There is simply enduring and coping. — schopenhauer1

Nobody wants to endure or cope with a situation, hence the above.

A case in point to the above sentiments is The Bell Curve by Charles Murray, which has been charged with scientific racism of sorts.

So, your essentially saying that you are wary of any appeals to authority in regards to figuring out who is most fit or competent for a job in terms of rationality or sanity. If you assume so, then there's no real answer to give here.

I had intended this thread, not as a discussion about the merits and failings of the orange clown, but as a discussion over the threat psychiatry is to a moral society. — darthbarracuda

Are we really living in a moral society?

When "objectivity", "sanity" and "rationality" are socially conditioned, the idea of a truly free and equal society is conceivably a contradiction in terms. Disregarding the opinion of a "raving madman" because he is a raving madman dismisses this individual's perspective as irrelevant. "Sanity" is a way of (arbitrarily?) separating opinions that "matter" from those that don't. — darthbarracuda

Yes, when you label a person as 'irrational' or 'insane' it is the deepest of ad hominem attacks possible.

Yet if sanity is defined as an overwhelming majority consensus of what is "real", then the imposition of sanity upon society as a whole is tyrannical. — darthbarracuda

Well, we do live in a democracy. It's not some Orwellian dystopia, yet.

The assumption of the "sane" with regards to the "insane" is that the latter must have something "broken" or deficient. — darthbarracuda

I think the terms is "disorder" or "dysfunctional".

This is dogmatic - what "sane" people describe as, say, paranoid schizophrenia, may actually be a more expansive form of awareness. The "broken mind of the schizophrenic" may actually let light in that is blocked by the normal "sane" mind. — darthbarracuda

Well, there is some danger in professing this line of thought. As if being schizophrenic were something 'normal', which it isn't.

A so-called delusional person may actually be more acquainted with reality than the majority. It is not inconceivable that at least some people are mis-diagnosed as insane when they are, in reality, very much so sane. What people call "insanity" can actually be a surplus of sanity. — darthbarracuda

That's possible, though self justifying and prone to delusion itself.

This has a funny consequence: an "insane" person can be oppressed by the "sane" society, and this oppression is ignored as oppression by the sane society in virtue of it being a deficiency of sanity. The insane is silenced, ignored and sometimes locked away in a mental hospital. — darthbarracuda

Well, again we live in a democracy, so everyone on the far or middle end of the spectrum can find some place in society.

So a free and equal society is a contradiction in terms for many reasons, the tyranny of sanity being one. — darthbarracuda

If you ask me, I have never seen American society so full of delusion, paranoia, and mistrust. So, if you really think that's a good thing, then you're living in the golden age of American madness.

The FBI sure ain't what it used to be.

Psychologically speaking, there's something very peculiar about this thread. As if one can run for office without being spotted and vetted out for being a sociopathic individual or XYZ.

I would think that the really crazy people get spotted out before they can get into office or implode under the pressure.

Here you go:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1648/are-facts-observer-dependent/p1

Take it for what's it worth. Just some ramblings on my part, nothing fully coherent and clear. At least not yet.

Not sure about that: "reality is the totality of facts not of things" - that sounds like a metaphysical claim to me. — MetaphysicsNow

If I assert that facts are observer independent, then that deflates the meta-physicality on the issue. The Tractatus is a solipsistic work though, so that conclusion is warranted on face value.

OK, but in the Tractatus he had a very restricted view of what language is (at least that is one interpretation of it). — MetaphysicsNow

I feel as though the Tractatus was not making a distinction between the self and language. They are one and the same thing, according to Wittgenstein in the TLP. But, that's clearly not the case, since whereof one cannot speak, thereof things must be shown, according to the Investigations.

All facts are built up from atomic facts, and the logical relations between propositions mirror the ontological relations between facts. — MetaphysicsNow

Yes, in logical space. See? No meta-physicality there.

With that in mind, proposition 7 reduces (or can be reduced) to the idea that you should shut up if you are not attempting to state either an atomic fact, or a fact constructed from atomic facts, because that's all that you can do with language. But where does that leave the propositions of the Tractatus? — MetaphysicsNow

Where does that leave the propositions of the Tractatus? Well, for one it leaves us at the very limits of our own world, and with that in a better understanding of it.

They are not statements to the effect that some specific atomic fact obtains. They also do not look like statements to the effect that some fact constructed from atomic facts obtains. — MetaphysicsNow

No, they are (as you said) about ontological/logical relations between facts in logical space.

This represents how difficult to near-impossible it is to be attain true objectivity. — Harry Hindu

There is that no true Scotsman fallacy again. He seems to like this thread a lot.

Heaps come in degrees. Objectivity comes in degrees. — Harry Hindu

Agreed, although I am wary of using that term ad infinitum.

What it is like to see red, or not to see red, no one can say, because one does not even know oneself, except by one's ability to use the word correctly. — unenlightened

Question begging. One needs criteria to address this, "correctness" issue. It can be like one of those "tests" or college or fundamentally the process of learning itself.

Whatever our experiences, we can make up a word for them, so there is nothing we cannot talk about. And yet no amount of talk can capture the experience, so there is always a chasm between talk and world. We can talk about anything, but it will only ever be talk. — unenlightened

I don't really think you actually believe that. Think solipsism.

I presume, then, that you either disagree with Wittgenstein, or you believe that one can say something about the mystical and the ethical. — MetaphysicsNow

I'm not quite sure yet. In practical terms, there's no way to evaluate the truth aptness of any ethical theory, along with most ethical theories committing the naturalistic fallacy. Going off on a tangent, I do think consequentialist theories as making a serious attempt at addressing this issue. Anyway, I'm not trying to be facetious. It's just that the growing sentiment from the Tractatus seems to be that prescriptive ethical theories will always be moot.

I've heard it said that the entire Tractatus is meaningless nonsense if one takes literally this particular aphorism from Wittgenstein. — MetaphysicsNow

Not really. Wittgenstein set out to delineate the limits of language and thought with the Tractatus. I think he achieved that goal.

I'll have to reread the Tractatus, but at that stage in his philosophy I think the idea of a private language still made sense to Wittgenstein, and this certainly seems to be lying behind this remark. — MetaphysicsNow

One has to realize that if we really don't live in our heads or have private content, then why does so much misunderstanding occur? I don't necessarily think everything is public nor am I a logical behaviorist.

Also, Wittgenstein was not the first philosopher to attempt to set limits to what philosophy can accomplish. Kant got there before him, and arguably did a better job of it. — MetaphysicsNow

That's a matter of preference. Kant had to invoke the metaphysical. Wittgenstein got by with doing without it.

I've always taken this more as practical advice. — fishfry

That's perhaps the only correct attitude to profess. I can't help but feel as though pragmatism is the logical conclusion to arrive at after reading the Investigations and the Tractatus.

The point was that this is not an empirical enquiry in the sense that any rule you set up giving the meaning of "subjective" can immediately be falsified by using the word in a novel way. — Banno

Then what is it if not an empirical inquiry?

I'm sympathetic to the notion that truth is correspondence, though aware of its limitations. — Moliere

What are they?

But in the case of practical reason if somethings makes me or others feel good that's pretty darn important to consider. — Moliere

You mean utilitarianism?

I'm also drawing my inspiration from different thinkers, which is likely to bring up differences I think. So Aristotle and Kant make hey with this notion of practical reason vs. theoretical reason. And Epicurus sort of calls into question the importance of theoretical reason in his philosophy, as does Levinas, and places more importance on the practical, the ethical side of thinking. These are the thinkers that are on my mind in formulating things this way. — Moliere

Interesting. I wonder what kind of eclectic philosophy you have compiled. Let us know so we may benefit too.

Why the question is important: meta-philosophically I've come to believe two things. One, that philosophy and reason are inextricable. And two, that philosophy should address the needs of people. So philosophy is the pursuit of a good life through the path of reason. Or, in a more limited sense, philosophy is the pursuit of a good life when reason is called for. — Moliere

All of this sounds very similar to the ethos that pragmatism propounded. For all intents and purposes, "practical reason" and "being pragmatic" could be used interchangeably.

Hope that helped.

I'll think about that, thanks.

I rather agree, but for different reasons. It's not that I want to refute what you or any of the others are saying, rather I want to draw attention to the fact that people are talking about different things. — unenlightened

I feel as though we're all talking about the same thing. Just that we're kind of confused about what it is.

The same goes for your "heap". — Harry Hindu

There are degrees of "heaps". — Harry Hindu

I don't quite see your point here. Care to expand? Genuinely interested.

It seems to me that you are trapped and are content to stay that way. — Harry Hindu

Yeah, I'm in the dark here.

Isn't that what I already said? — Harry Hindu

I wasn't sure, so I had to put it in my own words.

Delve into what - The topic of your thread? — Harry Hindu

No, the whole German continentalism/romanticism that elevated the welfare of the self above the rest of the world.

We attain a degree of objectivity by integrating all knowledge from every source, including other people, into a consistent world-view. — Harry Hindu

I think you sort of deflated the issue with qualifying "objectivity" here with "degree of objectivity", yet I can't help as though feel that you've fallen into this objective-subjective trap too. Is there no other way to understand the state of being impartial and free from bias, instead of referring to the objective-subjective fallacious distinction?

When we are able to explain all subjective experiences, for everyone, not just for yourself, why they are useful and why they are different for each person, we would be at a more objective outlook. — Harry Hindu

Ideally, yes, assuming perfect knowledge, information, and exchange of thought.

The way to approach the topic would be to list the noted uses for each term in the OED, then see which can be contrasted. — Banno

Isn't the OED a type of rule-book?

And how would we know that we had the right rules? — Banno

Certainty is not required, though should be the goal of any dispute or conversation. We can get along without knowing if we're using the words the right or wrong way. That's just how learning occurs. On the other hand, formal languages could not exist without rules. On the most general level, even the process of inference is rule bound.

Which is why i think it better to avoid using the terms, if at all possible. — Banno

Well, there's something to learn from the discussion if you're so inclined. Namely, that some foundations are required to start with and build upon. Yes, meaning is use; but, that use is governed by something else apart from it.

Sorry to hear. :sad:

*hands over the reigns of this thread to Banno*

Because we need a set of rules and principles to delineate between what is the realm of bias, opinion, and such to that of the real, the "objective". Hypothesis testing just requires that.

When one conducts an experiment or a drug trial it is usually double-blinded or even triple blinded for a reason. Then there are levels of sigma to delineate chance from occurring in an experiment. Just in the recent case of discovering the Higgs boson, a level of probability of 5-sigma was required to assure that the experiment was not up to chance.

Must I go on further?

To set out criteria is to restrict use. — Banno

That doesn't mean that the criteria cannot be changed or amended, much like a constitution. If there's no criteria then nothing meaningful can be said and anything goes.

Sorry, auto-correct changed "Banno" to "Banning" on my phone. Fixed it on my computer. lol

How about criteria Banno?

I seem to have fixated on that term to describe what one or more consider something as objective or subjective?

Thanks for taking time to help us out here.

I don't know if I agree, but I think I know what you are talking about. Doesn't it all come down to how we break the world up? — T Clark

Yeah, that depends on the criteria we're using to make sense of the world.

The paradox, if it is one, just recognizes the vagueness of the way we conceptualize things. — T Clark

Here is the Sorites Paradox with me adding the pertinent points that I raised to illustrate the point raised in the OP:

The sorites paradox sometimes known as the paradox of the heap) is a paradox that arises from vague predicates.[2] A typical formulation involves a heap of sand (knowledge), from which grains are individually removed (evaluating). Under the assumption that removing a single grain does not turn a heap into a non-heap (determining the objective from subjective), the paradox is to consider what happens when the process is repeated enough times: is a single remaining grain still a heap (problem of delineation between the objective and subjective)? If not, when did it change from a heap to a non-heap?(how do we know when we are being objective as opposed to subjective?) — Wiki

The bolding is my doing.

No, the whole point is that the predicates "objective" and "subjective" are undefinable. Hence, the paradox of treating them as definitions for things or objects or mental states and so on.

And then wouldn't we actually be using the dichotomy as opposed to dropping it? — Moliere

No, we just do away with the dichotomy altogether and talk about criteria for establishing knowledge, some are better than others (criteria); but, aren't defined as being either subjective or objective.

I'm still saddened that nobody has agreed that the objective-subjective divide is actually a version of the Sorites Paradox...

I'm not sure what frank is referring to here. So, I'm in the dark too.

How would you parse Tiff's example, in that case? OR do you mean just to restrict yourself to discussions of objective knowledge only? — Moliere

Well, I am only for the moment talking about knowledge. To answer you question though, pragmatically speaking the patient is the subject at the doctors office with some purpose (objective) and the doctor is fulfilling this shared goal of returning the patient back to health.

Yes.

For one, I wasn't sure if the OP was even talking about knowledge per se (I see un brought up this point too). — Moliere

Well, that's because I don't consider knowledge to be subject to the objective-subjective dichotomy.

There are no objective facts — T Clark

Then, is that not an objective fact unto itself?

Someone had to say it...

It was a prejudice of mine. Nothing more or nothing less.

Well now that, that implicit assumption that I have held has been expressed and open to criticism and examination, I'm not that sure it be true anymore. So, I seem to be at fault in assuming so.

Ill ask the mods to delete this thread if that's the case. — frank

No, it's a good thread. I just came off as judgmental.

Sorry.

I don't think I need to spell out the fact that nationalism goes hand in hand with authoritarianism.

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a personality and ideological variable studied in political, social and personality psychology. Right-wing authoritarians are people who have a high degree of willingness to submit to authorities they perceive as established and legitimate, who adhere to societal conventions and norms and who are hostile and punitive in their attitudes towards people who do not adhere to them. They value uniformity and are in favour of using group authority, including coercion, to achieve it.

[...]

Right-wing authoritarians want society and social interactions structured in ways that increase uniformity and minimize diversity. In order to achieve that, they tend to be in favour of social control, coercion and the use of group authority to place constraints on the behaviours of people such as political dissidents and ethnic minorities. These constraints might include restrictions on immigration, limits on free speech and association and laws regulating moral behaviour. It is the willingness to support or take action that leads to increased social uniformity that makes right-wing authoritarianism more than just a personal distaste for difference. Right-wing authoritarianism is characterized by obedience to authority, moral absolutism, racial and ethnic prejudice and intolerance and punitiveness towards dissidents and deviants. In parenting, right-wing authoritarians value children's obedience, neatness and good manners.[1]

Right-wing authoritarianism is defined by three attitudinal and behavioral clusters which correlate together:[14][15]

Authoritarian submission — a high degree of submissiveness to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives.

Authoritarian aggression — a general aggressiveness directed against deviants, outgroups and other people that are perceived to be targets according to established authorities.

Conventionalism — a high degree of adherence to the traditions and social norms that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities and a belief that others in one's society should also be required to adhere to these norms.[16]

The terminology of "authoritarianism", "right-wing authoritarianism" and "authoritarian personality" tend to be used interchangeably by psychologists, though inclusion of the term "personality" may indicate a psychodynamic interpretation consistent with the original formulation of the theory. — Wiki

And the book:

http://theauthoritarians.org/Downloads/TheAuthoritarians.pdf