“we persons are identical to these and those material causes which constitute us” and thereby remove the implication previously provided via the words “nothing more than". — javra

This is one of the issues of using "physical" as is used in contemporary philosophy, in more or less arbitrarily stipulates that the physical is whatever science currently studies. So, based on this, the argument would be that we as persons are identical with our chemical and biological properties, including cells, synapses, endorphins and so on.

I think this idea is silly. I mean, sure objects are going to be more than the sum of parts, that's why we recognize them as such. What reasons do we have for rejecting that the things science currently cannot study, and maybe never will be able to study, aren't physical too?

Thoughts, sublime things, do come out of brains - based on the evidence we have. Yet they lose nothing of the sublimity for coming out of brains. In fact, brains are constructions of things we experience in the world and label as such, containing those properties we attribute to them. But there is likely much more that we cannot attribute to them, because we know so little.

A seen rock is thereby conceptually identical to a bunch of unseen subatomic particles, themselves constituted from an amorphous quantum vacuum, this in the vantage of materialism. But, experientially, we don’t inhabit that world which this material-cause concept of identity entails; we inhabit this world wherein we both agree that the seen rock is only identical with itself as rock, its constituents holding their own unique identities. No? — javra

I'm unclear on what you mean. We attribute identities to rocks, but when we speak of rocks usually, we tend to speak of "rocks" and related common-sense uses, not of the properties that make it up. Like if we see a sheet of limestone, we don't speak of "calcium carbonate", unless we are geologists speaking about limestones from a technical perspective.

Point is, here, all is mind. In so being, this thesis then holds possible implications which materialism / physicalism (everything we take to be mental is in fact fine tuned physicality) outright rejects as metaphsycially possible. — javra

I mean, what difference is there between effete or "ineffectual" mind and matter as discussed by current physics? If all is mind as opposed to physical stuff, what's the difference? The reason I use "matter" and not "mind", is because I think there is a world out there, independent of us, not dependent on mind.

What position would you hold in relation to this view intending a more precise, philosophical definition of materialism? — javra

I don't think my view gives us a more precise meaning of materialism, I think it merely dissolves what is called the "mind-body" problem and in doing so, we can stop discussing terminology and instead focus on ideas.

We used to have, I think, a good notion of "materialism", back in Descartes's time, in which it was held to be something like "mechanistic materialism": everything in the world, nay, the universe, works like a giant clock - if we can build it, we can understand it kind of thing, based on direct contact between bodies.

The exception was that certain aspects of mind, did not fit into this scheme, namely creative language use (ordinary language actually) and thoughts, hence Descartes postulated "res cogitans".

Newton believed this, but then, he showed the universe is not a machine, to his dismay:

"It is inconceivable, that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact... is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it."

With that, our notion of "physical" or material is gone: we don't know what bodies are. So if we are to use the term "materialism", "physical" and point to the same phenomenon Newton had in mind, then it encapsulates everything, there being no other metaphysical distinction.

"That", *I point to something* "is physical". Ok. But then this thing inside my head is so too, or at least, I can't see a reason why it couldn't be. The problem with putting it otherwise and saying "that is mental or idea" is that I don't think objects are made of ideas, I think there is an external world out there.

we persons are nothing more than our constituency of this and that material causes which, as material causes, efficiently cause things — javra

Yeah, I mean, I do it sometimes too, I try not to, but using the term "nothing more", or "merely" or "just" is very misleading and can be taken to imply one is playing something down. I do do this at times, but one should be careful.

But's that's the gist of it.

EDIT:

Yes but, according to Peirce's idealism, he says that "matter is effete mind", rendering the distinction between mind and matter kind of moot.

I mean, I don't have issues with that way of expression or thinking about this problem.

If anything, those things not immediately in our heads - objects, hard stuff, whatever - are less known or understood than our ideas. Of course, it doesn't follow that those objects are made of ideas at all; it's a matter of emphasizing one aspect of our experience over another one.

So, you saying that ideas can be made into physical expressions makes sense.

A "feeling" that something is the case as it is taken up by Strawson, is not like an intuition of logic or one of, say, Kant's apriori space. It has no content and there is nothing "there" to acknowledge and interpret. Rather, it is just a reification of common sense, a pretending really, that the feeling that assures one all is well ontologically. But nothing at all is "well". And the concept as an ontology is absurd and really no better than religious affirmation in scripture in which feelings are very strong indeed. — Constance

Well, one should keep in mind, which Kantians don't usually bring up for some reason, is that he was a Newtonian. He took space and time to be the a-priori conditions of sensibility, as opposed to say, cognitive openness or a background of intelligibility, because he thought space and time were absolute as Newton showed. He then incorporated this into our subjective framework and denied the validity of these to things in themselves.

Today we know that Newton is only correct within a range of phenomena, but not others. We now speak of spacetime, due to Einstein.

I don't read into it much scripture. Again, you can label the world whatever, it's a monist postulate, not more. The idea that experience is physical was mind-boggling to me. But as he says clearly, his physicalism is not physicSalism. These are very different.

A concept about how this is possible, this kind of connectivity, is fundamental to all other claims to what could be a foundational substratum to all things, i.e., an account of what "reality" is at the basic level of inquiry. IF one assumes materialism in this, THEN one is bound to the essential descriptive features of materialism, and there is nothing in materialism that can do this. — Manuel

What something "really" is, is honorific. You can say I want the "real truth" or the "real deal", that doesn't mean there are two kinds of truth, the truth and the real truth nor the deal and the real deal.

You can ask, what constitutes this thing at a certain level. So in the case of neurons, you stay within biology. If you want to go to a "deeper" level (which can be somewhat misleading), you go to physics, not biology. But if we are not talking about neurons, and instead are speaking about people, we can speak in many different ways, not bound down to the sciences at all.

One is committed to science's paradigmatic limitations with this term and the trouble with this is, science cannot examine its own presuppositions, like the mind-body-epistemic problem. Attention must go exclusively issues raised by Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl, so forth into Derrida and others. — Constance

If you say so. That's why I said I'm the odd one out. I could call myself a real materialist in Strawson's sense, or a "rationalistic idealist" in Chomsky's sense and not be committed at all to the ontology of current science. I don't believe in this notion of commitment, my thoughts could change depending on arguments and evidence.

We are what we read, and there is such a thing as bad thinking. No doubt Husserl can be demanding. But the Cartesian Meditations are not so impenetrable at ll. But his IDEAS I and II really do lay out the details of his phenomenology.

But pls, it's not just a whatever floats your boat matter. Why not read Heidegger's Being and Time, just for the philosophical pleasure of coming to grips with the greatest philosopher of the past century? — Constance

Who says I have not read Heidegger? Why are you assuming this? Because I referenced Strawson, you assume I have not read him or Husserl? That's quite amusing. I used to be a Heideggerian, and I think he has interesting things to say, no doubt. Hegel I can't stand. I prefer Schopenhauer. I should read more Kierkegaard, but I have my own interests too.

I don't find Derrida is useful at all, in fact to me it's the opposite. But I am not going to pre-judge people who do find him useful because "they are what the read". You can tone it down a bit you know.

This is a stunning example of what I am talking about: Materialism is....what?? Just at the comfortable end of....whatever? How does this serve as a litmus for any kind of affirmation according to the rigorous standards os the scientific method? Does the thesis of materialism really rest with what one is "comfortable" with in the mind set of the scientific attitude? — Constance

It's not a standard of the scientific method, it's saying how much more the physical is compared to the view of the physical presented by people who call themselves "materialists", Dennett, Churchland and others.

As to the "certain kind of feeling" comment, it's more or less true. You can keep on asking why questions infinitely, but beyond a point the question itself does not advance any further answers. So one is either content to give the best explanation we may have of a thing so far as we can tell, or we'll merely end up talking about terminology, which is not interesting.

The point of the essay was to show how much more "materialism" is, than what is commonly assumed. It includes everything there is, because we simply don't know enough to claim that there is something else which is not physical.

We have not exhausted, at all, what the physical is. It's a monist claim. But if you dislike the name "materialism", you can call it "objective mentalism" or "critical idealism" or even "dialectical phenomenology", everything would be that one thing postulated by the term you use. And then you'd have to give a very good reason for justifying the introduction of another substance or ontology. Simply asserting the mind isn't matter is missing the point completely.

If one wants a true scientific approach to achieving a scientifically respectable philosophy, then Husserl is the place to go. Just read the first chapters of his Ideas I, and see. — Constance

I don't deny that Husserl has some useful things to say. He is not good at explaining them very well, admittedly, but if one wants to go through that monumental effort, there may well be some interesting ideas to be gained from him.

It's fine to prefer one school of thought over another, that's just the way we are.

Sure.

I'm the odd one out here. I either think Galen Strawson's "real materialism" is correct, namely that everything is physical, including or especially experience, which makes the physical much, much richer than mainstream physicalism or I take Chomsky's view that "materialism" no longer has any meaning.

The best guess I see for mainstream physicalism is that it's whatever physics and co. says, but whatever physics says will change in a year or two, making it very dubious as a metaphysics.

If this latter view is correct, as I think it is, we are merely discussing terminology. But if someone argues for "eliminitavism", then there is content, but it's not a serious view, in my opinion.

We will need considerable historical distance to see which of these names mentioned gets historical recognition.

Back in the time of the classics, people like Malebranche, Gassendi, Priesteley and More were as big as Locke and others, but for some reason which isn't clear, they're not much recognized at all, even if they did excellent work, in my estimation anyway.

I think Husserl and Heidegger will make it out, as will the pragmatists, of the po-mo crowd, it's hard to say. Maybe Foucault.

I don't know if Derrida will be a big name in say, 10-20 years. And people like Wittgenstein might end up being over-valued in terms of lasting impact. We don't know.

I don't know if you can "meet" systems of neuronal activity, or any biological activity for that matter, at least if you have in mind anything that people have in mind when they meet other people, or animals even.

It's not as if the neuronal activity will say anything, given that neurons don't speak, nor will it feel emotions, given that neurons themselves have no emotions.

I've really only met and talked with family members that were people, not abstract systems of their biological makeup. So, I think you can go to sleep with ease, and everything continues as is.

Logic being that it would be morally and politically justifiable for the US to retaliate with conventional weapons and Russia would have no moral or political justification to respond with nuclear weapons against the US, and so if they could not respond in kind conventionally then it does make sense.

However, the Russians can also retaliate conventionally to a US conventional retaliation, such as cutting undersea communication cables and blowing up satellites, even cause a full on Kesler syndrome, and the Russian made clear to explain to the Americans and the media that they can and would do these things.

Fortunately for the world these scenarios did not play out, but that would be the likely next phase of a nuclear strike in Ukraine. The followup question would be what the US retaliation to the Russian retaliation would be, and the Russian response to that, and if that cycle would end by one of the parties or would a conventional retaliation, if bad enough, provoke a nuclear retaliation. — boethius

Well, what has been conveyed to Russia is that NATO would reply seriously, taken to mean, destruction of the Russian military by conventional means. How the heck does that not practically guarantee a nuclear response?

I mean, Russia can claim to be able to destroy these satellites and underseas communication, but with NATO next door, how much time will they have? A direct confrontation between Russia and NATO will almost certainly lead to a catastrophe.

If it did not, and NATO felt quite confident Russia would not use nukes, then it could have implemented a No-Fly Zone and limit Russian advances. So that signals that they know what's at stake.

but the idea they wouldn't provide any tactical military advantage is I think extremely foolish. The relevance being that the purely military motivation to use them is genuine, and therefore political effort should be made to avoid that happening — boethius

If they use them in Ukraine, not as a reaction to NATO getting directly involved, then by using them they will get NATO directly involved. Which would soon escalate to full on nuclear war. Therefore, the advantage of using them in Ukraine, as the situation currently stands, if of no advantage to Russia, outside of reminding NATO of the consequences of direct conflict.

But that's the threat of use, not the actual use. Actual use as of now, would be suicide.

Yep, very much so.

One could add Whitehead, James, C.I Lewis, Nagel and so on.

But I'm sure some here will say we are missing the real geniuses, Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, Lyotard, Althusser....

Hah.

Yeah, it could well be sable rattling. Nukes would only be used if NATO fights Russia, in Ukraine they would serve little purpose outside of mass murder, with little by way of military advantage, if any.

I don't know, but, it would be good to tone these things down, as much as possible.

Those other articles aren't paywalled, you should be able to see them.

A similar one was published in the NYT, about 3 days ago.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-white-house-official-involved-in-undisclosed-talks-with-top-putin-aides-11667768988

That's the article which speaks of preventing "escalation", the rest of the info comes through Colonel Macgregor:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJvLVc0gA6M

As for the US troops, here:

https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/increasing-the-us-military-presence-in-poland

and

https://www.army.mil/article/261041/us_armys_warhorse_battalion_assumes_command_of_battlegroup_poland

Not nuclear weapons as a first response. What I heard was that the US would sends troops along with other NATO member countries to fight inside Ukraine, if Russia proceeds with the expected escalation coming winter. If this happens (US troops go inside Ukraine), then we are really playing with lava, not fire.

Of course, anyone using the first nuke, must know what the consequences will be, not only for their country, but for the world.

Supposedly someone inside the Biden administration, not Blinken, had discussions with a high-ranking government official, discussing "red lines", allegedly Russia was told that a mass retaliation would incur a reply by NATO.

I don't know how reliable this info is, but if it is true, it is laughable that NATO can say that "this is a war between Russia and Ukraine", while all the time stipulating what Russia can or cannot do. Imagine Russia and China doing this to the US.

It's stranger than fiction.

By the way, pal, we will have to iron out our differences concerning new perceptions, my reply was made on my phone, which limits how much I can write without making it look like a wall of text.

But since you rely on Kant, as a good Kantian should, I may create a thread about the topic, or if it happens to arise in some other thread, there we can discuss it without restrictions.

It's an interesting topic.

On to more Hume...

I think that the imagination is a topic which deserves more discussion- it is a very curious fact of human beings, true that Hume kind of posits it as a very broad faculty, but his highlighting of it has merits. As for the stipulations of the OP, I’m still learning, it’s only my 2nd reading group thread. I suppose I’ll modify the next one to make it less strict. As for the necessary/contigent distinction, it’s interesting but likely derserves its own thread. Yep, if one can supplement one missing shade of blue, we can get two, and red, yellow and sounds and smells and on an on till we have almost nothing left except what the mind postulates. I think there has to be a minimum of stimulation, but probably not much.

it appears that Hume intends us to understand “new” to merely indicate the difference in existential quality of the impression alone, a contingent condition of the mind, rather than existential quality of that by which the mind is impressed, which is a necessary condition of the object causing the impression. — Mww

Is that so clear to you? How can you tell what is contingent from what is necessary? For instance, Hume points out that:

"When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become
double, and one half of them to be remov’d from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu’d existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the’ disposition of our nerves and animal spirits." (This chapter)

Some animals see way more colors than we can, are we also to say that these animals are in a better necessary condition to perceive objects in the environment than we are? Or is this fact of perception contingent on the nervous systems they have?

So, this distinction is a bit blurry to me, not that it doesn't exist.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww

Sure. I agree, in principle it works this way. In practice, we need the proper stimulation to "awaken" the ideas we have in us.

That is one aspect of the imagination for Hume, but he also stresses "instinct and natural impulse."

I do think he does do us a favor in highlighting the role of the imagination in general, we may disagree with his exposition, but it is a quite pervasive theme in his philosophy, not explored in similar length or depth in other figures.

Kant did talk about it, but gave it a lesser role than Hume did, if I recall correctly: which is totally fair.

for any singular impression for which constant conjunction of its ideas doesn’t work with congruent certainty as with repetitive impressions, imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it. — Mww

Yes, and this may be putting too much power in the imagination. As I've said a few times, I'm not an empiricist, I agree with Cudworth, Descartes and Kant about the nature of perception, differences aside, which they indeed do have: they gave the proper role to the mind, which Hume supposed to be "an empty theater", which cannot be sustained anymore - maybe not even back then.

There was subsequently a metaphysical theory perfectly describing how this works, but what would Hume say about it? I suspect he would have rejected it, insofar as having already granted imagination extraordinary power, he would have insisted that power cannot merely be the ground of the greater one the new theory prescribes, especially seeing as how he’s already denied its validity.

You know…..consign it to the flames kinda thing. — Mww

One need not go to Kant: there was a prior metaphysical account, before Hume, considered to be "the most extensive treatment of innatism by any seventeenth-century philosopher", Cudworth. (From the SEP) The same essential idea is to be found here.

There is some evidence he knew of his ethics. Locke did know his work, but he rejected the reasoning.

In a similar vein, Hume would likely send Kant's theories to the flames too had he been able to read them somehow.

But then we must throw Hume's own theory to the flames for several reasons: his discussion of the self is not the best, him saying that ideas can sometimes replace impressions cast doubt upon his formulation.

Also, by far, and most importantly, is his own example, in the Enquiry, of the "missing shade of blue", which destroys his own theory. It is quite remarkable that he can so acutely point to such an example and proceed as if it merited no more attention.

so you believe we create reality. Do you believe there is any material world, outside of our perceptions? — GLEN willows

In a trivial, non-New Age way, yes, we create the world. We use our concepts, our reasons, our perceptions and our judgments and apply it to the sense data that hits our nerves, which we re-construct into something intelligible.

And yes, I also think there is an external world, independent of us, but I'd argue both are made of "physical stuff". Our perceptions are the results of physical processes, and the world is made of physical stuff. In order to show that something extra is needed that is not physical, you'd need to point out why thoughts cannot be physical, that does not depend on terminology.

I've yet to see good reasons given to my request.

if we can’t distinguish exactness of successive impressions, and if impressions are the source of ideas, then it follows that there would be successively indistinguishable ideas corresponding to those indistinguishable impressions. Then….how would we know there was anything new? — Mww

I think I may have misread your own quote originally, when you said "Even from a Hume-ian point of view...", I took that to mean that what followed need not be restricted to Hume, hence my introducing extra innate factors he does not talk about. My mistake.

As per what you say here, it's through reason that we can say that an impression is new, that's what Hume seems to be saying, I also think this simply follows logically that we have new perceptions every time we close and then open our eyes. I'll skip innate talk here, unless you want to pursue it.

An object that changes in successive perceptions by the same perceiver, on the other hand, would necessarily be new at the logical level, but may still be represented by the same conception. Healthy apple on a tree, same rotten apple on the ground, is still an apple. Sorta like Descartes’ wax, right? — Mww

Damn, I feel restricted here by sticking to Hume, but, that's the point of this thread (mostly). In a sense, yes, like Descartes' wax. But then we'd have to say that the conception of rotten and melted (in the case of wax) is not exactly the same one we have of a healthy apple or unmelted wax. We can still refer to them as apple and wax respectively but modified.

That wouldn’t be fair to Hume. I don’t recall his use of the concept, do you? If so, be interesting to read the context. — Mww

Not "concept" per se, but important innate considerations. You'd have to fill in a lot, but it is in the book. Here are a few quotes, not limited to this chapter or book even, but can be incorporated into it, fruitfully, in my opinion:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (This one can be found in this chapter)

"Reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls..."


"Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject... [the imagination is] a kind of magical faculty in the soul, which, tho' it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is however inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding."

It's easier to search here, finding that quote in the text I provided is difficult, not here: https://davidhume.org/texts/t/full

Finally, and most importantly, for me, is in his Enquiry, where he says:

"But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding."

Italics mine.

Instincts as Hume discusses here, as well as talk of the soul, are innate, there are no other intelligible readings of such passages.

https://davidhume.org/texts/e/9

Hume is a naturalist... so what goes for animals, goes for us too, though not always the other way around. If one keeps quotes like these in mind, it may make reading Hume more interesting, given that instincts are always in the background.

I think A Scanner Darkly was his best, or at least, tied with Ubik, certainly not worth watching the animated film of Scanner, it was garbage. The novel is fantastic, and his best prose by far.

Dr. Bloodmoney I remember liking quite a bit but remember very little of it. I went on a binge and read 14 of his books in 3 weeks, so, that might be the reason.

I think he has good stuff in all his periods, though I personally did not think too much of his VALIS work. But ymmv.

Yes, I missed putting in that word. But to be more precise, experience is a product of a person, realized in a brain.

A Scanner Darkly, Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said, The Three Stigmata of Palmer Palmer Eldritch, Dr. Bloodmoney, A Maze of Death, etc., etc.

He's fantastic and highly philosophical.

And also, he was schizophrenic and detailed this episode in his book VALIS and followed it up with two more books. Very strange beliefs, but unique, nonetheless.

There is a claimed mind-body problem, it doesn't mean this claim is true. There are many problems in our understanding of the world and our minds, but a mind-body problem need not be one of them, unless someone likes to discuss terminology instead of ideas.

What we have most confidence in, out of anything there is, is our own experience. This experience, when looking at the best available evidence we have, should conclude that experience arises out of people, realized in brains.

Brains are made of matter, suitably organized. So, experience a product of matter (or physical stuff if you prefer), as is gravity and everything else. That's extremely astonishing - so much so in fact, that to add some other substance or property, does nothing but complicate our understanding, unnecessarily so.

Under the framework you sketch out here, that is, depending solely on impressions and not bringing in any cognitive apparatus, it would indeed be correct to say that the impression is successive in time, as "newness" would involve the registration of this concept to the mind, instead of mere perceiving.

I can't answer your second question under these constraints, because again, to register something as new would require us to recognize that the object in front of us is not exactly the same, as the object we were looking at mere moments ago.

If you introduce cognition in addition to impressions, of whatever kind, the answer is far from trivial, in my opinion. There is no neat way of introducing a new object while separating this strictly from continuity in time, in fact, this is one of the problems we've been discussing, that of trying to establish how sensible it is to speak of a distinct impression being distinctly existent.

So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with such a proposal and it's the mental side of distinct perceptions which is problematic, given what you correctly say about the arbitrariness of our cutting up of time.

But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. There are many powers or capacities in the brain which Hume does not recognize or spell out well enough, one area of particular weakness is his notion of ideas being faint copies of impressions. As @Mww correctly reminded me, we should be thinking of representations, which are far stronger and more stable than Humean ideas, heck, I'd even say representations are underdetermined given the brevity of our impressions.

Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example.

If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive... — Metaphysician Undercover

By today's standards, everything is a bit elusive, so to speak. These "fictions" or representations that come innately from us are for sake of convenience. And here we should keep in mind that we are analyzing objects (mostly, not exclusively) from a "vulgar" perspective, which is rather different than analyzing an object from the point of view of physics.

The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way. — Metaphysician Undercover

We might disagree here. I don't think it's simplistic, even though I say it is convenient. Philosophers focus on different aspects of the world, those dealing with, say, ethics or law, will care much about the vulgar world. Those that focus on epistemology find interests in both. And then we have philosophers who focus mostly on science.

Back in Hume's day, these distinctions were not nearly as sharp as they are today.

Sorry for not commenting on your Aristotle's portion, I don't know enough about him, and would need more serious study, for some other time. Though I'm sure what you point out about him also merits consideration

Yes, but the representation of these perceptions, is not, re: consciousness. The implication of each new perception is that we have to learn a thing every time we perceive it. — Mww

Correct. The object serves as a stimulus, which leads us to develop representations of that object. So we have the representation of the object even when we are not receiving sense-data from said object. Nevertheless, the moment of perception, if you will, is still new: the object ever so slightly changes, and so do we. This us leads down some avenues, concerning rationalist thought, nevertheless, correct statement on your part.

You mean an internal cognitive power like, “… — Mww

Sure, Hume's quote is fine. But I can also say something like my comment above. An object stimulates us, we form a representation. However, each perception we have of the object is new, even though the representation is not, though we often don't register this unless the change is noticeable: a fire is still a fire, until the moment it is extinguished, then it's either tar or smoke.

so are we really looking for connection of perceptions — Mww

At t1, we are looking at a clock telling us it's 5:10 pm, at t2, it's telling us the same thing, the same thing at t3, but at t4, the clock now indicates it's 5:11. But this can be expanded to most objects.

There is a lot of material here to cover. One pertaining directly to Hume's own vocabulary, the other pertaining to your examples and illustrations. You are of course right that, perception is a complex process that we make seem instantaneously but is not. The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception?

In this case, we have no way of establishing this, absent some environmental change such as the wind, or a person or pet moving the curtain. But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events.

On to your own examples:

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world.

And it isn't altogether clear that evolution-arguments about survival here make sense. Like, if we happened to see objects in an interrupted manner, kind of like an object flashing quickly on and off, we would necessarily die - depending on how quick these interruptions are, I think creatures could survive such a circumstance, or see no reason why they couldn't do so.

So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, Hume aside for this moment, it is very curious. I mean, for us, the philosophically inclined, when we think about this topic, it just seems obvious to us that something is "wrong", or "incomplete" about objects: that's why such topics have been debated for millennia, back to Heraclitus and more.

Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.

So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated.

In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world.

And you know as well as I, that unless the power and absolute necessity of a priori reasoning denied by Hume and continental empiricists in general, became part and parcel of the rational human condition, there wouldn’t be a sufficiently explanatory theory, ever. — Mww

I agree that these explicit a-priori conditions are missing from Hume, aside from the very broad label of "instinct". But even if you take say, Descartes, Cudworth or Kant, and add all these innate mechanisms and architecture, we can say, roughly, that the "inner side", of identity is present to us.

It is still very curious that each perception is new, and that IN our reasoning, we cannot connect our perceptions, though we can postulate an internal cognitive power, which does such binding for us. The problem of the connection of perceptions pointed out by Hume remains, or so it looks like to me, in terms of it being fiendishly difficult to focus on each perception and looking for the connection of perception of object O at T1, T2 and so on.

Yes, that sounds accurate to me. A few comments:

One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new.

I think that's true, but then it also seems to me evident that even if we don't close our eyes or turn our heads, there is only so long we look at an object before we claim that we are currently having a new perception.

And, also, strictly speaking, we have a new object, say a chamber, which is extremely similar to the previous chamber, but not literally the same one, the wind might have blown a curtain to the side, particles of rock or leather have deteriorated and so on.

We are insensible of these changes, but they nonetheless occur. It is curious that reason itself can present us with such a problem, when at first glance it seems evident, we are looking at the real object in real time, but then Hume has a point with his idea of "double existence", which look quite unreasonable the more you examine it.

It is useful to note in this quote, the following:

"Whoever wou’d explain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body, must take the mind in its cummon situation, and must proceed upon the
supposition, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv’d. Tho’ this opinion be false, ’tis the most natural of any, and has alone any primary recommendation to the fancy." (p.213)

(Bold mine)

For some reason, which is not easy to discern, these we are content with these paradoxes in "vulgar reasoning", because it is "the most natural of any" and produces the least amount of trouble to postulate.

No no, I mean, it's a great post and quite methodical, I'm not quite an authority on Hume but have interests in some of things he discusses, so keep that in mind. I quoted him in the Appendix, which I will share again, this time more extensively, in which we have something very rare happening, a major philosopher admitting that his project has failed:

"But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another....

But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding."

Italics mine.

So yes, his account of the way we acquire ideas is false, though somewhat intuitive. What I think he is right on, is on his phenomenological observations about objects and us not being able to find a connection of them in thought, although it must obviously exist. Also, each perception is new - it might be an empirical issue which could tell us how long a perception lasts, though maybe it is too difficult to measure.

The way it looks to me, is that he has presented us some rather big problems, which are hard to even think about for too long, it's like he says, an instinct gets us off this train of thinking.

A different approach might help us, here you can bring in Kant or others, and although the framework is improved as I believe it is, I think the problems aren't solved, they're stated in a better manner.

Well he doesn't have Schopenhauer's dual aspect view: of being an object and a subject simultaneously, at least not nearly as strongly developed.

But he does say that when we look at our bodies, we are looking at impressions, not the actual body itself. Yes, I do think a Humean mind is not tenable, he is missing out on some important categories and powers - as he more or less recognizes in the Appendix.

But if you take perception as he does, which one can do, while still knowing the mind has more capacities than Hume allows, the problems he points out are still serious problems for perception. So he can be wrong about the powers of the mind, yet correct in observation, at least as I see it.

the animal has instinct moreso than reason, while the human animal has reason moreso than instinct. — Mww

Yes, exactly.

That's how it seems to me too.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience.

While browsing the preceding section which @Srap Tasmaner mentioned in his reply, I found an important quote, which also covers some of @Mww's concerns, and is a very important passage in general, as reading it should cure people of the misimpression of the extent of Hume's skepticism:

"Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those‘, sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood ; I shou’d , reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render‘d unavoidable." (p.183)

Book 1, Part 4, Section 1

Fair enough.



My reading of Hume is that he does take reason to be a faculty on its own, but he consistently tries to show how weak it is - weaker than we would like to believe. I'd have to enter the moral domain to give a full account of Hume, but I'm not too interested with moral philosophy.

Whether reason is or is not, as strong as we would like is an open question. One can say, that the state of the world we're in certainly shows reason is not our strongest trait. Yet we know many, many instances in which reason shines quite brightly. So, it's not clear to me either way.

According to the generally acknowledged first serious scholarly work on Hume, by Norman Kemp Smith, whom you no doubt know, says that Hume is a philosopher of "passion", if I remember the exact word correctly.

We may not trust our reasons, but we have no choice but to trust reason itself. — Mww

I don't understand what you are saying here. What does "trusting reason itself" imply? I mean, reason told us for thousands of years that we were the center of the universe, which is not at all a silly view due to the evidence available at the time.

So I'm unclear on what you are saying here.

Well, someone else replied to you, which takes a task off of me, not in that I don't mind exchanging ideas with you - truth is the opposite, but I also don't want to be overwhelmingly the only person talking here.

There are many directions to go and one's own inclination will also determine, to an extent, what one finds useful or surprising or revealing. You may be of the opinion that Hume may not be too interesting. Nevertheless, one thing I'll say:

It does not necessarily follow that because he can't find convincing reasons for our belief in the continuity of external objects, that he should also "... ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted."

For him, it is too hard a question to ask. We have reason, which for Hume is "...nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls..." (p.179) Book 1, Part III, Chapter XVI

An instinct is something that cannot be explained, it is given. It is also something we just do, like perceiving or talking. One can analyze the given, but not explain it. As he says: "Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity." (Last sentence of the Appendix.)

Cool! Mason & Dixon is wonderful.

I did not like Against the Day too much, maybe your experience will differ.

Sorry for the late reply, it’s been a busy day. You raise good points, as expected. I’ll give you a due reply tomorrow. All I’d say is to try and keep going, even with those concerns being raised.