I think this is why it is important to highlight how some writers, like Fosse, were able to confront suicide in the process of writing but may not be capable of going to a therapist and talking about it. — javi2541997

This highlights some interesting quirks of human nature in general. The psychologist whose own relationships are out of control. The actor who has social phobia. The genius who can't manage their own life. The writer who can't communicate. I've met several iterations of most of these over the decades. People are contradictions.

he comes across condescending, affected and incapable (im gathering, unwilling is the truth of it) to engage with many arguments he doesn't like. — AmadeusD

I don't see this either. @180 Proof seems to be asking for evidence to support a series of claims that keep getting repeated without significant justification. Incidentally those claims sound very close to ones Berando Kastrup makes about idealism e.g., as a more parsimonious and reasonable explanatory narrative than physicalism. I'd be interested to hear the reasoning too.

:up:

I can't seem to find any rational reason to stay alive. — rossii

Life and the process of living isn't rational.

It is in the context of actual and virtual possibilities that I am asking the question of the nature of risk. What is reliable and imaginary, and how do the two come together in proactive and preventative measures in sound philosophical thinking? — Jack Cummins

Risk has entered business thinking and clinical services mainly to avoid death, injury, litigation and loss of money. Having a risk mitigation strategy is often a way to reduce insurance premiums. Risk has become a minor obsession within the cult-like world of management theory.

Outside of this, I have no strong view of risk. We often connect risk to opportunity which recalls that shop-soiled homily, 'nothing ventured, nothing gained.' I have often told myself I need to take more risks. Part of this is in recognition that learning often involves embracing the strange and unfamiliar, in order to enlarge one's world. Often when you come to some philosophy you find yourself reacting against, it is important to try to 'make a friend' of it because it may just be the limits of your worldview rather than limitations in the philosophy that are activated. Often the things we fear (which present as risks) are the things we might benefit from learning.

Then what if two separate cultures or civilizations want different things? Are we saying the victor is in the right? — Philosophim

Interesting. Not sure why it would be about a 'victor'. Isn't the point that morality grows out of a sense making process? Morality will vary in detail and scope across cultures and history. Isn't that how humans work? And perhaps this does mean that subject to some criteria of value, the 'bad guys' win. This perspective will likely be anathema if you are looking for a morality that transcends the human process - a type of moral Platonism.

Form this vantage, for a living thing it is not existence which is good but self-consistent functioning. For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral. — Joshs

Nicely put and this resonates with me.

Can I ask you about the expression 'intelligible forms of social interaction?' This might be seen to contain a broad range of behaviors - so when one culture is judged by another, the first may seem shockingly immoral. Is there a useful approach to reconciling differences between cultures, or is this a fool's errand?

do you agree it is usually based on escapism as a common factor? — javi2541997

I wouldn't use that word. For some suicide is to punish others. For others it is a grand gesture. For others still the goal is to end suffering (however that might look). I think escape is too nebulous a term.

I would not say 'audience' because I would sound arrogant. — javi2541997

I would think most write for an audience and to be understood. Sure, some arrogant writers might think that the average person is incapable of understanding their great subversive thoughts and may expect a small audience of cognoscenti. Others write for the money - which means a large audience. If you are not writing to be read by others you are keeping a journal. :wink:

I discussed with Vera Mont and @Bella fekete whether literature or the art of writing is an individualistic or collectivist act. — javi2541997

Do you agree that writing is a process of approaching only ourselves? — javi2541997

There's a lot of nonsense said about writing. I've known a number of successful writers and I think it's not unusual for people to be drawn to writing because it is solitary and some people who write may be compelled to write to work through anxiety or deal with trauma. This is Alain de Botton's view. But in the end there are likely to be as many reasons for writing as there are styles and genres. Most people seem to write for themselves and an audience of readers they hope to acquire.

Reasons for suicide are similarly diverse. Some people are just fed up with living. Some people are unwell. Some are unable to deal with trauma. Some are reacting to situational factors. Suicide is one word for many situations.

We have established a sense that not having a purpose for living is normal because Millennials are screwed, etc. — javi2541997

I know quite a few Millennials. While it is pretty easy to complain and find fault in life, the ones I know are busy being active in the world - working or volunteering and they seem far more hopeful and motivated than we were at that age.

:up:

Ethics is difficult - intractable - to the point of there perhaps being no solution; after all, why must there be an answer to "what should we do"? — Banno

That's a very interesting observation which I mainly share. In the West, a history of divine command theory, linking morality to compliance and hellfire, via a foundational guarantee from a magic man with anger management issues, has probably messed with our thinking.

Agree.

What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable." — Michael

As a non-philosopher with a secular orientation, I've generally assumed morality simply referred to a culturally held (intersubjective) code of conduct (where, naturally, there are many outliers and dissenters). We have internalized or incorporated this intersubjectivity to the point where many of the principles have become oughts in a substantive emotional sense. Nevertheless it seems that many people who hold that killing is wrong don't object to killing men, women and children for the sake of territory, politics or religion, or for some different understanding of a 'greater good.' I now understand that I am a moral realist because I hold the position that we shouldn't cause suffering and should try to minimize it. But the interesting part for me in the ought business is the justification.

I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality. — Michael

Which supports a view that morality is fluid and constantly open to change. Today's outliers are tomorrow's conservatives.

Nicely explained. Thanks.

Thanks for taking the time.

How useful is the term moral realism? The only people not covered by it would seem to be some types of relativist who say anything goes.

How you justify that belief is over to you, and irrelevant to whether you are a moral realist or not. — Banno

Ok, I see that. In that case a moral realist can say anything. I was assuming that to be a realist you had to have some sort of foundational guarantee for the belief, like Platonism or some other magical thinking.

What you have brought ought here is that the justification is a seperate issue to the truth of the proposal. The point has been made several times throughout this thread, by a few of the more well-versed folk, but some are deaf to it. — Banno

I’m deaf to this too, I’m afraid.

Gets complex, doesn't it. It's hard to have a foundational principle that is not true. — Banno

Well, I would put it this way, I would like people to share my foundational principle - but I have nothing to point to its truth other than I choose it, the way I might choose a preferred art work. And I know that many would share my choices. I can’t find my way to truth in this.

How can that be made coherent? — Banno

I guess the same way I justify aesthetic taste. Plus I generally assume there’s broad intersubjective agreement about many matters based on shared human experience. I don’t spend much time worrying about coherence as a rule but maybe I should.

Again, moral realism is simply the view that there are true moral statements. Are you sure you reject this? — Banno

It’s not that I reject it, I just see no clear way to believe it. When you say there are true moral statements my intuition is to ask, based on what criteria?

I am happy with a foundational principle such as, we should not cause suffering, but that foundation rests on what exactly? Codified behaviour based upon the habits of culture?

I don't think I have ever heard an argument for moral realism that is overly convincing. I know where I stand on some moral questions, but I have no idea why I hold the views I do other than I am a member of a species with empathy and am part of a collaborative (if flawed) culture. This, plus an eternity of ingrained religious moralism, plays out as it must.

:up:

human reason is substantially a function of pattern recognition occurring in our brains, and that notions like forms and universals reflect a neurologically naive attempt at making sense of the results of such pattern recognition occurring in our brains. — wonderer1

I can see how this might work. What I'd like is an accessible article on the matter to flesh it out a little more.

Nice one.

I think we talked about this before. — Banno

Could be, I forget.

Thanks again.

In other words, number, and the pure geometric forms which depend on it, is universal because it is not tied to anything but itself. It is not a special universal sense but the absence of meaningful sense, thanks to the peculiar intentional relationship to things that creates it. — Joshs

I've not heard it put like this before, it's helpful. I need to source an expanded account.

Agree

The point is that objects have existence in themselves and exercise causal powers independently of anything we do or know. — Leontiskos

I'm personally unsure of this, although this would seem to be a common sense view. Does the world have any kind of coherence at all without us providing a point of view and the language to 'demonstrate' the relationships we see?

What we apprehend and understand can be in error. — Banno

Could not everything be in error, with some accounts just more useful in certain situations than others?

Notice this is about what we apprehend and understand, not about what is true. — Banno

But is not truth finally something we have to arrive at via apprehending and understanding? I feel like this is a bit of a loop. Are not the constituent ingredients of truth themselves subject to questioning? Note, I am not saying there is no truth just that I think truth is contingent and in that contingence lies an endless series of potential debates and nosebleeds.

Thanks. Good quotes.

They are 'in the mind, but not of it' - that is, intelligible objects. — Wayfarer

I guess it is this I need to unpack or develop a more robust view of. I've grappled with universals several times over the years.

there is no conceptual space in which there can be real abstractions. — Wayfarer

Certainly looks that way.

I would guess he would say it's contingent, as postmodernism generally does. — Wayfarer

I'd be interested to hear why.

In the end, if you drill down into the belief in god/s and transcend the literalism and unpack the allegories, you eventually have to end up somewhere here, right? Abstractions/universals.

No, because it has to exist in the first place, in order for us to know anything — Wayfarer

I'm going to have to ponder on this one.

Part of me feels as if you may be able to apply to reason that which you are applying to the apparent physical world - reason is a view from somewhere, based (it seems) on the inherent capacities and limitations of our cognitive apparatus. I see you are saying rationality exists independent of human perception. (A condition of experince but independent of experince. Kant) Can we say this? Could it not be the case that although reason allows us to do things, it's capacity to work is subject entirely to the human point of view. Perhaps reason is analogous to sight - a kind of sense rather than something outside ourselves.

What would @Joshs say about the status of reason.

We do have to presuppose it to function in our world, but I would like to hear what other thinkers have made of the nature of this presupposition (apart from the obvious Platonic interpretations).

Nice. It is cool and I have been dancing with it in this way too.

Incidentally, I thought you had held a view that rationality was a transcendental phenomenon of some kind.

if rationality emerges from how our mental structures organize and interpret our sensory experiences, leading to consistent and coherent knowledge, then isn't rationality contingent?

Fair points. I was not wanting to highlight CBT per say but rather the possibility that emotions come about through presuppositions - they relate to sense making, to values and perceptions. If these are radically different, then emotionality takes different forms or dissipate entirely.

Another example might be the metaphor of enlightenment. From the perspective of an enlightened person, it might no longer be possible to feel sadness or grief. Such feelings might be connected to specific forms of attachment that an enlightened person no longer shares.

We tend to see emotions as needing to be controlled. But it might be our perception of reality is what need to be altered, as emotionality seems to be a consequence of how we comprehend experince and what we understand to be significant.

I've probably said it already, but that's a very clear and useful essay. :up:

Got ya. Nice. Thanks.

Would we not have to construct the meaningfully recognizable object called a flower out of a series of sensory-motor interactions we have with it? There is no flower with four petals , or any other visually identifiable object, until we first establish these relational interactions between ourselves and the world. — Joshs

I find this fairly persuasive. We seem to apprehend and understand our world subject to frames of reference and emersion (for want of a better word) in the human experience - which brings sense making points of view, shaped and limited by our cognitive apparatus.

I don't agree. The flower has four petals regardless of what you suppose. That we see, feel, count or believe that it has four petals is incidental, post hoc. — Banno

I think this is correct given our intersubjective agreements about reality, which almost all share. But I think Joshs point refers to the sense making building blocks of human experince which assist us to make order out of apparent chaos. Until we have arrived at things like petals and numbers, the notion of flowers and counting, we can't really answer this meaningfully.

Now, unfortunately as a non-philosopher, I don't have access to the language I would need to defend this phenomenological perspective. I can only go by limited intuitions.

As someone who is not overly concerned with philosophy and is content to inhabit the quotidian world, I can see how many might consider it pointless to talk about the kind of constructivist process that seems to go into us making sense of our experince and constructing reality. To agree upon 4 petals is probably all we need to be happy and functioning.

In short, I probably want it both ways. Sorry.

If we're being honest with ourselves, the pursuit of human life involves a certain inclination toward deception that, when considered metaphysically, distinguishes us from other forms of life. This perspective, rooted in the human experience, encompasses not only philosophical aspects but also the insights provided by science--making it a distinctly human, all-too-human viewpoint. — Vaskane

A tantalizing vignette. Can you provide a couple of examples of the type of thing you mean by 'deception' and then how we might understand this deception via a metaphysical mode?

I understand something of Nietzsche's theory of resentment. I found the way your sentences were structured hard to follow. Sounds like you have something interesting to say but perhaps use shorter and simpler sentences and make it clear to the general reader what specifically you are referring to.

For instance -

The question revolved around determinism versus the free will issue, and the pre-cultural, age that didn’t concern with the psychological aspects that a mind set had to contend with, ergo the affect/effect dualism could not have said to have occurred as dualism, in those times. — Bella fekete

What is, "the pre-cultural age that didn't concern with the psychological aspects of a mindset had to contend with...

I don't understand what this sentences means and I don't know what it is referring to in this discussion.

Then you write:

"ergo the affect/effect dualism could not have said to have occurred as dualism, in those times."

Not sure of the meaning here either.

Also if you are wanting to quote another member, highlight the sentence or paragraph and click on "quote" then it automatically shows up as a quote in your reply.

Yes, I am inclined to think that mastery of emotions can be learned but is a rare achievement, such as the consciousness of monks and for spiritual masters. For most of us, behaviour is hard enough to control fully, which may be due to emotions, and mastery of the actual emotions is so much more difficult. — Jack Cummins

I wonder however if this thinking is putting the cart before the horse. What if some people don’t control their emotions but rather they understand the world in such a way that conventional emotionality no longer fits with their experience?

A small taste of this might be the classic presupposition, people are disturbed not by things, but by the views they take of them. There are ways of apprehending or thinking about the world and our experience that dissolves emotional responses.

Thanks for making the effort to clarify but I'm afraid I can't make sense of your response.

I thought so. I read all his big books a couple of times each 30 years ago, I remember his tone and approach but not much more.

Do you have a reference for anything by Russell placing universals in the context of his philosophical naturalism?