Wayyy too late. You hath been judged :razz:

Is there a unified language for science? You can say there is a unified language for physics or biology or some other sub-field, but there is no unique language for science, because it covers too much territory.

Likewise, I don't think we should expect the same in the fields of philosophy. Another issue, closely related, is if there should be a unified language for philosophy of mind or some other area.

It might help. But we have the additional problem that we don't tend to agree in the meaning of most of the words we discuss.

↪Manuel Or we can accept skepticism and carry on from there without stressing about certainty, knowing that we will die is as likely or less than that we were born. — Lionino

Stressing about Skepticism is futile, agreed. If Hume cannot overcome it and Kant cannot defeat it, what hope do mere mortals have?

Still, it's worth keeping it in mind as a problem. For ignoring it completely defeats the point of what is right about it, that we cannot attain certainty - in this world at least.

:up:

That's a good approach, among others. Skepticism can't be defeated merely kept in check occasionally.

If we play the game of skepticism, then we will not go anywhere, for there is nothing which is 100% certain in the empirical world.

If we loosen our restrictions a bit (leave aside skepticism), then we can say that we were born. Death would be a close second, assuming no afterlife.

They do, many beliefs (not all of them, I don't think) will change the world to some degree, some more than others. The issue is, how can we accommodate beliefs which are specific to some individuals (ghosts and fairies), versus other beliefs which are agreed by everybody: rocks, rivers, grass, people, etc.

I'm not clear on how belief in trees and rivers change the world for anybody, especially when compared to ghosts and fairies.

I'd like mention a related though perhaps side issue. Often, I think, it is assumed that if a belief is rational, then one can present enough evidence to convince people in general. I don't think that holds. We all have rational beliefs in things that we cannot demonstrate are correct to others. Of course, for many people these are things that others might consider possible, but we cannot prove the exact instance happened. But given that beliefs can form rationally from individual experiences, not all rational beliefs are going to be demonstrable to others. — Bylaw

Sure, and I think this applies quite widely. Part of the issue, which is far from trivial, is that we can't exactly say what "rational" is. We all assume and frequently act in a rational manner, but if one asks what is it that is "rational", people often given examples of what rational behavior is: If you see a man with a gun, stay away from him, or make yourself not noticeable or minimally so, etc.

Now, when it comes to having particular perceptions, it could be something like ghosts or a visual hallucination, such as seeing an oasis, the perception itself is neither rational nor irrational. It just is.

It's a popular issue, yes. But the attitude many determinists have in relation to free will matches the attitude of those who disbelieve in ghosts. They dynamic is the same. And, again, this was in relation to the idea that we shouldn't discuss this issue. You've now clarified that you don't believe that. — Bylaw

It is. It's a kind of stubborn attitude. And this connects to the previous issue of rationality, we will eventually find ourselves having specific philosophical positions for which we can give no further arguments for our belief in it, this is very noticeable in the case of free will.

I'm still responding to your saying they shouldn't bring it up in philosophical contexts. I haven't said that you, for example, should say they are real. — Bylaw

Not so much that it shouldn't be brought up, after all I am bringing it up here. What I want to convey is that if one believes in such things literally, then I think the arguments given for such views should be quite strong, considerably beyond say, demonstrating the existence of a tree or a river.

Again. I am responding to you saying that in philosophical contexts believers shouldn't bring it up. You seem to be taking this as me telling you what you should believe and do. — Bylaw

It's the same sentiment as above. By all means, anyone wanting to defend or articulate such views is welcome, but what I would want to see is what do they make about such experiences, so far as ontology is concerned.

Well, this is moving away from the points we were discussing, but, ok: how many adults believe in Santa Claus and believe they have see him?

And note: you don't need to tell me I haven't demonstrated that ghosts exist.
But I don't think those two things are the same. — Bylaw

Yeah, it's already complex. In one crucial respect, the vast majority of adults do not literally believe in Santa Claus.

In another respect, they do (or pretend to) and they have seen him numerous times, at malls or shopping centers of Christmas festivals and whatnot.

We can then clarify, they have not actually seen him, but they have seen people dress up to imitate how he looks like in our common mythology.

Not all phenomena have been as fixed and solid as trees. But again. I don't see why this shouldn't be brought up in a philosophical context.

Many people think the way you do about ghosts about free will. Would it make sense for them to say that free will shouldn't be brought up in philosophical contexts? There have been phenomena that were dismissed as the conclusions of people being irrational that later turned out to be true. On what grounds do we decide what should be talked about or not in a philosophical context? — Bylaw

With free will, we do have a very long and distinguished tradition going back to Classical Greece and even before that time. And it's very much pertinent today.

With ghosts or spirits, it's a bit more complex. I don't know how the Ancients thought about the gods, if they had a literal belief or a flexible belief system. As far as I know, I think the belief in literal ghosts started rapidly declining with the rise of modern science and modern philosophy.

To reiterate all beliefs should be looked at in philosophy and evaluated. The issue is the literalness of the belief and what this entails.

I mean I see the intuitive appeal but, are we then going to say: ghosts are real and so are trees and rocks?

Well, they could accept naturalism, but think that ghosts are a natural phenomenon. Something not yet confirmed via science, or perhaps they think there is enough evidence in parapsychology to take the possibility seriously and this fits with their experiences. IOW the discussion could be framed as, hey let's not close the door on this. Or one could be arguing against specific reasons people assert one can rule them out. — Bylaw

You can take that stance. The issue here is that, despite the numerous reports on such things, when they are investigated seriously, the evidence in favor of these accounts tend to be very thin or non-existent.

We should keep doors open, but it's tricky to do so, given what investigation into these things tend to show. Also, if we do this with ghosts, should we also keep the door open to fairies and gnomes? What about Santa Claus?

I don't intend to sound righteous or dismissive, but how do we differentiate between ghosts and Santa Claus?

If they seem to be suffering immensely and their belief in ghosts - or free will, or determinism, or Hell, or no afterlife, or The Ship of Thebes argument against the persistent self or whatever, iow regardless of the content of the belief, then we might tread lightly. But otherwise why not simply engage in the discussion like one might any discussion focused on a belief one disagrees with? Or is curious about, etc. — Bylaw

Sure, the point is to attempt to explore these topics, but irl situations are legitimate issues to bring up here, I think. In the case of schizophrenia, we do acknowledge the reality of the perception, as we must. But to assert the existence of what is experienced, the way we assert the existence of a tree we can all see and touch, is quite problematic.

I stole it from Donald Hoffman. ;)

Let me rephrase, for someone interested in philosophy, I think it would be a mistake to postulate things such as ghosts, unless that person accepts supernaturalism. If they do accept this, then there is no reason to tell them not to believe in anything.

But if they would like to have a more securely anchored system of belief, then the reasons for believing in literal ghosts and spirits should be extremely strong, otherwise I think we are not being critical enough of what our perceptions are informing us.

In general, that is, in the real world I do agree that is very much context dependent. I think that if say, someone latches on to religion because it gives them comfort about seeing loved ones in some other life, or it gets them through some really hard times, it would be very cruel to attempt to show them wrong.

Notwithstanding such exceptions, I do think we would like people to be better informed about the world than misinformed about it. I think we can explore ghosts and fairies and much else as experiences, which says a lot about us and the ways we interact with the world, thus treating it seriously, but not literally. For if they are taken literally, I think they are making a mistake.

It's somewhat analogous to telling a person living with schizophrenia that they should be extremely scared about this monster that are currently seeing. I think we should aim to the opposite, as it could help such people. But, again, there's a lot to tease out.

Really? I think there are triggers for hallucinations, sometimes these triggers can be external, sometimes internal, but I agree that the word can be quite loaded. One can also say one has a misrepresentation of ghost, or saw something like a ghost would be less likely to cause problems.

We can be technically agnostic, or say we doubt that, but I see no reason to tell them they are doing something wrong when they assert their beliefs. — Bylaw

I don't doubt the veracity of the perception they had, nor even the epistemology in some cases. The issue become problematic when we make metaphysical claims from perceptual judgements, such that if one says one sees a ghost, then it follows, that there are such things as ghosts in the world.

It's in this part that it becomes difficult.

Either side can speculate (in ad hommy and psychoanalyzing ways the reason the other has the belief or lack they have) but avoid it.
Those non-believers who have experienced something that they think matches the experiences of believers can instead be cautious about assuming they know, in fact, what the others have experienced. — Bylaw

That's a very good way to frame it, I think.

You do have people who outright think such claims are completely silly and meaningless. And while one can understand this attitude to an extent, it does miss out on analyzing the richness of said experiences.

But then there's also the issue raised here by others, suppose we don't believe such things exist, such is my case. Do I say, "I thought I saw a ghost, but instead saw a hallucination."?

Or the topic of, ghosts aren't real, ok. But then people who do see them (or any other related phenomenon) see fake ghosts? Some have suggested that they shouldn't claim they've seen a ghost or spirit, only that they have misinterpreted what they've seen.

That's a good point. I did not consider that arguments alone could cause people to anguish over sexual preference to the point of harm, so sure, there are similarities between sexual preference and religious belief.

As most of us know, according to Max Weber, as societies progress and become more rationalized, they tend to lose their mystical and enchanting qualities. This process is characterized by the replacement of traditional religious beliefs, magical thinking, and mystical worldviews with rational, bureaucratic, and scientific approaches to understanding the world.

Might it not be the case that many people bemoan this disenchanted world and flee to romanticisms and superstations for some relief? — Tom Storm

That's extremely hard to say either way. Sure, some people may find comfort in supernatural belief, but conversely others are terrified of potential negative consequences for such beliefs.

There is something to say about the issue of "something more", that there is more to this world than what we see with our senses. It may feel too poor or unjust, so in that case it could be a factor.

It's hard to completely get away from the fact that we just very recently left hunter gatherer tribes and got into modern society, so to speak. So some of these supernatural beliefs should be considered part of human nature.

I think by now aliens are folk accounts. All such traditions start somewhere. Perhaps aliens are just a technologically updated form of supernaturalism, located in the era's zeitgeist; science rather than magic.

I wonder if functionally there is much desirable psychological difference between aliens and spirits? They are probably founded on similar principles and psychological factors. Note, I am not considering in this account the more reasonable speculative notion that aliens may exist somewhere in reality. — Tom Storm

I suppose one can see it as a kind of technological God substitute, maybe something less powerful but mysterious and elusive, having powers that we cannot comprehend. I mean, this is complete guessing, but if we want to say that it's part of some people's folk account, then we should find a candidate substitute for traditional notions (god, spirit, demon, etc.)

So, you are probably correct here.

I wonder what counts as a receptive state? What are you thinking? A psychological state? My candidate explanations for this are personality, psychological health, and individual sense making shaped by culture. Same things that inform most of our choices. — Tom Storm

Nothing more than being that type of person who, for instance, feels that they are actually communicating with a higher power, as opposed to talking to oneself. As in cases in which people are in a church, and some people once they leave the religion say, they never felt such a force or power in the first place.

Or being the type of person who tend to believe that virtually every coincidence is very meaningful in some transcendent sense.

It's a capacity for being easily being influenced by external forces that other people lack or have less of.

Same upbringing but they chose one of the two dominant belief systems in ther culture - Christianity and materialism. Why do people make such choices - why are some 'receptive' to religion and others to materialism/physicalism? I've often likened this to a sexual preference. We can't help what we are attracted to. The justifications and arguments are post hoc. — Tom Storm

Well, I used to be religious as a kid, up until I was probably 16 or so, I really felt that I was speaking to God. Something in me kept surfacing that the dots weren't connecting and then I read some books and talked to other people and saw that my beliefs had no justification.

The comparison to sexual preference is interesting, but very complex. For instance, the issue of finding belief to be comforting is alluring, or that there may be a life after this one is an option which is available for the believer. But the difference from sexuality is that, on some occasions, arguments can persuade some people the religious belief is not based on a rational foundation.

I don't think you can use arguments to make a gay person not gay, or the other way around.

But I get what you are coming from, quite often, it's not a choice, it's a preference. It's very intricate though.

Yes, I think so too. It appears to be the case that there is something about the mind which we intuitively feel is qualitatively different from matter, because we also intuit matter to be "dead and stupid", but this latter belief is no longer supported by our best physics. To be clear, not that matter as such, is "smart", but to call it "dead and stupid" is to not appreciate how hard the topic is.

And thus we project images to external stimulations which we may experience as ghosts or spirits or monsters, and these can be very powerful.

I don't think it is a 'state of mind' as such that we're looking for. Just a worldview that includes, perhaps even embraces, ghosts and spirits and is therefore receptive to them. Which tends to result in an experience of them readily in ordinary events. A flash of light, a sudden breeze, a movement, a noise and, 'bang' it's a ghost or spirit. I have met many people who default to such interpretations regularly.

For those more elaborate (and much rarer) accounts were an entity appears and talks to the person - we can perhaps include lucid dreaming, wishful thinking, and other brain states. — Tom Storm

Sure there are such people who do interpret a flash of light or sudden movement as having some spiritual dimensions. But if they did not have a state of mind by which such experiences would be interpreted as ghosts or monsters, then they would merely say they saw something strange.

It's not too unusual to find people who may, as you say, have a worldview in which ghosts form a part, but whom they admit they do not frequently experience, because perhaps the mind they have is not readily or easily put in such a receptive state.

And yes, I do think that we experince things based on the culturally informed sense making tools and narratives we are immersed in. A person whose culture recognizes demons will see demons. A person whose culture recognizes djinns will see djinns.

I wonder if there is some similarity between some 'ghost stories' and UFO abduction stories. We can find hundreds of folk worldwide who are convinced they were abducted and probed by aliens. Is this, as Jung suggested, an expression of our psychological state, our anxieties and fears and, perhaps, an emerging spirituality/religion for this era of technology and science? — Tom Storm

Yes, this is accurate as I see it too. The UFO thing is in some respects even more bizarre, at least "supernatural" stuff like spirits or ghosts (of whatever specific variety) have some foundation in a human beings folk understanding of the world.

The UFO people tend to almost always describe the actual UFO like the ones we see on 50's movie billboards on the topic. And the aliens have the huge black eyes and are green. That's a very strong connection between culture and experience.

But I don't even find a supernaturalist "folk-account" that could explain this belief.

The point being that morphic fields, and morphic resonance, provide a medium for what is perceived by us as ghosts. I will add that the existence of morphic resonance is on the whole rejected by most scientists, despite Sheldrake's claims to have found evidence for it, so I'm not saying you should believe it. Only that they at least provide a paradigm. — Wayfarer

It is a way to think about the topic and I think we even have quite direct evidence that we experience things similarly, we assume that if one brain is damaged say, in Broca's area, then that person will not be able to use speech well, if at all, but this applies to all people.

In a similar vein, we understand when somebody says that they saw a ghost or maybe even a fairy, though we may personally not believe these things to be existing phenomena.

As for Sheldrake, yeah, he's been criticized for not being scientific. Ok, well that's up to each person to evaluate. He doesn't bother me like Chopra does, for instance. It's worth being open here.

That type of approach can be seen as a particularly speculative branch of sociology, but I don't think that as stated in that essay, is specifically problematic.

My own feeling is that some parts of these topics, especially when considering society as a whole, it's just a lot of it we do not know and some of this may be at the very edge of our understanding capacities, in which we can proceed no further.

Still, it's worth experimenting and keeping an open mind. We may differ in emphasis and articulation, but "hardnosed materialism", is something we both disdain. :)

That's not a bad way to put it actually.

It does sound strange though to say, "I thought I saw a ghost, but I actually saw some strange lights in human form."

But still, good way to frame it.

True, there is that tendency among people who wish to maintain that they are uniquely unique, in this experiential respect.

I'd only quibble that I think all of us have had at one time or another a "special experience", which is beyond normal experience. But that doesn't make one gifted or transcendent. I suppose what would be strange is to live an entire life and to have never had a particularly strange or powerful experience.

It doesn't serve to prove anything.

What, sunk cost fallacy for people who have become accustomed to believe in such things and now see evidence showing them they are wrong? In that case, I agree with you.

What about cases in which you don't have a person who believes strongly either for or against ghosts or spirits, but has a strong experience of them, would that be sunk cost too?

I know empirical evidence would be helpful here, I'm just thinking out loud

That follows in as much as in a culture where the idea of ghosts and spirts are accepted as real and are culturally important, you're going to see way more of them.

Reminds me of people who have religious visions of saints or of gods. People generally have visions of the saints and gods that are part of their own culture. I'd be more convinced if Mary appeared to people in Punjab. Or if a Hindu deity appeared to a Southern Baptist in Georgia. — Tom Storm

That's true and it would be pretty strong evidence if we saw Jesus figures consistently appear in Buddhists temples, or the other way around.

These tend to be kind of, without meaning to demean the term, more primitive experiences quite literally. People tend to experience the kind of stuff they are inundated with while growing up.

What's curios to me is that many people, not all, could be put in such a state of mind given specific circumstances, say, being in a cult or being constantly barraged with people saying and believing in these things. But what accounts for this?

Is it just that we experience things to some extent due to cultural circumstances?

One would have to see if such claims would happen to most scientists. Probably not. It's a puzzling topic...

That's pretty much the issue, one can't say that what a person experiences is false, for they experienced it. Of course the ontology of such a situation is not going to be settled by a personal experience.



Then you fall under the category of people who believe in ghosts. They would be real to you, but this would not serve to establish them as existing in the world, right.

Now you have to establish, if your belief in ghosts is naturalistic, that is caused by something in nature. Or is it supernatural, which complicates the picture considerably.



I did not know that. Huh. It's an interesting fact.

I was merely propelled to start a topic about this because I was reading a novel about 17th century England, in which people had to wrestle with the new science, and old superstitions.

But as a child, I do remember having slight "ghostly" experiences, which just completely disappeared once I learned more about how the world works.

I don't disagree.

What I do want to explore is the belief in such a state of mind and how it is that otherwise rational people could fall into believing this, as has happened to most people, at least when they were children.



And as stated, I don't see much hard in believing what you do. Of course, one thing is a belief another thing is reality. This does not mean I am dismissing what you belief in, but it is curious to see how our beliefs entangle with our perception of reality.

told me that he believed in haunted minds, not haunted houses. I am inclined to accept this explanation. We sometimes see and hear things as a consequence of our sense making gone wrong - we are stimulated, prompted and primed by so many things. Heightened emotion often provides the catalyst. The people I have known who have seen ghosts on a regular basis, all tended to have anxiety related issues, often well hidden. — Tom Storm

I like that phrase of "haunted minds", there is something to that. It makes sense that part of the issue is when we misinterpret sense data into seeing something that is not literally there. But given that such things were universal, say, in the Middle Ages, then it seems to me as if we are inclined to interpret such data consistently in a specific way, such as seeing ghosts or spirits as opposed to unicorns, in terms if repeated experiences.

As for anxiety, that's probably a part of it, but there has to be another element to this.

I think many of us are attracted to stories of ghosts and other occult phenomena because they are exciting, they lift us out of the mundane and promise us that in our increasingly technocratic world, a form of romanticism and mystery can still be found. — Tom Storm

They can be exciting. Though one should point out that there's plenty of excitement to be found in the natural world. Alas, this latter point does not apply to everybody.



If you can say more about this, it would be interesting to hear about this.

IMO, such beliefs (i.e. literal projections) are delusional. :sparkle: — 180 Proof

Quite often, absolutely.



That's interesting, yes, there is a strong connection between an old historical event, often a murder or some other horrible situation and a belief in such things.

For instance, last I heard the house in which JonBenet Ramsey was killed has not be sold in a very long time. I don't think anyone has seen anything, but it makes sense why people have not bought such property.

It's a kind of superstition, but it makes some sense in such cases.

An Instance of the Fingerpost by Iain Pears

Superstition goes hand in hand with ignorance, and because our age is wildly ignorant there is a high potential for superstition. For example, suppose Elon Musk said, "If you wave your iPhone in three big circles above your head after turning it on, the scrambling of the gyroscope will make it harder for political activists who are not in your contact list to send you unsolicited messages." People would instantly start doing this, and would probably soon swear by the practice. Why? Because we have no freaking idea how an iPhone works. Our scientific culture is faith-based, premised on arguments from authority. As Arthur Clarke said, "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." — Leontiskos

There's a lot to unpack in that, and I think there's very much legitimate issues pertaining to the politization of science, which was off the wall with Covic.

It's a bit strong to say out scientific culture is faith-based, maybe some parts of it are quite encased in certain ways of thinking, say, expecting that evo-devo will explain everything about human behavior, or that if we continue making AI even better, we will reach AGI, etc., these have adherents who verge on "superstition", but there are many exceptions too.

On the other hand, you are quite right to point out that people like Musk have a cult following, such that anything he says is considered gospel. Heck, his "predictions" on what "Neuralink" will be able to do are laughable.

I agree that there is a very clear sense in which, at bottom, we do not know how iPhones work. I would be even stronger in your last sentence, virtually every phenomenon in nature is a kind of magic, as I see it. The reason we no longer see it that way is because we have become used to it and thus take it granted.

Certainly, newborns experience the world as baffling to them, because it is.

I specifically had in mind people like Krauss or Dawkins, or worse yet Dennett or the Churchlands, who are just off the wall. It is this strain in thinking, which I regard as kind of "superstitious" - the belief that science will allow to understand everything eventually. It's crazy to me to think this, for obvious reasons.

I think we can readily split sociological forms of superstitious behavior from psychological superstitious/magical thinking behavior. — schopenhauer1

That sounds like a very sensible distinction.

I think it has to be a component of "magical thinking". That is to say, there has to be a component of "Is this going to change reality in some way". One of the things that have changed over time, is that previously we might wholeheartedly just go along with the magical-thinking. — schopenhauer1

Well, not that you have mentioned this, but let's put prayer to the side and take a common observation: most cultures do not condone say, mishandling a human body or not offering some sort of something in a kind of ritual (for a recently deceased person) and this does have a bit of magical thinking.

The issue becomes obscure when we do things such as celebrate Christmas or some other holiday. Is this superstition or is it mere ritual? And what would be the difference?

That is to say, we might know X behavior is "irrational" but we still believe its effects on reality. — schopenhauer1

In some ways, yes, agreed.

Very much so. And perhaps and argument can be given that we are quite superstitious today, we simply aren't aware of it or we have modified ancient beliefs into our modern outlook. For instance, some aspects of "scientism" are very much of the same caliber as believing in ghosts.

Not to mention the way we often treat presidents or nations. Quite a few other things.

It is more sophisticated, there may be less amount of it on the whole, but I think it's part of our nature.

I don't recall him making that distinction either. Though I do find his mystical stuff to verge on something close to such a distinction, but my interpretation may be wrong.

Yes. According to the Tractatus ethics and aesthetics don't quite fit seem to fit into what "is the case", but he apparently considers them the most important thing of all, are at least, way up the list.

I do not know why he does not say anything about sensations. — Fooloso4

It's a good point and I wonder what he could have said about the topic during his early views.

My main issue here is that he lets go of too much in the Investigations. I don't believe that transcendental philosophy, can be eliminated through proper language use.

Now, if someone wants to say that the distinction between say, a dogmatist and a skeptic is mostly a "verbal" issue, then that's already found in Hume.

Btw, I found the book online, the relevant chapter is 14, starting on p. 310 (which is p.318 in the pdf):

https://www.docdroid.net/ER9hZXg/computer-science-homework-cs206a-pdf#page=318

Yeah, the ladder is used in different context, but it's the same metaphor.

I'm not saying that Schopenhauer is being specifically original in many of his ideas, but you find all these aspects together in Schopenhauer.

To be fair, you can find almost everything in Plato though. Whitehead had a point.

It is here that we can see the difference. What is the case, the facts of the world, are independent of my representation of them. — Fooloso4

In a certain sense yes, in another sense, the stated facts about the world amount to extremely little in comparison to "what we cannot talk" about. Is this noumena? Or ethics? Or sensations? The Manifest image?

That's left open for us to explore.

Wittgenstein's claim that logic is transcendental.
Wittgenstein's "pure realism" vs. phenomenal and noumenal distinction.
The role of representation.
Will vs. independence of facts. — Fooloso4

I don't remember off the top of my head exactly what was Wittgenstein took from Schopenhauer, but it has the flavor.

For instance, the metaphor of reading his book is like climbing a ladder and then kicking it down was taken directly from Schopenhauer who says the same thing.

His last part of the Tractatus, the mystical side, certainly echoes Schopenhauer's views about art, wherein we catch glimpses of a pure idea, but such experiences are very poorly explained in propositional form.

Not how the world is, but that it is, is what's mystical, reminds me of Schopenhauer's claim about the riddle of the world.

As for differences, plenty. Schopenhauer does not deal with the sophisticated logic Wittgenstein dealt with, nor did he particularly care about the nature of language, or reference.

As for representation, I don't know exactly how it fits in, nevertheless, Schopenhauer begins his book by saying "The world is my representation.", Wittgenstein says "The world is everything that is the case." There may be something to that.

As for will, I don't remember Wittgenstein dealing with this in his early work. For more specifics, you might want to see Magee's book.

As far as I can recall, I think it was Bryan Magee's book on Schopenhauer, specifically the chapter on Schopenhauer's influence, talk about this.

The early Wittgenstein was a Schopenhauerian. He then abandoned transcendental views by the time of the Investigations, which though his best-known work, and while having good stuff in it, is also in some respects, a step down form the Tractatus.

I know it's probably a minority view, but, I prefer his earlier stuff. Better yet if he combined some aspects of the former into the latter.

The issue here is connected with a kind of phrasing of the topic.

One thing is to say there are things which exist, independent of us, thus they are being or "existents." And this should be readily granted, unless one is an extreme version of a Berkeleyan idealist.

I think this becomes thorny when we specifically start to speak of extra-mental terms in mental terms, such as how can a rock exist absent our perception (and conception) of them? I don't think we have a clue. We are using foreign notions here.

It's the latter formulation which causes problems, as we attempt to use our concepts and apply them in a way that doesn't work.

But the topic of their needing to be something that exists in order to sustain consciousness, shouldn't be controversial.

But these topics are part of the bread and butter in philosophy.

:cheer:

Indeed.

Great quote. :cheer:

"And I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that God has not given me a greater power of
understanding or the natural light which God gave me is no greater than it is; for it in the nature of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things, and it is in the nature of a created intellect to be finite. Indeed, I have reason to give thanks to him who has never owed me anything for the great bounty that he has shown me, rather than thinking myself deprived or robbed of any gifts he did not bestow."

- Descartes

Can a computer think? Locke points out:

"..since we know not wherein thinking consists..."

Or Russell:

"I do not know whether dogs can think, or what thinking is, or whether human beings can think. "

Or maybe even Turing himself:

"If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are
commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd."

Italics mine.

Or Wittgenstein:

"We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of spirits too."

There are several more. It's a small problem, but perhaps we should clear up what this "thinking" is for us, before we attribute them to other things.

The High Road to Pyrrhonism by Richard H. Popkin

It should also have the capability to bridge the divide between the simplest and the most complex sorts of meaningful human experience. It should be readily amenable to an evolutionary timeline. Where there has never been human thought and belief, there could have never been meaningful human experience. — creativesoul

Maybe I'm already starting the hair-splitting process, but, what kind of experience would you think as counting as a "meaningful human experience"? Is the idea something like, from appreciating the blue of the sky on a cloudless morning to talking about the big bang with some friend? Is it that broad? I have no problem with this, just don't want to misinterpret something basic.

So, I still maintain that at conception there is no meaningful human experience. The biological machinery at that time is grossly underdeveloped and as a result is insufficient for drawing meaningful correlations between different things. Although, I think it undeniable that correlations are drawn in utero. If all meaningful human experience consists of correlations being drawn between different things, and all experience is meaningful to the individual, then meaningful experience is limited to and/or enabled by the biological machinery providing the means. Practicing this helps eschew anthropomorphism, which has run amok. — creativesoul

I think this is factual. It is as you describe it here, we do have innate biological dispositions, that can only be "awoken" or activated when the organism reaches sufficient maturity to use the concept/idea/thought adequately.

Of course, one issue here, is that I don't know if we can make much sense of "meaningful human experiences" in biological terms, that do justice to the depth of relevant experience. There is an inevitable clash between our manifest and scientific image of the world, at certain levels, which seem to me to be unsolvable.

Isreal and Bibi react. Then think about tomorrow. 'The distant future' is not on their minds.

And note, IDF cannot surely beat the movement called Hamas, but present military units of Hamas the can take out or degrade to a point that they can say to the Israeli public that Hamas isn't a threat. And that's it. That's the objective. Same is for Hezbollah they have a huge stockpile of rockets, so the issue is to destroy the existing capability. Those physical rockets and present leadership and present fighters. And with the October 7th attack having a similar effect of the 9/11 attacks, this logic can easily prevail. Why not? It's an opportunity. — ssu

For the time being. There are elements with the government that are tired of Bibi, but sadly, many of the alternatives to him are even worse, which is hard to comprehend.

It risks escalating into an even bigger war this time, I don't believe that, once this is over, whenever it is, Israel will ever be the same again, nor will Gaza. I see the logic you are presenting, similar to what many in the government are presenting, but it has its drawbacks too, most notably civilian losses for Israel.

Hence for Israel to deal with Hezbollah now is an opportunity. It's not when things are calm. — ssu

Well, a lot can happen, but my feeling is, even if they go to war with Hezbollah, which they may very well do, Israel is no longer guaranteed long stretches of peace, that is, they won't be able to avoid significant large wars, if they do not give up some land. So this is a band-aid for a missing arm, only more troubles for everybody.

Naturally "Genocide Joe" is against this. Yet it will be harder and harder for the US to keep this stance when it's already fighting it's war against Hezbollah in Iraq! — ssu

What Biden is doing is crazy, given how the polls with young voters are showing.

You may very well be right. But it's a big risk, is all I'm saying.