Did you see this?

History doesn’t corroborate your position: rather, it tends to function as a tendency towards flourishing for an in-group. There have been tons of societies that do not generally care about the suffering of other people outside of their own group. — Bob Ross

I think history may have demonstrated that moral facts don't exist and societies can turn to killing people indiscriminately fairly quickly. Particularity those cultures run by those who think they own the truth.

Anyway - let's move on to the next part since we aren't going to agree on truth and facts.

And thanks again for engaging with such thorough responses.

In relation to your example about stealing

What we can see here, is that we have a form of moral objectivism which is a form of moral relativism; whereof each objective good is relativistic to some teleological structure such that what is good is fundamentally about what best suits and sizes up to the teleology of it. — Bob Ross

Agree. And I have already alluded to this approach myself that we can set a goal and reach this objectively, but the goal itself is subjective. This is how Sam Harris seems to arrive at wellbeing as a moral foundation.

We see here that this view inherently admits of evolutionary teleology, which is a hot take these days, so let me speak a few words on that real quick. The idea that biology supplies us with teleology has lost all credence nowadays, but it is easily recoverable by understanding that we behave as if it does provide a telos. — Bob Ross

As you suggest this is a contested idea and I have no way of determining whether you are correct about this.

Back to the good human. In order to understand what a good human is, we must understand (1) the nature, teleologically, of a human and (2) how a human can behave so as to align themselves with it. There is a ton I could say here but to be brief, human’s have rational capacities with a sufficiently free will (that can will in strict accordance to reason—to cognition—over conative dispositions); and this marks them out, traditionally, as persons. A person—viz., a being which has a rational nature—must size up properly to what a rational nature is designed to do. Some of which are the intellectual virtues like the pursuit of truth, pursuit of knowledge, being open-minded, being intellectual curious, being impartial, being objective, etc. The one important right now, for your question about stealing, is Justice. — Bob Ross

I find this paragraph riddled with assumptions I am either skeptical about or cannot accept as true. I see no good reasons to endorse essentialist accounts of human behavior, so the notion of a teleological human nature is contentious and unsubstantiated.

I believe our use of reason is directed and shaped by affective responses, with reason often serving as a post hoc justification for emotional responses. I tend to hold that reason follows emotion, so what is often described as a 'rational nature' is better understood as rationalization rather than an innate rationality. I don't accept that the qualities you have listed here (pursuit of truth or knowledge or impartiality) are anything more than contingent factors shaped by culture and language, and I don't think we are likely to arrive at an agreement about what such values would look like in practice. I also think several levels of expertise would be needed to assess the contents of this paragraph in full.

I do thank you for clarifying where you are coming from and I respect the amount of thought and effort you have put into this. You seem to really crave certainty. I tend to be more appreciative of uncertainty. I suspect our dispositions are responsible for where we land.

I don't think it is worth us taking any more time on this (for now) since we do not share enough presuppositions to continue and we are bound to stick to our guns no matter what the other person says.

I don't think we've had a Liberal Party in Australia in some years. Old school conservatives and 'wets' were overtaken by radical free marketeers and culture war wankers. And conversely, the Labor Party tries to appeal to business and prosperous white collar people, while tradies increasingly see themselves as small business owners and Liberal voters, who often resent welfare spending. The electorate also seems to have changed. And who'd be a politician these days anyway? Most people instantly hate you, or think you're a lying, narcissistic hypocrite.

It's aliens. Late in the year 2025, Donald Trump, through manifest incompetence, started a nuclear war that destroyed much of the earth. Aliens have arrived to try to set about some solutions in order to change history and avoid the conflict.

Of course, the Buddha was writing prior to ideas of Nietzsche and Jung, which throw absolutism of good, evil and ethics open. — Jack Cummins

Of course the person known as Buddha did not write and never directly contributed anything to what we know today as Buddhism. The writings came centuries after he died. Oral accounts did until then. How do we even know what Buddha may or may not have really said?

Because it enables us to enact what is actually good; and anyone who doesn’t want to enact what is good must be either evil, ignorant, or a lunatic. Don’t you agree? — Bob Ross

No. I don't think things are as simple as this. But it tells me a lot about why this model appeals to you. You appear to be an absolutist.

So, then, if we by-at-large hate the jews; then we would be correct to extinguish them under your view. It’s the same glaring issue over and over again. — Bob Ross

Curious that you miss the point over and over again. It's this.

We are not isolated nomads, indifferent to the fates of others. Just consider what it is to be a person. We are all invoked in webs of affinity and webs of sympathy and acquaintance. We are connected to others. We don’t (generally) want others to suffer. We are a social species. We support behaviors which support such human dispositions. — Tom Storm

I have consistently argued that morality functions pragmatically and aims to provide a safe, predictable community that minimizes suffering. The fact that you keep arguing that I might just as well advocate anti-social or violent behaviour is absurd.

Your argument is similar to those religious apologists who maintain that if there wasn't a god there would be no morality and people would steal and lie and murder all over because only god can guarantee morality. Looks like you have just substituted god for the abstraction, truth.

Can we explore an example of a moral truth? What objective truth underpins the notion that stealing is wrong?

:cool:

I've seen a few photos but nothing particularly clear.

Wayfarer Tom Storm anything to share on it? — schopenhauer1

I got nothing. Do we have a photo of one of these drones? I’ve heard they are almost car sized.

While I don’t find non-physicalism to be univocal in what is upheld as an alternative to physicalism, physicalism does in all its variants entail nothingness in the sense of non-being upon mortal death, as well as before the commencement of life. — javra

Which is an idea I personally find quite lovely. To me this is meaningful. We have one life, make it work.

How, then, can physicalism be understood to allow for the possibility of a meaningful cosmos, hence a meaningful existence, and, by extension, of a meaningful life (be it in general or in particular)? — javra

Meaning is a human term which is the product any number of contexts and we area sense making creatures - we can't help ourselves.

I think this is right. The aesthetic appeal is important. I'm reminded of the sublime aesthetics of the great cathedrals and Christian rituals. — Janus

Indeed, although I don’t much like cathedrals. They are striking rather than beautiful. I think ideas can also seem ugly or beautiful. For instance, the idea of a world where there is nothing after death, where limitations are imposed by natural laws, and where there is no transformative reconciliation with the ground of being, may feel ugly to some people - much the way a painting by Francis Bacon might unsettle or alarm some.


I'm just repeating myself...

Good response, thanks.

When people take their own ideas, what seems self-evident to them, too seriously it seems that culture wars are looming. For some on both sides this is can become a moral crusade. — Janus

Indeed, binary or dualistic thinking like this is certainly responsible for many unnecessarily conflicts.

I have often thought that one of the reasons people are attracted to superphysical ideas is their aesthetic appeal. It perhaps seems more harmonious to imagine that there is a transcendent realm, something grander and more meaningful beyond the physical world. I have noticed how often advocates of the transcendent describe the physicalist position as an ugly worldview - stunted, disenchanted, devoid of mystery, limiting.

I think we may be going around in circles. I believe I have dealt with your objections sufficiently - as you no doubt feel you have with mine. :wink:

I'll conclude (for now) with a few points here.

So, why should anyone who disagrees care? Is Hitler wrong, then? Under your view, he has no reason, other than his own subjective dispositions, to change his mind. — Bob Ross

Hitler and many of his supporters probably thought they were doing good and were promoting flourishing as they saw it.

I have no problem stating that I am against Nazi values and their approach, but I don't believe there are objective moral facts about it. Nazi ideology contradicts most human conventions and behaviors, causes needless suffering, and is inherently unstable for society. What more justification do you need?

In the absence of moral facts morality shifts from being about discovering "truths" to constructing frameworks that work for individuals and communities. As I have already argued, humans mostly have concern for others and want predictability, safety, resources.

According to you, again, well-being isn’t actually good: it’s just, at best, what everyone mostly wants to be the case. So, why should anyone who disagrees care? — Bob Ross

Why should anyone care even if there are moral facts? Religious believers still commit crimes/sins even while they believe god is watching and will judge them. Makes no difference. Some people will do what they want regardless. What magic do you suppose a 'moral fact' has to compel anyone to do anything?

It sounds to me like you want to identify moral facts so you can dismiss any ethical positions you disagree with by appealing to 'truth' as the ultimate criterion. I'm curious - do you also wish to criminalize behaviors that don’t align with your truth criteria? What’s your end goal here?

In the case of the latter, there may be legitimate disagreement if they subjectively agree on some maxim(s); but there’s not true disagreements because there are no facts. I say “I like vanilla ice cream”, you say “I don’t like vanilla ice cream”—who’s wrong? Neither. — Bob Ross

This is a common rebuttal and I think this gets my position wrong. Rather more is at stake than flavor. We are not isolated nomads, indifferent to the fates of others. Just consider what it is to be a person. We are all invoked in webs of affinity and webs of sympathy and acquaintance. We are connected to others. We don’t (generally) want others to suffer. We are a social species. We support behaviors which support such human dispositions.

what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives? — Janus

Agree. I've often said that idealism really doesn't change anything. There is nothing I do now that would change.

That said, for others there seem to be at least two reasons for change. For some folk, this idea appeals to their vanity. 1) They want to know more about this 'secret' ontology and be special in some way. 2) They believe that a judgement is coming, as you say - [quote="Janus;953617" that such a mind is an omniscient, omnipotent God who will judge us[/quote]. Then people might fall over themselves in a vain attempt to anticipate how they might be judged.

I find it interesting that some secular philosophers, like AC Grayling, have left behind the word physicalism these days and use the term naturalism. Any thoughts on this word? The problem for me is that how do we draw a distinction between a natural and a supernatural world if physicalism isn't a distinguishing factor? If idealism is true than this is part of naturalism?

Thanks for this discussion, by the way. I've found it useful. These are my beliefs as they currently stand. I'm open to tweaking.

Here’s another gigantic issue with moral anti-realism: there’s no way to resolve these disagreements. — Bob Ross

There is no agreement on how morality works right now and yet we have morality and it mostly works. Cultures argue about morality all the time and have ongoing conversations about what they beleive and how to live better. So morality already functions the way I am suggesting. Western societies tend to balance pluralism. We do not have an agreed upon way to resolve disagreements, we just have a discourse.

Western societies usually seem to set wellbeing or flourishing as a goal. What is best for people and culture. But there will never be agreement on how to get there or indeed what precisely flourishing entails. But it's close enough.

But according to you we don’t agree that it is actually better: we just subjectively like it more, whereas the masters subjectively liked their society more. — Bob Ross

No, it's more than a mere like/dislike. Just because there are no moral truths, doesn't mean there's no reasoning involved.

My current belief is that there are no moral facts but I believe morality is useful pragmatically - people (mostly) feel empathy for others and they generally want a predictable, safe society. They want to be able to raise families, pursue interests, have relationships and achieve goals. They want codes of conduct that allow for this. That's what morality is. Like traffic lights. There's nothing inherently true about road rules but they provide us with systems of safety and allow for the possibility of effective road use. And we can still debate which rules work best for certain purposes.

We don't need 'true' or objective morality to build a useful system.

To whom? To the slaves? To the masters? — Bob Ross

Depends on the society. Obviously in 1830's America, to the masters. But the conversation changed. There's a general thrust in the West for egalitarianism and greater solidarity. We all seem to agree with this except when we don't, when perhaps it involves people of colour, Muslims, or women or trans folk, we might not consider solidarity relevant and call any consideration of such people 'woke'.

We mostly all know how this works.

What you are noting is correct, insofar as it outlines how human social structures work, which are inherently power-structures, but the problem is that you gutted out the part where we are actually developing better social structures because they are ethically superior to previous ones. — Bob Ross

Only subject to certain purposes and values, right? I might share with you ideals of emancipatory humanism and by this frame we might both consider human rights imperative. Great.

But we all need to agree that this is the best way to achieve human flourishing or wellbeing or whatever you consider your foundational value to be. In choosing this, you are not being objective, nor is there agreement about what constitutes flourishing/wellbeing.

Now there might be some argument to suggest that if you decide that preventing suffering is your foundational goal then Marxism might be the best approach, or Islam. But of course we don't agree on this, hence the problem. Are there objective ways to reach a goal once you have arbitrarily chosen one? Perhaps. Is this what you are arguing for?

I obviously belong to a cultural tradition and have, like most humans, evolved as part of a social species - so for this reason nurturing, tribal identification, caring for others, collaboration, protecting the weak, is hard wired in me and most of us (unless, perhaps you grow up in a war zone). But even this is provisional and contingent.

Thanks. Not sure there's much I can do with those dot points, I'm afraid.

But if you ask me what do I do when I try to escape restraint. I have been locked up in a room before. I try to escape. Survival kicks in. What does this say about the self?

If your point is simply that my reality appears to be different to the reality of the person who locked me in, so? How is this identifying anything useful about the self?

Not sure, also not sure how this helps. Please demonstrate with an example - perhaps in dot points - how you see this working.

For instance:

So let's say someone calls me an idiot. I feel a reaction. But this is far from clear. If my boss calls me an idiot, I have a different reaction to if my daughter calls me an idiot. Situation and tone varies too. And so does what the week has been like so far. How does a reaction, which is variable and unpredictable, delineate a clear sense of self? It seems to me there are various selves, with various reactions, depending on contingent factors. I might even react in a way that has me asking - what happened? I was not my self then.

Then, you are a moral anti-realist; and no one should take your view seriously; because all you are saying is that what is right or wrong is stance-dependent. So if, e.g., I want to do something you consider wrong, or others consider wrong, then there is absolutely no fact-of-the-matter that makes me wrong: I am just as right as you are (objectively speaking). — Bob Ross

That seems a rather limited way of interpreting my point. I did not say anything goes. I said humans come to agreements about what morality is and follow this right down to crafting legislation. For the most part, I am comfortable to live in a world with a code of conduct and one that provides consequences for those how step outside it.

Morality doesn't have to involve moral facts to provide social cohesion. predictability and harm minimisation. It's pragmatic and evolving.

Collectively we arrive at right and wrong through an intersubjective agreement. In other words cultures arrive at values, from a myriad sources. And we know there will always be outliers. We know that the idea for who counts is a full citizen has varied over time, as culture and values change. In the West, slavery is no longer acceptable, but it is acceptable to exploit and underpay workers to keep the rich person's housework and maintenance done. We no longer criminalise and imprison gay people or trans people. Although some elements of society seem to want to punish them again. Our agreements are not necessarily permanent.

For me this seems to be an ongoing conversation. There are no facts we can access about values, just agreements made about what we value together and what conduct we will accept. It's imperfect but I see nothing wrong with this. We don't need 'true' or objective morality to build a useful system.

One can accept that there are objective goods AND that society is a power-related structure. The idea that some people are exalted as heroes and those very same people criminals by others just highlights that humans are creating laws; and does not negate the fact that humans should be creating laws which abide by facticity. Under your view, those laws are non-factual; because there are no moral facts. — Bob Ross

Who mentioned power-related structures? Or heroes? I agree that the laws are non-factual. But I do not see this as a limitation, as you do. I don't go looking for absolute truth or foundational guarantees in the world because I am not convinced such things exist.

Idealism, in the way that I intend it, and I think in the sense in which it is meaningful, is not about what 'things are made of'. It is about the nature of reality as experienced. — Wayfarer

Yes. I can see this. And I like this more sophisticated framing of the idea.

Buddhist philosophy takes a view which is neither idealistic nor materialistic; Buddhists do not believe that the Universe is composed of only matter. They believe that there is something else other than matter. But there is a difficulty here; if we use a concept like spirit to describe that something else other than matter, people are prone to interpret Buddhism as some form of spiritualistic religion and think that Buddhists must therefore believe in the actual existence of spirit. So it becomes very important to understand the Buddhist view of the concept spirit. — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Cool. Noted.

Fuck, there's a lot to remember is this caper...

Have a restful break.

I've seen the word "subsist" to refer to the referent of the first statement. So, chairs exists and numbers subsist? Is that a common understanding? — Art48

I think this refers to the old debate about mathematical platonism - were numbers invented or discovered? It's one of those endless debates which ultimately circles back to the nature of reality and what counts as transcendental. There's an entire thread on this here somewhere and many references to this in idealism discussions. To subsist, I believe, is to 'exist' conceptually but not as an object located in space and time - like a chair. Or something like this.

It may not mean much, but I have found your ongoing conversation on this matter very interesting. It's been quite a display of endurance. Ultimately, it seems to be down to whether one finds the arguments convincing or not, as inferences don't always lead us all to the same conclusions.

We don't even fully understand or definitely know what causation, or anything else, is. We have a "folk" understanding of what we think consciousness is. There is not really a naive realism, but also a naive idealism. How are we going to find out the truth of these matters? Even scientific theories are defeasible. — Janus

I think this is sensible. I personally can't rule out idealism, but I have no good reason as yet to accept it as true. But who here actually has any expertise in this matter? Are we just unsophisticated yokels sounding off about ideas we find most appealing emotionally?

I will conclude for now by making the observation that nothing is 'purely' or 'only' physical. That has been made abundantly clear by physics. It is not an appeal to 'quantum woo', as I've studied the issue closely, from a philosophical perspective. It is beyond dispute that at the most fundamental level, we can no longer conceive of reality in terms of particulate matter, of energetic particles obeying deteministic laws. Determinism went out the window with the uncertainty principle, and it's not going to be revived. Particles are now understood to be excitations of field states. And what field states are is far from obvious. — Wayfarer

It's a case well put. But how do we rule out a different approach and model all together? Does it have to be physicalism versus idealsim? Is dualistic thinking all we have to resolve our biggest quesions? I'd be interested to hear more from a rigorous, post-modern perspective assessing the foundational axioms or presuppositions that may be propping up our confusions. And if the world is entirely mind created and contingent, how do we know anything for certain about either metaphysical position?

It's a great way to instill a sense of gratitude, appreciation, and social responsibility in our children.
a day ago — Alonsoaceves

I doubt this. I grew up in a time where what you are suggesting was standard and obligatory practice. We were all made to learn lessons of responsibility, gratitude and to memorialise the positive achievements of others. You only have to look at sitcoms of 50 years ago to see that even these were generally presented like moral instruction as Alex P Keaton or Richie Cunningham were taught (and by extension, we, the audience) a series of lessons about humility, integrity and other virtues. It made no difference. Look where we are now, the world reared on this material. Perhaps a reaction to the moralistic, stifling mainstream preaching of yesterday? I think we probably need entirely new notions of community and citizenship. But if we do, it will need to come of its own, you can't make these things happen.

Where did the cocaine come in to the conversation? I thought they were talking about prostitution...

But when a few drugs were decriminalised in Canberra a year ago, it was predicted to be the begining of the end.... It wasn't. — Banno

Indeed.

Cocaine was named as a base pleasure. I said this:

There’s nothing inherently wrong with the pleasure cocaine can provide. Many people I've known use it a few times a year with great satisfaction and wellbeing. Addiction to coke however is a problem. But so is an addiction to hard work. So is an addition to alcohol, which can also be used responsibly, with great happiness and pleasure. — Tom Storm

Apparently this means I want to legalize cocaine. :wink: I have made no comments about legalization.

I do have a problem with people talking about good pleasures versus base pleasures. My point is it's the act that has the moral dimension, not the pleasure. But really I'm just asking questions. I don't think using alcohol or drugs for fun is necessarily a moral question.

Above and beyond this, I also think that it is possible for an immoral person (however we understand this) to live a happy and rewarding life. I do not mean this as an endorsement (although surely this is an unnecessary qualifier).

We never know what personal challenges a member here might be facing, so I generally don't return aggressive responses. I find it curious that your inferences are taking you to such adverse conclusions. I apologize if my posts have been unclear.

So you're just saying things you don't believe to be true. That's called lying. — Leontiskos

I wonder however you arrived at this? Name calling too. That's called strange. doesn't seem to be having any trouble following.

With that being said, I rather think it is the reason for the act needing the closest examination. It is, after all, my act, determined by my reason, so I am the act’s causality — Mww

I'll mull this over. I am happy to be convinced to change my view. :up:

superficial personal gratifications, mere desires. — Mww

I'm somewhat skeptical of this idea, but I understand its attractions and history.

Yes, I find this one interesting. I am curious that people talk about good pleasures versus bad pleasures. I don't think there really is a distinction between feelings of wellbeing and satisfaction, or however else one wants to describe flourishing.

For me it is the act we are questioning and whether this should or should not provide a person with satisfaction. My own view is that a career criminal may well have a more pleasurable and satisfying life than a 'saint'. Knowing this is probably why humans constructed notions of heaven and hell, since there are not always consequences for crimes on earth.

My joke above, following the quote about the use of bought sex, is simply an observation that there is no recipe for happiness and a rewarding life. Discrete use of sex workers for pleasure might lead to someone's overall flourishing, while a marriage (which some might like to present as a virtuous contrast to naughty prostitution) might be like dying inside. Life is not simple.

Do you really think cocaine should be legal and prostitution leads to happiness? — Leontiskos

Curious, I never said either of those two things.

Son: Having sex with prostitutes whenever I please gives me great pleasure.
Father: But what about happiness? Will it make you happy? — Leontiskos

Son: I think so. Certainly happier than you in your passive-aggressive and destructive marriage. :wink:

I think the empirical experience of inflicted acute pain, physical or emotional, does an effective job of locating the position and boundaries of the self — ucarr

It teaches us about pain. But this is a very narrow band of experience and doesn't go anywhere near notions of who we are. For instance - could the self a part of the 'great mind' or will, as per Schopenhauer or Kastrup? Are we all dissociated alters of each other? How would we tell?

This is self-undermining: if we assume there are objective goods but that, according to you, we cannot parse them properly, then we would be incapable of having an ‘ongoing conversation’ where we ‘scrutinize our actions’ objectively or intersubjectively. All it would be then, is baseless inter-subjective agreement; which is nothing but a moral anti-realist theory which should be disregarded immediately. — Bob Ross

No. I don't think you are following. I don't accept there are objective goods (your term). Society engages in an ongoing conversation about a 'code of conduct' and who counts as a citizen - this evolves and is subject to changes over time. Hence gay people are now citizens (in the West), whereas some years ago they were criminals. And who knows where this conversation will go under Trump. In other countries, gay people may still be killed. Humans determine notions of right and wrong pragmatically, based on evolving values,

ideals and situations. And the journey isn't one way, ideas like justice or fairness are constantly in flux.

Eudaimonia is not identical to the english word ‘happiness’. In english, it can refer vaguely to both superficial, hedonic happiness and the deeper, eudaimonic happiness. Aristotle simply says that the best is eudaimonia, which is ‘soul-living-well’, and everyone wants this that are healthy and sane merely in virtue of being an living being. If you don’t want to live well, ceteris paribus, then something’s wrong with you. — Bob Ross

Happiness will do. Eudaemonia is just one construct and to me it seems tied to an ancient, culturally specific framework of virtues and reason, which may or may not be of use today. I personally don't find this helpful.

Reality boils down to the self/other binary. It is the essential platform supporting all empirical experience and abstract thought. — ucarr

I'm not sure how accurate this is. It sounds like dualistic thinking and so, I imagine, Eastern traditions might challenge this model. When I think of 'self' - I don't consider this to be one discreet thing or even a knowable thing and I am uncertain what parts of the self are entirely me or not. I wonder if the idea of this/that is more of a convenient shorthand with limitations and gaps.

Technology is the 'stomping grounds' of youth, and lesser the high-school, place of worship, place of play, or the work-space. What do you think this means for the way we conceptualize ourselves as part of a greater whole? — kudos

I know quite a few younger people. I don't see a lot of difference between their understanding of the world and mine. Many young people are not significantly interested in technology. From what I've seen, the 50-65 year-olds seem more interested in social media.

Your idea that the prohibition of cocaine has nothing to do with the pleasure cocaine provides is what is implausible. — Leontiskos

I didn't address the prohibition of cocaine, I addressed the pleasure it provides and the notion of pleasure itself. In the US there used to be prohibition of alcohol too. Not any more. Presumably alcohol hasn't changed, while social policy has. Prohibition is irrelevant to my argument.

Let's move away from substances to take the excitement out of this idea.

My point is that it's the action we judge, not the pleasure or satisfaction derived from it. I would hold that the pleasure experienced by a person who collects stolen artworks is likely identical to the pleasure experienced by one who buys art through Sotheby's. The issue at stake is should they derive pleasure from a crime? — Tom Storm

For example, why do we prohibit cocaine as a society? Because it is a base pleasure that deprives individuals and groups of deeper fulfillment. — Leontiskos

There’s nothing inherently wrong with the pleasure cocaine can provide. Many people I've known use it a few times a year with great satisfaction and wellbeing. Addiction to coke however is a problem. But so is an addiction to hard work. So is an addition to alcohol, which can also be used responsibly, with great happiness and pleasure.

Actually the idea that some pleasures are intense but empty strikes me as a unanimous idea in both ethics and psychology. — Leontiskos

My point is that it's the action we judge, not the pleasure derived from it. I would hold that the pleasure experienced by a person who collects stolen artworks is likely identical to the pleasure experienced by one who buys art through Sotheby's. The issue at stake is should they derive pleasure from a crime? Not whether the feeling of pleasure arrived at is of a qualitative differnce. I am not convinced by the idea of an 'empty' pleasures.

Exactly. Aristotle doesn’t call this kind of cheating happiness happiness at all; because the only way one becomes truly fulfilled in life, with the happiness which is deep, is by earning it. Like I noted before, by “worthiness of happiness”, you are necessarily using the term “happiness” to refer to this cheap dopamine kind of happiness and not what Aristotle means by happiness. — Bob Ross

Whenever I hear this argument, I find it underwhelming. Parsing happiness into "the right kind" and "the wrong kind" seems both futile and subjective. How can we demonstrate that so-called low happiness (the version Aristotle might disapprove of in our interpretation of him) is qualitatively different? We can’t, not really. Instead, we’re forced to return to behavior and evaluate it, not by the happiness or flourishing it supposedly provides, but by the act itself—which introduces a whole new set of problems.

Aristotle himself supported slavery and likely believed it contributed to the "right kind" of happiness/flourishing. This highlights the issue with attempting to parse happiness in such terms.

Probably better to just accept that humans act, and whether those actions are good or bad always depends on a contingent context—shaped by culture, language, and experience. The best we can do is reach an intersubjective agreement on morality and continuously scrutinize our actions to understand where our morality might lead us in an ongoing conversation.

I guess there has to be a consensus on what a primary relevant source is, right? — javi2541997

I can't see this as being hard, it refers to a work by the thinker themselves, not by someone interpreting it. Thus; Plato's Republic; Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

Do we now have to celebrate Elon Musk and the other tech gurus that are insanely rich? — ssu

Cool. Totalitarian Tech Bro Cocksucker Day: January 6.

Consciousness is surely the subjective experience of physical things. But the physical things don't hint at the subjective experience. Something is happening in addition to the physical things. — Patterner

This frame probably has special appeal to those who are idealists or religiously inclined.

Neither is the fact that we've only found physical things with our physical sciences. — Patterner

Well, some might go as far as to call that a clue. But for me the idea that everything is waves when understood from a particular perspective seems a fun notion. When will waves end up being something even more elusive?

, they're described as the excitations of fields, and the nature of fields is far from obvious. — Wayfarer

Indeed that’s the current model. Will we ever finish arriving at tentative theories? Theories that to some extent peg out a version of reality and allow us to make predictions, until the next one comes along?

Everyone I've read who believes physicalism is the answer says we just need to wait until the physicalist answer is figured out. But that's not evidence that physicalism holds the answer. — Patterner

Yep, I get it. I'm not sure we have coherent explanation of the material or the immaterial, whatever that could be. I believe both are held up by a scaffolding of biases. I don't have enough expertise to commit any particular account of subjective experince and recognize that the experts don't really know yet either. Can I do a Chomsky and be a Mysterian? I find it enjoyably ironic that it might be the case that we lack cognitive ability to determine why we have cognitive abilities.

Interesting. Do you think we can demonstrate that feelings are not the product of physical events?