I read the biblical creation myth this way: "Adam and Eve" were slaves punished with mortality by The Master for learning that they do not have to be slaves by learning to disobey (i.e. how to free themselves). :fire: — 180 Proof

Exactly. The serpent actually tells the truth in the story. As stories go, it's pretty flimsy one and from it I see no reason why humans should follow anything god says, just because god said it. God in the Old Testament is clearly a superlative asshole. That is, if one were a literalist. If the story is allegorical, then who knows what it is attempting to teach us other than 'obey the powerful'.

Anyway, I'm logging out for a while, posting here has become too much of a habit, and it profiteth nothing. I need to develop some other interests. — Wayfarer

Only do what you can manage, but I for one really value your contributions. You do a stellar job as an advocate for, and synthesizer of, the more interesting accounts of idealism and higher awareness.

We might look to differences as well as similarities. One difference is that Wittgenstein's writing leads less to aporia than to a change in gestalt, a reconsidering of the way in which something is to be understood.

Presumably, there are folk who cannot see the duck, only the rabbit. It's not a surprise that they feel excluded. — Banno

Nice. I like the 'change in gestalt' frame here.

and he's a legitimate academic, he's not fringe or crank. — Wayfarer

Never said he wasn't. My point is that times have changed, along with the stories we tell each other, and this causes many anxiety. I do not subscribe to this all being a product of rationalism, a disenchanted world and a post-enlightenment fugue state wherein we have lost touch with a purer philosophy.

You seem to like V because you are already a fan of countercultural metaphysics, from your early days of Alan Watts. That's fine. My aesthetic and emotional biases don't necessarily click with this stuff.

the reason he's developed a following is because he's saying something that needs to be said, and that a lot of people needed to hear, shame folks here don't appreciate that, but nothing I can say is likely to change it. — Wayfarer

Isn't it ok not to be on board with him? Developing a following means little; Trump has a following. Not comparing the output of the two. Actually Trump is probably a symptom of the same thing Veraeke is. The old stories have lost their power, pluralism and diversity is confusing people and many long to go back to making something great again, whether it be philosophy or the nation itself.

I've watched a number vids by Vervaeke and been aware of his work for a long time. I find him dull as dishwater. Whether he is adding anything useful to philosophy is up to others to determine.

Personally, I don't think we can demonstrate that meaning eludes us now more than in the past. This nostalgia movement or 'paradise lost' frame seems somewhat wonky to me. I think what confuses people is that we have moved away from dominant homogeneous cultural expressions into a world of energetic pluralism and multiculturalism and this is read as a lack of certainty and meaning. Diversity has certainly undermined the old metanarratives and I am not convinced that this is a bad thing.

I suspect Vervaeke sits with all those theorists and self-help folk who seek to offer a remedy for common anxiety. He's certainly no snake oil salesman, he seems likable and sincere, but I doubt he has all that much I can use.

I think there's a lot of misconceptions about matierliasm - it's not the boogyman many of you seem to think it is, as Janus points out. — flannel jesus

Some here seem to think of materialism, (better known now as physicalism or naturalism) as superficial and untenable nonsense. I don't hold a particular view of this since I am not a theoretical physicist, or a philosopher. I just live in the world I experience and get on with things. :wink:

Your reading would certainly fit with the notion of apophatic silence. I wonder how @joshs would see this point in relation to a postmodern or phenomenological reading of W. I guess I'm asking if there's a third option, perhaps somewhere between mysticism and scientism?

I don't have much patience for people who pretend to know what they don't know. What I mean is this, if you haven't seriously studied a subject, then you shouldn't be dogmatic about your views on the subject. — Sam26

I tend to agree. Of course there is some interpretation involved in what counts as 'serious study' of a subject. It seems to me that most members here are autodidacts and hobbyist philosophers.

I do not think that Plato, for example, is responsible for the varied and contradictory ways is which he has been read over the centuries. — Fooloso4

Yes, interesting you raise this. I have sat at tables where there was furious, indeed acrimonious disagreement about Plato's meaning in exactly the kinds of terms has been deriding. There has often been an elitist dimension to academic philosophy, a reverence for one's own interpretive credentials, often as part of a cognoscenti, who are closer to truth than the rest of the academic riffraff. I imagine this a common in many fields.

How many times can one philosopher have the glory of being saved by Appeal to Misunderstanding? — schopenhauer1

In theory a philosopher could be reinterpreted almost endlessly. Whether this be considered 'saved' by an appeal to misunderstanding may depend on one's point of view

It's clear that Wittgenstein is a writer of complex ideas, expressed in an obscure style, with many potential meanings and uses. But I think the same holds for others, Nietzsche, Derrida, etc. People are often talking about someone having an inadequate reading of those thinkers too. I always imagined that the point of philosophy for many was to dismiss or pillory another's reading and then go on to demonstrate why one's own reading is superior. Is't that inherent in the activity?

Yes, I made pretty much the same point.

It inherently assumes that the philosopher is right if you only knew him better... — schopenhauer1

And for soft-core pessimist like me, it inherently assumes we'll never know if the philosopher is right or wrong because we can't demonstrate that we've arrived at a correct reading. :wink:

This tactic deflects from holding the philosopher accountable for the clarity and coherence of their arguments, which should stand up to critique regardless of the critic's breadth of reading. — schopenhauer1

That's a fair perspective. I suspect however that postmodern thinking would consider this an anachronism. Clarity is so early 20th century.

Personally, one of the reasons I have never privileged philosophy (apart from the inherent dullness of the work) is the unlikelihood of gaining a robust reading of a given text unless one studies it with discipline and probably, with professional instruction. I have other things to be getting on with.

It can create an environment where philosophical works are revered rather than critically examined, which is contrary to the spirit of philosophical inquiry. — schopenhauer1

There may well be those who think philosophy is an enquiry dedicated to reasonableness and ongoing discourse. I suspect that much philosophy is faddish tribalism, dedicated to onanism, amongst other things. :grin:

understanding”. Do you believe that Wittgenstein can only be refuted by better readings of Wittgenstein or could Wittgenstein just be wrong and refuted thus? — schopenhauer1

This point is interesting. Might it not be argued that until one has a robust reading of any writer it is not really possible to refute or acclaim them? This endlessly fecund, perhaps even Rabbinical reinterpretation of W does suggest that critique almost seems superfluous.

:up:

No. Except where a philosopher proposes, in the e.g. Hellenic sense, 'philosophy as a way of life' (P. Hadot) — 180 Proof

That's a good point.

But, philosophy isn't mathematics, in that it isn't self-evident. How do you counter that? — Shawn

I have no idea what this comment means in relation to what I wrote.

I am not a fan of psychologizing the work of anyone, whether it is a philosopher or a movie actor.

What do you mean about the "psychologizing fancy" part? — Shawn

Just the tendency of some people (even biographers) to think they can explain a thinker's work based on their imagining of a writer's psychological state. Conjecture. Or even the claim that they know what a writer intended based on the writer's (putative) psychological state. Whatever that means.

Heidegger just lost the game if you're right. — Shawn

Whether Heidegger was a Nazi or not (for me) may well taint our experience of his work, but it says little or nothing about whether the work is any good.

Barbara Eden (I Dream of Jeannie) is 92. I remember watching her reruns 50 years ago. They seemed old then.

Eek.. I don't even want to know, honestly.. That in itself will devolve into who can show off how much Wittgenstein is beyond really "knowing"... — schopenhauer1

I confess to not knowing or caring much about Wittgenstein's work. It's too arcane for me. I read the Monk biography when it came out and assumed W was an exceptionally gifted and interesting individual with autism.

I would never assume we are in a position to know who the philosopher is as a person. All we have is a text and the text is a fecund vehicle for alternative interpretations. But I recognize that old school criticism would have it that the artist and their life is the context of a work when fully understood. I think this has limited application and is subject to many flights of psychologizing fancy.

Do you agree that the philosopher must uphold, almost, a fiduciary duty towards the public, in terms of living a certain life? — Shawn

I assume most people (philosophers or not) are flawed and limited beings - so no.

I think your view is amusing and it is hard to imagine that you are offering it as a serious solution.

Sharing is not exactly popular. It is antithetical to most forms of capitalism. You'd need to deliver such a policy with a gun.

I would not give up my land, nor would anyone I know. In fact, many would likely blow the heads off any motherfucker who comes for their property.

So how do you intend to govern such a process? How would you deal with those who would not surrender their land? How would you manage the wars and terrorism that would arise as a consequence?

How would you manage the world government of millions of displaced people who have to move around with their families so that they can get their plot of land? How would you manage the gaps in manufacturing industries all over the world, created by mass migrations of people?

Do you have any land or do you live at home with your parents?

Unrealistic. Who is going to support that? Who is going to give up their land?

Sounds naive. What is sharing? Give me an example of how 'sharing' will be implemented and by whom and what problem it will address specifically?

Surely, sharing would work everywhere? — Truth Seeker

No.

Too broad a question. One should consider too that all people do not see the same world, the same problems or anticipate the same solutions.

Probably best just to take one specific issue and then tailor a specific solution for it. Effective solutions tend to be culturally specific and co-designed by the people effected. What works in the USA would probably not work in Finland, say.

The great challenge is not identifying problems and proposing solutions, the problem is getting agreement robust enough to allow for implementation. This is why some of our more authoritarian brothers think that a benign dictatorship is the only answer.

That's why I'd suggest religion perseveres in an otherwise scientific world. It simply provides answers science does not. — Hanover

I would have thought virtually anything can provide us with answers. We have too many of those. Humans will always find a way to derive answers from stories, whether it’s evolution or Jane Austin. Whether or not this is sound philosophical practice is irrelevant to those who seek and find.

But I suspect when you say ‘answers’ you are referring to something more? Truth perhaps? Wisdom?

Anyway, having worked in palliative care, often with theists who are dying, by far the most common explanation offered to explain the importance of their faith is that it provides comfort. They claim to be less afraid , not just of death but also in the ‘knowledge’ that their suffering is not in vain. If comfort or meaning is what you’re looking for, it’ll probably be much harder to find this in science.

I’m not convinced any of us really know why we believe certain stories and not others. I suspect the answer is in cultural and psychological factors. We may think we can point to the intellectual superiority of certain frames or the meaning generated by others, but who knows?

Buddha wouldn't have been Buddha and neither would Schopenhauer been Schopenhauer without a strong sense of identity derived from the suffering of others, yes? — Shawn

It could be argued, based on their putative biographies, that the initial impulse towards their school of thought was entirely personal. Buddha's life of privilege was disrupted by shock (the 'Four Sights'). Schop's, by childhood and the death of his father. Both stories don't seem to have involved empathy. More a case of ontological insecurity - perhaps, 'my world is fragile, I am at risk!'

It's fairly easy to empathise with another. I don't think sympathy arises out of nowhere. — Shawn

Two different things - the former IMO being hard to achieve.

Yes, well isn't it derived from a sense of compassion, or a strong sense of empathy towards others? — Shawn

I don't think so. I have encountered too many philosophical pessimists who don't care much about others at all.

Buddha is a mythological figure and Schopenhauer is an influential philosopher. I wouldn't feel comfortable coming to conclusions about pessimism in general based upon their stories.

I wonder if it's worth separating empathy from sympathy or from compassion. A lot of people have sympathy for others but they don't quite arrive at empathy - the notion that one can put oneself in the other person's position and creatively imagine how they must feel in certain circumstances.

I'm skeptical about empathy. I don't think most of us can put ourselves in the shoes of others. Whatever that is meant to mean. We may imagine a person's situation as applied to our unique circumstances and adapt it to suit our own disposition. Or we have to radically recreate an other's experience to arrive at some pretence of understanding. How, for instance can someone without children understand what it is like to lose a child?

I've tended to prefer the word compassion (but I'm happy to be talked out of it) - you can conclude that others require care and support without having to connect viscerally with what they are experiencing.

I use to think that pessimism had a narcissistic underpinning - we may believe that nothing will go right for ourselves, that we will not be happy (often based on childhood experiences) and then we globalise our emotional reaction. Pessimism seems a pretty easy, even tidy solution to the world's problems. If you can put all things into the basket of 'everything's fucked' one doesn't have to think much further.

Why does one read philosophy? — Constance

There are multiple reasons. One might be to have an encounter with the unfamiliar - to see what's out there and find out what others think. Another might be to find post hoc justification for views arrived at emotionally. The latter seems most common in the discussions I've had with others.

I stopped caring about what my confrères were talking about long ago. — Constance

Who said anything about caring what others think? I simply remarked that my confrères had held a similar view to yours about metaphysics, so it's not such an unusual position.

One has to care about one's finitude in the midst of radical indeterminacy, because our existence is essentially ethically and aesthetically founded on caring. We ARE caring, and caring seeks consummation. Such a thing is generally confined to the usual matters, the owning of things and basic enjoyments. But philosophy takes one thoughtfully where religion once could only go. — Constance

Your wording seems a complicated way of saying something simple and fairly commonplace - that philosophy has the capacity to lead individuals to deeper contemplation and understanding, surpassing the traditional realm that religion once solely occupied. Perhaps yours is a quest for foundational justification for compassion.

Quite the problem to solve. Only one solution I see: The terms of object intimation (the cat) must exceed the idea of locality. It simply cannot be that that cat over there is independent and localized as normal perception tells us. — Constance

Hmm, the bigger question right now is why won’t my cat eat his usual brand? The metaphysics involved won’t reach help us here.

See the above: how is knowledge possible? Well, it isn't. YET, there is no question I see the cat. And so knowledge is simply a fact. Quite the problem to solve. Only one solution I see: The terms of object intimation (the cat) must exceed the idea of locality. It simply cannot be that that cat over there is independent and localized as normal perception tells us. — Constance

‘Reality’ is what most of us chase these days instead of gods. We create models that allow us to do things in the world and eventually these models are displaced by new ones. Do we ever arrive at ultimate knowledge?

What does your very interesting model of metaphysics here provide you with? Is it just a speculative approach that deconstructs the status quo, or can you build things with it?

I claim something far more interesting and difficult, which is acknowledging that the everyday world really is — Constance

Actually, I’m pretty sure that’s what my confrères would have argued. The quotidian is metaphysics. I would have thought metaphysics is unavoidable even if some think their version is ‘real life’ while the metaphysical foundations of others are flights of fancy.

:pray:

Because you and I have spent our lives in a world that ignores metaphysics. — Constance

But is that really the case? I spent much of my young life associated with the New Age movement as it was called back in the 1980's. Most of my friends were idealsits and Theosophists and Buddhists and Hindus and Jungians and Gnostics and Sufi mystics, etc. Quantum physics was seen as proof of idealism, etc. So metaphysics was very much the flavour of the day. I also grew up with Jung, the archetypes and collective unconscious, so I was not exactly immured in 20th century scientism or common sense.

How about my cat: does she exist? How is the word 'cat' such that when I use it, I am dealing with the real? Or is the term just like General Motors? — Constance

But aren't these questions a bit naff? I don't know about yours, but my cat exists. I know this because if I don't feed him he give me hell. I subscribe somewhat to Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of language as being an arbitrary set of signs and signifiers. General Motors is the collective noun for a company.

Any subject or object can be deconstructed into meaninglessness or incoherence, but so what? Not all questions and investigations are useful. I'm fine with reality (whatever that may be) being a pragmatic or tentative construct that helps us to manage our lives. The problem isn't so much in pointing out putative flaws in our construction of the world. The problem is no one has any useful alternatives.

Robert Sokolowski's "The Phenomenology of the Human Person, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cool, thanks for the references. I was wondering what Sokolowski's status might be. I've dipped my toe into some Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela.

As to how ‘reliable’ it is, obviously anyone is liable to self-delusion, but nevertheless grappling with that existence is an essential part of the philosophical quest. — Wayfarer

Fair enough. I like asking questions, they are not necessarily an indication of what I am thinking, or what I might know - more a desire to cover off on a range of domains and understand better what others think.

You often ask 'why should I bother with this?' But something keeps drawing you back into these discussions. — Wayfarer

For me this quesion goes to the heart of philosophy - what ought we do? I personally see no connection between asking this and any desire to depart from discussions. I ask this question about most things I do as a regular practice. What difference does X make to me or others?

I think It’s essential that you learn to feel what you cannot know. Coming to think of it, this is a large part of what 'mindfulness meditation' comprises - learning that the verbal or discursive element of your being is only one facet of a much greater whole. That also comes out in artistic performance and art generally. But being aware of it is important - a kind of somatic or bodily awareness, not just on the conceptual level. That's what comes from 'zazen'. Also, for anyone that has done awareness training of the kind done at EST and the like, you're taught that ego resists this awareness, as ego's role is to incorporate everything under its gaze. That is what 'letting go' means in relation to contemplative awareness. (And I *think* this is related to the OP.) — Wayfarer

I'm not unsympathetic to the thrust of this but how reliable is such felt knowledge? People often imagine they have access to truth when it is feelings they have access to and those feelings are as likely to be bigoted or intolerant as they are to encapsulate Buddhahood. Probably more so the former. Again, I'm not saying this to dismiss the point; it's more about testing its reliability. And by the way, I'd say my atheism is significantly informed by felt knowledge. Reality, whatever it may be, feels sans-deity to me.

The question-begging (Platonic / Cartesian / transcendent) assumption in (Kantian, Husserlian) transcendental arguments is that "in there" (mind) is somehow separable from – outside of – "out there" (non-mind (e.g. world)). That's how it's always seemed to me which is why I prefer Spinoza's philosophical naturalism to the much less radical (i.e. more anthropocentric) 'transcendental idealism' of Kant et al. — 180 Proof

Fair enough. Don't some expression of phenomenology try to break down the mind/body problem with embodied cognition? I have a superficial understanding (which is all I have time for) of this, but I am wondering why I should care. It's just that we always seem to come back to quesions about what is true and how do we know it. Then, invariably, we end up with responses of religion/idealism/postmodernism/dogmatism. Or something like that.

I agree with the relevance of the distinction of 'transcendent' and 'transcendental' noted above, but the latter is in some ways just as difficult to understand - it to is connected with the concept of the 'a priori' which also is a form of 'always already so'. — Wayfarer

Yes, I keep overlooking this.

This is inexorably connected with what is nowadays (usually dismissively) described as mysticism. But then Wittgenstein also said, not far from those other passages I quoted 'There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical'. — Wayfarer

Yes, I thought this might be the answer. I'm as fond of the ineffable as the next person.

But is the benefit of using this frame? As an individual. I know a case can be made that we have lost something. Humans always seem to have lost something when they look back. But here and now, what do you get from all this?

I tend not to personally suffer from a meaning crisis whatever Vervaeke and Jordan Peterson may assume. If anythign there is too much meaning for me personally. I recognize that dominant cultures are always pretty fucked and monomaniacal, whether they be in the thrall of the Vatican, or in the thrall of contemporary consumerism.

When we say "transcendence", don't we usually mean something metaphysical like 'X transcends, or is beyond, Y' (e.g. ineffable, inexplicable, unconditional, immaterial, disembodied, etc)? — 180 Proof

Yes, that's what I have always assumed.

I guess they are making a case that our understanding of the world is, in some sense, transcendental too - how out there (the world) ends up, in here (mind). But there are assumptions bound up in this to make it work.

What do you think?