Banal and exceptional are not the only two choices. I — T Clark

Sure; never said they were. Note also, that this idea of 'exceptional' will itself consist of a spectrum of possibilities, my idea of exceptional might be very different from yours, or Andrew's.

I'm with Tom Storm - We do the best we can.
— T Clark

But some people want more from life.

I probably do. — Andrew4Handel

You're making assumptions that the best you can be has to be banal. Some people make it exceptional.

Naturalism is a counterpart to theism.
— Tom Storm

The Natural and the Supernatural, being related by contrast (a complicated affair) don't strongly suggest themselves to me as being counterparts. — ucarr

Maybe, but the quote is Sean Carroll's not mine. He means, I guess, they are both in the metaphysical explanatory business as competing stories about reality.

the upshot of this discussion-within-a-discussion concerns the particularities of the interrelationship of physics_metaphysics. — ucarr

Well, generally physics rests upon the assumption that the natural world can be understood and that reality is physicalist in origin. But what grounds physics exactly? Answering this is beyond my qualifications but enters into some highly abstruse metaphysical and speculative thought.

Some of what is called metaphysics is just nonsense.
Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics.
Some of what is called metaphysics has been clearly defined, by Popper, Watkins, etc, according to it's logical structure.
So, some of what has been called metaphysics is legitimate, some not. — Banno

This seems pretty good to me. The problem, of course is generally in what people assess as nonsense and what they see as reasonable. Generally if QM is brought up I usually fuck off.

I think we are in a situation where are decisions or lack of can have profound consequences. Every one who didn't stand up against Hitler contributed to the Holocaust. — Andrew4Handel

My point is that none of this is relevant to the 'baby Hitler' thought experiment wherein a scenario which can't possibly happen is used to shape real world thinking.

Choices can be restrained but are these restraints, pragmatic or social or religious or through fear etc? — Andrew4Handel

Yes, you do the best with what you have. This includes thinking about one's influences and restrictions and doing something about them if you have reflective capacity and insight into how they might be impacting upon you in a negative way.

Everyone has to do this to a greater or lesser extent. Comes with being human.

But of course it is probably easier to give up and make the claim that the 'right path' is impossible to find in a world overflowing with choices and influences.

Doing the best we can can be apathy and a lack of imagination and following the crowd. — Andrew4Handel

Sure. And some people have intellectual disabilities and the best they can be also looks different to how it might be for others. But the real questions for us all is probably are we doing the best we can within our capabilities?

So we might more profitably ask, what metaphysics is legitimate? What stuff that we call "metaphysics" is useful? — Banno

Yes, good questions. I'd be interested to get a firmer grasp of this.

Metaphysics is not post hoc, but an integral part of physics, and of whatever else we might do. — Banno

Well put.

Isn't the issue here that no one really avoids metaphysics, no matter what position you hold? If you are making paradigmatic and presuppositional claims about the fundamental nature of reality you're doing it, right? The claim that reality is described by the 'laws of physics' is itself a metaphysical claim.

Also, do you really need to have any metaphysical commitments in order to conduct scientific research? Can't you just smash some atoms together and see what happens? — coolazice

The most powerful hold metaphysics has on people is where it forms the background to your notion of reality and is not questioned. I would suggest most scientists hold strong beliefs about reality of naturalism/physicalism, but you're right, it's not compulsory. I have also met the odd priest who doesn't believe in god so there's that... :wink:

Here's physicist Sean Carroll:

Naturalism is a counterpart to theism. Theism says there's the physical world and God. Naturalism says there's only the natural world. There are no spirits, no deities, or anything else.

I'm not sure you can demonstrate the validity of a metaphysical presumption by looking at what scientists do — coolazice

Certainly true and maybe I misunderstood your original point. I wasn't demonstrating the validity of the assumption - I was demonstrating what the assumptions are. Some people believe, probably because they are rooted the Western physicalist/naturalist tradition, that science has no metaphysical presuppositions.

The calculations you need to do to live ethically are immense and convoluted. — Andrew4Handel

That's not my experience. No calculations involved. We can only do the best we can (within reason) and make our choices. Fucking up sometimes is the price of freedom.

The baby Hitler example, for instance, is never going to happen and like most thought experiment scenarios, has minimal relevance.

I in particular has a very strict authoritarian religious upbringing. — Andrew4Handel

I suspect this may be at the heart of your concerns. Sometimes those who have stringent religious upbringings become very preoccupied with trying to work out what is right and wrong - it's part of the conditioning from childhood (righteousness/purity/reward - sin/judgement/suffering - all that good stuff) and may need some support in overcoming.

o really grasp the nature of metaphysics and its role in our lives is to realize that , when it comes down to it, science also is nothing but a bunch of folk sharing just-so stories after smoking a crack pipe — Joshs

While I find this kind of claim exciting, do you think this might be more outrageous than accurate? In practice you would privilege certain stories as being more useful (if nothing else), right? Would you recommend a scientific approach to treating diabetes, say, or use Mary Baker Eddy's prayer model? Surely you are not saying all stories have the same value. Can you tease this out for me in very simple steps ? (I'm sure you've addressed this many times before.)

All ideas rest on foundations and pre-suppositions.
— Tom Storm

This claim approaches the Rosetta Stone of knowledge: the axiom. — ucarr

No. I make no assumption on this and my language was unclear. I think people often retrofit foundations and presuppositions - to explain things to themselves and others. But we tend to draw from the preexisting ideas and values available to us or told to us. We are embedded in a culture and draw from it consciously and unconsciously.

Science rests on a metaphysics - the notion that the world is intelligible and can be understood through physicalism or something like that.
— Tom Storm

My problem is, essentially: how on earth could we even come close to demonstrating that this is the case? Why should I take this metaphysical speculation seriously? — coolazice

The demonstration is that scientists generally take the the view that the world is intelligible and can be understood through physicalism. That's how they come to identifying physical laws in a physical universe, and take the view that humans can understand the universe, right? And like all metaphysical positions, it can be (and is) subject to doubt.

I'm crossing my fingers for you, Brother.

For example it is not wrong for me to eat a chocolate bar and it is not wrong for me not to eat one. There are no innate rules for behaviour and any value judgements and ought's are completely fabricated.

Every decision we make we don't know if we are doing the right thing and what the consequences are going to be. — Andrew4Handel

Sounds like freedom to me. And choice. What a luxury! Celebrate it. Humans have to make choices in life. You do the best you can with what you have, or in worrying unduly about putative outcomes, you might succumb to analysis paralysis.

Let's agree that I have a problem with a lot of philosophy. — coolazice

That's fine. I'm not a philosopher myself. Doesn't matter if it is a system or not. All ideas rest on foundations and pre-suppositions. Science rests on a metaphysics - the notion that the world is intelligible and can be understood through physicalism - or something like that. Metaphysics doesn't have to involve Platonism or metempsychosis. :wink:

I'll admit the problem is probably with me rather than metaphysicians, but for the life of me it's the only major branch of philosophy I just can't seem to find interesting. — coolazice

Aren't all philosophical systems ultimately grounded on a metaphysical model?

Whereas the sciences concern possible models for experimentally explaining transformations among 'aspects of nature', metaphysics, to my mind, concerns the concept – rational speculation – of 'nature as a whole' that necessarily encompasses the most rigorous findings of the sciences as well as all other human practices and non-human events/processes. Statements in metaphysics are paradigmatic and presuppositional, not theoretical or propositional; (ontological) interpretations of the latter are only symptomatic – insightful though still speculative – of the former (e.g. MWI, mediocrity prin — 180 Proof

This is nice.

The only positive one might take from these appalling posts is the reminder that there are folk hereabouts who are not interested in clarity, in explanation, but have instead an active preference for the cryptic and esoteric. These are the folk who will explain the ineffable at great length, with no awareness of the irony involved. Historically such a thread runs parallel to, but against the flow, of philosophy, which seeks open rational explanation. — Banno

As a layperson, I'm inclined to hold a similar perspective to this. The problem for someone like me is that in the absence of a theorized philosophy, all I have are intuition and 'common sense'. It is fascinating to me that some forms of philosophy seem to hold irrationalist positions and seek to remove any form of foundational thinking as though philosophy is tantamount to demolition work. It's fascinating and exciting to read, but I understand your dismay.

Reason comes in several flavors. We talk about reason being the process of drawing logical inferences. We talk about reason as being the 'antidote' to superstition and magical thinking, as in the Enlightenment tradition. We talk about pure reason (a priori) as opposed to practical reason (working things out). As a method, reason is generally seen as a superior approach for establishing truth. What would Feyerabend say?

Much of my understanding of reason comes from the old secular humanist clash with religion, where reason is seen as being in opposition to faith, as a 'more reliable' tool for guiding life choices. I'm sure an anti foundationalist position like postmodernism would consider reason to be a kind of fetishized relic of an approach fading in relevance. But I guess if you are arguing against the use of reason you are using reason... My cursory familiarity with Richard Rorty suggests that he thought reason could be replaced with acts of creative imagination - perhaps this was also Nietzsche's approach?

:up:

They are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires.... — Pantagruel

I guess he's describing a fallibilistic approach.

"Reason" as a faculty separate from experience, introducing us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike us as remote, uninteresting and unimportant. — Pantagruel

Possibly what I was getting at when I said that reason can be better understood in the context of situational exigencies.

As I noted in my response to javra, above, I don't think rationality is really capable of dealing with "a web of interrelated ideas and values." — T Clark

I struggle to see how it wouldn't if we're exploring reason as a practice to guide human behaviour and choices. I'm not sure how we understand the rational/irrational in isolation without locating this within a set of values and situational exigencies? Maybe I'm missing something.

I think we're coming up against the problem that we never did define what "rational" means back at the beginning. — T Clark

Probably right. It might even be instructive to identify that which is irrational. If belief in god is rational (and not everyone agrees) is belief that you are going to burn in hell because you are a sinner irrational?

I don't think it is easy to have a discussion like this without recognising that reason belongs to a web of interrelated ideas and values and any substantive discussion will lead us irrevocably to matters of truth and reality.

I think @joshs would see Pinker as part of an old problem in his fairly traditional notion of and advocacy of reason.

I am happy with Pinker's definition but I recognize its problems. Is not part of the issue that some of us see reason as a superior pathway to truth (small 't') - and let's not get onto that one either.

Does that answer your question? — T Clark

Bingo. Thanks.

The definition is Steven Pinker's -

HAVARD GAZETTE: Can you define rationality in a sentence?

PINKER: I define it as the use of knowledge to attain a goal, where “knowledge,” according to the standard philosopher’s definition, is “justified true belief.”

Perhaps this latter bit I left out precludes the animal kingdom.

Lots to take issue with, like JTB.

Julien Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" claimed that consciousness did not develop in humans until about 4,000 years ago. — T Clark

Is he talking consciousness or metacognition?

Previous cultures may have held what we would call superstitions as foundational premises upon which to reason and arrive at the "inferences to the best explanations" they were able to derive. — Janus

And this makes it interesting to me. How is a standard of reasonableness determined if superstition and magic are your compass points? I remember sitting with a staunch, right-wing Catholic in a cafe one afternoon. In walked an Islamic family. The Catholic gentleman clucked, shook his head and uttered 'Primitives!' Here's the question - is the secular humanist who regards both my Catholic fella and the Islamic family and their worldviews with dismay any more 'entitled' to his values driven reasoning here?

In cultures existing prior to, or unaffected by, our current conception of empiric and propositional logic-based reasoning, would you say there was no distinction between rational and irrational thinking, or reasonableness and unreasonableness? — Janus

That's a great question and I know it's directed at @T Clark. If rationality is using knowledge to achieve goals, then probably. But there is always a foundational set of values by which a culture measures itself. Many people believe that reason is synonymous with The Age of Reason - what we call knowledge and the practices this engenders must be arrived at without superstition and with no logical fallacies. At one end of the continuum this is probably scientism.

I have always had a soft spot for this. It starts very softly and builds.

If thinking is strategic, is it therefore also rational? Is it possible to be a criminal, and also rational, in the strictest sense of the word? What about reasonable? — Pantagruel

Something being rational does not make it ipso facto good. In essence, reason is using knowledge to achieve gaols (S. Pinker) and this can be in the service of almost any purpose imaginable, from serial killing to political dictatorship.

We tend to fetishise reason as a sort of transcendental virtue. And while I think reason is non-negotiable for civilised discourse, it may also be used to achieve lamentable outcomes. And how you determine the lamentable from the benign will likely depend upon your worldview.

We're repeating ourselves. Maybe we can talk another time. Take care.

:up: :

Goodness. Thank you.

“kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible — praxis

This sounds incomprehensible (to me). But I do understand an aesthetic experience - let's just say they are the same so we can feel a level of certainty about the matter. :wink:

I understand that - I know he isn't an idealist or solipsist. But the tentative nature of what he thinks we can demonstrate kind of belies his certainty elsewhere. It's no big deal and I'm being glib.

Very interesting. Thanks.

"Real" is mostly an honorific according to Chomsky. — frank

Which is curious given his certainty about truth - right and wrong - in geopolitics.

Because we're bored and we're trying to distract ourselves from the brilliant autumn light shining through the golden maple leaves. — frank

I hear you.

It seems important that it be cultural rather than fundamental because if it were fundamental then metaphysical intuition would be impossible. — praxis

Can you explain this simply? What's an example of metaphysical intuition?

If they're fundamental then they're not cultural. — praxis

They're fundamentally culturally attached, don't you know anything! :razz:

I guess it could be argued that one informs the other, surely? May there not be something fundamental in how our neural system generates a matrix of gestalts which also has a multiplicity of cultural possibilities based on time, place, etc?

It's a very individual reaction, the one we have to corporeality. — Vera Mont

Indeed. And I think it demonstrates how readily someone's equilibrium can be undermined by dwelling on a specificity.

Both "Frodo" and "George" are expressions. They're both real in their respective frameworks, Frodo being a real Hobbit in LOTR, as opposed to a bad dream Gandalf had. — frank

As someone who finds this discussion somewhat lifeless, can you tell me why this matters? What are the practical consequences or implications of 'real' being used in these different ways?

My issue with some of this is we are often not in a position to know what is real about the real. With Washington, for instance, we have that well known 'chopping down of the cherry tree' story, which turns out to be as fictional as Frodo going to Mordor. How far does 'real' get us?