Supplements sell like hot bread in the US. Why is it that many supplement companies are from Cali? — Agustino

Cali is full of health nuts, haha. You know, more disposable income and all that.

Well, he already runs it. I hope to ride along on his wave of success.

But you can't give me a list of the invisible people with high intelligence that are not remembered as they achieved nothing despite their intelligence — charleton

Yeah; but, neither can I prove that unicorns or Santa Claus exists.

I don't understand your point.

I quit my all my medications since New Year's or as a unconscious resolution for this year and feel great. Planning to move to Las Vegas with a friend running a supplement company in March. Hope things go even better there and will have more money too, haha.

Then I can give you a list of all the most famous physicists, philosophers, and mathematicians with their IQ right next to it.

This is the first time in my life feeling ashamed for being an American. What Trump said today was something only authoritarian dictators do. Shit like this does not fly in any type of democracy.

OK, found a really interesting research paper confirming what I suspected:

National IQ and National Productivity: The Hive Mind Across Asia

A recent line of research demonstrates that cognitive skills—IQ scores, math skills, and the like— have only a modest influence on individual wages, but are strongly correlated with national outcomes. Is this largely due to human capital spillovers? This paper argues that the answer is yes. It presents four different channels through which intelligence may matter more for nations than for individuals: 1. Intelligence is associated with patience and hence higher savings rates; 2. Intelligence causes cooperation; 3. Higher group intelligence opens the door to using fragile, high value production technologies, and 4. Intelligence is associated with supporting market-oriented policies. Abundant evidence from across the ADB region demonstrating that environmental improvements can raise cognitive skills is reviewed.

It is reasonable to be cautious about claims that IQ has a major influence on national productivity. After all, a large labor economics literature shows that IQ and other testable skills have only modest correlations with wages at the individual level. Whether we look in developing or developed countries, the story is the same: a 1 standard deviation increase in cognitive skills (15 IQ points) within a country is associated with about a 15 percent increase in wages, perhaps less. For instance, Alderman et al. (1996) found that in rural Pakistan, those who perform 1 standard deviation better on an abstract visual pattern-finding IQ test—the Raven’s matrices— earned 13 percent more. One should draw two lessons from this result. First, the intelligence tests widely derided in popular culture as being culturally biased nevertheless have the power to predict economic outcomes in one of the poorest regions in Asia. Second, this 13 percent effect is still far too small to explain poverty in South Asia. If differences in cognitive skill are important drivers of national economic outcomes, cognitive externalities must be large. Jones and Schneider (2006 and 2010) provide evidence for this. They found that across countries, the IQ–productivity relationship is much larger: 15 IQ points is associated with a 150 percent increase in productivity. Perhaps this strong relationship is epiphenomenal but the psychology, economic growth, and behavioral public choice literatures all give reason for thinking otherwise. There are good reasons for thinking that intelligence—the name used for the underlying trait measured by IQ tests—matters more for nations than for individuals. For instance:

1. Intelligent individuals tend to be more patient, and growth theory predicts that patient nations will save more, building up a larger capital stock in a closed-economy world.

2. Behavioral economics experiments show that high IQ players are more cooperative in repeated prisoner’s dilemma, trust, and public goods games. Since trust and trustworthiness are key to holding together wealth-creating institutions, intelligence will cause prosperity through public choice channels.

3. Skill complementarities may be important in producing “O-Ring” forms of fragile, delicate output. If so, then small differences in worker skill may cause massive differences in cross-country productivity.

4. According to Caplan and Miller (2010) high-IQ individuals appear more likely to support promarket, pro-trade policies. Thus, more intelligent voters are more likely to see the invisible hand, supporting policies that create prosperity.

Available here.

Relevant references to the bolded text:

Jones, G., and M. Podemska. 2010. “IQ in the Utility Function: Cognitive Skills, Time Preference, and Crosscountry Differences in Savings Rates.” Unpublished. George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.

Jones, G., and W. J. Schneider. 2006. “Intelligence, Human Capital, and Economic Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach.” Journal of Economic Growth 11(1):71–93

Rule #2. Whereof one cannot speak things must be shown.

Pictures, please.

But what of the Stoics and Cynics? Surely their indifference isn't apathetic yet liberating.

We'll take up the tragic cases of unimaginative workaholics in another thread — Bitter Crank

Something to envy in our society.

Ah, but how does one prevent the depression? It would seem there are countless ways of trying to get out of it once depressed; but little education or prophylactic means of preventing it from arising. That needs to be addressed on a national scale in my opinion.

Surely, a reductio ad absurdum doesn't need to be pointed out?

I believe that's what Marx was trying to do. — bioazer

Please do go on.

One of the questions that motivated Plato in his Republic is the question "How can one be mentally healthy in (mentally) sick society?" (Or so it seems to me.) — Mitchell

I would say that Plato was first and foremost against incompetence, which Aristotle expanded on or left off where Plato stopped, and philosophers have continued that tradition captured in Whitehead's footnote comment about Plato and Western philosophy.

At the heart of the issue seems to be the matter of educating the public, as Plato might say.

Even upon superficially reading The Bell Curve, one can draw some correlation between higher productivity and intelligence among the population in the US. Would that be something that could be a form of support for the above?

All our minds are subject to illusions, prejudices, fears, superstitions, habits, ideologies, misunderstandings, misperceptions. How are these different from "cognitive distortions" except in origin? Human minds are imperfect. They're more than imperfect - in order to do the job established by evolution to help us survive, our nervous systems, brains, minds must be structured to give us a simplified, distorted view of the world.

That's not to say that the concept of cognitive distortions isn't worth studying in relation to psychopathology, just that it doesn't seem to me to be anything mysterious or different from our other mental processes. — T Clark

I would like to better understand the relationship between cognitive distortions and beliefs in isolation or et ceteris paribus. Meaning, if psychology tells us that we can have beliefs that cause individuals to perceive reality inaccurately, then what does that imply? That a belief can be or is subject to a means of justification about their accuracy with reality, and hence truth or validity in holding them?

Thanks for the paper. I'll try and review it in my overabundance of spare time.

Here's the Wikipedia definition:

Cognitive distortions are thoughts that cognitive therapists believe cause individuals to perceive reality inaccurately. These thinking patterns often are said to reinforce negative thoughts or emotions.[2] Cognitive distortions tend to interfere with the way a person perceives an event. Because the way a person feels intervenes with how they think, these distorted thoughts can feed negative emotions and lead an individual affected by cognitive distortions towards an overall negative outlook on the world and consequently a depressive or anxious mental state.

Personally, I think cognitive distortions are false beliefs - I take them to be presumptions that people act on, which don't reflect reality. For example, if someone sees another laughing, some people will presume they are laughing about them, and start feeling anxious/bad, and change how they act. So that belief will cause one to feel bad. On the other hand, I don't think it's the truth or falsity of the belief that causes one to feel bad, but merely having that belief. If it happened to be a true belief, and they really were laughing at them, then would the person be justified in feeling bad? — Agustino

I started a thread listed below. Let me know what you think. It's 3 AM and I should be heading to sleep. Night.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2697/cognitive-distortions-belief-and-knowledge-#Item_1

So are cognitive distortions false beliefs then? — Agustino

Good question. What's your take on the matter? I think I might have to polish this up before starting a thread. Still reading the Shestov.

In other words, why is there a conceptual gap in the rationale of the classical economist when confronted with their economic theory and the future ahead of us? You would think these were sincere and educated people, and surely know that climate change isn't just some hoax.

Explain to them the economic impacts of climate change? — Michael

Why does that even require explaining, is my point? Isn't it intuitively obvious or am I missing something in their rationale?

Okay I see. Well, I think the term "energy" doesn't only have the meaning we're used to in physics. If you're very tired, you'll say "I don't have enough energy". In that case, you certainly don't mean the useful work that can be quantified, but you're referring to a psychological state. Correct? — Agustino

Yeah; but, that's a sort of cognitive distortion if we're going to be strictly logical about this. I mean, how does one know if they have 'enough energy' for some task. And, where does this energy come from?

How are beliefs and cognitive distortions related? — Agustino

Beliefs are subject to being true or not. People with schizophrenia tend to have more cognitive distortions arising in their minds than the rest of the population. But, that's not the point. The point I'm trying to make is that there doesn't seem to be a fundamental difference between beliefs and knowledge as I understand it. So, if one has accurate beliefs about the world then that is knowledge bona fide.

Yeah, there is no mention of "psychic" energy there. I did say psychological energy, because that's what it is phenomenologically speaking. Do you disagree? — Agustino

Fine, then. Allow me to use that term in a different context. How do you understand a term that cannot be quantified, meaning that which is 'psychological', and at the same time include a term that can mostly be understood when quantifying it, such as 'energy'? They don't seem to go well together.

So you don't agree with the CBT version that wrong beliefs, wrong expectations and wrong attitudes are one of the prime causes of depression? — Agustino

I'm afraid that's the wrong term to use in this case. CBT talks about cognitive distortions, not the right or wrong'ness of a belief.

I did not say psychic energy though — Agustino

Here's the quote:

There are a lot of contributing factors for low psychological energy though. Beliefs, attitudes and expectations are part of it. If you have the wrong beliefs, the wrong expectations and the wrong attitudes, you're going to dig yourself in a hole. Studying stoicism is useful in that regard. Mindfulness also helps bring those into awareness and learn to manage the underlying emotions. — Agustino

I just think that there's no point in talking about 'wrong beliefs', 'wrong expectations', and 'wrong attitudes', as if some Ayatullah or priest professing a certain dogma or way of life.

Can you explain why you believe so? — Agustino

Well, it's just that depression is much more than the manifestation of 'psychic-energy'. Doesn't that term sound too new age to be taken seriously for you?

Read it. Only read first paragraph but it's superb.

Can you expand on this? — Agustino

Well, you brought up a term called 'psychic-energy' to describe a state of depression. Something I doubt has any use to trying to describe the term, 'depression'. Such as states characterized as 'low psychic energy' manifesting in depression.

How much is needed? I hope we can get a toolbar that says how much we need to raise every month to cover the costs if possible. We had such a feature at the old PF.

Yes, but the question remains that how does one address this insidiously 'common sense' talk about the economy professed by conservatives and classical economists in light of climate change?

Just in case it isn't obvious, I have climate change in mind when talking about classic economic thought being professed by conservatives.

And then, there are people in their 20s who stay on their bed the whole day starring at the ceiling. Why? Their body is 20, but their mind is 90! — Agustino

I doubt describing this in terms of 'psychic energy' really frames the issue. It seems more complex than that.

Pragmatism with respect to morality doesn't sound appealing to me, and I wouldn't trust anyone who thought it was. — Thorongil

Why not? We do it all the time in courts...

It would, but ironically, philosophy would be cut from the calculus, as it has little to no practical utility. In this way, utilitarianism as philosophy is self-undermining. — Thorongil

Arguably. I doubt philosophy would be cut from discourse based on a perfect calculus as if that is something that can be attained without philosophy...

The essence of an honorable democratic nation is not majority rule, it is majority rule with liberty and justice for all. With fairness. — T Clark

I agree; but, simply think egalitarianism could encompass what you are saying. It assumes the same and even more. Utilitarianism is inherently egalitarian.

One man's opinion about the utility and happiness of the many, is another man's hell on earth.
How to judge? — charleton

Well, as far as I am aware, utilitarianism is normative primarily. So, what's best for the general population is entailed to include what is best for the individual.

Here is the part that directly addresses the OP's question. Anyone care to help me unpack it?

This leads us to the final solipsistic doctrine of the Tractatus. 'Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension and there remains the reality coordinated with it' (TLP, 5.64). Wittgenstein's doctrines have of course followed out the implications of solipsism. How do they show that solipsism, paradoxically, coincides with pure realism? The analysis of propositions about other minds willnot mention the metaphysical self, or a Cartesian res cogitans. It is plausible to think that such propositions will be analysed in some way or other in terms of names referring to elements of my experien~e.~~ Hence if epistemological realism is, roughly speaking, the commonsense view of the world expressed in propositions such as 'A has toothache', 'The is shedding its leaves', then transcendental solipsism does not deny that such propositions are sometimes true. Nor indeed does it claim that 'I am the only person who exists' is true. What it claims is that the analysis of such propositions into elementary propositions is to be carried out in a certain way. The truth of solipsism will manifest itself in the fact that the analysis of 'I have toothache' will differ in important ways from the analysis of 'A has toothache' (where A is not myself). The former will involve reference to the experience of toothache. The latter will refer only to the behaviour which others manifest when they are said to have toothache. But even in the analysis of 'I have toothache' the metaphysical self, the self of solipsism, will not appear. It will be the constant form of all experience, presumably represented in the ideal notation by the variable or variables taking names of unanalysable elements of experience or perhaps names of objects in general as values. Thus everything the realist wishes to say can be said; and nothing the transcendental solipsist wishes to say can he spoken of. There will be no practical disagreement between them, nor will they quarrel over the truth-values of propositions of ordinary language. But the analysis of such propositions will manifest the transcendental truths that cannot he said. Wittgenstein's doctrine in the Tractatus is best described as Empirical Realism and Transcendental Solipsism.

Page 103-104

I am quite aware that the solipsism professed in the Tractatus is not of narcissistic of vain attitude. Rather Wittgenstein, from my readings, professed an attitude of humility and selflessness (mentioned in the OP) by professing solipsism.

example to the thesis of extensionality, and that it has the same logical multiplicity as p.Io It thus emerges that Wingenstein was willing to adopt a neoHumean analysis of the empirical self. There is no empirical soulsubstance thinking thoughts, there are only thoughts. The self of psychology is a manifold, a series of experiences, a bundle of perceptions in perpetual flux. However, the claim in 5.5421 that this analysis of propositions about belief shows that 'there is no such thing as the soul-the subject, etc.-as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day' is, when juxtaposed with 5.641, misleading. For 5.641 refers to the human soul as the legitimate subject-matter for empirical psychology. Yet 5.5421 says that 'a composite soul would no longer be a soul', and the analysis does show the soul to be composite. The claim should be interpreted thus: the soul conceived of as a unitary simple subject encounterable in private experience and constituting the meaning (Bedmtung) of 'A' in 'A believes that p' does not exist. But conceived of as a manifold, it is the legitimate subject-matter of psychology. All that empirical psychology needs to say about the psyche can be said. Philosophy has no concern with this. But nevertheless philosophy must discuss the I in a nonpsychological sense. The reason given for this in the Notebooks is that the I is not an object I confront. In the Tractatus the obscure reason given is that 'the world is my world' The philosophy which is concerned with the self is not the envisaged philosophy of analysis of the post-fiactatus era but the nonsensical philosophy of the Tractatus itself. The self with which philosophy is concerned is not the human being, or the human body, or the soul which is the concern of psychology. It is rather the metaphysical self (TLP, 5.641). We are introduced to this concept immediately after the thinking self has been dismissed as illusory. In 5.632 Wittgenstein wrote 'The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.' The subject here referred to is not, of course, the thinking subject, but the metaphysical subject. This is clear from the following section 5.633, and confirmed by the source of the remark in the Notebook (NB, p. 79). The metaphysical subject is the bearer of good and evil. Why is it not part of the world? Wingenstein merely hinted at an argument by way of analogy. The metaphysical subject is related to the world as the eye is related to the visual field. Nothing in the visual field entitles one to infer that it is seen by an eye. The eye of the visual field (not of course the physical eye, but what Wingenstein later called 'the geometrical eye' (NFL, pp. 297, 299) ) is the source of the visual field, not a constituent of it. The point is not that I always notice the position from which I see what I see, hut that 'I also always find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my visual space has as it were a shape' (NB, p. 86). Section 5.634 hints at the shreds of an argument that faintly echoes Kant's 'the "I think" ' that must be capable of accompanying all my representations. No part of our experiences is a priori. Whatever we see could be otherwise. But, by implication, that our experience belongs to us and could not belong to another is a priori. It could not happen that we should need to employ some principle of differentiation to distinguish within the flow of experience those experiences that belong to us from those that belong to others. The 'owner of experience in general', the possessor of all the experience I can ever encounter, is the metaphysical subject." How is this to be intemreted? The received intemretation is that Wittgenstein was in effect dismissing the notion of a metaphysical self. Blackrz argues that Wingenstein entertains the idea of a transcendental ego and eventually rejects it. The Cartesian ego, he claims, is not part of experience but the limit of experience. But since this way of speaking is nonsense, there is no sense in talking of a metaphysical subject. Hence consistent solipsism leads to realism, and he who intends to be a solipsist can he brought to see that there is nothing he really intends to say. Considerable light can he thrown upon the issue by a brief comparison of Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer. Schopenhaueri3 accepted Kant's masterly refutation of the Cartesian doctrine of the soul as a unitary thinking substance. Kant's diagnosis was that Descartes confused the unity of apperception with the perception of a unitary subject. This rejection of the thinking, knowing, representing self as a constituent of the world did not, however, prevent Schopenhauer from a quasi-reification of the transcendental ego to constitute the foundation of his particular version of transcendental idealism. The transcendental self, he claimed, is 'as an indivisible point' (WWR, ii.278). Though it is simple, like the res coptans, it is not a substance (ibid.). The metaphysical subject and its object, i.e. the world as representation, 'limit each other immediately' (WWR, i.5). The transcendental ego is a presupposition of the existence of the world (ibid.): the knowing subject thus conceived lies outside space and time which are merely the forms of its sensible intuition. As the source ofthe forms and categories of experience, it is 'a presupposition of all experience' (WR, ii.15). It is the 'supporter of the world, the universal condition of all that appears' (WWR, i.5) The self is 'the eye (which) sees everything except itself' (WWR, ii.q91), the ego is the 'centre of all existence' (WWR, ii.486). Wittgenstein's metaphors are identical with Schopenhauer's. There can be little doubt that the last of the three extant notebooks was written while Wittgenstein was re-reading Schopenhauer. To be sure, he is only mentioned once by name: 'It would be possible to say (A la Schopenhauer): It is not the world of Idea that is either good or evil; but the willing subject' (NB, p. 79). Immediately following this remark another Schopenhauerian thought is entered: 'the subject is not part of the world but a presupposition of its existence'. Schopenhauer's transcendental subject limits the world as idea. Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject is a 'limit of the world'. Schopenhauer compared the I to the 'dark point in consciousness, just as on the retina the precise point of entry of the optic nerve is blind.. . the eye sees everything except itself'. This metaphor first appears in Wittgenstein's 'Notes on Logic' of September 1913, without any overt reference to the self and without any Schopenhauerian overtones: The comparison of language and reality is like that of a retinal image andvisual image: to the blind spot nothing in the visual image seems to correspond, and' thereby the boundaries of the blind spot determine the visual image-just as true negations of atomic propositions determine reality. (NB, p. 95.) As we shall see below, this original employment of the metaphor to illuminate the relation of language and reality, seen in the light of its subsequent use, is important. In the 1916 notebook the eye metaphor is used to illustrate the relation between subject and experience. On I I June 1916 Wingenstein wrote 'I am placed in it [the world] like my eye in its visual field' (NB, p. 73). The metaphor recurs repeatedly in subsequent remarks (e.g. on 4 August 1916, IZ August 1916, 20 October I~I~NB, pp. 80, 86) in obvious Schopenhauerian contexts. It reappears, as we have seen, in the Tractatus, 5.633-5.634. Finally, even Schopenhauer's reference to the self as the centre of all existence reappears in the Notebooks 'If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I . . .' (NB, p. 80). These Schopenhauerian influences provide us with important evidence for interpreting Wingenstein's remarks on the self. First, the argument of non-encounterability of a Cartesian self appears in both Kant and Schopenhauer as part of the refutation of the rationalist doctrine of the soul. Given the Schopenhauerian influence upon Wingenstein it is plausible to take its reappearance in the Tractatus, 5.631 to be directed at the same target, as we have already conjectured. Secondly, the common view that the metaphysical self is identical with the illusory thinking self and hence is not countenanced by Wingenstein can be conclusively rejected. In the first place, the non-encounterability argument is effective in demolishing a naive conception of a thinking soul-substance hut is wholly ineffective in dismissing the conception of a metaphysical self, since the laner is not alleged to be part of the world, but its limit, not a constituent of the world, but a presupposition of its existence as idea. In the second place, the parallels with Schopenhauer run sufficiently deep to make it a plausible conjecture, in the absence of countervailing evidence, that Schopenhauer's distinction between the illusoty Cartesian self and the transcendental self was adopted by Wingenstein. In the third place, the enigmatic claims that the self is a presupposition of the existence of the world and that it is the centre of the world do not suggest its illusoriness. Finally, the existence of the metaphysical self as a non-empirical object is required by Wingenstein's doctrines of the will and of good and evil. Wingenstein had little to say about ethics in the Tractatatus. Ethics, in his view, is transcendental. It belongs to those things that cannot be put into words, the mystical. The will is the bearer of value, but as such, not being a phenomenon in the world, cannot be spoken of. Value does not lie in the world, for all that is within the world is contingent. Hence [...]

And so on...

I included in this post PMS Hacker's book. I will try and read and post what I think he says from that passage.

Wittgenstein's first point is that there is no such thing as the thinking, representing subject (denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt). The argument supporting this contention resembles the standard Humean argument2 of the non-encounterability of the self in experience. If I wrote a book entitled The World as Ifound it I should mention my body, but the subject, my self, could not be mentioned in the book for I do not find it in the world. Here there is an important difference between Wittgenstein and H~me.~ For Hume, who looked Jar the self in (introspective) experience, supposed that it at least made sense to talk of finding it (indeed, he seems absurdly to have thought that a permanent perception would fit the hill). But Wittgenstein, like Kant, held that the 'non-encounterability of the self' in introspection is an essential, not a contingent feature of experience.' Similar points are made in the Notebooks. On 4 August 1916 we find him querying 'Isn't the representing subject in the last resort mere superstition? (NB, p. 80). A week later he remarks 'The I is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the I. So there really is a way in which there can and must be mention of the I in a nun-psycholopi.al sense in philosophy' (NB, p. 80). Two months later he repeats the same points in a slightly altered terminology. The illusory non-existent subject is called the 'knowing subject' (erkennendes Subjekt). It is important to bear in mind that the Humean argument of non-encounterability was directea against the Cartesian conception of the self as a res cop'tans.

The similarity of Wittgenstein's argument to that of Itfume goes beyond the repudiation of the thinking, knowing, subject as an object of experience located within the world. Section 5.641 points out en passant that the subject-matter of psychology is the human soul. Wittgenstein's suggestions for the proper analysis of the human soul bear strong affinities to Hume's constructive analysis of the self. The clues to Wittgenstein's proposal lie in the earlier discussion of propositions about belief as potential counter-examples to the thesis of extensionality (TLP, 5.541). The superficial view of the meaning of propositions such as 'A believes p', which Wingenstein attributes to Russell and Moore, is that A stands in the relation of believing to the proposition p. Both Moore and Russell had indeed flirted with such a conception at earlier phases in their careers. Moore, in Some Main Problems ofPhilosophy, toyed with the idea that belief was a special act of mind directed towards an objective entity, viz. a proposition.' Russell, in his three articles 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions' published in Mind xiii (1906), argued similarly that belief was a mental attitude towards a proposition that exists whether or not it is believed. Wingenstein brushes this dual relation theory of judgement aside: it looks as ifthe propositionp stood in some relation to the object (soul, mind)A (and so it looks as if one proposition occurs withim another, viz. 'p' in 'A believes that p', without being a base fur a truth-operation, contrary to the thesis of extensionality). But this is confused (as Moore and Russell had, for various reasons, realized by 1910). It is clear, Wingenstein insists, that 'A believes that p' (or 'A says, or thinks, that p') are of the form.' "p" says p' and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects (TLP, 5.542). This analysis satisfies the requirement on any analysis of judgement, namely that it be impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. Russell's theory, he adds, does not satisfy this requirement (TLP, 5.5422). Here Wittgenstein is referring to Russell's later multiple-relation theory of judgement that occurs in his 1910 paper 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood" and is repeated in the 1913 manuscript Theoly of

Knowledge. The essentials of the theory are expressed in the following paragraph: judgment is not a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to the various other terms with which the judgment is concerned. Thus if I judge that A loves B, that is not a relation of me to 'A's love for B', but a relation between me andA and love and B. If it were a relation of me to 'A's love for B' it would be impossible unless there were such a thing as 'A's love for B', i.e. unlessA loved B, i.e. unless the judgment were true; but in fact false judgments are possible. When the judgment is taken as a relation between me andA and love and B, the mere fact that the judgment occurs does not involve any relation between its objects A and love and B; thus the possibility of false judgments is fully allowed for.' Wittgenstein's central (but not only) objection was that Russell had purchased the possibility of false judgement at the price of allowing nonsensical judgements. Nothing in Russell's theory ensured the preservation of logical form between the elements of the judgement. But a correct theory of judgement must make it impossible for one to judge that 'this table penholders the book' (NB, p. 96).8 This objection, Russell said, paralysed him, leading to the recantation in 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism': although it was not until even later that Russell was prepared to dispense with the self as an element in the final analysis of 'A judges that p'. The form of 'A believes thatp', Wittgenstein argued, is '"p" saysp', which does not correlate a fact with an object, but correlates two facts by correlating their objects. This analysis is subsequently said to show that the so-called 'soul' is composite and hence not really a soul. This gives a clue to the interpretation. Facts are always composites of objects, and only composite things (although not 'complexes', which are not facts at all) can 'say' something, for the possibility of saying depends upon the existence of an articulated structure whose elements can be correlated with what is said by means of projection. Only a fact

can represent a state of affairs. 'A believesp' involves the correlation of two facts in the same way as the proposition 'p' says that p in virtue of the correlation of the elements of the proposition-constituting fact with the objects configured in the fact that p (if it is a fact). The obscure relation between the mind and the unco-ordinated terms of the judgement in Russell's theory is here replaced with the (hardly less obscure) method of projection correlating elements of thought or utterance with objects. It should now be clear why the analysis was thought to show the complexity of the 'soul'. The apparent unitary subject A which seemed related to an object, viz. a proposition, is a multiplicity of elements some of which are structured into a fact that pictures the fact or possible fact that p. The 'unitary subject' recedes into the 'metaphysical self (infra) leaving behind a composite empirical self. We have already mentioned Wingenstein's remark in the Notebooks that thinking, even though non-verbal, is a kind of language (NB, p. 82) and his letter to Russell of 19 August 1919 in which he wrote: '. . . But a Gedunke is a Tauache: what are its constituents and components, and what is their relation to those of the pictured Tatrache?' I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.. .. [A Gedunke consists] of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know. (NB, pp. 129-30.) The mind or selfA is not an object, but a complex array of psychical elements. 'A believes p' is allegedly analysable in such a way that the existence of the psychical constituents which correspond to the constituents of the possible fact that p is specified. These psychical constituents are related in some contingent way to whatever other facts or configurations of elements constitute the empirical se1fA.A'~ belief consists of these psychical elements of a manifold being correlated with objects constituting a fact, together perhaps with some kind of 'colouring'. For, to be sure, the differences between distinct propositional attitudes are not captured by the suggested analysis. These differences were, in Wittgenstein's view, a matter for psychology not logic. From the logical point of view the only important points to establish are that 'A believes p' is-appearance not withstanding-not a counter-

And so on. All can be found on pages 99 henchforth.