.

There are some important ideas in the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein rejects the a priori logic behind the Tractatus in favor of a more broad view of logic. — Sam26

I believe that logic was too broad. It seems as though Wittgenstein set up the cart correctly, with logical analysis behind ordinary language. Let me say this more clearly, that (and this sounds pragmaticistic) that only upon "verifying" or scrutiny of concepts and ontological placeholders, that we encounter "facts" or "truth" in our ad posteriori conclusions on common sensical propositions in the world. So, when confronted with greater examination, we resort to logic and analysis that we can derive our sound and logical conclusions based off of empirical or analytical methods.

So, put simply, OLP comes first, and then ILP takes place upon scrutiny. I guess that's why Wittgenstein called his second book, the Philosophical Investigations, whilst relying on some form of logical analysis on forms of life within the scope of investigating their nature. Yes, and then there was Kripke.

To draw a distinction between OLP and ILP in a strict manner wouldn't make sense, but I don't think that the proposal theory of language as seen through Ayer or Austin really is too myopic — Shawn

I didn't want to edit the previous post, because this follows. However, in my opinion proposal theories of language are myopic because the suppositions and baggage of epistemic criteria utilized rely too heavily on epistemic content to dismiss. Hope that made sense.

The logic of conceptual use, as seen in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is reflected in our forms of life, which tends to bring out the correct grammar (or logic) behind the use of our words/concepts. — Sam26

I side with the earlier Wittgenstein; in that he was mostly correct about logical forms instead of forms of life. Here's why, due to the logical syntax of language and grammar, we are compelled by our very own way of linguistic use to default to methodological nominalism and OLP. Yet, it's through logic that these mistakes are spotted and rooted out in our everyday ordinary language.

This is where I believe Bergmann is correct that through logic and analysis we come to our conclusions about truth and facts. To draw a distinction between OLP and ILP in a strict manner wouldn't make sense, but I don't think that the proposal theory of language as seen through Ayer or Austin really is too myopic.

Yeah, well I think the hoi polloi wouldn't much care. But, for those that live an examined life, maybe?

What about the person who is forced to change, to become stronger and braver or end up dead in a ditch, or so heavily traumatized they are hollowed out from within? — ToothyMaw

I believe that the reason for this are natural factors that cannot be accounted for ethically. These natural or social issues, such a living in poverty or being poor, can be omitted from the discussion.

That seems to cut against this self-exploratory, somewhat saccharine, and speciously value-laden discussion. — ToothyMaw

Sure, however it seems that trying to come to terms with one's circumstances in life along with not wanting to become something one isn't, is a healthy and therapeutic practice. What's not to love about self-acceptance? I precise the issue in this thread about ethics and how to behave ethically when confronted with not wanting to change the way one is; but seemingly we haven't come to agreement about what a person's integrity constitutes.

I have a pixel 6 pro. I won't be upgrading for a couple of years unless the battery goes to crap. — frank

I have the Pixel 5. I just got it for 5G connectivity. I don't care for a 30 MP camera on a phone. Go figure.

That's your business, not ours. — frank

Yes, well, if it was worth saying. I don't think I need the new Google Pixel 7 Pro or the mePhone 14 Pro. I'm quite content with what I have already.

A fictitious supposed entity is not an oxymoron. We suppose that there is such an entity, when in fact there is not. — Herg

Soo, when we talk about God, or Allah, are those supposed entities or do they just have a historical background? Are you noticing that the lines are getting blurry when thinking about stipulating existence to supposed entities?

The North Pole in the context of supposition is not the actual North Pole — actual entities can't exist in contexts of supposition — but a fictitious analogue of it. — Herg

This seems incoherent. We can't assume that Santa lives in his "own" North Pole, while the "true case" of the actual North Pole not having Santa Claus over there.

I think that as long as we are careful not to mix the real with the supposed or fictitious, there's no problem. — Herg

But, this happens all the time. We don't distinguish for children that Santa lives over at Walmart or at the North Pole. It's all ad hoc here.

It is the depersonalisation that leads to these absurd questions as to what or who exists or fails to exist. Can you believe that there are people who study philosophy, yet deny the existence of Sophia, who they profess to love? — unenlightened

Psychologically, that makes sense. But, I believe language acquisition came first or its primacy dominates over psychologies, not depersonalization.

But he (Santa Claus) is an archetype, not a person. — unenlightened

Yet, we refer to him as a person in everyday language. Is that a feature of language, and why is that so?

I'm going to continue with the analogy of utilizing the modal phrase of whether I should become what I am not in terms of what one ought to do.

Counterfactuals are basically things that could have been otherwise. What I am and do, are the aggregate of dispositions and preferences towards who I want to be. This entails that I am not satisfied with who I am, if I want to be something that I am not. Thus, to achieve satisfaction, I ought to be content with who I am. Yet, everyone has wants, or the majority of people.

Therefore, how can I achieve satisfaction is through maintaining myself just as I am.

Does all the above follow to the conclusion that I should be consistent in myself and avoid being something I am not?

Most of the discussions in forums like this reflect these linguistic confusions. — Sam26

What kind? What methodology ought one adopt if not an ordinary language one? That's all we can default towards. So, methodological nominalism prevails, yes?

Does justice exist?
Is life fair? — unenlightened

Santa is a person that ascribes a jolly old man over at the North Pole. He is known by two names, both "Santa Claus" and "St. Nicholas".

Soo, what can be said about him is based off, of his descriptions we all know about him as delivering presents on Christmas and other stuff about him.

Do you mean, can the name "Santa" be its own referent, since it doesn't denote anything in the real world? — bongo fury

Yes, well, if you pick up my gist, my intention here is to suppose that Santa has no referent outside of his fiction that are elucidated by his ascription to the non-denoting ontological placeholder of living at the North Pole. So, don't we just default to making his descriptions representative of his obtaining relations in fiction (the sum total of fiction about "him").

[...] we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. — Herg

To suppose Santa's existence is to ontologically ascribe him to the domain of discourse based of of his fiction as an entity. Yet, a fictitious entity is an oxymoron, so how is that so?

In this particular 'context of supposition' (to use Griffin's own term), both Santa and the North Pole exist, and so does the relation between them 'Santa lives at the North Pole.' — Herg

I'm not sure if this is some sort of category error. The North Pole actually obtains in the real world; but, Santa over at the North Pole, does not. How is that so?

Can Santa be his own referent since he doesn't denote anything in the real world?

It's a fiction that "Santa wears a red hat" is true. So, it's false. Logic with oxymorons. Great fun! — bongo fury

Yes, so why is it necessarily an oxymoron? Must Santa denote something the the world or can he just denote his own descriptions as I already believe he does?

This one will upset some folk: Santa wears a red hat. Therefore something wears a red hat. — Banno

Yes, this is quite upsetting to say the least, and to add to the confusion, then what does Santa denote? Or is that the wrong way to present the issue as him only denoting his own descriptions?

Yes, I say that because being something you aren't isn't really necessary if who you are is good enough. Bullshitting entails wanting to say or doing things that are contrary to what you are.

The good, a thoughtful life, being virtuous? Why do you ask?

Oh, so there's nothing to discuss then. I thought that bullshitting was morally detrimental to ethics.

So, why do you disagree?

What do you mean by "no"?

I'd say there is nothing circular, and my previous comment almost sounds like a Q.E.D why Frankfurt is right about the dangers of bullshitting...

Well, Frankfurt says that there are people who lie, there are people that bullshit, and there are people that tell the truth. With these three cases we are most satisfied with the person that tells the truth, less satisfied with the person who bullshits, and disprefer the person that lies. Having that said the point of saying this is that being consistent with oneself and telling the truth is morally preferable and more ethical than living a life full of bullshit or deceiving ourselves about our self worth. Further, if behaving consistently and operating on a calculus of what's best to do then we ought to not engage in bullshitting or lying, yes? Therefore, if I am to become a more ethical person, it would be prudent to avoid bullshitting to myself and others along with lying. Thus, my best interest is to not become someone I am not (in the majority of cases where I am either already an ethical person or in the negative if I am not an honorable person).

Does that make sense?

Why become something we are not?

I don't see how we cannot. Should we h. sapiens give up our civilized facades, or pretenses? — 180 Proof

Better than bullshitting, no? :wink:

So, you say that's it's hard as does frank. So, being ethical is hard? What's hard about accepting oneself as she or he is?

Yet, integrity doesn't exist in a vacuum, does it?

... the placebo effect works. — 180 Proof

Can beliefs be delusional or borderline psychotic? Surely...

I don't see how we cannot. Should we h. sapiens give up our civilized facades, or pretenses? — 180 Proof

I don't really know what else to say that wouldn't sound Platonic. I mean, that, to desire the good is to be in agreement with who we are with respect to the truth and the good, no?

It's funny to see that the central question of the title stated hasn't been addressed. Here it goes again with a little more,

In what sense does Santa Claus or even - Pegasus exist?

Just to spark some discussion, I do concede that in some instances becoming something that you are not may be a better alternative than being, for example, poor rather than rich. I mean living in poverty is undesirable for the sake of itself. It's simply uncomfortable to be poor. But to have the volition to get rich is likewise undesirable also, due to the inconvenience of feeling poor until your rich.

I find it hard to find an instance that satisfying a counterfactual to become something or someone you aren't, unless your a criminal in prison or jail that needs to reform themselves, as anything worth doing.

On the other hand, I can find examples of people who are quite straightforwardly full of themselves and quite delusional, like Donald Trump. These distorted psychologies seeking something always greater or more than their pity boredom are seldom happy with themselves. Donald Trump can be rich and wealthy, yet be boor and quite delusional.

The word refers to other words, or to people who are not Santa. Language exists, certainly, but Santa does not. — NOS4A2

On a close examination, would you assert that Santa alone exists as the sum total of descriptions that we have assigned to him? Such as the the man that delivers presents or exists on the North Pole with reindeer? Is Russell's theory of denoting entities really here at the gist of all Santa's descriptions?