The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant, — Mww

Maybe to you it is, but not to me.

If you follow the imperative, then you think (because of what the imperative says) that lying is wrong in any situation, right? I'm questioning the idea that deontologists don't make judgements on others. Responding with: “I wouldn't have lied” is, it seems to me, just a way to dodge the question.

The problem with this consequentialist approach is, I am judging the effect of my deceit on another subject, in which such effect can never be properly understood, for if it was I could claim to know his thoughts, which is impossible. — Mww

I can't know his thoughts, sure, but I can know what he is probably thinking, and probably would like, statistically speaking. If the possible consequences of lying were too bad, and weren't too unlikely, then it might be better not to take the risk. My decisions depend upon each particular situation's circumstances and the information available to me.

Also, for the sake of consistency, “to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative” has the proverbial cart before the horse. — Mww

I phrased that poorly, I should have said: Is it his duty to tell the truth about how he thinks I should have acted, according to the imperative? Can deontologists just dodge questions or keep quiet instead of lying whenever they find it convenient to do that instead of telling the truth?

And even if they keep quiet, don't they think I shouldn't have lied, even if they don't say it? Then how is that not making a judgement on me? If not, why don't they think what I did is wrong? Is it only because I'm not a deontologist? What if I was a Kantian? Would they still think what I did isn't wrong?

I used the world “feels” since you said even Kantian ethics are ultimately based on feelings, but it didn't come out well.

Spellchecker: can’t live with it, can’t kill it. (Sigh) — Mww

Yep, it's very annoying, it seems from now on I'm gonna have to triple check the spelling of my posts to see it hasn't played a prank on me again.

Edit: It just did it again...

The hypothetical world does not matter as an actual possible world, but as a purely logical possibility. — Tobias

What I don't understand is why this mere logical possibility in some hypothetical world has any relevance to how we should act in the actual world, where that almost certainly won't happen in any near future. The criterion of “universalization” as a way to distinguish good acts from bad ones just seems arbitrary to me.

Why is it that if an action can be universalized without contradiction, then the action is morally/ethically justified, and morally/ethically reprehensible otherwise? Without circular reasoning, I mean.

He takes away the boy's dignity as a rationally thinking being. — Tobias

I prefer that over making him terrified and sad/depressed.

His duty is to be there for the boy in his dying moments as an acceptance of that fate. — Tobias

Why does he have to learn about his fate in the first place? If he doesn't, he won't be terrified by his imminent death. It is more likely that he will suffer less if he doesn't learn about his fate, so I think it's better to lie to him.

And yes, I know deontologists don't care about the probable effects of actions, but I still find that unreasonable. They themselves use probabilistic criterions all the time: when they get out of their house, they don't give serious consideration to the idea that it might be better to stay home because a meteor might fall on their head if they get out, or that suddenly it'll start to rain heavily leading to them being struck by lightning when they get out — although they can't be certain those things won't happen — because such events are very unlikely to happen. And the same is true for almost all of their beliefs in daily life.

Yet when it comes to ethical considerations about the effects of each action, they suddenly seem to stop caring about the probable consequences of each action, and just care about following the categorical imperative, only because we can't be completely certain about the consequences of each of our actions, and because some elaborate and unlikely scenarios in which the actions lead to bad consequences are possible (not always though, sometimes they do mention possibilities which aren't that unlikely, and should be taken into account).

The point is you cannot refute Kant's idealist ethics with consequntialism or by appealing to majority opinion. — Tobias

I'm not trying to refute Kantian ethics, I just think its core criterion is arbitrary. Nor do I think that an act is good because most people think it is (“ad populum”), the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions.

If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. So other dying relatives may ask that question and not face the perennial anxiety of not knowing. — Tobias

Supposing it became common knowledge (which is not likely, so long as there are deontologists suggesting a different course of action) I think the suffering they would feel after finding out about their son's dead outweighs the suffering caused by the anxiety they may feel for not being able to get an answer to that question.

And certainly if you contribute in order to feel good, then while there may be considerable benefit, you don't get virtue points. — tim wood

Why should I care about those “virtue points”?

Bill Gates, for example, gives huge amounts of money to charity. I do not think he does it to feel good or even cares about that. He has so much money that I'm pretty sure he can afford to contribute as he does because it is categorically right to do so. And a further guess, that what he cares about is if his money is well used and helps to accomplish the goals of the charity — tim wood

Well, if he does it for a reason other than it making him feel better, or reducing his suffering in some way (not even because he'd feel bad if he didn't follow his lawful obligation, because he desires to do so), more power to him! That doesn't make sense to me, but what matters to me are the good consequences of his actions, regardless of why he does them.

Kant would simply observe that your criteria are deficient — tim wood

Why?

Which is to say you don't like it that he hurt you, but in terms of merit, apparently it's all his, right? — tim wood

He may feel well with what he did, but I don't. And I don't care what someone with such values thinks about his actions. And I wouldn't mind such a one to turn into a deontologist, if that would make him stop doing such things, I wouldn't tell such a one to follow a consequentialist criterion.

But you seem to forget that most people aren't like that, many of them upon reflecting about other people's suffering will regret their way of acting.

I would not have lied. — Mww

But I didn't ask him what he would have done, I asked him if he thinks what I did is wrong. So that doesn't answer the question.

To stay silent is not to lie. — Mww

I didn't mean to imply that it was, I was just wandering if the deontologist was forced to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative, or if he could stay silent.

The imperative is merely a formula, determined by principles held by the subject. Only the subject knows what the imperative commands. — Mww

I know, I asked if universalizing the maxim of staying silent when he is asked such a question leads to a contradiction or not.

The former is mere inclination, the latter is lawful obligation. — Mww

And why is that morally relevant? In both cases they are doing more or less the same thing. If the effect of the action is approximately the same in terms of reducing suffering, then the action is equally good regardless of whether you do it to feel good or to follow a lawful obligation. But then again, this is exactly what deontologists deny.

And how would you ever make that preventable? You cannot, so what matters what you want? — Mww

I don't think I need to worry about that. How many people visit this site? Not that many, I bet. How many of them are wicked in the sense that they care little or nothing about other people's suffering? Even less. How many of them are interested in ethics and are currently following this thread? Even less. How many of them give a damn about what you or I think, so that they would change their mind by reading this discussion, something which they otherwise wouldn't have done? Even less (if any).

And in the first place, do you think most such people spend a significant amount of time pondering about their actions and philosophizing? I don't.

As for the posible bad consequences of influential people defending consequentialism, I concede that you may have a point there.

That's called murder. — tim wood

And? I think I'm justified in killing someone to prevent another person from being tortured. I should have added, though, that this is only if there's no other way to save that person, like if in that scenario you don't have a phone to call the police and have no other way to prevent that man's suffering, and can't get out of the place. Plus you are afraid the man will try to do the same thing to you (this hypothetical example is just to illustrate my point).

Would you rather let the man suffer? Would you say murder is always wrong no matter what?

What if a murderer forces his way into your house and tried to torture and kill you, and the only way to save yourself is to kill him? Would you just let him kill you?

But the forger had his own criteria - as do you - what do you have to say to him? — tim wood

As a consequentialist he may assure you that his happiness was both greater and more worthwhile than your suffering which in any case the existence of which he could only speculate on. — tim wood

I have already answered that:

I would think that what he did to me is wrong, because he has caused other people to suffer just so he could get money. But I freely admit that he might not be persuaded If I confronted him about it, since he might be one of those people who, unlike me, feel or care little or nothing for the sufferings of others, in which case it’d be a waste of time to try and convince him that what he did to me is wrong, there’s nothing to say to those people. Just as I’d be wasting my time if I tried to persuade Jack the Ripper or another serial killer that his gruesome murders are abominable.

And by the way, I wouldn’t want such wicked people to follow my consequentialist criterion if they didn’t feel bad when contemplating or watching other people’s suffering, since that would probably lead them to cause more suffering just so they can gain more pleasure. I disagree with Bentham’s doctrine of “enlightened self-interest”, interpreted as meaning that if one acts only for one’s own interest, in the long run that will also benefit the others, since that’s only true in some cases. I state it only for those who share my values about empathy as well as an ethical criterion similar to mine, hoping they agree with my views:

I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many (of those who care deeply about other people’s suffering and happiness) as possible will agree.
— Russell (I added the part in black font) — Amalac

If the imperative says to always tell the truth, shouldn't he obey? — Raymond

If that's the case, he would be making a judgement on me. But Mww says deontologists don't make such judgements on others, but only on themselves. So what exactly does he mean by “judgement”?

If the imperative says to tell the truth he should answer that you tell the truth to the poor man. He can also remain silent. He doesn't lie then. — Raymond

Let's not get lost, the question was this one:

if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”? — Amalac

That's after I have already lied.

A deontologist makes a discursive judgement on a behavior not his own by his cognitive criteria, which is an experience. That experience informs by means of a aesthetic judgement as to whether he would or would not behave in similar fashion under the same conditions, measured exclusively by how such behavior would make him feel about himself. — Mww

So, to go back to the example I gave to tim, if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”? If his answer is yes, then he is making a judgement on me. If his answer is “no” or stays silent, then it’s more likely that I’ll continue lying in similar circumstances, and we’d have to conclude that he can only judge other deontologists, or only himself as you suggested.

What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent?

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself. — Mww

In a sense yes, in so far as another person’s suffering would also make me suffer more, and their happiness make me happier. But in another sense, I’m also thinking about the outcome which that person is more likely to desire. Most people would rather not know that their son is dead on their deathbed, for example.

If you use the thinking for what is good for yourself, but apply it to another, as would a typical consequentialist, you are in effect using that other as an end for your own good. To use others for your own good can never be justified as a universal law. — Mww

I donate significant amounts money (as far as my income and expenses allow me) to charity so that people suffer less, which in turn makes me happier, not because of any abstract universalization. Is that “using another as an end for my own good”? Maybe, but why is that bad?

Like I said in my last reply to tim, I wouldn’t want psychopaths who feel nothing when they watch or contemplate the sufferings of others to adopt a consequentialist criterion, since that would likely lead to more suffering. But I don't see what would be wrong if empathic people who more or less share my ethical views “used another as an end for their own good” in ways like donating to charity. And I don’t want nor care for trying to “universalize it”, since as I said I don’t want evil people to hurt others for their own pleasure. And if the “universalization” is merely to be done in a hypothetical world (if it can only be done “in principle”) then it seems to me irrelevant to the way of acting in the actual world, in relation to how people do in fact behave.

Insofar as it is a claim that you make, we can ask you to prove that you know best. — tim wood

Just look at the evidence: if blood loss to the brain entails that the person is far more likely to be in a euphoric state rather than suffering badly before dying, then it's better not to shoot them. If not, then it's better to shoot them. If it's not clear because the evidence is not conclusive one way or another, then it's like trying to guess if a coin will land on heads or tails, so choose what your heart tells you.

I wouldn’t claim to know it with certainty, but very often we can know what’s more likely to happen, considering how bad the consequences would be if one has bad luck to see if it’s worth taking that risk, and that’s enough for our practical purposes.

That you should be a moral person? — tim wood

If by this you mean to ask if it's proof that I should be a Kantian deontologist, then yes. Otherwise, you are just assuming that the way to be a moral person is to follow Kant's criterion rather than a consequentialist or utilitarian one, thus again incurring in petitio principii.

Of course, were this you, you could not be trusted with anything arithmetical, nor any of your judgments about such. Agree? — tim wood

So your analogy amounts to: “if you don't act as the categorical imperative says you should, you can't be trusted with anything about the categorical imperative, nor any of your judgements as such”, which is false, just as someone who inquires into non-euclidean geometry can be trusted when he says that euclidean geometry is not the one that seems to govern the universe, and that some of Euclid's axioms are dubious.

Or perhaps you are just saying that if we define a good action as one which is in conformity with the imperative, then what the consequencialists say about the good is wrong. Which is trivially true, and not disputed by anybody.

There is dialectical argument, concerned with what is and is not, and rhetoric, concerned with and considering both sides of contradictories — tim wood

The rethorical trap I was referring to is defining those who don't agree with your ethical criterion as “immoral people”, taking advantage of how unpleasant it sounds for someone to be “immoral”, to sound more persuasive.

Although this is a purely semantic matter, it seems less dishonest to say that consequentialists simply may have different definitions such terms as “good”, “freedom”, “will”, etc., as well as having different ideas and judgements about them, instead of defining them in such a way that we can only say kantians care about them.

Kant arithmetized it, accomplishing a goal attributed at least to Socrates. The price of arithmetization being the limitation to general and not particular rules, his categorical imperative, in its various forms. And these do not tell us what to do, but instead how to test and evaluate our possible actions according to criteria of non-contradiction. — tim wood

You can see it as analogous to the situation concerning the famous axiom «the whole is greater than the part». I don’t argue that what follows from that axiom is true if we accept that axiom as true, but we now know that this axiom isn’t just dubious, it is in fact false in the case of infinite sets, as was shown for example by the fact that the cardinality of the set of all natural numbers is the same as the cardinality of the set of all even numbers. Similarly, I don’t question what follows from adopting the categorical imperative as one’s ethical criterion, I question the criterion, the starting point, because it strikes me as arbitrary and remote from reality, and find the starting point of consequentialism more plausible.

These all tied in with his ideas of freedom, right, will, and good. And these all you can deny, ignore, be ignorant of, at the cost of your exclusion from the society of people concerned with freedom, right, will, and good. — tim wood

Once again, depending on how you define those terms (“freedom”, “right”, “will”, “good”) this is either the same rhetorical trap as before, or a false dilemma: making it seem as if the only choice is to either be a kantian, or someone who does not care about freedom, right, will and good (as if consequentialists didn’t care about those things, or didn’t take them into account in their ethical analyses). And again, it’s circular since it just assumes without proof that the way to be moral is to guide one’s actions by following Kant’s criterion.

An example: you purchase for yourself and family expensive and hard-to-get tickets to a major athletic event. At added expense you all prepare yourself for the day but on arriving discover your tickets are forgeries, no good. Question: do you celebrate the skill and cleverness of the forger? Or were you wronged? — tim wood

I wouldn’t celebrate it since he would have caused me and my family to suffer by stealing from me and denying us the chance to assist to that event. Skill and cleverness don’t matter to me if they are used for evil purposes.

I would think that what he did to me is wrong, because he has caused other people to suffer just so he could get money. But I freely admit that he might not be persuaded If I confronted him about it, since he might be one of those people who, unlike me, feel or care little or nothing for the sufferings of others, in which case it’d be a waste of time to try and convince him that what he did to me is wrong, there’s nothing to say to those people. Just as I’d be wasting my time if I tried to persuade Jack the Ripper or another serial killer that his gruesome murders are abominable.

And by the way, I wouldn’t want such wicked people to follow my consequentialist criterion if they didn’t feel bad when contemplating or watching other people’s suffering, since that would probably lead them to cause more suffering just so they can gain more pleasure. I disagree with Bentham’s doctrine of “enlightened self-interest”, interpreted as meaning that if one acts only for one’s own interest, in the long run that will also benefit the others, since that’s only true in some cases. I state it only for those who share my values about empathy as well as an ethical criterion similar to mine, hoping they agree with my views:

I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many (of those who care deeply about other people’s suffering and happiness) as possible will agree. — Russell (I added the part in black font)

This might exemplify Kolakowski’s inconsistency: a consequential moralist makes judgements on others predicated on his criteria; a deontological moralist makes makes judgements on himself using his own criteria. — Mww

The deontologist also makes judgements on others, since he thinks they are acting wrong when they lie, or borrow money.

And supposing he doesn't, why should it be inconsistent for the consequentialist to judge others predicated on his criteria? How else is he supposed to judge others if not by his own criteria? Or are you saying he shouldn't make any judgements about others at all?

To witness the behavior of the sufferer says nothing of the suffering. — Mww

If I watch someone —who I know is not a masochist or anything of that sort — being subjected to brutal physical torture, see that they scream loudly and desperately ask for help with a pained look on their face, and there's overwhelming scientific evidence which shows that they will almost certainly feel a pain that's even worse than the worst pains I've felt, then I feel pretty confident in thinking that the best course of action I could take is to shoot the psychopath while he's not looking to stop the other person's suffering, if I have the chance, regardless of what the “universalization” of my action would entail.

If you were in such a situation, could you still honestly say that the behavior of the sufferer says nothing about their suffering?

Of course I can't be 100% sure that their pain is really that bad, or even that they are feeling any pain at all, but the scientific evidence in favor of this view is overwhelming, making it far more probable than the opposite.

(Actually, due to blood loss to the brain, I’m in a perfectly euphoric state, reliving my fondest memories from a long, illustrious life....and that clown ended it all because of something that completely escaped his judgmental criteria.)

Immoral indeed. — Mww

If I knew it was more likely that you wouldn't suffer in that state, rest assured I wouldn't shoot you.

That makes you an immoral person. — tim wood

And now you are using rethorical traps? Of course “immoral person” for you means “someone who does not follow Kantian ethics”. So why not just state it like that? We're back to the same vicious circle as before.

And you want proof you should be a Kantian in ethics? That proof is all around you at all times. For reasons peculiar to you, you're not able to see it. It might help if you were to consider just how much of your life depends on truth. — tim wood

And this is just a deepity.

Or how about you mention part of that proof that's “all around me”?

And to be sure, I do not see where K., above, argues against Kant's conclusion, but only against the argument. — tim wood

Yes, that an argument isn't valid, does not mean that its conclusion is false, only that it gives no good reason to accept its conclusion.

Edit: damn autocorrect.

Kolakowski denies there's any such inconsistency. Ok, but what's his argument? The OP is silent in that regard. — Agent Smith

Those who claim that it is inconsistent either offer a circular argument (assuming Kant's criterion is the correct one for determining whether an action is good or bad, without first proving that this is the case) or mean merely that if you are a Kantian in ethical matters, you'd be inconsistent if you didn't follow the imperative. Which is a truism, and won't convince those who don't already believe Kant's criterion is the true criterion for determining the goodness of an action, rather than adopting some consequentialist criterion.

So they still haven't met the burden of proof, or have met it in a trivial and uncontroversial way.

Kolakowski's argument was thus the following:

This (Kant's) argument is not convincing and may be circular. Even on the assumption that some principles — it doesn't matter whether they are explicitly admitted or not — necessarily ground my behavior, that is, whatever I do, I always believe, however vaguely it may be, that there is a normative "principle" that justifies my behavior (and the assumption is far from obvious), there is no reason why those principles must necessarily have universal validity or why I have, as it were, to impose my rules on all humanity (not only Kant had this opinion; Sartre had it too, for reasons he did not explain). I am not at all inconsistent if I prefer other people to follow rules that I do not want to follow. If, to continue with the example given above, I lie whenever I feel like it but I want everyone else to be invariably frank, I am perfectly consistent. I can always, without contradicting myself, reject the arguments of those who try to convert me or push me to change my way of acting by telling me: "What if everyone did the same?" Since I can coherently maintain that other people's actions do not concern me, or that I positively want them to obey the rules that I refuse to follow.

In other words, an imperative that demands that I be guided by norms that I wish were universal has, in itself, no logical or psychological foundation; I can reject it without falling into contradictions, and I can admit it as a supreme guideline only by virtue of an arbitrary decision.

How, exactly, is that “silent”? I can give a couple of examples of people who are actually inconsistent:

1. If someone wanted to lose weight, and ate junk food all the time, then they obviously would be inconsistent, since they won't achieve their goal of losing weight that way.

2. If a student wanted to pass a hard test, he'd be inconsistent if he only studied half an hour before the test.

On the other hand, the liar's goal is to deceive, in order to benefit either himself or others. If everybody lied, he could not achieve this goal, and hence he would be inconsistent. But in reality, many people are honest, so in the actual world he would not at all be inconsistent with his goal since he could actually achieve it by lying, whether or not we think his goals are morally questionable.

Yeah, but who said you were a) correct, or b) had a right to make that decision? — tim wood

I think I'd be acting correctly based on my consequentialist criterion.

As for whether I or not I “had a right” to make that decision, that doesn't seem relevant to me. What I care about is what will most likely lead to the least amount of suffering to that man in his last moments. The rest (in this particular case) doesn't matter.

In effect, you're giving me permission to decide what you can know, what is best for you to know. — tim wood

I think it's best for that man not to know about the fact that his son is dead. And I think the man would likely do the same if our roles were reversed, so he probably would think my action is justified.

But supposing the man happened to be a thoroughgoing Kantian, well... I'd just think what he wanted me to do is wrong, and that his ethical position is wrong (though I admit I can't prove those claims, just as Kantians can't prove that consequentialism is wrong). Unless I become convinced that Kantian ethics are better than consequentialist ethics, I don't see any reason to believe that it is wrong — in all circumstances — to decide what a person can know, this being what I think is best for him to know.

That doesn't mean one should always decide what is best for someone to know when considering whether lying is justified or not, as I said before that depends on the particular circumstances surrounding each situation, and one has to go through this analysis:

“I think the courses of action (as well as choices of not doing anything) which are more likely to lead to a state of affairs which has the better balance of the total positive mental states (pleasure, joy, peace of mind,...) and total negative mental states (pain, psychological suffering, boredom) are to be preferred.”

And, if it is my decision and it's acceptable to lie, then I have no responsibility for any consequence of the lie. — tim wood

Once again I ask: in what conceivable way could lying to the man about his son lead to worse consequences than telling him the truth?

As for whether or not people should be responsible for their lies in general, one has to take into account the likelihood of their lie having bad consequences, as well as how bad the consequences are likely to be, and comparing them with the likely bad consequences of choosing to tell the truth. If it's not clear which choice is more likely to be better, because the situation is too complicated, then the person can choose what their heart tells them to. I don't think they should be responsible for acting in the way more likely to lead to a better balance of good and bad consequences, even if lying be that way, if their analysis is correct.

Also, why shouldn't people take responsibility for telling the truth as well? If you told the man that his son is dead, and he broke down crying and cursing you for telling him the truth just to have him suffer even in his last moments, I'd say you are to blame for what the man is feeling, which was caused by you telling him the truth.

Thus, it seems to me, it's not about their felling better, or you feeling good, but about preserving both of yours participation in a moral world. — tim wood

I think we will never agree on this point.

As corollary, he adds that the lie places on the liar a responsibility that the truth does not impose. — tim wood

What's the responsibility in the example I gave? The man will die soon, and I just want him to have some peace of mind rather than to make him more sad and miserable in his last moments, so I lie to him. How could my lying conceivably lead to worse consequences? (I mean besides fantastic and invisibly improbable scenarios) I don't see how.

I can of course will all kind of things. I can live by the principle: "T lie through my teeth and I hope everyone speaks the truth". However, one immediately recognizes that if everyone lived by that principle it would not turn out to be a correct description of the world for anyone. What I recognize is that I give myself a 'status aparte' that is dependent on the behavior of others to make sense. That I think Kant would consider building your kingdom on shaky foundations, because you are not acting autonomously, but you become dependent on the actions of others. — Tobias

And what's wrong with “depending on their actions” in that sense? Again, is it likely that everybody, or at least a majority of people will suddenly all start lying any time soon? No, that's probably never going to happen. So why should that hypothetical world in which everybody lies matter in the least? I'm not trying to justify liars, I just don't think lying always or very often is wrong for the reasons Kant thinks it is.

One recognizes that such a maxim might be a way to live, but not a way to live ethically. It is the inversion of treating each other as a means to an end. If you hold this maxim you can only become an end in itself if everyone does as you hope they will do. It is also the inversion of being a legislator in the kingdom of ends, because you write a rule 'ad personam', yourself. You are therefore not legislating, i.e. providing general rules. You can do everything you want, but you will recognize it as not ethical. I think that is Kant's point. His claim is we can recognize ethical from unethical behaviour, so knowledge of ethics is possible. — Tobias

I don't think it follows that if you reject Kant's criterion for living what he considers an ethical live, then you can do anything you want. It just means you move on to some consequentialist criterion for determining how you should act.

And why should the person provide general rules for others, why can't he just have a personal and private ethic? Even if he did provide general rules about how he thinks everybody ought to act, it's not likely that others will change the way they act by what some random person tells them, the reality is that most people simply won't give a damn about it, unless it's someone close to them, someone famous or someone influential.

Also Kant concludes — if I'm not mistaken — that lying is wrong no matter what the circumstances are. And I think that's just wrong, as is shown in the example I gave of a man on his death bed asking if his son is ok, when the other person knows that their son is dead.

Here's another example: suppose someone's son is terminally ill, and the doctors tell the man that his son will almost certainly die soon. A few days later he goes to visit his son in the hospital, and the boy fearfully asks him if he's going to die. Would the father be doing something wrong or unethical if he lied to his son, telling him that he is ok and that he will recover soon, so that he wasn't terrified and would suffer less? I don't think so.

Bertrand Russell gave yet another example:

Once, walking in the field, I saw a weary fox, on the verge of total exhaustion, but still struggling to keep running. A few minutes later I saw the hunters. They asked me if I had seen the fox and I said yes. They asked me where it had gone and I lied to them. I don't think I would have been a better person if I had told them the truth.

Yes, absolutely. No one can tell anyone else what to do, except in cases of instructions for, or in the pursuit of, a skill. — Mww

Ok.

There are no knowledge claims in pure speculative moral philosophy, so all this is not something Kant claims to know. Morality is based on feelings alone, from which follows that if one feels he has acted in accordance with the goodness of his own will, he can claim entitlement to being happy. There are, nonetheless, knowledge claims a priori in a subject, in that he knows either how he ought to act, or, he is acting, according to his will. He also knows when he does not, for he can feel it, in aesthetic judgements he makes on himself. The most familiar common knowledge a priori being.....”I’m sorry”. — Mww

Ok, I'm glad that was cleared up. I was under the impression that Kant held some form of moral cognitivism.

So far so good...

It is known a priori, But perhaps not so much through logic alone per se, but through pure practical reason, by which is deduced on its own accord, those “commands of reason”.

The logic that grounds the deduction, in the form of cause and effect, has been argued incessantly, insofar as the causality here can never be proved, which logic requires, even while the effect is obvious in the actions that follow from it. Kant was chastised for his inability to prove the reality of transcendental freedom as a causality with the same necessity as empirical causality naturally, but based his entire moral philosophy on the impossibility of morality itself without it, whether or not it could be proved. Hence, the ground for the birth of consequentialism proper, post-Kant.

The independent merely indicates without empirical influences, which are wants or desires, and the unquestionable merely indicates the impossibility of disregarding that of which our own reason informs. Both of those are given, which makes Kolakowski’s implication correct. — Mww

... And now you've confused me again. I'll respond to this later, at the moment I find it hard to wrap my head around what you say there, I'll have to read it more carefully, as well as re-read the Critique of Practical Reason.

A strange equivocation. I doubt you're a liar, but in fact you're telling us you are. — tim wood

I was referring to Kolakowski's example of someone who lies whenever he pleases, I'm not like that. Most of the time I don't lie, but I think lying can sometimes be justified.

For example, if someone in their deathbed asked how their son was, and you knew their son is dead, would you tell them the truth? I wouldn't, yet according to Kant's criterion I'd have to tell him the truth regardless of the man's suffering.

I admit that I expressed myself poorly, I need to work on my english.

Are you a liar? If not, why not? — tim wood

I'm not a liar, in the sense that I don't always lie whenever I please, although I think lying can be justified in some circumstances, unlike Kant.

Why don't I lie all the time? Because I believe acting in that way would lead to a worse balance of the positive and negative sensations of all sentient beings in a not too distant future, following a consequentialist criterion.

But if one is in a situation in which lying is the course of action more likely to diminish the total amount of suffering, then I think one is justified in lying, even if by bad luck the consequences turn out to be bad.

And btw, who cares for arithmetic: that's circular too. — tim wood

There is a difference in the case of arithmetic, since the axioms of arithmetic seem self-evident to me, whereas the criterion proposed by Kant does not. Arithmetic is not circular, since we eventually reach axioms or claims so obvious that they don't need justification.

Or are you just an opportunist who would do any of these things and more if you thought you could get away with it?
— tim wood

Or would you massacre women and children if you thought some benefit would come? Are you in favor of Guantanamo bay, and do you admire the US for its so-called black-site practices of illegal detention and torture? I think you wouldn't and don't, and the absurdity of these questions indication that all of us - most, anyway - are deontologists and just don't know it. — tim wood

Of course I wouldn't/don't do any of those things, and I think my conduct can be justified by appealing to consequentialist criterions.

My criterion remains the same: the course of action more likely to lead to the best balance of the total sum of positive and negative sensations for all sentient beings is to be preferred. Doing what you say would most likely lead to the suffering of many people, and other people's suffering makes me suffer too, and viceversa: the thought and contemplation of a scenario in which the least amount of people suffer makes me happier. That's why I wouldn't walk around raping, murdering or stealing even if it were legal to do so.

As to the liar, he depends on his lies being taken as true. If everyone were to lie, where would he be then? — tim wood

He'd be in trouble of course, but is it likely that everyone, or even most people, will lie in any near future? Of course not, so that liar would be more or less as concerned by the possibility of everybody lying as he would be concerned by the possibility of being struck by a meteorite when he takes two steps outside his house, or being struck by lightning. I think probability is what matters here.

The c.i., because it is a command, is a “shall”, not a “should”. Should, or ought, denotes a hypothetical imperative. — Mww

Ok.

The c.i., because it is a command, is a “shall”, not a “should”. Should, or ought, denotes a hypothetical imperative. — Mww

Then just answer me this: why, according to Kant, do we have to act as the categorical imperative says, instead of basing our actions on consequentialist/utilitarian principles? Does Kant hold that one can logically prove that it is better to act as the categorical imperative says, rather than following a consequentialist ethic?

I ask because, if I remember correctly, Kant claims that the categorical imperative is known a priori, in which case it could be deduced through logic alone, and as Kolakowski suggests, this would imply that we can have “independent and unquestionable moral certainty”. Or is it rather like the choice between the axioms of euclidean or non euclidean geometry?

Do you agree with tim's claim that Kant doesn't tell us what to do? If so, what exactly do you think he means?

He didn’t mean we should; he means we must (in order to demonstrate the worthiness of calling ourselves good moral agents). — Mww

But how does Kant know that the way of being good moral agents is to follow the imperative, rather than some utilitarian principle? Is “being a good moral agent” defined as “following the categorical imperative”? If so, that's a mere tautology, isn't it? (Something like: “you must use the categorical imperative as your ethical criterion if you want to demonstrate the worthiness of saying that you follow the categorical imperative”). In that case, why should we adopt the imperative as our criterion in the first place, instead of some consequentialist criterion? Is there any proof of that?

I haven't had the chance to read about the transcendental idea of freedom, so I'm still unsure of how it ties into all this. Maybe today I'll have the time.

For what it's worth - This, from the "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" article on Kant's Moral Philosophy:

Kant claimed that all of these CI formulas were equivalent. Unfortunately, he does not say in what sense. What he says is that these “are basically only so many formulations of precisely the same law, each one of them by itself uniting the other two within it,” and that the differences between them are “more subjectively than objectively practical” in the sense that each aims “to bring an Idea of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thus nearer to feeling”. He also says that one formula “follows from” another, and that the concept foundational to one formula “leads to a closely connected” concept at the basis of another formula. Thus, his claim that the formulations are equivalent could be interpreted in a number of ways — T Clark

Hmm thanks, but I'm afraid that just confused me even more.

Kolakowski has to tell us how, but he doesn't; at least the excerpt in the OP doesn't contain any argument that demonstrates the consistency in a person like x's position/actions. — Agent Smith

The burden of proof is in those who claim that a liar who wants others to be honest is somehow logically inconsistent with his goals by acting like that. If the answer to that is: “because if everybody lies, then no liar achieves his goal” one would also have to prove that the criteria for determining whether an action is good or bad, is whether or not it can be universalized without contradiction. And that proof must not use that criterion itself, since then it would be circular.

And once again, why would a hypothetical world in which everybody lies, be relevant to a single individual's choice between lying or being honest in the actual world? In reality we know that many people will be honest, thus not causing any contradiction with the liar's goals, which means the problem Kant seems to worry about won't arise in reality.

I think Kant's argument might run thus: if your intentions are good, then your virtue intact consequences notwithstanding. On the other hand, if consequences are your measure and you do not achieve them, then you got nothing. And this would seem supported in the admonition to "do the right thing," and not some variation like, "be sure to get yours," or "it's ok it comes out ok..." or "the ends justifies the means." In the latter case, of course, the ends perhaps justifying some means, but not all. — tim wood

Well, I personally still find the utilitarian/consequentialist criterion more persuasive. Sure, you can't be certain about the consequences of an action, but you can very often know about its probable consequences, and guide your conduct by a probabilistic criterion, by measuring the risks involved as well as the balance of the total amount of positive and negative sensations in the various possible scenarios (though I concede that this analysis can sometimes be difficult, depending on the amount of variables involved).

Also, I don't think utilitarianism/consequentialism (or at least some versions of it) is necessarily incompatible with good intentions, or the “universal freedom” kudos mentioned. My personal ethical system, for instance, is consequentialist, and has lead me to a position that's very similar to effective altruism.

Kant doesn't tell us what to do. He merely provides some tests. But they're pretty good tests, and he bases them in logic. Which consequentialism/utilitarianism do not do — tim wood

If Kant really didn't mean that we ought to do as the categorical imperative says, then I have no complaints. If we accept the axioms of Kantian ethics, then his “tests” are grounded in logic, but not otherwise.

But I don't agree with the claim that consequentialism isn't grounded in logic, in some sense at least, since once one accepts the axioms of the consequentialist criterion, what follows from that principle will be based on logic. It's just like choosing between the axioms of euclidean geometry or those of non-euclidean geometry.

You can say that consequentialism rests on claims that can't be proven logically and are merely based on feelings, but something similar could be said about Kantian ethics, since I have yet to see a convincing, non circular proof that the categorical imperative [stated in the form: “you should act only according to a maxim that you can... (and so on)”] is true.

In Kant, the source for moral certainty is the transcendental idea of freedom, not once mentioned in the essay. Or, at least the part of the essay posted here. I couldn’t find it to see if there was more to it. — Mww

The OP's quote comes from the book Religion: If There is No God...on God, the Devil, Sin and Other Worries of the So-Called Philosophy of Religion, not sure if it's available for free.

I read the whole book, and it seems that he never says anything about the transcendental idea of freedom.

I'll re-read that part of the Critique of Practical Reason to see if you have a point there, and later post my thoughts about it.

I'm not saying your interpretation of Kant is wrong and I admit that I'm not sure where you got this line, is it a direct quote? — kudos

Here you go:

(...)That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law. In this context the guiding principle of the will is conformity to law as such, not bringing in any particular law governing some class of actions; and it must serve as the will’s principle if duty is not to be a vain delusion and chimerical concept. Common sense in its practical judgments is in perfect agreement with this, and constantly has this principle in view.
Consider the question: May I when in difficulties make a promise that I intend not to keep? The question obviously has two meanings: is it prudent to make a false promise? does it conform to duty to make a false promise? No doubt it often is prudent, but not as often as you might think.
Obviously the false promise isn’t made prudent by its merely extricating me from my present difficulties; I have to think about whether it will in the long run cause more trouble than it saves in the present. Even with all my supposed cunning, the consequences can’t be so easily foreseen. People’s loss of trust in me might be far more disadvantageous than the trouble I am now trying to avoid, and it is hard to tell whether it mightn’t be more prudent to act according to a universal maxim not ever to make a promise that I don’t intend to keep.
But I quickly come to see that such a maxim is based only on fear of consequences. Being truthful from duty is an entirely different thing from being truthful out of fear of bad consequences; for in the former case a law is included in the concept of the action itself (so that the right answer to ‘What are you doing?’ will include a mention of that law); whereas in the latter I must first look outward to see what results my action may have. — Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals , page 11

Can you will that your maxim become a universal law? If not, it must be rejected, not because of any harm it might bring to anyone, but because there couldn’t be a system of universal legislation that included it as one of its principles, and that is the kind of legislation that reason forces me to respect. I don’t yet see what it is based on (a question that a philosopher may investigate), but I at least understand these two:
•It is something whose value far outweighs all the value of everything aimed at by desire,
•My duty consists in my having to act from pure respect for the practical law. — page 12

These are just a few among other passages. I didn't mean that consequences are wholly irrelevant for Kant, only that because they are uncertain, we have to guide our conduct by the imperative rather than them, if we want to be virtuous in Kant's sense.

To ask this you must first affirm the possibility of an ethics. That done, then off to the races! — tim wood

Remember that in the post you quoted I defined being ethical as “acting in accordance with the categorical imperative”, in order to show the trivial way in which what you said is true. What the question you refer to assumes is that each of us can find out whether it's better to be a deontologist or a consequentialist, or a mixture of both, by seeing which of them harmonize better with our fundamental moral values. But Kant claims that he can logically and objectively demonstrate that an action is right or wrong a priori, and I think his argument in support of this claim is not valid.

Nor will I argue Kant with anyone who has, apparently, neither read not understood him. — tim wood

I have read him, and the claim that I don't understand him is just a form of special pleading.

And, to be sure, that you do not have to be ethical by any standard, or ethical at all, but that once you claim to be, then like the chess player, bound by the rules you have yourself adopted to be under. — tim wood

Yes, if you claim to be a Kantian in ethics, then in order to be consistent you must follow the categorical imperative. Once again, it's trivial.

Why should one be a Kantian instead of a utilitarian? It seems to me like Kant didn't answer that question. And if he doesn't hold that one should act in accordance with the imperative, then what exactly does he mean when he says that the imperative is known a priori?

I know you already said you won't bother responding about Kant, I just leave this for other people to read.

But we can start small. Do you have any problems with reason or the golden rule or good intentions? — tim wood

I have no problems with any of that, except good intentions in some cases. But I thought you didn't want to argue Kant with someone who, according to you, didn't understand Kant? Then how is that related to this thread?

but this phrase of Kant's – that in writing meant was only as a guide to a more complex analysis – seems to ask, given the opportunity to influence what we perceive as the right thing, what would we select? — kudos

Didn't Kant say that the consequences of an action are not morally relevant to virtue? If so, why would the influence due to our actions be relevant in a Kantian framework? If I'm misunderstanding, could you can elaborate on what you mean by “influence”?

I thought the categorical imperative was simpler than that. Kant gave the example of borrowing money: if everyone tried to borrow money, then there would be no money left to borrow, and so nobody would get the money they want, contradicting the goal of their action, therefore borrowing money is wrong.

But why should it matter what would happen in such a hypothetical scenario, which is so remote from reality?

But chess is a reasonable analogy. There's nothing in logic that says you have to play chess. — tim wood

I agree.

You do not have to be ethical, but you cannot be unethically ethical. — tim wood

What Kolakowski is doubting is whether or not the way to be ethical is the one suggested by Kant, instead of utilitarianism or some other ethical doctrine.

Of course you can define being ethical as “acting in accordance with the categorical imperative”, and in that trivial sense what you say is obviously correct. The non-trivial question would then be: should we act ethically or should we act as the consequentialists say we should?

“From now on I'm thinking only of me."

Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile: "But, Yossarian, suppose everyone felt that way."

"Then," said Yossarian, "I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn't I?” — T Clark

Nice one.

Kant included three formulations for the categorical imperative:

1 - Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
2 - Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.
3 - Thus the third practical principle follows [from the first two] as the ultimate condition of their harmony with practical reason: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will. — T Clark

It is formulations 1 and 3 that I had in mind, and I think Kolakowski probably had them in mind as well.

I think 2 is different. If, for instance, I decide not to vote, am I “using other people as a means to an end”? I don't think so. I wouldn't mind, in the case of veganism, to include sentient non-human animals as moral agents in 2 to be honest, but that doesn't change the fact that, in a sense, a single person's choice to buy meat probably won't change the future production.

I know Kant also said that the effects of actions are not relevant to virtue, but I think he is mistaken on this point, and this assertion of his also strikes me as quite arbitrary.

I don't either. But whoever said it had to? And certainly, wrt logic, the denial does not itself entail anything. K. has (it seems) provided a specious argument. I wonder why. — tim wood

So either Kant offers no argument for accepting that what the categorical imperative says is true (which he considered to be a synthetic a priori truth), or — as Kolakowski says — Kant's argument may be circular:

K: Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a general law. Or: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law.

A: Why is the right criterion for determining whether an action is or is not good, whether or not it can be generalized without contradiction?

K: Because you'd be inconsistent otherwise (which is circular, since it assumes the validity of the criterion that's in need of justification).

So, why should we believe what Kant says about the way to determine whether an action is good or bad?

Kolakowski has pulled a fast one on us. There are dragons. — Agent Smith

...what?

The Categorical Imperative (CI): Adopt only those maxims that you would will to be a universal law.

You may not like done unto you, what you do to others. It appears Kant's CI is simply a variation on the Golden Rule. So, the question is, what's wrong with the Golden Rule? — Agent Smith

The golden rule doesn't apply to actions like voting (those actions which you don't do to someone) though and sometimes people want to be told a lie rather than the truth, which is not compatible with Kant's criterion, so I don't think you can equate the two.

Kolakowski's argument, if it even is one, would require as a premise a proposition that clearly states the difference between you and others. Everyone is unique of course, but then...everyone else is too :chin: — Agent Smith

Not sure I quite get what you mean by this, but your concern has, I think, already been addressed in the OP:

Those who argue: “the influence of a group of many people cannot be achieved if each person belonging to that group thinks their individual actions change nothing, therefore it's not true that an individual's actions change nothing” could be accused of committing the fallacy of division, trying to infer that because the actions of a group composed of many people has a significant influence in the course of many events, a single person belonging to that group also has a significant influence with their actions. — Amalac

An analogy which illustrates this is given by Russell:
Granted that football could not exist without football-players, it could perfectly well exist without this or that football-player — Amalac

It can be argued that if many people become convinced that what Kolakowski says is true, this would have very bad consequences: no one would vote, making democracy useless. No one would stop purchasing animal products, increasing the amount of suffering of sentient animals, etc.

But that is not — strictly speaking — an objection to Kolakowski's argument, which seems to me to have no logical flaws, it is rather an observation of possible bad consequences of publicly stating and defending the argument, and its possibly convincing many people.

That would no doubt be true if it came from someone who is quite famous and influential. But what about the average person? I honestly doubt they could have much of an influence in other people's decisions with regards voting or meat purchasing, even if they posted their opinions here. I don't know how many people visit this site, but I doubt it's that many, and as I said before many of them won't even bother reading threads about those subjects. Furthermore, one would have to prove that those people who do change their mind about these subjects, wouldn't have changed their mind if they hadn't read person X's post about a certain subject. — Amalac

Only if you ignore/forget that it's an ethics that is under consideration. — tim wood

What I mean is that the factual claim that an individual's action changes nothing, in the cases of such actions as voting or buying meat, is probably correct. If, for instance, you compare a scenario in which you vote, and one in which you don't vote, the outcome will almost certainly be the same.

I don't see why it would have to be logically necessary that the criterion to determine whether an action is or is not good, is whether or not it can be universalized without contradiction.

To the question: What if everyone did the same? One can answer: that hypothetical scenario is irrelevant, in the real world it's almost certain that not everybody will do the same things I do, and most likely won't change their actions or decisions due to finding out about my individual actions or decisions.

Kolakowski's argument as presented seems similar to a claim that an illegal chess move can be somehow a legal chess move. — tim wood

Not sure what you are getting at here. There's, in principle, nothing logically inconsistent about saying: I'll lie whenever I want, but I want others to be honest, or: I''ll never vote but I want others to vote. I know that's the pharisee's attitude ( “do as I say, not as I do”), but I don't see what's contradictory about it, once the criterion of universalization of a maxim/action to determine whether an action is right or wrong, is rejected.

We don't have access to K's understanding of what ethics is. Generally, though, ethics concerns regard for others. Any argument that turns that upside down is no longer within ethics but is something else. — tim wood

I think Kolakowski rejects the idea that the way to determine whether a single individual's action is good or bad, is whether or not it can be generalized/universalized without contradiction. Why should one accept that criterion in the first place instead of, say, a consequentialist criterion?

Could you elaborate on that? — john27

I guess he means that it doesn't make sense to say “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time” if time is unreal.

But those who say time is unreal presumably mean that time is something that's only “real” in our minds, not outside them.

For instance, Kant's view is that a thing in itself causes us to perceive phenomena, and that our cognitive apparatus arranges the matter of sensation in space and time. That does not imply that statements about time, like the one contained in the Law of Contradiction, are meaningless, it only implies that they are statements about phenomena rather than about things in themselves (noumena).

1. if the universe was temporally infinite, then there would be no 1st moment
2. if there was no 1st moment, then there was no 2nd moment
3. if there was no 2nd moment, then there was no 3rd moment
4. ... and so on and so forth ...
5. ... then there would be no now
6. since now exists, we started out wrong, i.e. the universe is not temporally infinite — jorndoe

I think 5 is a non sequitur.

Let’s say we are trying to figure out if time A (the Big Bang, for example) was the first moment or not.

If the universe is temporally infinite towards the past, then time A could not be labeled as the first moment, but there would still be a time A. Likewise, the very next instant (time B) could not be labeled as the second moment, but there would still be a time B.

I think the argument should be rephrased, in order to avoid confusion, as follows:

1.If the universe was temporally infinite towards the past, then no moment of time could be labeled as the first moment of time.

2. If no moment of time could be labeled as the first one, then no moment of time could be labeled as the second one.

3. If no moment of time could be labeled as the second one, then no moment of time could be labeled as the third one.

4. ... and so on and so forth...

5. Therefore, the “now” can’t be labeled as the nth moment of time, no matter what you substitute for n.

Labels in a universe with an infinite past work the other way around: you can only label each moment as last (the “now”), second to last, etc, always in reference to the last moment rather than the first one, since by definition a universe with an infinite past has no first moment.

Or maybe I made a mistake somewhere.

Juck. — Tzeentch

What a persuasive argument, you just don't like what I said there. Maybe you could say why that is? Why you dislike effective altruism, I mean.

So what is one to make of the moral character of folk who hold someone who tortures folk unjustly in the highest esteem?

If you made the acquaintance of someone who thought highly of a person who tortured dogs as a hobby, would you befriend them? Ought you associate with them? — Banno

Let's take as an illustration two notable christian philosophers, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint Augustine:

That the saints may enjoy their beatitude and the grace of God more abundantly they are permitted to see the punishment of the damned in hell. — Aquinas

In that day true and full happiness shall be the lot of none but the good, while deserved and supreme misery shall be the portion of the wicked, and of them only. — Augustine

Is there a way to persuade someone who, like them, sees nothing wrong about eternal damnation? I doubt it, here their faith in God's goodness in the long run despite working in “mysterious ways” seems to be at the core of their belief, combined with how much importance they attach to the sufferings of others. Or else they are wholly indifferent to the suffering of the people they regard as wicked, which is also not something that can be changed by way of arguments.

As for whether I'd associate with Aquinas or Augustine, I think I still would, because it'd be a shame to lose the privilege to get more insight into such interesting subjects as Aquinas' interpretation of the philosophy of Aristotle or into Augustine's theory of time, or their more recent philosophical ideas.

Knowing their views on hell, I'd try to avoid that subject as much as possible, and just leave if they insisted on talking about it.

I don't think one should judge a person based solely on one contemptible view that they have about a certain subject, since they may have other redeemable views or qualities. Augustine, for example, was opposed to judicial torture, which I think is morally quite lofty.

If those beliefs they hold had some important consequences in the sense of making them act in a wicked fashion in their day to day life, then it's probably better not to associate with them, depending on how strong that effect is.

If the person who sees nothing wrong about hell has no redeemable qualities, then I think it's best not to associate with them.

One person chooses to go vegan, another may visit lonely elders in nursing homes, and yet another donates money to the homeless, etc. What makes one better than the other? — Tzeentch

My criteria for measuring moral goodness would be how much that person's actions decrease the total amount of suffering of sentient beings, as well as how much they contribute to increase the total amount of joy, pleasure and peace in the world.

Should people who visit lonely elders in nursing homes go around telling other people that they would live more moral lives if they too visited lonely elders in nursing homes? — Tzeentch

They could suggest it as one way to be a more moral person, sure, but I think one should ask oneself if visiting lonely elders is truly the best thing one can do, in terms of reducing suffering and increasing happiness in the world, with one's available time and resources. That's one of the main ideas behind effective altruism, as is advocated by Peter Singer among other philosophers.

Singer gave an example to illustrate this: with the same amount of money, you can either train a guide dog to give to a blind man, or you can cure between 400 - 2000 people of blindness by donating to the right charities. It's obvious that although the former is a good action, the latter is a far better one, so that it's better to help those charities instead.

In the case of veganism, once I researched into how to have a healthy vegan diet, and as to the cost of maintaining it, I determined that the better course of action in my circumstances would be to stop purchasing animal products. Notice that unlike the case of giving a guide dog to a blind man, there is no opportunity cost problem here, because I only have to abstain from certain actions.

The question I ask myself to determine the most moral choice or course of action I have at my disposal is the following: which of my choices and actions are more likely to lead to a better total balance of positive mental states (pleasure, happiness, joy, peace of mind, ...) and negative mental states (pain, sadness, boredom, despair, ...) in the world?

I agree, but does "mainstream" vegan doctrine? — Cheshire

I'm aware that there are many vegans, in Central and South America for instance, who espouse different, more radical views than mine. Those who, for instance, seem to think eating a burger per month is just as bad as eating a burger per day, or that it's bad even to eat some dead animal struck by lightning you find on the street.

I think those kinds of tenets are absurd and dogmatic, and if I'm not considered a vegan for not adhering to them, then I don't mind giving up that label. The same applies to someone who fancied himself morally superior to others who buy animal products, merely because they don't.