Well, I did not get that drift from you. I thought I had to make you make a stand. If your position was that right from the start, I missed it, as I was mislead.

Mislead by what? I don't know. Perhaps by my interpretation/miscomprehension of what you said. — god must be atheist

Not to be malicious, but I'm quite sure a fair reading of what I wrote in proper context made it more than a little clear that I held the position I did, given that I say multiple times things like:

God is pure actuality (or pure being itself if you'd like), which is analogous I suppose to infinity, then nothing less than pure actuality (such as an act/potency composite) could ever limit, derail, encumber, or even produce change in God. — Questio

But I suppose one can have a tendency to read over what is spelled out in the open.

So now you agree that God is not omnipotent, because omnipotence is a concept that is absurd in and by itself — god must be atheist

No, actually. My whole argument was that this conception of omnipotence you forward is not the proper way to concieve of real omnipotence, as it is based on voluntarist assumptions which, inspite of your reasoning, may side step any logical or rational based argument against them due to their central premise (will over intellect). Instead of attempting to refute God in his omnipotence by playing into their hand, I suggested that we instead recognize and debate these matters on classical theistic grounds, where not only is intelligibility primary in reality, thus making it so that no contridictive state of affairs can be wrought, but it also denies heavily the first premise of your argument, meaning that it is both rational, intelligible, and not suseptible to the caricatures that modern atheist seem to love destroying. A serious atheist takes on the serious, defendable positions, not the irrational, simplistic, and frankly more contemporary interpretation and approach to God. Thus, I disagree that this refutes omnipotent Being (though I agree that it is an argument against voluntarist omnipotence, though not a great one given what I've said earlier).

If you agree that God's abilities and actions are not subject to logic, — god must be atheist

I specifically, repeatedly, have made my position clear that I detest the idea espoused by volunturist that state God can do whatever he wants despite intellectual restrictions. So of course I disagree with this.

then you agree that Galileo was wrong — god must be atheist

Galileo was not wrong, he was indeed right, and the church was acting uncharacteristically silly in punishing him for abiding by the doctrine of universal intelligibility origining from the logos. This example was the exception of the rule, that being that the church was more prone to advocate, support, and defend institutions of learning even if it sometimes runs contrary to the scriptures, for they believed if they do someone might one day find a way of reconciling it with church teachings or instead to defeat the idea through their own sound logic (a good example would be Aristotle's grand philosophy which, initially having been forwarded through Averros, was very much contrary to scripture. However the church let it grow because it was an intellectual movement which they believed could either be defeated via Platonism or, in a future event, be reformed by an Aristotlean who finds errors in Averrosian interpretation, which did indeed happen with the arrival of St. Thomas Aquinas).

because though his theory was logical and right on, it still got rejected by the Chruch on the same reason: the use of logic is not a valid tool to question ways of the Lord. — god must be atheist

That was indeed ridiculous, and very much contrary to the normal circumstances in which they treasured logic and reason for being God himself (the divine logos). Don't believe me? Well throughout the middle ages, universities and learning institutions weren't very cheap, so the state hardly had the money or will to create and support such things. The church, on the other hand, being quite wealthy indeed and being rooted in an intellectual tradition primarily in Platonism, were both willing and able to further the education of the masses. They were the bulwark which brought most if not all the major universities to creation in medieval Europe, and not, as many hold, their inhibitors. Everything from mathematics, astronomy, philosiphy, theology, history, to literature was taught at these universities, and were the main source of education for most of those who could afford it. So no, the church is indeed not against reason, nor does the church believe God above reason (given they believe him to be the logos); Galileo was the exception, not the rule.

Hence, since you subscribe to this decree, and you deny the validity of logic when it comes to scrutinizing the scriptures, you must agree that the Earth is flat (since Galileo is wrong). — god must be atheist

No. I completely denounce your interpretation of both my position and the church's position over all (especially given they recognized the roundness of the Earth since the beginning, as it was recognized by mathematicians, which the church advocated for. What was challenged was the heliocentric theory Galileo forwarded, not the Earth's shape).

Therefore, if you believe the Earth is NOT flat, then you negate your stance, and you agree that God's words, teachings, and very essence are also subject to logic. — god must be atheist

Yes... I agree... God is subject to logic. Good job for deducing the position I was open about from the beginning? I hope you're proud, I suppose.

What? I'm sorry good friend, but where on Earth do you get that?
— Questio

You did say you agreed with me,

By the way, on a side not, completely agree with this response
— Questio

until you thought of a decree of church figures:

God is not subordinate to logical cohesiveness
— Questio — god must be atheist

...really... are you really doing this when I just addressed this here:

"Your argument makes perfect sense logically, Galileo/God Must Be Atheist, but we reject it because the scriptures say otherwise."
— god must be atheist

Are you perhaps referring to this:
By the way, on a side not, completely agree with this response (and I wish I could like comments as there are many that either ammuse me or make solid points worthy of recognition).
At least until...
you realize that [the voluntarist] would merely assert that God is not subordinate to logical cohesiveness
— Questio

...and as such can make the contridiction both valid logically yet untrue at the same time. Is it absurd? Absolutely. Do they deserve to be called out for it? Certainly. Does that mean they'll be convinced by this argument? Likely not my friend. Though I commend your effort :).
— Questio

If so, you most definitely are misunderstanding me. For the volunturist - based off of their central premise that the will has primacy over the intellect (and not scripture, for God's sake) - is who would find a way to side step your argument. That has nothing to do with flat Earths' or my position at all; my position is that the voluntarist are wrong in asserting that the will is first over the intellect, and as such God cannot do things which are unintelligible, meaning your argument falls on the premise
god can create a stone that he can't lift.
— god must be atheist
, because such a thing can't happen, for...

given that God is pure actuality (or pure being itself if you'd like), which is analogous I suppose to infinity, then nothing less than pure actuality (such as an act/potency composite) could ever limit, derail, encumber, or even produce change in God. It would be like saying that given a big enough number we can actually reduce infinity to a finite quantity; such an assertion simply does not understand that infinity cannot be reached by finitude (unless it is an infinite series of finite quantities, but then we are dealing with an infinite and an infinite, not a finite and an infinite). So yes, because there is nothing beyond being itself other than nonbeing (which is exactly that: nothing, and thus has zero effect on being), nothing can inhibit God (pure subsisting being) even theoretically as that would obviously suggest, as I said, something beyond being itself (a plainer absurdity cannot be found, as being encompasses what is, thus if something is yet isn't being... well that's like saying there's a triangle out there without three sides).
— Questio

As such, my agreeing with your argument was my acknowledgment that the alternative to my position is absurd and irrational (something they embrace, strangely), while my claim that it would nonetheless be of no use is based off the fact that they do not believe intelligibility eliminates the possibility or actuality of certain state of affairs. That is by no means an advocation for voluntarism, but rather a rebuttal of your argument on the basis of ignorance pertaining to voluntarist premises. Again, please, next time, actually read what I wrote in proper context and with a dash of diligence before you fire lazy shots at me, or indeed, anyone else. — Questio

Good sir, I'm sorry, but I'm beginning to suspect you're reading the first three sentences of what I write and then drawing conclusions from those mere three sentences without the proper context, just evaluation, or fair interpretation. How do you expect to show anyone anything if you take what they say, pull it out of its context, twist it, and then attack that straw man of an argument or assertion? Its either the highest of laziness (which it is, fair enough, but just don't pretend to be interested in discusing the topic at hand) or the lowest of intellectual integrity (given the repeated fallicious pittfalls you dive in); whichever it is, I simply ask you stop that, as some people prefer discussions and not a game of shoot down the fallacy.

"Your argument makes perfect sense logically, Galileo/God Must Be Atheist, but we reject it because the scriptures say otherwise." — god must be atheist

Are you perhaps referring to this:

By the way, on a side not, completely agree with this response (and I wish I could like comments as there are many that either ammuse me or make solid points worthy of recognition).
At least until...
you realize that [the voluntarist] would merely assert that God is not subordinate to logical cohesiveness
— Questio

...and as such can make the contridiction both valid logically yet untrue at the same time. Is it absurd? Absolutely. Do they deserve to be called out for it? Certainly. Does that mean they'll be convinced by this argument? Likely not my friend. Though I commend your effort :). — Questio

If so, you most definitely are misunderstanding me. For the volunturist - based off of their central premise that the will has primacy over the intellect (and not scripture, for God's sake) - is who would find a way to side step your argument. That has nothing to do with flat Earths' or my position at all; my position is that the voluntarist are wrong in asserting that the will is first over the intellect, and as such God cannot do things which are unintelligible, meaning your argument falls on the premise

god can create a stone that he can't lift. — god must be atheist

, because such a thing can't happen, for...

given that God is pure actuality (or pure being itself if you'd like), which is analogous I suppose to infinity, then nothing less than pure actuality (such as an act/potency composite) could ever limit, derail, encumber, or even produce change in God. It would be like saying that given a big enough number we can actually reduce infinity to a finite quantity; such an assertion simply does not understand that infinity cannot be reached by finitude (unless it is an infinite series of finite quantities, but then we are dealing with an infinite and an infinite, not a finite and an infinite). So yes, because there is nothing beyond being itself other than nonbeing (which is exactly that: nothing, and thus has zero effect on being), nothing can inhibit God (pure subsisting being) even theoretically as that would obviously suggest, as I said, something beyond being itself (a plainer absurdity cannot be found, as being encompasses what is, thus if something is yet isn't being... well that's like saying there's a triangle out there without three sides). — Questio

As such, my agreeing with your argument was my acknowledgment that the alternative to my position is absurd and irrational (something they embrace, strangely), while my claim that it would nonetheless be of no use is based off the fact that they do not believe intelligibility eliminates the possibility or actuality of certain state of affairs. That is by no means an advocation for voluntarism, but rather a rebuttal of your argument on the basis of ignorance pertaining to voluntarist premises. Again, please, next time, actually read what I wrote in proper context and with a dash of diligence before you fire lazy shots at me, or indeed, anyone else.

↪Questio You realize that you sound completely like Galileo's critics in the church in his time — god must be atheist

What? I'm sorry good friend, but where on Earth do you get that?

They said something similar to this quote: "Your argument makes perfect sense logically, Galileo/God Must Be Atheist, but we reject it because the scriptures say otherwise." — god must be atheist

When on Earth did I say anything of that sort?! I made not a single reference to scripture, but instead to reason and history, and pointed out the flawed logic to which you employed, as it rested fundamentally on a voluntarist set of assumptions instead of a classical theistic set of assumptions (that being that the will follows the intellect and not the other way around). Where on Earth do you get this absolute straw-man retort where you compare me to Galileo's critics?! Can you give me even one quote in which you can remotely substantiates such assertion? For I certainly don't think you could, given that I had no such thought in mind at the time of writing my response. Perhaps, my friend, instead of making half baked assertions and lazy retorts you should either admit you don't know what you're talking about or actually produce a well written response to claims and arguments I actually make and defend. After all, that is the spirit of fair discussion, wouldn't you agree?

I wonder if you, Questio, think, accordingly, that the Earth is flat. — god must be atheist

@god must be atheist, what I'm truly wondering is how on Earth anything I said even remotely implies that I am a fundamentalist's Christian given that 1) I am a Catholic, and the Catholic Church does not endorse fundamentalism 2) I am a Thomist, and Thomist traditionally do not endorse fundamentalism, and 3) I made zero reference to scripture, fundamentalist's interpretations, or anything even remotely concerning such things. I made responses purely based on Thomistic philosophy, scholastic history, and voluntarist criticisms. But, of course, I suppose none of that matters, for that might require you to actually read, understand, and respond to my arguments.

If you tell me that you do, then I accept your counter-argument. If you think the Earth is not flat, then I rest my case. — god must be atheist

...what? Rest your case? I fail to see how this is a retort in any sense of the word, let alone a case closer. But, once more, I suppose that's what happens when you completely misread, misunderstand, or misrepresent another's arguments or claims. In any case, no, the world is not flat. For the love of what is good, please do even the slightest bit of diligences if you plan on responding to me, for I'd rather respond to actual rational arguments and claims, not fallacies and straw men.

I can go to my kitchen. That doesn't mean I am in my kitchen. I can create something too heavy for me to lift. That doesn't mean I have. And so on.
— Bartricks
The potency is there. The capacity to do so. The ability to do so.

Yes, god can create a stone that he can't lift. Can he? Let's suppose that he can. Then CAN he lift it? No, he can't. He fails at the CAN LIFT part.

Therefore he fails the test at the "can" state. He does not heave to actually go and try and do it.

If, on the other hand, god CAN'T create a stone (whether he actually tries or not) that he couldn't lift, that is, he can only create stones he can lift, then he fails the CAN CREATE part.

Either way, whether he actually tries in real time, or just supposes to do so, he necessarily fails in one or the other of the "CAN DO"-s.

And we agreed that omnipotence is a potency to "do". The capacity, the ability, to "do". Not restricted to any actual act, but encompassing the ability, the potency, the capacity.

Any failure at the ability to "do" will render the quality omnipotence invalid. The example puts to task those thoughts, that god can do the CREATING and the LIFTING. And that proves that there is no omnipotence as such. — god must be atheist

By the way, on a side not, completely agree with this response (and I wish I could like comments as there are many that either ammuse me or make solid points worthy of recognition).
At least until...

you realize that [the voluntarist] would merely assert that God is not subordinate to logical cohesiveness — Questio

...and as such can make the contridiction both valid logically yet untrue at the same time. Is it absurd? Absolutely. Do they deserve to be called out for it? Certainly. Does that mean they'll be convinced by this argument? Likely not my friend. Though I commend your effort :).

I find no unintelligibility about "god is capable of creating a stone he can't lift" if it comes to his power of creation. I find no unintelligibility about "God is capable of lifting a stone he had created" if it comes to his power of lifting.

It is not unintelligible to create a self-contradiction with the two. If twelve-year-olds are completely capable of understanding the proposition and seeing that it leads to a self-contradiction, then it is not impossible to expect normal adults to see the same thing.

I think you are hiding behind a rhetoric of devout god-worshippers, who can't admit that there is no such thing as irrefutable contradiction in the scriptures. — god must be atheist

Ah yes, the accusation game, the most fun source of entertainment in the world of wannabe intellectuals where you give a rather dull fallacious argument based on straw manning against an opposing view and then label the individual as having some sort of exterior motive or underlying irrationality keeping them from enlightenment without any of the evidence to suggest let alone actually substantiate such a claim. How cheery :lol:.

Well, I suppose I'd be no better by playing such a game, so I suppose I'll just talk philosophy and not fall into nonsense or attacking the motive fallacy (though I'd be lying if I said I'm not annoyed when others do not show the same kindness).

In any case, onto the first objection:

I find no unintelligibility about "god is capable of creating a stone he can't lift" if it comes to his power of creation. — god must be atheist

Oh but there is certainly much unintelligibility here; for given that God is pure actuality (or pure being itself if you'd like), which is analogous I suppose to infinity, then nothing less than pure actuality (such as an act/potency composite) could ever limit, derail, encumber, or even produce change in God. It would be like saying that given a big enough number we can actually reduce infinity to a finite quantity; such an assertion simply does not understand that infinity cannot be reached by finitude (unless it is an infinite series of finite quantities, but then we are dealing with an infinite and an infinite, not a finite and an infinite). So yes, because there is nothing beyond being itself other than nonbeing (which is exactly that: nothing, and thus has zero effect on being), nothing can inhibit God (pure subsisting being) even theoretically as that would obviously suggest, as I said, something beyond being itself (a plainer absurdity cannot be found, as being encompasses what is, thus if something is yet isn't being... well that's like saying there's a triangle out there without three sides). Thus, it is an unintelligible suggestion that God may be ontologically inferior to anything so that he may not effect it (some may say it is reason he is inferior to, for he need obey it, but the Thomist simply holds the position that the will follows the intellect, and because all perfect intellectual activities are cohesive, consistent, and constant, so to is God, so that God is reason himself; the logos). Any objections to this argument presupposes an anthropomorphic conception of God, one which is far more contemporary and widely divorced from classical theism; one that should be easily dismissed as erroneous. Thus, if you are of such a kind, I would politely ask that you don't straw-man me by invoking such an interpretation of God into your counter argument given that I too dismiss such a God; please and thank you :).

I find no unintelligibility about "God is capable of lifting a stone he had created" if it comes to his power of lifting. — god must be atheist

This, of course, is intelligible given that God is being itself and thus ontologically superior infinitely over any and all of creation (for, unlike God who is pure actuality, they are a composite of actuality and potentiality, and thus may be subject to change, transformation, creation, destruction, passions, appetites, imperfect intellects, etc. to which God is not). As such, God could very will lift any stone he'd like given that he determines such to be good and befitting his natural end (his own goodness and perfection). If any of this is alien to you (my interpretation of God, my terms such as act and potency, my belief that God does not change or hold passions, etc.) then I truly mean without malice that you should do your due diligence towards the classical theism of the sort found in St. Thomas Aquinas (rooted in Aristotle, as you may have heard) or some contemporary Thomist, such as Edward Feser, and learn from them what it is to be a serious theist (unlike many of the theist of today who are quite shallow and worthy of every argument against them). I think it might be better than attacking the age old boring caricatures of God forwarded by today's culture and cultural intellects, wouldn't you agree :).

If twelve-year-olds are completely capable of understanding the proposition and seeing that it leads to a self-contradiction, then it is not impossible to expect normal adults to see the same thing. — god must be atheist

Very true; and if we were discussing voluntarist theism like the very kind I address in my initial response to you, you'd see that I find such a position untenable (and if you go over to the thread "Can God do Anything", you'd see how I attack quite harshly those who do forward such a "God can do anything what so ever even if its completely illogical" philosophy). But, it seems as if you've looked past that unfortunately, and indeed, lump me into the very same position I disagree with. Indeed, such is disappointing given that some of the back hand, half baked arguments you respond to me with are actually addressed in my last response; and indeed, also exemplify how I am against the labels you now place on me. For, doesn't...

it is not logically possible for actus purus to be undermined in some capacity by what is a composite of potency and act. — Questio

... give a comment on the statement....

I find no unintelligibility about "god is capable of creating a stone he can't lift" — god must be atheist

...despite it being written earlier? Geez, its almost like I anticipated this response :). Of course, if you had a problem with such a response, you should've been a little more specific; perhaps I could've thus been more useful to you, ay?

Ah, but I have the strangest of feelings that you are too busy accusing me of...

hiding behind a rhetoric of devout god-worshippers, who can't admit that there is no such thing as irrefutable contradiction in the scriptures. — god must be atheist

...inspite of conceding that God cannot make logical contradictions true:

Nor can God will that a four sided triangle exist, or that the internal angles of a triangle be any more or less than 180 degrees in Euclidean space. — Questio

How unfortunate...

This is getting tedious now. — Bartricks

Perhaps a bit :lol:

To be honest, I don't know what you mean here and I've been charitable in assuming you mean that there is something incoherent in using reason to establish the existence of a being who can flout reason. — Bartricks

Sure; call it self-undermining, but not because I am falling into the obviously fallacious argument of saying because it is irrational for an irrational being to exist it must not exist. I am instead arguing that if you do not take reason to necessarily be oriented towards absolute truth and instead hold that good reason could still be wrong (like 2+2=6 could be true) then you aren't making much of a case, as your very case relies on such notion.

If that's not what you are trying to say, then why not just lay it out as a deductively valid argument? — Bartricks

Fair enough I suppose:
1) Let it be assumed that reason brings us to an entity which may defy reason
2) Given such, this being may have created the world in such a way where as what is reasonable does not necessarily entail truth.
3) Given such, we may also say that the being may have created the world in such a way whereas we believe certain statement to be true via the virtue of reason, but in fact are not (such as 2+2=4 may seem true because we think it irrefutably rational, but it may be that 2+2=6 is more rational, just hidden from our intellect, or perhaps irrational but more true, or absolutely true until this being decides otherwise).
4) Thus, despite common intuition and reason, we can never know what is true because we can never know if the entity created reality as such (and if we try to show through reason that he didn't, we violate 2 or 3).
5) Thus, reason cannot be trusted as a measure or tool for truth, as truth and reason may be loose and separate (as Hume might say).
6) Reason being a trusted measure and tool which leads to truth, however, leads to 1.
7) Therefore, even 1 can be overthrown just as the necessary connection between reason and truth can.

I'm hoping you find this useful.

Forget God and focus on me. I am sat at a computer. I want you to believe this — Bartricks

Fair enough...

I am telling you that it is the case. Because of this you have reason to believe I am sat at a computer. But I can lie. I can bid you believe things about me that are not true. Does that mean you no longer have reason to think I am sat at a computer? No. You still have reason to believe I am sat at a computer. — Bartricks

Certainly so! However, I simply can't have certainty that you sit at a computer. And I believe thats the thing we're caught up in. Its not a matter of whether or not something is or isn't true, but rather if, given we rule out the basic tools of certainty, we can know anything to be certainly true via argumentation. Certainty lies at the core of this discussion, I'd forward.

Does the fact he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time give us reason to believe that true propositions are not false at the same time? Yes. — Bartricks

But not with certainty unless we may fix onto some aspect of his nature, or from a set of certain truths, and be guided from these things to the truth of his statement. For example, I believe that God is logos via reason, thus he can never lie, so for him to tell me that would only be taken as true by me. For God to be omnipotent as you describe it, however, does not seem enough to make the point that his statements maybe taken as true (except via discussion of his omnibenevolence, yet, due to his omnipotence, we may consider that he is lying to us and also being omnibenevolent at the same time given contradictions don't effect him. Sure, he might not, but the lack of certainty simply cannot give us a proper fixed principle by which knowledge can rely on).

A proposition - including a proposition about an imperative of Reason - does not 'have' to be true to be true. It just has to be true. — Bartricks

If by that you mean "there is a phone on my desk" is true, but it doesn't have to be true, then sure. But I don't think that's actually relevant (it could be and I'm just mistaken, but I'm quite sure its not), as I'm sure that certainty is the root of the problem.

If you want to find out about Reason, consult your reason. And if you do that, you'll see that your reason tells you that Reason is a mind who can do anything. — Bartricks

But if perfect reason can still lead to falsehood, how can we be certain of this principle?

You think that's not possible, right - that it is not possible for our reason to tell us about the existence of a being who is not bound by reason? — Bartricks

Its possible, just not tenable. All you would do is cast doubt on your own position if seen all the way down.

Well, a) I've demonstrated that it is possible by actually doing it — Bartricks

You still had a non-sequitur moving from "reason comes from a mind" to "if its in the mind of an entity, he is not constrained to act according to such", as there is the perfectly reasonable alternative conclusion without all the sticky holes you seem to fall in: "therefore reason and this mind are one".

b) that's as silly as thinking that words can only tell you about words. — Bartricks

Certainly; but I would call it a false equivalency as words are oriented beyond themselves while reason seems to orient itself into a closed logical system.

Our reason is a faculty. It brings us an awareness of the imperatives and other norms of Reason. That is, it gives us an awareness of what Reason - which my argument demonstrates to be God - wants us to do and believe. But that does not mean that Reason himself is bound by what he wants us to do and believe. And that itself is something our reason reveals to us (that is, our reason reveals to us that Reason is not bound by what he tells us). As I said, it is the same as fallaciously inferring that what we can see by sight is thereby limited by our sight, as if our sight determines what's there. — Bartricks

Okay, so now your just dancing around the main problem at this point, which is unfortunate, as I expected a little bit more in terms of actually reading what I said and doing your due diligence given that I have explained to you how this only brings me to further the same tired point over and over again. But, if this is what you insist, I shall as well :)

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? Indeed, any justification through rationality would itself beg the question. Of course, the only option left then is to reject the premise that leads to such result, for there is no gain for either Ockhamist, nor Scotist, nor Cartesian or even atheist in entertaining this idea, except of course the most extreme of skepticisms — Questio

Emphasis on the

However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? — Questio

If you argue that x is reasonable yet x need not be true, then how can we thus know that reasoning brings us necessarily to truth?

So, as far as I can tell, all you're doing is insisting in one way and another that our reason is incapable of bringing us an awareness of a being who has power over reason — Bartricks

I am insisting that you are undermining yourself by forwarding the idea of a being that can break the laws of reason so much so that the laws of reason does not necessarily lead to truth and then use said laws of reason to get to the "necessary truth" of this being. This is self undermining and self defeating. You cannot have your cake and eat it too. Either the laws of reason do not necessarily bring truth, in which case we can't trust your argument, or the laws of reason are necessarily true, in which case your argument is invalidated.

Again, you just keep begging the question. — Bartricks

Give me one set of quotes where I do so. I for one can actually substantiate such a claim. Watch:

I can discover by reason - as can anyone who exercises it as carefully and diligently as I do - that God exists — Bartricks

So reason can necessarily bring you to truth you can trust...

So, God could do anything - he could make 2 + 2 = 7, hell he could make 2 + 2 = a giraffe — Bartricks

Interesting... so the reasons you got to God are overthrown by your conclusions as we can't trust reason to take us to truth. And how do we know God hasn't done this? Well...

But has he? No. How do I know? My reason tells me 2 + 2 = 4. It tells me it 'must'. — Bartricks

That's right, an appeal to reason... wow, that didn't work out for you did it my good friend :lol:.
Especially given the case that God could just make 2+2=6 just as rational as 2+2=4, given he's omnipotent, right? And this God can make both equally true and false, or one true and the other false, or vice versa, correct? See my point yet? If you overthrow the absolute power for reason to find an absolute truth you really can't take a ride on said overthown things back and say reason has absolutely found an absolute truth necessarily.

How? Here's my argument again:

1. If the imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing, then that mind is not bound by those imperatives
2. The imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing (see my proof of God for that).
3. Therefore, the mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason - God - is not bound by those imperatives. — Bartricks

Well first, as I've said earlier...

Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason
— Bartricks

Exactly right, except you make a nonsequiter and follow by saying "therefore this mind or being may overthrow the object of his mind". Indeed, its ridiculous to make this jump without an extra premise. Indeed, even if you did, as I hope you have seen by now, theres no way such a conclusion is tenable, as it overthrows your premises of premises: that reason leads necessarily to truth.

Also, in case your wondering how on Earth I can't make the easy jump from "reason in the mind of God" to "thus he may overthrow it" I present you oncemore with Thomism and the gospel, along with ancient and medieval philosophy which recognized the flaws in your proposal and instead recognized God not as above reason, but instead as the logos; reason itself. — Questio

Second, 3 contridicts the formulation, as it opens the possibility of me and you being totally rational yet not necessarily concluding in truth, which of course is the purpose of your formulation.

I could be in Paris. I mean, it is metaphysically possible. By your logic that means I can't know that I'm not. But I do, yes? I know that I'm not in Paris. — Bartricks

Well if God is all powerful, he can very much make it so that you are in Paris yet you think your not, despite reason as well given it takes that. Do you still not see the skeptical box you put yourself in? If so, maybe you should consider abandoning the premise or conclusion which got you here. After all, there is no justification for your idea of God's omnipotence, as I have pointed out (given its a nonsequiter).

Why are you cutting and pasting an earlier post? — EricH

So that I may be entertained with a response, to be frank. And on top of that, because I felt an argument was made, and I'd think it would be a terrible waste for @Bartricks to simply waste his time in reformulating it. Further, given that this is the argument, now that you've raised some fairly valid points on the matter, I'm hoping his next response stays focused on answering your questions. Entertaining for me, time saving for him, less head ache for everyone I'd suppose.

I could go on, but I think you get the idea. As I said earlier I do not have the time / energy to do yet another back & forth, so if you choose to reply I apologize in advance for not replying back. — EricH

Yes, indeed I get the idea, and you raise good points. I'd raise them myself if I didn't care more on the topic at hand (intelligibility). In anycase, no need to respond to this if you don't want, I just wanted to forward some clarity on my part.

1. If there are laws of Reason, then there is a mind whose laws they are

It is also not open to reasonable doubt that there are laws of Reason. For if you think there are not, then either you think there is a reason to think there are not - in which case you think there are, for a 'reason to believe' something is an instruction of Reason - or you think there is no reason to think there are laws of Reason yet disbelieve in them anyway, in which case you are irrational. Thus, this premise is true beyond a reasonable doubt too:

2. There are laws of Reason

From which it follows:

3. Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason

The mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason would not be bound by those laws, as they have the power over their content. A mind that is not bound by the laws of Reason is a mind that can do anything at all. Thus, this premise is true:

4. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnipotent

The mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason will also have power over all knowledge, for whether a belief qualifies as known or not is constitutively determined by whether there is a reason to believe it - and that's precisely what this mind determines. Thus:

5. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omniscient

Finally, moral laws are simply a subset of the laws of Reason (the moral law is, as Kant rightly noted, an imperative of Reason). And so the mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason will be a mind who determines what's right and wrong, good and bad. As the mind is omnipotent, the mind can reasonably be expected to approve of how he is, for if he were dissatisfied with any aspect of himself, he has the power to change it. And if this mind fully approves of himself, then this mind is fully morally good, for that is just what being morally good consists of being. Thus, this premise is also true beyond all reasonable doubt:

6. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnibenevolent.

It is a conceptual truth that a mind who exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent 'is' God. Thus:

7. If there exists a mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then God exists

From which it follows:

8. Therefore, God exists." — Bartricks

I think @EricH, that this is his argument. Whether this meets your conditions is, I suppose, for the two of you to deciede. That he made an argument, however, is certainly beyond doubt (that it proves what he thinks is certainly another case entirely).

Thank goodness someone else has joined this conversation who understands this distinction! I tried to venture it earlier in the thread, which of course was brushed aside peremptorily. I’m not an expert in the matter, but I believe it’s a fundamental distinction and you’ve made a much better case for it than I was able to do. Suffice to say, I’m more persuaded by the Thomist philosophy than that of the Nominalists. — Wayfarer

Seeing your post get so easily sweeped off is somewhat the reason I entered the discussion. You knew what you were saying and I understood why, but it wasn't pushed as hard as it should've been (not saying thats a problem as we're all a tad busy I presume). In anycase, I can't help but find it silly to enter into a discussion without properly understanding the historical roots of its subject and then boast of your superiority over thousands of years worth of philosophy while simultaneously championing yourself as a return to classic interpretations. No offense of course @Bartricks. I wouldn't want to do that to our future saint :).

Questio You provide no evidence that I am begging the question and appeal not to arguments, but authority figures. — Bartricks

Then you clearly did not read what I said, blatantly misrepresented it, or horrendously misinterpreted me. As to the first, I wrote twice this:

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? Indeed, any justification through rationality would itself beg the question. Of course, the only option left then is to reject the premise that leads to such result, for there is no gain for either Ockhamist, nor Scotist, nor Cartesian or even atheist in entertaining this idea, except of course the most extreme of skepticisms — Questio

Clearly what I wrote was an argument, although not in a formal deductive format. In order for you to forward an argument or even merely assert the existence of an entity which may go contrary to reason (and thus one who may establish an irrational world, or a world which abides by seemingly rational laws but isn't, or a world where we think we're being rational but aren't) would itself need such an idea to be false to be forwarded, as otherwise:

what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? — Questio

And if we can't be certain that reason leads to truth, then sorry, you don't really have a way of supporting your theisis.

As for your second blatant assertion; no, I did not use authority figures to exemplify I'm right and your wrong. Instead, I used it to rebut the accusation you made of me and others here: that we are somehow twisting the original interpretation of God for no good reason and with no historical backing, which is simply false, given the naming of the figures I did who date back as much as they do believing that God is the logos (reason, logic, rationality itself). Bartricks, our little discussion is a fun one, but for all of oursakes - especially yours given that you have to read the same points over and over - I suggest you pay your due diligence when responding to a post and no go about straw-manning the way you like to accuse some of doing.

Have I denied the law of non-contradiction? No. I think that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. I believe that as firmly as you do. If you are labouring under the impression that I deny it, then you're confused and you're attacking a straw man. — Bartricks

Sorry good friend, but whether you like it or not your position presupposes that reason does not lead necessarily to truth, as good reason could very much lead to either false conclusions or bad reasoning to true ones (given that the law of contridiction needn't hold necessity). For, if the God of your conclusions existed he could very well make two plus two equal 7, despite reason; say what you will about whether he would do so, but so long as he could we really dont know if what we reason to is true, false, meaningless, or something in-between. And if that be so, all we could really take away from such is that reason doesn't necessarily lead to truth, nor does the law of noncontradiction stand, or any of the other laws of logic. So, despite your accusation, I'd say my conclusions of your conclusion don't seem ill founded or straw-manning (unless of course straw-manning means pointing out the obvious consequences of your position, despite your lacking in their recognition. In which, you can just call me the Mr.Fallacy guy).

although perhaps he has, of course - perhaps "this proposition is false" is one....but let's not get into that as it's beside the point — Bartricks

On this subject, I'd just like to point out that the statement is neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. Its lack of certain semantic content can only conclude in its absurdity and thus lack of true meaning. As such, its not a great example of your point, but anyhow...

So, again, in reality no true proposition is also false. You're not more confident about that than I. — Bartricks

How do you know? Through reason? But if reason isn't necessarily leading to truth, as I've made in my prior point, then any reason you have for trusting reason is simply begging the question.

Now, if you want to add to the law of non-contradiction the claim that it is 'necessarily' true that no true proposition is also false, then I deny that. For I deny that anything is necessarily true or necessarily existent. And I deny that becuase God exists and God can do anything and thus nothing is necessarily true or necessarily existent. — Bartricks

Fair enough, although I think your making a very false dichotomy between there being the necessary existence of logic and the truth it bears and God (for as any Thomist will tell you, God could be the logos - as described in the gospel - and thus logic and truth himself). But, in anycase, as I've said, you won't have much of a nice time reconcilling this with reason, given that, as I've said, your undermining your own position if you do (and frankly, even if you don't).

But denying that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth is not the same as denying that it is true, yes? — Bartricks

Sure, but again, how can you know when its true or if its ever true? If you appeal to reason, you beg the question. If you appeal to God, you remain in obscurity.

I am begging no questions. — Bartricks

Your begging questions with every extra foot step you take over the "Logic is not necessarily true" line. Its not my fault I just so happen to point it out.

You think I am, because you think that if I appeal to reason to establish that God can do anything, then somehow that means that what I prove with reason is bound by reason, yes? — Bartricks

Not necessarily; I'm arguing that even just asserting God could make irrational truths and thus reality is possibly unintelligible undermines yourself in both forwarding an intelligible statement oriented towards truth and in putting yourself in the tightest of skeptical boxes.

I can see lots of things with my eyes and only with my eyes, but that does not mean that my eyes exercise power over what exists. — Bartricks

But to see things does show that seeable things exist; the same as the intellect knowing shows intelligibility. So for one to come and say "hey guys, seeing things isn't leading seeable things" is like saying "hey guys, rationizing doesn't lead us to rational conclusions". And if you respond "of course they do, straw-manner" I'll say "how do you know? God may have made our rationality conclude in irrationality and we'd never know" to which you could say "you just used rationality to get to something rational" and I'd say oncemore "says who? You don't KNOW that". Do you see the problem here?

I can discover by reason - as can anyone who exercises it as carefully and diligently as I do - — Bartricks

How humble :lol:. No disrespect or anything my friend, but some of us would disagree. Although I won't deny that you are a thinker of intrigue (though not for the best reasons, I'm afraid).

It is also not open to reasonable doubt that there are laws of Reason. — Bartricks

Well sure, but that doesn't mean they can't be doubted. Thats like saying "anyone who agrees with x can't disagree with x". Its a trivial truth that I think attempts to establish that you can't doubt reason, only to do so by saying one should be reasonable. I bring this up not to challange you on this but to oncemore show you how deeply in this box you are that you put yourself in. If you undermine yourself to overthrow reasons ability to find truth then theres no harm in throwing out its laws either.

Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason — Bartricks

Exactly right, except you make a nonsequiter and follow by saying "therefore this mind or being may overthrow the object of his mind". Indeed, its ridiculous to make this jump without an extra premise. Indeed, even if you did, as I hope you have seen by now, theres no way such a conclusion is tenable, as it overthrows your premises of premises: that reason leads necessarily to truth.

Also, in case your wondering how on Earth I can't make the easy jump from "reason in the mind of God" to "thus he may overthrow it" I present you oncemore with Thomism and the gospel, along with ancient and medieval philosophy which recognized the flaws in your proposal and instead recognized God not as above reason, but instead as the logos; reason itself.

I think St Anselm and I would get along like a house on fire. — Bartricks

If you were the fire burning down that poor, horrified house that is St. Anselm's faith in human thought .

He'd bloody love my proof of God. I mean, it's better than his, isn't it? — Bartricks

I like your proof, though I think it needs a few patches here and there and I'd probably defend it myself. Although, St. Anselm's proof was indeed irrefutable given his platonic metaphysics, where the ideas in the mind correspond to a real and existing eternal form.

And in 2900 your future twin will be talking in hallowed terms about St Bartricks and how foolish are those who put themselves above him. I mean, it has quite a ring to it - St Bartricks. I like it. — Bartricks

As much as I strongly disagree with 90 percent of what you say, I can't lie to you and say your name isn't errily fitting for sainthood :lol:.

As for @counterpunch, Im sorry for pushing back the response I owe you a little while longer. Im not too familiar with Spinoza, unfortunately, so I can't really comment on that particular part. However what I can tell you is that although divine simplicity (which is synonymous with pure actuality for the most part) seems, given a few arguments, as the best way to interpret God, modal collapse does pretty much make it necessary to create reality, although not in the way most people argue. I'll be sure to explain a little more when time is generous once more, but until then just know that its probably the best argument against the existence of God I've ever seen, and I have angered and frustrated more than a handful of catholics and Thomists on this point (and I say that as a Catholic Thomist myself!)

The problem is that you're going to have to beg the question to make a case against me. That is, you're going to have to assume that Reason restricts an omnipotent being before you can show that it does. And that's question begging. — Bartricks

For certainly this is correct! However, I would like you to understand that the weight of my rebuttal was in accusing you of entertaining a self defeating proposition, and were you to bring yourself a defense of such an accusation, it would result in vicious question begging. For as I have said:

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? Indeed, any justification through rationality would itself beg the question. Of course, the only option left then is to reject the premise that leads to such result, for there is no gain for either Ockhamist, nor Scotist, nor Cartesian or even atheist in entertaining this idea, except of course the most extreme of skepticisms — Questio

What we fall into then, of course, is nothing more than a dressed up discussion of whether or not the law of noncontradiction is applicable to reality and truth more broadly. But, as any logician would know, to ever go against the law of contradiction and be challenged on such a thing would either result in the presentation of an argument for the decision or merely reasserting the statement. To do the former of course would only affirm the case of the opposition, however, as it presupposes that coherent and noncontridictive reason may lead to truth, and as such really only leads the ladder response. But in that case, not only do we have no reason to take your point seriously, as no evidence, argumentation, or anything of the sort support your case, but your very own position is self undermining, as to even forward the idea supposes the consistency of its truth and not its contradiction. Either way, you can take this to be sufficient for intense skepticism (and if that be your case, fine by me mate), or you can admit that such a position is untenable and thus accept the law.

It most certainly does mean that he is limited by something above him. — Bartricks

If God is logos (logic if you don't care for latin) then no, he is not limited by a principle above him, but rather he works only in conformity with his being. This follows from the intellects primacy. You might call this limiting if you like (though I would call that a rather misrepresentative, but I suppose thats a moot point), but the fact of the matter is that what I have forwarded does not lead in any way shape or form to the claim you make. The only way you could make such a claim is if you deny that the will follows the intellect, which you are welcome to do, but I have seen none of it thus far. But perhaps you aren't talking about God (as in pure being itself) but instead just a subject or entity which can do everything and is thus "beyond God". In that case I have one question. If it isn't being itself, then is it in nonbeing? Certainly not, I'd suppose, as nonbeing results in nothing. Is it beyond being? But being encompasses all that is, with only nonbeing having exclusion. So what is this entity exactly? Or perhaps you'll claim I am the begging the question by asserting that there must be some logic behind this entity? If that's so you're making a very poor point. For if we can't even know what it is how can we assert that it holds your conception of omnipotence? Or is this merely a claim we must accept? The point being that every one of these assertions really puts you in more trouble than you think, as it merely reinforces the point I made prior, that you are simply rejecting the law of noncontradiction and leading yourself to a self undermining case as a result.

you think he can't will that a four sided triangle exist. Even I can do that!! — Bartricks

Then you either don't know what a triangle is or the number four, (or alternatively your undermining everything you say by attempting to present your vision of omnipotence as valid in some manner even at the sacrifice of the very principle of noncontradiction it rests upon).

And you are, of course. The 'divine intellect' is not God. It's God's intellect. My intellect is not me. It's my intellect. — Bartricks

Ah, then you clearly don't know what divine simplicity means or is. You see, God is not some anthropomorphic being as many make him out to be. For if he did, and he had parts (a intellect separate from a will separate from his love, etc.) their principle of union would be more fundamental than God himself. And as I'm sure you'd agree (seeing as you don't think God is subject to rationality), its not God unless its ultimately fundamental. As such, God must be without parts, purely simple. That also means that if he has a will and intellect, they must be really indistinguishable and the same, meaning the only way we can talk about such a separation is through logic, or virtual separation as its called. So no, you may not be your intellect or your will, for you aren't supremely simple and you do have a more fundamental principle (many in fact) above. God, however, does have all these attributes in him as the same thing.

And what does "God only acts in accordance with his intellect" mean if not "God does what he does"? — Bartricks

It means he acts perfectly intelligibly, meaning in accordance with right reason and rationality and not contrary to that, as that would be a case of an imperfect intellect.

You are just like the rest and think of God as straightjacketed. That's conceptually confused. It's also, of course, offensive to God - telling everyone that he can't do this and can't do that...the cheek of it!! — Bartricks

Well Bartricks, is nice to know that you take the thoughts of ancient Christian philosophers very seriously and don't instead look to shoehorn a more contemporary protestant fundamentalist's interpretation of God into your philosophy... oh I'm sorry, no. My good friend, it seems as if you have a bad case of thinking yourself superior to two thousand years of Christian theistic thought and reason. Which is fine, I'm okay with that, and encourage it to some extent. Just don't claim me to be a man subverting the traditional idea of God with a much cooler and hip "new" concept, for St. Augustine, St. Aquinas, and St. Anselm would like a word with you.

As for

Enjoy it while it lasts! I like to start from a place of good will and fine manners - but have found that as a discussion becomes an argument, it becomes a matter of battling ego monsters - and the gloves come off, good Sir! — counterpunch

I am beginning to see such. :lol:
In any case, I will respond to you when time is generous. You raise many good points, and I believe you will find some of the information on divine simplicity and modal collapse interesting.

It was a pleasure to read. In its own terms, the logic seems irrefutable:

Many thanks for the pleasant comment. Those were quite rare in the forum I used to post on, so it is a very welcome change.

Yet I disagree, because the omnibenevolence of God is not considered.

As you might anticipate, good sir, I do indeed disagree. But before I address my reasonings for this I might preface by saying that although this particular point you bring up seems incorrect to me, there is another formulation which does indeed seem to follow the same conclusion, and with great reasoning as well. Have you ever heard of the argument from modal collapse?

Presumably, by the term "God" we are speaking of the Creator of the Heaven and the earth, and not just some random omnipient hanging out in no-space. Indeed, there needs to be a Creation for Him to be benevolent toward. One cannot be good or bad alone.

All that so, God's omnipotence is hampered by his omniscience and benevolence

First, on the topic of God's identity I refrain from calling God merely a creator, or a person with a set of awesome attributes, or any description that lies between these two or beyond as they bring forth into the conversation theistic personalism or neo-theism as its been called. This is problematic as things such as change, time, emotions, and many other features which I firmly believe are not in God are presupposed in many instances, which lead to a number of problems. Instead, as a Thomistic Aristotlean, I instead affirm classical theisms definition of God as being *actus purus* or pure actuality itself, being ultimately simple, ultimately powerful, and ultimately necessary.

Second, as I've claimed in my last post, to be omnipotent is not to have the power to do anything (which I hope to have demonstrated was absurd) but rather to do whatever is intelligible. As such, nothing can bring forth a four sided triangle, a married bachelor, or move pure actuality; all of these things are unintelligible conceptions. Now, within God there is no real divisions; as such God's omnipotence IS his omnibenevolence which IS his omnipresence which IS his intellect which finally IS his will, which IS pure actuality. Now, because what is perfect in every manner, such as pure actuality, cannot, without being marked with unintelligiblility, move or act in accordance with imperfection, he thus cannot do a lot of what men can do.

However, this is not out of any lack of ability, but rather because any imperfection or wrong or anything of the sort (such as wrong reasoning) is always (in Thomistic thought) a deprivation of what is perfect, good, and so forth; to be doing such things isn't a positive gain but a negative loss. But it follows that there is, from this deprivation, the possibility of having such a thing. Thus, to do what is imperfect aligns with potential being, while to have is in alignment with actual being.

Now, as for Bartricks, I will address your response in time tomorrow as Im at work now. I find your puzzles absurd yet interesting :)

(This post is an edited version of an older post I forwarded on a different area. Because the subject matter is similar, I find it wastful for me to not simply reuse a large chunck of the post for present purposes. To clarify, I disagree with your God, as I am a Thomist, and instead forward that God is pure actuality. I hope that won't fall into too much conflict @Bartricks)

I'm sorry good sir, but you're argument is fundamentally flawed. The claim that God is omnipotent is certainly affirmed by classical theist of course, and they do believe it to have good foundation. However, we must distinguish between two very different perceptions of what God's omnipotence entails; on the one hand, there is the interpretation of the Thomist, which is that omnipotence is the power to exercise any given set of actions so long as they hold intelligibility - i.e whatever is logically possible. This follows from the idea that the divine will follows the intellect. The other interpretation is one pedaled by William of Ockham, a voluntarist, who forwarded the claim that God's omnipotence entails that all may be willed and accomplished, regardless of whether or not it is in any way intelligible. This followed from his idea that the divine intellect follows the will, and so what is willed is what is ultimately the foundation of reality, and thus the intellect conforms to the will to mark things as "intelligible".

Of course, many egregious implications are opened the moment this idea is accepted; for example, because there is not any law of logic or intelligibility that reality need conform to except for what God wills, propositions such as 2+2=6, although contradictive and incohesive, may become an accurate manner by which to conduct mathematics given that God wills it. The law of noncontradiction would of course be heavily violated, and as such undermine whatever argument William may have forwarded to bring him to voluntarism, but nonetheless it seems as if his ideas have spread further than it should, as this post seems to show.

(And I'd like to emphasize this point for present purposes. As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contridictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. However, that these things can be undermined results in the idea or argument which leads to such a conclusion to be defeated, as what supports the theisis that reason can reveal any truth if reality maybe unintelligible and thus "outside" the scope of reason? Indeed, any justification through rationality would itself beg the question. Of course, the only option left then is to reject the premise that leads to such result, for there is no gain for either Ockhamist, nor Scotist, nor Cartesion or even atheist in entertaining this idea, except of course the most extreme of skepticisms).

For given that you are arguing against the God of Ockham, of course these objections of "can God make a rock he can't lift" seem quite devastating - at least until you realize that Ockham would merely assert that God is not subordinate to logical cohesiveness (and not trivially but as a result of the very premise which brings us to this objection). But to a Thomist, or any one who takes the classical interpretation of God seriously, these objections are silly and can be answered quite easily: you simply do not understand omnipotence.

Omnipotence entails that what ever is intelligibly possible may be willed to occur. And as such, no, God cannot make a boulder that he can't lift because that is an unintelligible conception; it is not logically possible for actus purus (pure actuality) to be undermined in some capacity by what is a composite of potency and act. Nor can God will that a four sided triangle exist, or that the internal angles of a triangle be any more or less than 180 degrees in Euclidean space. And no, that does not mean that God is thus limited by some principle above him such as logic and thus is not highest being (which is also an absurd proposition, as highest being cannot be actus purus, only being itself can be). Instead, it is to say that the divine intellect, which is God, is first before the divine will, which is God, and as such God only acts in accordance with his intellect, which, as all perfect intellectual activities must be, is cohesive and noncontradictive.

(Again, I need to emphasize on this point in particular for the sake of the conversation. For, to be omnipotent is to be all powerful -i.e to have all the power - so to lack a power is to lack omnipotence. However, there simply cannot be a power which can bring forth contradictory state of affairs, as not only would such a power be completely incoherent and contradictory, any argumentation towards such an end would also be incoherent and self undermining, as shown above. Self contridictory state of affairs are inconceivable to the intellect and mental images not because they are beyond reason, but precisely because they are ludicrous and self defeating as it undermines any principle of sepetation between being (is and could) and nonbeing (isn't and couldn't), as what is self defeating yet exists is both in being and nonbeing. A more fundamental absurdity cannot be found, of course. As such, of course what is pure actuality - pure being itself - cannot bring forth nonbeing. Nor can anything do so, for that would require an existence - being - to be beyond being - but nothing can transcend being itself, as nothing is outside of being but nonbeing, and of course nonbeing cannot result in being. As such, pure being, God, cannot produce contridictory state of affairs, nor can anything be said to do so coherently to show something "above God". This is not because of some inherent flaw in omnipotence, but merely Ockhamist omnipotence. As such, because bringing self contridictory state of affairs is not a power for it cannot hold being, it does not participate in omnipotence and thus is not in God).

Thus, you're argument rests on more than a little questionable of a premise.

(Further, as for God's inability to reason badly, you have it all wrong. That is nearly the equivalent of saying "God cannot make himself not all powerful, which he should be able to do if hes all powerful, therefore God isnt all powerful". The theist can easily respond "no, to not be all powerful or to have bad reasoning are clearly deprivations of a power, not an "extra" power omnipotence doesn't hold. So for God to be able to do such things is to bring him down to imperfection. Such is, of course, a blatant inconsistency with God's pure actus essence; as such of course he can't and won't do these things."

As such, good sir, I believe your reasoning to be flawed and your conclusions incorrect.

I'm sorry good sir, but you're argument is fundamentally flawed. The claim that God is omnipotent is certainly affirmed by classical theist of course, and they do believe it to have good foundation. However, we must distinguish between two very different perceptions of what God's omnipotence entails; on the one hand, there is the interpretation of the Thomist, which is that omnipotence is the power to exercise any given set of actions so long as they hold intelligibility - i.e whatever is logically possible. This follows from the idea that the divine will follows the intellect. The other interpretation is one pedaled by William of Ockham, a voluntarist, who forwarded the claim that God's omnipotence entails that all may be willed and accomplished, regardless of whether or not it is in any way intelligible. This followed from his idea that the divine intellect follows the will, and so what is willed is what is ultimately the foundation of reality, and thus the intellect conforms to the will to mark things as "intelligible".

Of course, many egregious implications are opened the moment this idea is accepted; for example, because there is not any law of logic or intelligibility that reality need conform to except for what God wills, propositions such as 2+2=6, although contradictive and incohesive, may become an accurate manner by which to conduct mathematics given that God wills it. The law of noncontradiction would of course be heavily violated, and as such undermine whatever argument William may have forwarded to bring him to voluntarism, but nonetheless it seems as if his ideas have spread further than it should, as this post seems to show.

For given that you are arguing against the God of Ockham, of course these objections of "can God make a rock he can't lift" seem quite devastating - at least until you realize that Ockham would merely assert that God is not subordinate to logical cohesiveness (and not trivially but as a result of the very premise which brings us to this objection). But to a Thomist, or any one who takes the classical interpretation of God seriously, these objections are silly and can be answered quite easily: you simply do not understand omnipotence.

Omnipotence entails that what ever is intelligibly possible may be willed to occur. And as such, no, God cannot make a boulder that he can't lift because that is an unintelligible conception; it is not logically possible for actus purus to be undermined in some capacity by what is a composite of potency and act. Nor can God will that a four sided triangle exist, or that the internal angles of a triangle be any more or less than 180 degrees in Euclidean space. And no, that does not mean that God is thus limited by some principle above him such as logic and thus is not highest being (which is also an absurd proposition, as highest being cannot be actus purus, only being itself can be). Instead, it is to say that the divine intellect, which is God, is first before the divine will, which is God, and as such God only acts in accordance with his intellect, which, as all perfect intellectual activities must be, is cohesive and noncontradictive.

Thus, you're argument rests on more than a little questionable premise.