First, it's not the case that Wittgenstein was a solipsist in the sense that you may be ascribing to him (keeping in mind that there are variations of solipsism, including linguistic solipsism), but he is sympathetic to the view that there is a metaphysical I that represents a kind of privileged view of things. The self that is associated with this privileged view is not part of the world, i.e., it's at the very boundary of the world peering in. It's also important to point out that for Wittgenstein what's beyond the boundary is what's mystical, and as such can only be shown or reflected in our actions. Remember his illustration of the eye, and the visual field of the eye. One cannot see the eye itself, the eye is behind the visual field, not in the visual field. Think of the self in this way, the metaphysical self is not part of the world, one doesn't see it in the world, although one experiences the world through the self, as one sees the world through one's eyes. — Sam26

Yes, to which I was alluding to here.

I'll repost it:

What the solipsist means, and is correct in thinking, is that the world and life are one, that man is the microcosm, that I am my world. These equations... express a doctrine which I shall call Transcendental Solipsism. They involve a belief in the transcendental ideality of time. ... Wittgenstein thought that his transcendental idealist doctrines, though profoundly important, are literally inexpressible. — Hacker, Insight and Illusion, op cit., n. 3, pp. 99-100.

What do you think is so profoundly important about these transcendental idealist doctrines?

They're in the OP and next post right below it.

P.M.S Hacker thought along what I am trying to express:

What the solipsist means, and is correct in thinking, is that the world and life are one, that man is the microcosm, that I am my world. These equations... express a doctrine which I shall call Transcendental Solipsism. They involve a belief in the transcendental ideality of time. ... Wittgenstein thought that his transcendental idealist doctrines, though profoundly important, are literally inexpressible. — Hacker, Insight and Illusion, op cit., n. 3, pp. 99-100.

Then, I ask to reread the TLP passages I posted. He makes solipsism compatible with pure realism.

Thanks! Looking forward to what you have to say.

Happy New Years!

You can't logically refute solipsism but it's pointless. — fishfry

But, then it must be true!

What do you guys and gals think about what these hoards of bitcoin that drug cartels have and hackers have are going to do? Do they just buy gold and convert it to cash and then launder from them using other methods?

I wonder whether the confusion between blockchain and Bitcoin may be partly fuelling the Bitcoin price bubble. It seems possible that blockchain may become the dominant currency mechanism, and completely disrupt existing currency mechanisms. But if that were to happen, it doesn't imply that Bitcoin will soar further in price. It may even mean that Bitcoin crashes and disappears. — andrewk

I'd say it's a combination of Bitcoin being first to make it to the market with a semi-tangible good (meaning that it is convertible through barter or trade). Someone said around here, can't remember who it might have been you actually, that there were more efficient and better variations of bitcoin devised subsequently to its development. Bitcoin being first must have been that enabling factor for exclusive adoption, which devalues the rest of the competition.

Sam26, do you mind letting me know what you think of the thread I posted?

If it's utter crap, that's fine too.

Is a thing a fact? If so, doesn't that make everything things and facts? — Buxtebuddha

A thing doesn't exist. Only facts do.

Does Witty say that a fact is certain and true? — Buxtebuddha

1. The world is all that is the case.
1.1The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

So, if the world is the totality of facts, then it would seem that it is something indubitable. Obviously, facts can be relevant, something I don't think Wittgenstein incorporated into the Tractatus. However, solipsism is an indubitable fact.

http://www.tractatuslogico-philosophicus.com/#node/n1-1

Some attitudes* are indubitable or nonsensical to ponder over. Like, the fact that I have two hands.

I'm not even sure talking about having two hands is an attitude. More like a groundrock belief, one that never gets's questioned.

Perhaps I should also add:

§5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.

I posted a half ass take on my reading of the self from the Tractatus below:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2614/on-solipsism#Item_1

Here is a pretty strong case for at least presenting the truth of solipsism:

Wittgenstein makes some very strong claims about the self. For example:

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World As I Found It, I should have to
include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were
subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method
of isolating the subject, or rather showing that in an important sense
there is no subject . . .

Why does Wittgenstein think that in an important sense there is no such thing as the
self? This seems to be denying the one thing we can be most sure of.
To understand this, we have to return to Wittgenstein’s views about objects and states
of affairs. Suppose that the self were an object in the world. Then there would be an
object that pictures facts using propositional signs. But what is the connection between
the subject and the propositional sign on the one hand, and the fact which is represented,
on the other? It seems that this relationship is necessary, not contingent. Once we
have the projective relation supplied by the subject, it is a necessary truth that a given
propositional sign represents the fact that it does. But this would mean that, if the subject
were an object in the world, there would be a necessary truth about the relationship
between objects. But, as we know, Wittgenstein denies that there are any necessary facts
of this sort.


On this interpretation (defended by Fogelin), the denial of the subject’s being part of the
world is of a piece with the denial of the claim that there are facts about logical form,
and about representation.

2 The truth in solipsism

This can help us make some sense of Wittgenstein’s remarks about solipsism. On the face
of it, it is odd for someone who denies the existence of the self to say things like

5.63 I am my world.

However, a view about how this sort of thing can be combined with the foregoing is
suggested by the following remark:

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed
out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism
shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality
co-ordinated with it.

In the light of this, §5.63 should not be read as suggesting that in the end there is no
world other than me and my mental states, but rather that there is no me other than the
world. The sense in which what solipsism means is correct is that these ultimately come
to the same thing: the existence of a world of states of affairs.

Available here.

OK, I'll see what I can do. It'll be a clutter of confusion though, which I try and avoid by professing quietism, heh.

Start a thread on the Tractatus and spell out the argument. — Sam26

I don't have the idea in front of me, or at least I can't express it better than simply referring to proposition 5.62 in the TLP.

Yes, but:

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62, TLP)

That has always sounded solipsist to me and can be considered a bedrock belief.

Yes, but Wittgenstein did profess a solipsistic view of the self in the Tractatus. I never got the feeling that this was repudiated in his later works. Even the private language argument still allows for private content in the form of what you have been referring to about prelinguistic content. The fact that there's so much diversity among people, based on a personal trait like intelligence, which seems to be a measure of one's prelinguistic capability or versatility, seems to support this notion.

The belief is made up of two distinct things, the private nature of the mind state, coupled with the public acts. — Sam26

This would seem to imply that the mind is a solipsistic universe where these prelinguistic and private ideas or concepts form, and from there, their meaning and content resides wrt. to the world. Is that something you would agree with?

First, it seems that there are beliefs that arise apart from language, and a belief, whether linguistic or not, is simply a state-of-mind. These mind states are clearly seen in our actions. This is not to say that all actions by living organisms reflect beliefs, but simply to say that all beliefs are reflections of mind states, which in turn are shown by the things we do. — Sam26

This seems to point towards qualia and private content. Something I am not too sure about. I think there is merit in calling homo sapiens exclusive to this category as we seem to have issues with expressing our thoughts most of the time, which education and careful examination of facts remedies. There are specific cases, such as extreme forms of Asperger's syndrome or autism that seem to point towards this belief.

Fourth, these three previous ideas form what is bedrock to all of epistemology. For epistemology arises out of language, it is a way of expressing what we know, or what we believe we know by using propositions. Justification come to an end with beliefs that are quite apart from those that arose through any method of linguistic justification. These bedrock beliefs are outside the purview of epistemology. — Sam26

I have my issues with the justification theory of truth and knowledge. It seems to impose an indirect realist interpretation on the mind and thus linguistics. Hence my above sentiments.

Finally, the ideas expressed here solve two problems that have plagued some epistemological theories. First, the infinite regress problem, viz., that there is no end to justification, and the problem of circularity. — Sam26

The infinite regress problem just turns on its head and says (according to the justification theory of knowledge and truth) that what are misgivings in language simply corresponds to the fact that language is not mirroring reality, but then how does one go about ascertaining or verifying such a claim?

I'd have to try to find where he said it, but from my memory Wittgenstein wasn't necessarily saying that philosophy was "amazing" (especially since he saw it to be analogous to a sort of disease). He was rather saying that while some people may give up on philosophical questions because "they'll never be answered", he finds their continual resistance to answering to be a source of awe. — darthbarracuda

Wittgenstein elevated ethics to the status of religion within the field of philosophy. That is amazing.

The idea is this: that form and function are intimately related, and that form cannot be thought about in any way separately from the immanent conditions which shape it. — StreetlightX

What makes you say the latter, that beyond immanent conditions form is not shaped?

I don't get the extravagant idea that something was being 'censored'. It was just a moderation attempt that wasn't really necessary.

I'll leave this thread in shame. Hope you guys have fun.

What happens to causality in that form of interpreting QM?

Part of my issue is that I don't understand the conception of time in the MWI. If someone could clarify that I might to be able to clarify the confusion.

Do you even have any clear idea about what you are asking? I get a strong impression that you don't. — SophistiCat

Forgive my incoherent question if that is what it seems like. I'm just an amateur interested in some physics and quantum mechanics.

I don't understand what's the issue either. Maybe let me restate the question. Does determinism apply to a situation where all outcomes can and are realized?

Have you heard of the Many Worlds Interpretations? If so, then my question is geared towards it in asking if it makes sense to call something deterministic if every possible outcome is realized in such a universe. I hope that makes sense.

Is the MWI, infinitary?

What can I help elucidate about the question? Basically, does determinism make sense in infinitary systems?

To think of yourself as a subject and object is illuminating, just that you can't do it simultaneously.

Some outcomes are mutually exclusive. — Purple Pond

Some interpretations of QM, have that every outcome can be equally valid.

My assumption is that the compression theorem can serve as a mathematical foothold to understanding that things like the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle as impossible to achieve. I've been fixated on that principle and Godel's Incompleteness Theorem for a while now.

Here's the exchange I had over at PhysicsForums. Maybe you could see the connection from that exchange.

Is that a reasonable interpretation? If so, what aspect of this did you want to ask about? — fishfry

Yeah, so are emergent phenomena by that understanding mystical phenomena or indeterminate?

A two-party system is diverse?

And what happened to pragmatism? Surely there are better and wose ways but then there's the matter of how efficient they may be and picking which method is best on that basis.