What is the purpose and what are the boundaries of our philosophical conversation? What sort of cult are we here? — Cabbage Farmer

We used to invite professors to the old philosophy forum I spent time around in. It was a great way at gearing the audience (informed) towards posting some prominent questions in regards to some philosophical thought experiments. I wish we could revive something like that here if possible.

Typing on my phone waiting for a dentist appointment...

I have to say that what your pointing towards is the convergence of the left and right towards neoliberal economic policies. I don't think any side would fight against it, rather more to the matter of who benefits from neoliberal policies the most. I don't think you can build consensus on both sides of the aisle without addressing the current status quo. How can one go about that is a thorny issue.

I find it hard to believe this is intended to be a serious statement. Or am I misunderstanding. Are you saying women are more ethical than men? I don't know which it is more insulting to. — T Clark

I have wrestled with this statement to a large extent, and still think it is generally true. A prime example I ask of is why are males much more representative of prison populations than woman are, around the world? I'm not saying that men are inherently more guided by 'dark forces' or whatever you want to call it.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. I understand how this happens in divine command theories (but why?? BECAUSE I SAID SO!!!), but theories like Kantianism, utilitarianism, or similar find grounding in reason, or intuition, or something. — darthbarracuda

Philosophy has been searching for an ideal rationale for guiding moral theories and ethics for a long time. Even the most universal of ethical postulates, such as the golden rule, rely on people to empathize with others to decide what is the best moral positions to be in regards to others. So, I don't see what's wrong with moral theories if most rely on notions such as 'caring', 'compassion', or relatability in regards to others.

I don't think an ethical theory would count as an ethical theory if it didn't put emphasis on other people instead of yourself. I'm totally on board with investigating the ethics-before-duty, the phenomenology of the encounter with the Other (Levinas), etc. But I think it's a straw man to say only virtue-care-feminist ethics are ethics concerning other people, because that is certainly false. — darthbarracuda

Well, that's not the point I'm making here at least. What I'm saying is that ethical truths are only found upon further examination to be made possible when another person can be related to in some regards based on emotive theories of what 'ethical truths' are.

Additionally, I think it was Aristotle who said virtue comes with habit. True, you must want to be virtuous, but it's something that needs to be taught as well. I'm not sure if the claim that virtuous people will always be a better moral actor than a prescriptivist person is true - and what are we defining "better moral actor" as apart from a person who does what is right, i.e. what ought to be done, i.e. prescriptions. — darthbarracuda

Well, doesn't wanting to be ethical implicitly rely on emotions, in general? Perhaps there is some selfish element to wanting to be moral; but, I haven't heard of any sort of material gain stemming from wanting to be moral or ethical. Are teachers motivated by an ethic of care and love for others that makes them want to put up with under-developed moral actors? Yeah, I would think so.

You mentioned previously how someone who doesn't "get" an ethical command will never see the rationale behind it. Yet I believe this is merely a case of someone not seeing the whole picture, or of having an impaired set of reasoning skills. — darthbarracuda

Well, yes, none of us have immediate access to a type of rationality that isn't bound by epistemic criteria available at the moment. So, what's wrong with emotions guiding decision making? There's a great deal of prejudice built around emotions nowadays in people. Largely due to the fact that emotions are unpredictable and uncertain. But, if they are what guides moral decision making as best as possible, then I would think there's nothing wrong with having emotions guide what's best for the other than one's seelf. Sure, people have whole sorts of emotions; but, if the right sort of emotions can be cultivated, then, the rest of ethics just falls in place to follow what one thinks is best for another based on a sense of caring and compassion.

There is far too much conflict for compassion to be all that great as a general ethical model. It is of course good to be compassionate, but compassion is also the source of guilt, and retribution, is my only point. If someone that you are uninterested in falls in love with you, or the truth might hurt someone, then compassion is going to make you feel shitty about rejecting them, or telling them the truth. You can be forced into lots of situations if you're too compassionate, and be tempted to lie all the time. You have to reduce compassion in order to be able to set boundaries, and not just let people walk all over you, or to tell people things they don't want to hear.

Also, when you reduce someone's problems to victimization and oppression, that compassion is going to make you feel invested, and personally hurt as well, and the blame, or responsibility, rather than being placed with the self causing guilt in the first case, will be placed with the third party causing anger, frustration, and desires for retribution in this case.

You can see that compassion is partial, or indeed individual, taking of sides, and feeling equal compassion for everyone leads to a stalemate, where a super-ordinate value must be the ruling principle in all cases, meaning that "compassion" itself is a nonstarter. Sounds nice and fluffy, and is a feel good word, that signals all kinds of virtue, but it isn't a great ruling principle — Wosret

Most people, generally, don't view other people as tools that can only be exploited. Although, I know of examples that exploit sympathy and other emotions to further their goals, but, such people typically end up in trouble or most people recognize their falsity and decide not to deal with them. Compassion and other emotions are already moral guidelines that come before rationalization. So, what's wrong with embracing their conclusions than rejecting them on grounds that they can't be rationalized? Not many, I think.

What "love and care" is, is deep deep bias. We definitely should have love and care for those close to us, but this means favoritism. This means bias. That's been well known for a long, long time. The idea that these should be a wide spread ethical system, is to propose tribalism. — Wosret

Perhaps, then there's a deficiency in this bias towards others? I don't think we should require us to be caring or emphatic towards others; but, there's rarely something wrong with having people display those traits towards others. I don't really see a problem with encouraging such a bias in general.

Yes, they do profess. It is part of the character role. In actual practice .... I have observed no differences between men and women when it comes to caring. Some people do and others don't.

Caring is not an ethic, it is a feeling. Where does this feeling come from, is tough to say? Some people certainly seem to care more than others. In part, caring can be somewhat learned by trial and error in a lifetime, but then again it may take, many, many, many lifetimes. — Rich

One can make the argument that all of ethics boils down to a sense of feeling, according to emotive theories and intuitive notions of what feels do ethical decisions derive from. I still find it hard to assume that a rationale can be devised to be taught or encouraged to people to care more. Rather, one can encourage certain feelings of care or empathy towards others to maintain some sense of care towards another.

It seemed to be hovering on the edge by implication - because of the link made between feminist philosophy and virtue-ethics; and the comparison between the ethical goodness of men vs women. — Cuthbert

I don't think there was a value judgment made about the ability to care for women more-so than men. If you want me to make a value judgment for the sake of discussion, then I can say that women profess an attitude of care more than men do on average. Does that make them more ethical beings? Not really, it's just that they are more caring than men are in regards to the welfare of others.

However, that doesn't mean that men ought to take care of what they're 'best at' and leave women to do what they're 'best at'.

Yeah; but, I didn't suggest that the above was the case. You did. And, although it is an important point, I was solely asking about what members of this forum know about or think about ethics as caring.

It may also be used to imply that they need not bother themselves too much with politics, law, duty and matters of principle. Let them concentrate on looking after the children and the old folk. True on face value or not I think some reflection is needed on the implications of the view I expressed.

Generalisations are often invidious. I could say 'But look at this wonderfully ethical man, and look at this despicable woman!' Then someone else chooses contrary examples. Eventually it becomes clear that we are not talking about men and women at all but about virtue, care, law, politics etc as those things are relevant to us all. But by that time we have wasted our energy on an ill-advised battle of the sexes. — Cuthbert

Well, then you've answered your own question despite evidence showing that prison populations are predominantly male vs female.

The issue still is that why isn' there more talk about virtue-care-ethics and instead we still get Plato brought up and Aristotle, and the Stoics or Epicureans? Is there still some hefty amount of sexism in the field of philosophy despite ethics as care being a strong argument being proposed by feminist philosophers?

Am I to understand that women's philosophy is about care, education, families, communities, virtue, being a good person and matters of personality and men's philosophy is about duty, right and wrong, law, politics and matters of principle? I don't think anyone has said such a thing in this thread and yet it seems to be a thought that's hanging around on the edge of the party waiting to be invited in. Or alternatively uninvited explicitly. — Cuthbert

That would seem to be the case at least. Implicit or explicit, it's true on face value. As a population representative of what ethical conduct means or stands for, women sure do take the cake.

Am I the only person that views this as a boon for the world and not only the myopic fixation with the US, prevalent on these forums?

The issue with command type ethics is that you're left with a person who doesn't realize what they're doing is good, or why it should be counted as something good over some other action. This greatly stupifies the whole moral framework. There's no point in telling that some action is good unless they can't rationalize it themselves, and if you follow the news, then most of ethics can't be rationalized at all, it's rather a trait that can only be observed but not modeled.

Virtue-care-ethics is elegantly simplistic because it puts the emphasis on the individual to extend their sphere of interest to include others than one's self. I'd rather live in a democratic collectivist ethical society than have a benevolent dictator tell me what is good. Ethics of care is inherently democratic and education is focused on not habituating a person to be good but rather giving them the tools to want to be ethical and moral. What's more, a person who is motivated by care or love or other noble traits will always be a better moral actor than one guided by command type prescriptivist ethical theories. And, that get's neglected in philosophy nowadays. The pursuit of moral absolutes or as you say, monistic tendencies are largely a failure in terms of ethics.

What's more, a philosophy of care appeals to the Rawlsian notion of a veil of ignorance. If you empathize with an individual it requires some degree of putting on a veil of ignorance and trying to view the world in terms of the other and not the self.

In regards to virtue, I think people are generally stuck to their psychological types and it's only through an immense amount of effort that a person can "change" - yet even this possibility is dependent on the person being of a certain psychological type. If this is true, then not everyone can be "virtuous" - yet certainly there are things people should and should not do even if they are incapable of being "virtuous". In that sense, right action is to be sharply distinguished from good natured-ness (i.e. it cannot be a moral requirement to act from a certain intention or motivation). — darthbarracuda

Yes, but if doing what is ethical isn't motivated by a sense of care or compassion, then what are we left with? The alternative is worse than having a personal care and go through the process of deliberation about what's best for someone other than one's self to decide what is moral. Like, I said, having a person motivated to be ethical through encouraging kindness, care, and love will in almost all regards be better than even the best Kantian. To put this another way, emotivism and intuitionalism are superior to other ethical theories because they don't really rely on a yet undiscovered rationale as to what actions are the best, they are just intuitively obvious. I seriously doubt a calculus of utility could also be imagined to discern what actions are best or worst in some or any predicament or situation.

In regards to love, I think it is entirely unreasonable to demand people love each other, because love is not something that can be voluntarily made. Love is not a foundation of ethics, at least, not in the romantic or deep friend-like way. Love is sometimes said to be the desire to see the good develop in someone else - yet this is a motivation, and I don't think motivations can ever be morally required (since we have no control over them). — darthbarracuda

No, you're conflating Kantian/prescriptivist ethics with what is talked about, rather a normative ethical theory based on natural and emulatable (emphatic?) emotions. To demand that a person act or behave a certain way is unrealistic and goes against the Hume'ian emotive sense of ethics. People, are not programmable like computers and demanding anything from them to behave ethically completely nullifies the effort to be ethical. In other words, it's just not possible to teach a person to behave morally or ethically. Rather in some Buddhist sense, it's a facet of human nature that ought to be cultivated rather than demanded or required from a person. And, to cultivate this trait from a person, then a person ought to be encouraged to behave with a sense of care or love or something beyond one's sphere of interest other than the self.

Objectively, is it really a tragedy if you have a nation spending on warfare as much as the next seven nations down the list?

Most nations recognize that not ISIS or Russia or China or Al Qaeda are the real threats to peace and stability in the world.

Which part of what I wrote are you addressing Posty? — creativesoul

I posted as a remark to the following:

If the rules of entailment can be shown to be both followed and unable to preserve the truth of the premisses, then we are saying that the "rules of correct inference" do not need to preserve the truth of their premisses. — creativesoul

and,

This presupposes that the rules of entailment are infallible regarding truth. — creativesoul

My suggestion is that you're taking the rules of entailment under too strict an understanding for it to maintain truth. Or in other words, you demand from a non-formalized system the same certainty you would get from a formalized system. Your position would only make sense for a solipsist.

Well, omniscience should not be grounds to discredit the epistemic closure principle.

So, yeah, do you need certainty in a non-formalized system to arrive at meaningful entailment?

To some degree, yes. As to what degree is in question here.

Posty McCarthy? — Hachem

More like, Posty McEconomist. But, if we can invent a near infallible central manager, such as some superintelligent AI, then sure, maybe then communism would work.

No. The point is that phenomena are the only thing we can talk about. We have to start from experience itself (which is prior even to a mind~world distinction - the debate between the idealists and realists). — apokrisis

Yeah, and that's the point of the Tractatus. Whereof one cannot speak (say epiphenomena, ethics, love, traits, qualities, even qualia) thereof things must be shown or observed. You seem to be describing what phenomena are or what counts as phenomena and epiphenomena if ever a strict definition can be concluded, I'm merely talking about the difference between phenomena and epiphenomena existing and the difference in logical terms between the two which this thread seems to be about.

So it is an ontology of relata rather than things. — apokrisis

What do you mean by that? Yes, the relation of things in logical space gives rise to facts, which is only made possible by a consciouss observer or even an observer from within the system of relations of things and thus facts.

That is why the talk is of counting degrees of freedom instead of particles or things. — apokrisis

Well, on a more fundamental level, the discussion cannot be made without observation of the state of affairs, which is puzzling, and could perhaps elucidate that there is some assumption of metaphysical entailed in interpreting information, facts. Obviously, epiphenomena seem metaphysical (from within the system or state space or logical space itself); but, are rather just emergent properties of the relations between things and not facts. So, in essence, we seem to be talking about epiphenomena.

In other words, traits or things cannot be modeled; but, rather only observed.

Philosophy joke of the day:

Communism.

I tend to view this question in terms of a Tractarian ontology of facts, not things.

Namely, that information is the description of the arrangements of particles or 'things'. Meaning is derived from the sum total of the arrangement of 'things' in space, which are facts.

If one wants to take a metaphysical view on the state of affairs of these facts in logical space, then a reference to 'the map is not the territory' is apt. Namely, that information itself is devoid of meaning, and meaning is derived from modeling these states of affairs in logical space giving rise to 'facts' not 'things'.

In case anyone is interested I posted something along the lines of what has been mentioned here over at PhysicsForums.

Really great people there too.

A couple is being robbed.
The wife asks the husband, 'Can he be reasoned with?'
The robber is a philosopher.

Well, no guns on Mars would be a good and reasonable start.

Here is a quote that may have saved the world, during the Cuban missile crisis. It really touched me and struck a chord. In some manner, it changed my entire propagandized worldview about what the Soviets wanted... peace. It was an appeal to rationality, which almost failed, and we're here today because of luck, not reason, as after all reasonable people were in charge at the time yet let such a situation arise. So, we ended up being lucky and nothing more. I leave it for you and others to enjoy.

In the first message, Khrushchev said this: "We and you ought not to pull on the ends of a rope which you have tied the knots of war. Because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction. For such is the logic of war. If people do not display wisdom, they will clash like blind moles and then mutual annihilation will commence."

Source.

Yes it's a very deep root of identity. The self is made of such images, and being imaginary at root, is always insecure. This insecurity is intolerable, and 'un-masculine'. And so one acts masculine. — unenlightened

I feel the influence of Jung here. I do agree that images are worth more than what words can say, therefore are we doomed to be led towards idealized pictures or can these things be rationalized and taught by words alone?

But one only has to act (as if) one was something, to the extent one is not that thing. If men are masculine, they do not have to act; if some men are more masculine than others, neither have to act. — unenlightened

No, that's the problem here. The desire can never be satisfied once a perceived deficit is conjured up. The image is never attained due to a variety of factors (which I would be interested in exploring more).

Folks act to escape what they are, which is futile, painful and self-destructive. — unenlightened

It's a form of self-soothing. We act so we can interact. Diogenes never found a true human being with his lantern after all. Maybe he just needed to take a look at himself in a mirror(?)

Have a dick by all means, be a dick if that's what you are, but for God's sake don't feel obliged to act like a dick. — unenlightened

There is something about being a dick that is satisfying. It makes me feel better when you feel bad or down. I justify my happiness by the misery of others.

Thus, violence is paradoxically the means through which the escalation of violence is brought to a halt. That is the fundamental trait of all human culture, society, and religion - the resolution of conflict and the establishment of order through violence, which is then effaced and projected unto a victim - oh it was her who didn't like him, she liked me. — Agustino

Yeah, but we already know how that ends up. Jog your mind back to 1939. Fascinating and horrible times.

*On a side note, this is why Europe is considered the most culturally and educated place on the world. They learned what rampant violence leads to. So, does Russia know that violence abroad or at home is a cause for concern and are seemingly more rational than who won the Cold War? I can't but help but shake the belief that acts of tremendous violence on people or an ethnic group or an entire nation are a prerequisite for desiring peace. One can only understand a decision or the path taken in retrospect / looking behind. Then again, the spoils go to the victor.

I also get the feeling fat Continental philosophy tries to liberate us from the shackles of our evolutionary past. Analytic philosophy is very foundationalist or binary and in some sense displays a masculine approach towards doing philosophy.

Any Nel Nodding fans here?

Yeah, that could serve as an example. I get the feeling that people may have not evolved, however they can adapt to an ever changing society.

I think Socrates was a hyper masculine man. Poor Plato, though.

Yeah but how do you know when that trait has been expressed to the required or sufficient and adequate amount or degree. It's almost as though it can be expressed forever without knowing some baseline or whether or not it's an inferiority complex manifesting itself or some form of neuroticism or overcompensation.

Do it when it works. — Baden

How do you know that?

Masculinity is not a belief. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Then what is it?

Some unconscious process?

Oh, and to answer your question, I'd say something of the sort of 'logical positivism', 'scientific positivism'...

Well yes, I think you have it about right. Shall we say that a perceived deficiency, measured according to a faulty image of masculinity, leads to an exaggerated performance of the image, which is itself already exaggerated, and so to an excessive demand that others also perform to support the image? I think this is the best explanation of homophobia and the like - that even the possibility that another can deviate from the image is a threat to one's whole being. Thus, not to join in with the gauging and burning is to fail the image of masculinity. — unenlightened

There seems to be more to it than just an image that can't be realized. Not unlike the concept of self-esteem, there is an image that changes due to the variety of people; but, also an issue that the image cannot ever be realized (after all who has learned how to limit their desires apart from the sages and Buddhists, which are in the grand scheme of things, quite a few). So, at some deeper level, one can live with having low-self esteem and be depressed or neurotic; but, with masculinity, it goes to the deeper level of some sense of insecurity about one's self.

It is perhaps in pointing out the weakness, the effeminacy, the sheeplike nature of such behaviour, that one might hope to guide others to have the strength to resist the images that are purveyed by society and the media. — unenlightened

Yes, however, you can't reason with such a drive or desire to be masculine if you so happen to be a male. I don't quite understand the process of adapting to not being masculine, it goes against that drive at a very deep level.

You can piggy-back over what modern techno-utopians think about this concept manifest in the form of super-intelligent AI, called the singularity. Or you can provide some economic analysis of the deflationary power of technology on most realms of life.

There's a lot of material; but, I don't have the expertise to recommend any books that would serve that goal. Try reading some of Ray Kurzweil's books on the concept of a 'singularity'.

He might as well have been on some powerful adulterants like drugs, sex, and money. I don't know if places like Las Vegas brings out the best or worst in people; but, being in such an environment could encourage the said behavior. I mean, people do act irrationally by gambling, despite knowing how little chance they have at beating the house.

Did anyone watch The Hangover? There's already a third installment of the film, in the works.

Yes, it's a self fulfilling prophecy. What is masculine is what men do. Men, masculine men, sometimes wear make up, and skirts and heels and have sex with other men. Therefore that is masculine behaviour. Occasionally they castrate themselves, that is masculine behaviour. Sometimes they shave and sometimes they grow a set, and both are masculine behaviour.

In short, let the images and stereotypes follow you, rather than feeling you ought to follow them, let alone that you ought to oblige another to follow them on pain of being stabbed and burned. That too is masculine behaviour, but more to the point, it is repulsive behaviour. — unenlightened

So, is it a deficiency in some emotion or feeling that causes (predominantly) men the need to express or display their masculinity in such a manner and way or is it an excess of some sort? How does one guide men to tame these animalistic spirits? Heck, I doubt animals are capable of such deeds and actions. The sane and rational me is quite worried about this state of affairs.

Even deeper, is it society to blame for this form of behavior? I can't imagine these events happening in more developed cultures like Germany or the European countries or the UK. Typically the neuroticism doesn't reach psychotic levels there and if one can't-do anything about it, they tend to off themselves or are deprived of the tools to make their desire manifest.

In regards to my previous post, I just read yesterday about a transgender teenager being stabbed to the death by a teenage male in the groin area who gauged out their eyes and then a group of three or four accomplices disposing of the body by burning it. Then there was an incident where a transgender was stabbed some 80 times by another male not too long ago. The utter cruelty of the incident stands out as if the transgender person was some "repulsive" 'thing' and not a human being.

What is being expressed here? Very depressing shit to read about.

Here's the article:
https://nypost.com/2017/09/27/sheriff-insists-murder-of-transgender-teen-not-a-hate-crime/

And I am a real man, so you can safely agree. — unenlightened

But, what if you were transgender or gay? Would that detract from what you are saying as a 'real man'? It all seems like a self-fulfilling prophecy, no?