No, wait, this doesn't make any sense. So, your definition of good is "what it should exist". So if a thing should exist, then is good. If not, is bad.

Then you make the example of Justice. You say that "Justice is good", so Justice should exist. That is correct, but why Justice is good? According to your definition Justice is good because it should exist. But Justice should exist because Justice is good.

Basically it seems that saying that something is good or saying that something should exist is exactly the same thing. Then you didn't provide an informative definition of what good is.

"Good is largely defined as what should be."

What do you mean "should be"?

You know what's the problem with your idea? This part:

"giving up all their personal political beliefs, just there to think as good as possible"

Hi there, I'm one of the best philosopher in the world! Don't worry, even If you didn't vote for me, even if you don't live in a democracy anymore and it is ME who is making the rules, now, I would never, never, never take advantage of that, for my own interest! Why, you ask? Well, because I'm a philosopher. I'm wise. Trust me! ; )

Well, I'm sorry we didn't find an agreement. I hope the other readers will find out who is playing with words and who is not. : )

But if you take the first literally than it's not equivalent to the second.

"Nothing is that which can be conceived by the mind" can be interpreted in different ways. It could mean that Nothing is the set of the things that can be conceived by the mind. But this cannot be what you meant. Or it could mean "Nothing can be conceived by the mind". This interpretation is not paradoxal, as I've shown. Because we are just talking about the concept of Nothing, not about Nothing itself (the only statements we can make about Nothing itself are negative statements). To be conceived by the mind is not a property of the Nothing. It is just an existential proposition of the form "There's an x and this x is the concept of Nothing". When we say that we conceive something, like a triangle, we just mean that we can form a concept of it.

I've already answered your question. There is no paradox. You're just playing with language.

"Is Nothing that which can be conceived by the mind?"

This proposition is equivalent to:

"Do we have a concept of Nothing?"

Now, is this second form of the proposition paradoxal? Nl, it's not, as I've shown. But you insist in using the first proposition, even though should be clear now that the real subject of the proposition is not Nothing, but the concept of Nothing. Because If I had to take LITERALLY the first proposition, of course the answer would be no. But in that case it would be different from the second proposition. So, in this case, do we have a concept of Nothing? We do. But is Nothing that which can be conceived by the mind? No.

Yes, you can separate the referent from the word and from the concept. The word is wathever word you choose to use. The concept is the description of this new fruit that you want to use. Of course there are many descriptions available to you. You may just describe the external feature of the fruit, but If you are a scientist maybe you will study the DNA of the fruit and use this information for your categorization, hence your concept of the fruit. What about the referent? The referent is just the thing you are seeing with your eyes. In the case of new fruit, it's just a "this", but the experience of the fruit doesn't change. I may be an indios of the XVI century and see for the first time in my life, on the sea, a huge spanish ship. I don't know anything about Spain or ships. It doesn't even resemble anything I know. I'll just call it "that thing". And then I'll describe it to others. Maybe the others will call it "the thing that he saw this morning". They will use my description as a concept and try to imagine the "thing". As a referent they can only use the image formed in their imagination, but I can use my memory of this morning. That thing that I saw this morning, that is what I'm referring to.

But this is in no way in contrast with the simple semiotic theory that I used. Even if the real object is the result of a complex constitutive subjective process, and even if we are subjective idealist and we think there are no apples out there, the concept of "reference" still make sense and is extremely useful. The process described by Husserl occur in a very pre-cognitive way. It's a fast, almost subconscious level. If I take an apple and I present it to you, can you recognize in your mind all these steps that Husserl describes? I can't. It just appears as an apple, almost in an instant. Then of course I may provide a very sophisticated phenomenological theory about this appearance, or I may be an idealist and say that there's no external world in which the apple exist. But there is still a HUGE difference between the apple in front of me and my concept of the apple. The concept it's just a definition. A collection of propositions. The apple is a collection of impressions. It's not fair to call the apple a "concept". Even if it is subjectively constructed, the process, as I've said, is so fast and so... still (the apple won't go away, even If I want it to go away) that it's a completely different experience. I understand that "real" objects can create some misunderstanding, but that semiotic theory does in no way rest on the assumption that there are objects outside my mind or something like that.

Even if the object is not present and we say there is a referent, it can work in an idealist framework. Let's suppose there is an apple on the table, and the table is in another room. I'm not perceiving the other room, so it seems like that, being that apple in the other room my referent, I'm assuming the apple exist in the other room, and so outside of my mind. But it is not necessary. I can use a mental representation as a proxy for the referent, and say: "If I will go in the other room, I will perceive the apple".

The concept is the meaning of a word. Now, with abstract objects it's complicated and it really depends on a lot of things, but in the case of real objects like an apple, it seems straightforward to me. I'm not sure I understand your point.



What do you mean by "the language enacts rather than represents"? And why is the referent itself a concept? Of course we have a concept of "reference" and "referent", but a specific referent it's not a concept.

There are many concepts that evokes an image in the mind, a mental representation. As you said, this is the case for an apple. But try, for example, the christian notion of God. What do you "see", when you hear the word "God"? Of course someone could picture an old man in the skies, or a bright ligth, but we know that these are merely symbolic representation. An old man sitting on a cloud or a bright, ethereal ligth is in no way a TRUE representation of God. Think also about the root square of two. What do you see? The symbol "2" inside the "root" symbol? That is not what root square of two really is. The root square of two is a mathematical object, and only the definition is really able to convey the concept. I think it's the same for "Nothing". Even though, like in the case of God, I could still picture something while I hear this word (in fact sometimes I picture a black screen), I understand that these are merely symbolic representation, and that a black screen it's something, so it cannot be "nothing". But I still would separate the concept (the definition) and the mental representation (which may or may not be symbolic). Even though for some objects (like mathematical objects) I can't form mind images that are not symbolic, I know an objective definition, and that is the concept of those objects. Even if it is a negative definition, I still think that it's a legitimate concept.

Take the word "salumia". I just made it up. I will now give a definition of salumia: "Not a dog." Which should be understood as "If x is not a dog, than it is a salumia". You now have an operative concept of salumia. If now I say to you: "Is Lassie a salumia?". Your answer of course will be no. Lassie is a dog. Hence cannot be a salumia. Is Napoleon a salumia? Yes, Napoleone was a salumia. He wasn't a dog, so he is an element of all the salumia. I am a salumia too, and you too are. As you can see, it works witouth a problem. We have a word, we have a (negative) definition which provides an operative concept to distinguish a salumia from a "not a salumia" (which is now a definition of "dog"! Funny.)
And what do you picture when you now hear the word "salumia"? You may picture Napoleon, but you know that Napoleon is just A salumia, and only in a symbolic way could represent the concept that salumia convey. Only the definition is really true to the concept, because they are one and the same.

You could even define an apple with a negative concept. That would be quite difficult without specifying a finite set, so let's suppose we have a set of three elements: an apple, a dog and a cat. Let's call this set A.

Definition of apple: "for every x of A, if x is not a dog and x is not a cat, than x is an apple". Of course this is not a good definition of apple for everyday life, but I hope you get the idea. The idea is that there's nothing wrong in negative definitions. I think that Hegel had something interesting to say about these subject. And try maybe Berkeley and Hume for the "picture in the mind" part.

Finally, I think the definition you gave provide a legitimate concept of "Nothing". It is a negative concept, without a referent that you can picture in the mind, yes, but it's not a big deal. It can be conceived in the mind, but only as an operative negative definition. Not in other ways. Berkeley and Hume failed to understand this when talking about abstract objects, for example.

Finally, you say: if Nothing can be conceived by the mind, than it's something (something conceived by your mind), which is paradoxal. But to me to say that something can be conceived by the mind is to say that we have a concept of that thing. So we you ask me if nothing is conceivable, it's like if you are asking "Can we form a concept of Nothing?". The answer is yes. Does it mean that Nothing is Something? No. The concept of Nothing is something. Nothing is just nothing, as the concept say.

Yes, I meant the square root, sorry. It doesn't matter if you say "square root of 2" or "1.41...", the result is the same. There is no referent for abstract objects. You just have an analytic definition.

We have a concept of "Nothing", and Nothing is a concept that does not refere to anything. I don't understand what is the problem. I don't see any paradox.

1) We have a concept of "Nothing". True.

2) "Nothing" can't be a concept. True. It's a word. We have a concept related to this word, but the word per se is not the concept.

3) Nothing can't be a concept. This statement is ambiguos, cause it's not clear if you are using the word "Nothing" as a sostantive or as a negation. If you are just saying there's no thing that can be a concept, than you are clearly wrong. If you are saying that THE Nothing can't be a concept, of course it can't. And it is not. And there's no contradiction with 1).

4) Nothing refers to not anything, let alone a concept. Of course. Just like I'm saying. We have a concept related to the word "Nothing". This concept is a definition which express the meaning of the word "Nothing". That doesn't make neither "Nothing" nor Nothing a concept.

Not, that the word "apple" is not the apple is another story. I wasn't talking about the word "apple", but about our CONCEPT of the apple. Is the concept/definition of apple an apple? No. The structure is something like this:

WORD "Apple" -> CONCEPT (which can be the definition or a mental representation) of the apple -> REFERENT (the apple rigth in front of you, or an apple at the market, or wathever).

WORD "Nothing" -> CONCEPT (in this case you only have the definition: not any thing) -> REFERENT (which does not exist, because of the definition).

There are other cases of concepts without referent. The root square of two, for example. You have a definition, but it doesn't refer to anything in particular. Or the concept of triangle. It has no referents because a drawn triangle is not a triangle, but just a symbol used to represent the pure concept of "triangle".

Now, a triangle is "a polygon formed by three edges", and this is a concept. But a polygon formed by three edges is not a concept. It's a polygon. There's a subtle difference. The concept is the definition, but the content of the definition is not a concept. Of course we can form a (negative) concept of Nothing, but that has nothing to do with the content of the definition (which actually doesn't exist).

So, returning to the apple, my concept of an apple is "the round fruit of a tree of the rose family, which typically has thin green or red skin and crisp flesh". But is a round fruit of a tree of the rose family a concept? Of course not. It's a fruit, not a concept.

Yes, in the natural languages the quantifiers are almost always open-ended and have blurry domains. But you can get an idea of the domain in which the speaker in quantifying by looking at the context. For example, if the person speaking "There's nothing to be afraid of" is guiding you in an abandoned house, it goes without saying that what he means is "The set of things inside this house to be afraid of is empty, to the best of my knowledge". Even though it seems he is making a general statement, he is not. Maybe he thinks there's nothing yo be afraid of in that house, but he's afraid of MANY things that are not inside that house. Abstracting words from their usual context is one of the favorite game of many philosophers, unfortunately.

Anyway I don't see have a problem conceding that we can write down a definition of the word "nothing", and assume that the definition and the concept conveid by a word coincide. But as I said the problem is the confusion between the concept and the reference. Confusion between the semantic point of view and the ontological point of view (even though I unserstand that the boundaries is very thin and sometimes no so easy to see).

Please, consider the way the word "nothing" is used in the english language. An empty room. There's nothing in that room. Is this a correct use of the word? Of course it is. Then you look at the definition: not ANY thing. But then it's impossible that there's nothing in the room. There's st least air. Maybe some snall insects. There's ligth coming from the window. There are so many THINGS in the empty room. Then why do we say that there's nothing in the room? Because it is a matter of quantifiers. When you say that there's nothing in the room, you are not quantifying on EVERYTHING, but only on things like furniture. It's irrelevant to you that in the room there's actually air, light, organisms and particles that you can't see, and space, because space is a thing too.

This was only an example, but it seems to me that this is the case every time that the word "nothing" is used in english (or in the italian word "nulla"). The quantifier is always on a finite dominion of things. Because how could you formulate a sentence with "Nothing" using a quantifier without boundaties which makes any sense? Nothing comes to my mind (hehe).

Having said that, the definition you provided is clearly problematic, because it can interpreted the way you did, even though no one use that interpretation in the english language, apart maybe for some philosopher who wants to play with words just for the fun of it.

So, it should be clear at least that we can use the word "nothing" without any problem.

Anyway, let's suppose we are one of those philosophers who like to have fun with words, and let's use your interpretation of that horrible and ambiguous definition. You say that at least we have a definition of "Nothing". You're rigth. If we have the definition, we have a concept. Ok. But the definition is talking about the REFERENCE of the concept. What does the word "Nothing" refers to? To not any thing. Which is like to say that "Nothing" does not have a reference. I don't understand why you are using the definition retroactively on itself. Take an easiest example:

Apple: the round fruit of a tree of the rose family, which typically has thin green or red skin and crisp flesh.

We have a definition of "apple". So we have a concept of "apple". The word is referring to the thing described by the definition. Does it mean that an apple is a concept? Well, no. This apple that I'm eating it's not a concept. It is not the concept of the apple. It's the apple.

For the same reason you should distinguish between the CONCEPT/definition of Nothing and the reference of Nothing. Nothing refers to not any thing. There's a concept, but there's no reference. There you go.

That everything has to have a cause to exist is a pretty weak premise, but let's get along with it.
I don't understand what is the problem with the hypothesis that we are living in an universe that always existed. Is because it would contradict the premise? Since the universe exist, it HAS to have a cause? But then even God would be subjected to the premise. You can't say that this transcendental cause (God) always existed without denying the premise. Or is it because of the infinite regress with the causes? But that there is an infinite regress of the causes is not contradictory or unintelligible in any way I can see. Does it defy logic in some way? How? Doesn't seem so.

Now, let's assume that there actually is something outside of space and time (very problematic talking about space and time in this way, but let's get along with it) that created the universe. Why are you assuming only ONE cause? It could also be the result of many dinstict transcendental causes. You may call each one of those a "God", amd then you would have many gods. Maybe A LOT of them. So why one instead of, let's say, 123'876 gods?

Finally, EVEN IF you could show that it has to be just one transcendental cause, would it be fair to called it a "god"? What if this cause ceased to exist rigth after the universe was born? Would you still call it a god, even though is, well, dead? And what about its attributes? Is this cause intelligent? Does it have a will? A mind? Is it good? Because, if it is neither intelligent, good, omnipotent and "alive", than I think that calling it "god" is just playing with words. And it would even be offensive for the vast majority of religious of people, assuming that God is just a stupid, mindless cause that has even ceased to exist billions of years ago.

By showing that the existence of something is more probable than the existence of nothing, you didn't answer the question. Even if the probability of something to exist was 0.0000001%, "something" could still win against nothing. And even if the probability was hugely in favor of something, the result could still had been that nothing exist. So this kind of analysis doesn't really provide a satiafying answer, and I doubt that even shows that "something" is more probable than nothing, since we are starting from the premise that every outcome is equiprobable. This premise it is not grounded in empirical observation, as ALL probability statements should be, but only on our complete ignorance about the subject.