I'm interested in what I might get from member's responses. As I said at the top, time is limited and I have no education in any of this, so I am just wanting to sift through the various views. My trying to read about maths proper would be like teaching card tricks to a dog.

One way of putting that is to say that some philosophers of mathematics and foundationally inclined mathematicians were becoming postmodern even before postmodernity. (Alternatively, perhaps these concerns are not postmodern at all but are quintessentially modernist) — Jamal

That is definitely an interesting strand which you and the Count have raised.

I'll mull over what's come in so far and see if I need to refine my OP quesion somewhat.

Thanks for the article. Looks interesting. Possibly too technical for me, but I like the thrust of the enquiry.

The idea of 'truth-value realism, which is the view that mathematical statements have objective, non-vacuous truth values independently of the conventions or knowledge of the mathematicians' is I guess what I am am exploring too.

But a mathematician talking about post modernism... that might be interesting. — Banno

A conversation between both would be interesting (and perhaps incomprehensible).

This recognizes the issues at the foundations of math but also fixes "math as math" in itself, as a long-form tautology. From within the tautology of math, there is no room for cultural or historical influence. Or maybe the culture is that of universe, and its history is all time, and the society is the society of minds. Only such influences will produce a math, and because these influences are so simple (universe, mind, all time) that math is so simple and need never change - we've fixed it that way in its own axioms. — Fire Ologist

Nice.

I don't think we ever can or will. Math is sort of how we think, not what we think. Math turns whatever we think, objective. It makes objectivity by being math. It is therefore, non-cultural. It is just human. — Fire Ologist

Ok. I'd like to hear what @joshs might say in response to this. It simultaneously suggests that maths is an intersubjective phenomenon but what is the relationship of the reality we map maths too (or visa versa)?

Challenging mathematics lack of grounding is already a major issue in mathematics. It was the defining historical trend in the field over the 20th century. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could be. But no one is claiming PM is entirely original in this.

So, attacking the grounding would be nothing new — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm sure, but no one is saying it is.

whereas attacking the reliability seems extremely difficult if we're not talking about applied mathematics — Count Timothy von Icarus

If this is what they do. But I don't think it is the reliability as such they would unpack, perhaps more the context of that reliability - the world we assume maths seeks to map and explain. But that is my question - what do they argue in this space?

From Joshs earlier response, it seems that Husserl's phenomenology has a framework for exploring the nature of mathematical objects and structures. It examines ways in which mathematical objects are given to consciousness - an investigation of the ontology of mathematical entities. The old quesion: are mathematical objects mind-independent entities, or are they dependent on human consciousness?

And I suspect some postmodernists coming after this might find that the role of consciousness or, perhaps, the human point of view is what gives maths its power. It isn't that maths is discovered but invented. I'm curious how that this might be laid out. I suspect it will be too technical for a layperson.

This makes sense as "mathematical foundations," is simply not something most people care or even know about, and so it's not a good place to "challenge power dynamics," at least not for any sort of social effect. Math classes, however, are an entirely different story. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does your language here suggest that you take post modernism to be a posturing deceit?

There is already a lot of pluralism and "questioning all assumptions," in the foundations of mathematics/philosophy of mathematics, so it's hard to see what a post-modern critique of mathematics would find worth critiquing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not aware of a maths specific critique. Just taking as the starting point anti foundationalism and the notion that all human knowledge is radically contingent. What does this mean for maths and how do post modernist theorists assess it's reliability and, presumably, its lack of grounding?

AFAIK, no one, including any p0m0, has ever pointed out a 'culture' wherein mathematics does not work — 180 Proof

That's the issue right there isn't it. If there are variations in how maths is done, this does not appear to undermine its capacity to produce consistent results every time.

Enumeration represents what Husserl calls a free ideality, the manipulation of symbols without animating them, in an active and actual manner, with the attention and intention of signification.
So rather than a perception of things in the world, counting requires turning away from the meaningful content of things in the world. The world is not made of numbers, the way we construct our perceptual interaction with the world produces the concept of number, and this construction emerged out of cultural needs and purposes , such as the desire to keep track objects of value. — Joshs

That's what I'm looking for. It's not an easy thing to fully understand.

Some argue that the concept of 2 is more fundamental than 1. Theses disputes suggest in a subtle way the cultural basis of concepts of number. — Joshs

Any thoughts on the unreasonable predictability of maths? Does maths allow us to make any assessment of realism?

P.s. In large part posting this in a want to see if any more formally mathematical intellect would find anything to disagree with in what was here expressed. — javra

Great and thoughtful response: I'll mull over it.

I gave you an example and you completely ignored it: please re-read my previous response. — Bob Ross

Do you mean this below?

let me use a perhaps odd example. A calculator would be hypothetically perfect if my purpose for it is to hold up books and it is flawless at fulfilling this task. — Bob Ross

As you say an odd example.

I think this is just a strange way of defining the idea of flawless. You may as well say that perfection is an erect penis flawlessly being used for hanging up a dressing gown.

The calculator is actually perfect if it is in a state of 100% (flawless) self-harmony and self-unity—i.e., all the parts are in agreement and peace with the other parts. The calculator isn’t broken, it doesn’t have parts that oppose other parts in a manner that brings disunity, etc. — Bob Ross

This sounds like what happens when language is used imprecisely.

I can accept that we might use the word perfect to describe a calculator which does its job flawlessly.

I would avoid talk of parts being in agreement and at peace with each other. The calculator is not Krishnamurti.

What benefit does the word prefect bring you here? Does it not just mean 'working as intended'?

I don't think you are quite understanding pragmatic goodness. It is perfection for some purpose. — Bob Ross

I think if it means pragmatic goodness then leave out perfection. The hallmark of 'pragmatic' is it's efficacy in certain situations (which may change with new information and says nothing about whether it is good or true). It's utility. The moment it is called perfection it suggests the goodness is far from pragmatic and constitutes that which cannot be improved upon.

In terms of actual perfection, the clock is perfect (morally good) if it is in self-harmony and self-unity. — Bob Ross

You have parsed perfection into a kind of dualism - that which is not quite perfection (the physical) and that which transcends the human (Greek philosophy's The Good).

I'm assuming you are joking about a clock being morally good, with self-unity, etc.

:up: This is the matter I'd like to hear more about from someone with more specialized understanding of the subject. It's in the realm of social constructivism, perhaps. And I guess it leads to a subsidiary question, does supposed universal language of maths have to be such as it is, or could it have taken a different form and had the same results? And in this identified difference, does this point to maths being more arbitrary than we think?

But its not the most pivotal of issues to me. — javra

Ditto.

Thank you for an interesting conversation. I've appreciated your approach. :up:

But, if so, then – via pi and so forth – so too is all our modern scientific knowledge of quanta nothing more than concoctions of human imagination. — javra

I am not sure my point leads here but I am sympathetic to this regardless. I am a reluctant anti-foundationalist and consider human knowledge to be contingent. With constructivist leanings, I've often thought truth is shared subjectivity.

If I can remember back to the point of the discussion I think I was arguing that I have never seen an physical example of perfection in the real world. Examples we could proffer like Margot Robbie or George Elliot's Middlemarch or Mahler's Second Symphony or Botticelli's; Primavera, whatever, are using the word perfect to say we like them. The notion of perfection in this kind of context becomes a superlative rather than a precise philosophical understanding.

I suspect only maths offers us what we might dub perfect solutions (but I am no mathematician, so I'm happy to be wrong here) where an equation is the most elegant, prefect solution to a given problem. An equation which cannot be any better. This would satisfy my idea of perfection as that which can't be improve upon.

it can then likewise also lead to unicorn based technologies we all live by and universally agree upon. — javra

That I would like to see. Apparently their horns contain magic...

But you are quite right to say that a perfect circle and a unicorn have little in common. A perfect circle is a mathematical abstraction, while a unicorn is a mythical creature. The unicorn relies upon open an open ended imaginative discourse, while the circle's properties are defined mathematically.

By entailment: If a perfect circle is no more objective/true/real than is a unicorn, then the number pi is no more objective/true/real than is a unicorn. — javra

But I didn't say that a perfect circle is no more real than a unicorn. I said we can't rely upon the mechanism you identified since it can also imagine a unicorn. It's a critique of the epistemology not the putative conclusion per say.

You made this point which I liked:

A perfect circle is realized in this world by all minds which can comprehend it's, granted non-physical, being and, furthermore, all minds with sufficient comprehension will be able to thus realize an understanding of the exact same geometric form. — javra

But it may also lead to unicorns. :wink:

All experience is meaningful, and all meaning is valuative. All valuation is affective. — Joshs

Nice. :up:

I think I agree, but I would add that it is not the expression of anger which is the biggest problem today in our polarized world, but the failure to see the world from the perspective of others such that what appears as malevant intent can be seen instead as the other’s best effort to live ethically based on their vantage. Anger is blame, and blame impugns intent, delegitimizing the other’s motives. Whether we express our anger or not , as long as we cling to blame, we delegitimize the other, as seen in today’s political discourse. — Joshs

A way of thinking we really need to overcome. Any thoughts on that?

A perfect circle is realized in this world by all minds which can comprehend it's, granted non-physical, being and, furthermore, all minds with sufficient comprehension will be able to thus realize an understanding of the exact same geometric form. Such that this understanding is objective. — javra

Nice. I hear you but i don't think this is all that useful a formulation. We can find any number of minds to agree and visualise a unicorn but it still doesn't make it true. In this way we can also have objective accounts of ghosts and UFO too. Not sure what the word objective adds to this understanding.

But its getting a bit late for me. And, again, I've got nothing to sell. So I'll leave it at that for the time being. — javra

No worries. I don't have the right currency, anyway. Have a good one.

My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing. — Tom Storm

Exactly. Can we demonstrate perfection in any thing?

Abstractions are abstracted from concrete givens, and as far as I know there are no concrete examples of perfect circles. — javra

A perfect circle is still an abstraction even if there is no such thing as one in real life. Abstractions are not always directly derived from concrete examples. They can also emerge from conceptual reasoning, logical deduction, or mathematical principles. But my point doesn't rest on use of the word abstraction. Call it 'theoretical' if that sounds better to you.

are you saying that the (perfect) circles do not occur in the real world, but only in fictitious worlds? — javra

Do we know if a perfect circle can be realised? I call it an abstraction because until it is concrete it is just an idea that represents general qualities or features distinct from specific instances or occurrences.

But even if there were a perfect circle what does this mean for perfect morality? Is it the same use of the word perfect or is this another equivocation?

And by now I've forgotten what Bob Ross was arguing about morality and perfection in the first place. :wink:

I just find you implicit assertion that objectively perfect givens do not occur, — javra

Fair enough. You are entitled to that reaction.

But have I said that objectively perfect things do not occur? I actually don't think this, so if you can find me saying it, I withdraw it.

My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing.

And I'm not even sure if we came to an agreed working definition of perfection.

I'm not selling anything, you — javra

Surely you know this expression essentially means, 'I do not accept the proposition you are putting to me'. Or are you not, in fact, trying to convince me of something via argument? Anyway, I've already said syllogisms don't do it for me. Let's see what others think.

No. I'm not going for it. But nice try. Someone else may buy it.

Nice work.

But don't we have to ask first, "Is anything objective?" You kind of just asked that, so I think you would agree this question is in the mix here. I mean, if nothing is objective, or we can't know it if it is, than what measuring stick can we hold up to anything to adjudge "No, this one is subjective." And then to ask about a thing like 'perfection' whether it is subjective or not - difficult question. — Fire Ologist

Good point. I guess I would say that instead of ‘objective’ there are intersubjective agreements on matters. These are held by communities which share values and world views. Politics, religion, art and science are examples of such intersubjective communities and yet even here there are schisms.

I thought you were only interested in perfection's application to morality; — javra

Indeed, but you know what it's like here; you enter a conversation and come out the other side covered in the conceptual detritus of ideas others raise in your passing.

objectivity as that state of being which is fully impartial relative to all coexistent sentience (let me know if you have a better but incongruous definition of “objectivity”), — javra

I don't understand that sentence.

p1) There either can occur or cannot occur such a thing as an objectively perfect circle (this in contrast to the subjective perfection of a circle which my five-year old niece has drawn on paper).

p2) If there is no such thing as an objectively perfect circle, then neither can there be such thing as an objectively imperfect circle.

p3) If there is no such thing as an objectively imperfect circle, one can then objectively have a circle which takes the shape of an octagon.

p4) A circle in the shape of an octagon, however, is not a circle when objectively addressed - as is commonly confirmed by all sane humans.

c1) Therefore, there is such a thing as an objectively perfect circle.

c2) Ergo, objectively perfect givens can and do occur. — javra

I'm not a big syllogism guy. Firstly I can never understand them and secondly it seems to me (as my old philosophy tutor used to argue) that one can make a valid argument for anything using a syllogism. But reality will always have its own ideas. I stay away from them.

Let's just take P3

The fallacy here lies in the equivocation on the term "imperfect circle." In the first part of the statement, "imperfect circle" I assume refers to a circle that deviates from the ideal geometric definition of a circle, perhaps in terms of symmetry or roundness. However, in the second part of the statement, "imperfect circle" seems to be interpreted as any shape that is not a perfect circle, including polygons like an octagon.

The fallacy occurs because the two interpretations of "imperfect circle" are not equivalent. A circle that takes the shape of an octagon is not objectively a circle; it's objectively an octagon. An octagon lacks the defining characteristics of a circle, such as being round and having a single continuous curve.

But let's not do syllogisms.

You did give me a chance to use the word 'objectively' so maybe there is progress. :wink:

Sounds good to me. What part of the world are you from?

what is Valentine’s Day? I’ve never had to engage with it. My memory from movies is that you send anonymous cards to people you have a crush on. And I imagine some young couples might go out to dinner and buy presents for each other. Is that it?

I am surprised to see Valentine's day come up here. Apparently it is February 14th. Not that this means anything, but I don't know anyone who has taken any notice of it. I thought it was an old Victorian tradition that mainstream Americans (mainly) seemed to go in for. We've just had Valentine's day and at my work (around 40 staff) the subject never came up and I would think most people would consider it a cheesy mainstream pseudo-event used to sell stuff (presumably trinkets, flowers and dinners?) like the inconsequential Mother's and Fathers Day.

Do we know or can we demonstrate that there was ever a case of nothing?

It strikes me that 'perfection' is a word which we use in various ways - from a mere superlative to an almost transcendental category. Which usage is correct? — Tom Storm

"The word perfect is used in various ways.." This sounds like subjectivity is at play.

"...it just means..." This sounds like objectivity is at play. — Fire Ologist

You're almost there. Keep going....

What would really be interesting is what you mean by "transcendental implications" in general, and then apply it to "perfection". — Fire Ologist

Yes, what a great question! Wouldn't that be interesting? Imagine if there were a Platonic category of perfection - an instantiation of perfection that operates above and beyond any human criteria of value. The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category?

Ok. Perfection is identical to flawlessness. There are only two types of perfection: hypothetical and actual perfection. The former is pragmatic goodness; the latter moral goodness. — Bob Ross

What I meant was an actual instantiation of perfection, not more abstractions or discussions of usage. Let's look at something in the world which we can agree upon is an example of perfection.

There is no chief function of a clock.. . — Bob Ross

Well if that's the case then we can't say what perfection in a clock looks like since there will be multiple competing possibilities as I have already described. I've already said that time keeping is but one dimension in those who collect clocks. :wink:

:up:

The word perfect is used in various ways, sometimes it just means ‘great’ or ‘cool’. The more interesting philosophical aspect of this is the transcendental implications of the idea of perfection.

As I said earlier, 'perfect' generally means that which can not be improved upon. I entered this discussion by looking for an example of this understanding of perfection in relation to morality. It is this I am interested in, not its imprecise and multifarious uses in ordinary discourse, poetic or otherwise.

When someone I'm enamored with tells me they'll see me at 10 o'clock, I'm gonna reserve the right to reply, "perfect". — javra

You would be using the word metaphorically/poetically.

Yes, as you've mentioned, this would require adopting some variant of the Platonic ideal/form of “the Good” - but is in no way sinister in and of itself. — javra

I don't think Platonism is sinister. Just unwarranted.

The word sinister came up specifically for the notion below.

How does one describe a 'fit for purpose' morality? Sounds sinister. Fit for whose purpose? — Tom Storm

I so far take it you're not big on objective morality. — javra

I think morality is a code of conduct that shifts with time and varies between cultures. There are intersubjective agreements made around principles like - 'we should prevent suffering' which can operate as a 'foundation' for moral choices. But in the end morality is a conversation we have about oughts and ought nots.

Let’s just lose the work perfect if all we mean is fit for purpose. Which then takes us back to more pragmatic relationships with ideas. How does one describe a 'fit for purpose' morality? Sounds sinister. Fit for whose purpose?

Let’s call this chair the perfect chair - would you be happy to have the label perfect applied to it rather than just adequate? — kindred

No. See above.

Perfect generally means that which can't be improved upon. Where do we find this perfect thing? Unless we accept Platonism?

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I’d just call that fit for purpose.

I was contemplating this question and would like to hear the thoughts of fellow thinkers here on whether perfection is a trait that can be universally acknowledged or whether it’s a more subjective description that can also evoke aesthetics in the subject. — kindred

How about we start with an actual example of perfection in the world and then go from there?

It strikes me that 'perfection' is a word which we use in various ways - from a mere superlative to an almost transcendental category. Which usage is correct?

Can you demonstrate an instantiation of perfection about which we can all agree upon so that I can see what perfection 'looks' like?

Which kind of perfection? — Bob Ross

Any.

Only if you agree that telling time is the chief function of a clock

I did not argue this in the OP: I said that pragmatic goodness is about utility towards a purpose (or purposes), and an example of this is a ‘good’ clock in ordinary language: we say a clock is ‘good’ when it can adequately tell the time—because it fulfills the commonly accepted purpose of telling the time that it was designed for. — Bob Ross

You've just repeated my point in different words. I said that identifying what counts as good is subject to a multiplicity of potential criteria. How do we deicide which is the right frame?

I suspect we are not going to agree - I am more interested in quesions and peeling back presuppositions and in recognizing the role of personal values and you seem more interested in locating some form of objectivity from experince.

But I would be interested in your example of perfection.

I hope, Cecily, I shall not offend you if I state quite frankly and openly that you seem to me to be in every way the visible personification of absolute perfection.

Oscar Wilde: The Importance of Being Earnest

I struggle to follow your argument - possibly because I am not a philosopher and also because I regard words like goodness, evil and perfection as being contingent and subject to personal or intersubjective worldviews.

a good clock is a clock that can tell the time, — Bob Ross

Only if you agree that telling time is the chief function of a clock. As someone who has spent a lot of time in horology circles, the idea of a 'good' clock is subject to many other considerations, telling time may be the least important - age, maker, decorative appeal, historic significance, may all rate higher than time telling. I guess what I'm saying is that when you come to establishing what is good you are trapped by the criteria of value you use to establish merit.

Can you demonstrate an instantiation of perfection about which we can all agree upon so that I can see what perfection 'looks' like?

:up:

'm not surprised. The standard sales pitch makes big assumptions about what believing in God means. There are also people whose belief in God means guilt, self-loathing and sadism — Ludwig V

I do accept that "is" does not imply "ought". But there is no doubt that "is" does lead people to conclude "ought". — Ludwig V

Certainly and it makes sense. We make choices about what we ought to do based on inferences and predictably.

I don't know , do momentarily pleasures take away long term pleasures of life? — No One

What are the 'long term pleasures of life' and what do you mean by 'momentarily pleasures'?

The title of your OP is a bit clearer. But I think most people know already that money can't buy happiness (hence the saying) and that owning some trinkets and vulgar displays of wealth don't really work for anyone. Some of the most unhappy people I have known have also been the wealthiest.

This isn't because happiness is fleeting or because material things come and go, it's because some people have psychological problems which can't be addressed merely by buying stuff.

The average day of each person is sad, boring, depressing and nihilistic. — javi2541997

While this might be true for some, I can't say I agree with this. Sad, depressing and nihilistic feature occasionally, but not in my average day or even my average month.

Religions codify and organize life, so it is easy to see what the implications are of accepting his arguments. Atheism and Agnosticism do not have a codified way of life that goes with them and it is not clear what kind of attitude or way of life might go with them. — Ludwig V

Yeah. That's the key. People often confuse atheism with secular humanism. Which does have a worldview. Atheism itself is about a single issue and doesn't have a worldview. I know atheists who believe in astrology, ghosts and UFO abductions, so skepticism isn't necessary.

For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of God and our duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature.

For my money this is waffle. It only makes sense if you already presuppose an account of god as per Berkeley. A Scientologist might make similar arguments using their beliefs. It's just the rhetoric of someone who assumes truth. I'm not aware of the Gospels offering humans anything except some stories and claims which can be twisted in endless directions. Jesus death seems absurd and pointless. To believe in the New Testament you could be a rapist or a priest (or both), a homophobic fascist or a gay socialist. I would suggest there is no Christian worldview either. It supports disparate and contradictory worldviews.

In a different vein, Existentialism (and Romanticism) seem to me to be a response to the idea that the universe is a soulless, meaningless machine. — Ludwig V

Does romanticism generally hold that the world is soulless or meaningless? Existentialism certainly seems to have been constructed as a way to deal with meaninglessness and in Camus' case, absurdity. The idea that we need to find meaning in a world without gods in it always makes me laugh. It's not as if theists don't find life meaningless. I have worked in the area of suicide intervention and on balance those who find life meaningless and become suicidal are just as likely (if not more so) to believe in a god.

I think your response is parochial in some sense.
Those parameters will only meet your humour benchmark. For others, it will be different t — AmadeusD

Perhaps you didn't finish your response. I assume you see my comment as personal judgement. I don't disagree. Given he asked - 'what do you guys think' - what I provided is what I think. :wink:

Is it possible to answer this question without personal judgement?

What do you guys think about dark humor and sarcasm? — Born2Insights

Depends what you mean. Most alleged dark humor and sarcasm is fairly tame and piss-poor. The really dark stuff is off limits to most as it deeply offends. Sarcasm is often predictable and dull - note also the old the saying that 'sarcasm is the lowest form of wit'. Irony and satire are somewhat richer, but may also suffer from conventional dullness if not undertaken by someone with some talent.